Suchergebnisse

Der Rheinische Kapitalismus, das tradierte Beziehungsgeflecht zwischen Unternehmen, Banken als Kapitalgebern, politischen Entscheidungszentren, den Wirtschaftsverbänden als Kollektivorganisationen der Unternehmen und den Gewerkschaften als Repräsentanten der Arbeitnehmer erodiert. Während Unternehmen in der angelsächsischen Welt private Vereinigungen von Shareholdern sind, werden sie auf dem Kontinent als soziale Institutionen wahrgenommen.Durch den Strukturwandel verlieren großen Unternehmen ihre soziale Einbettung. Sie werden autonomer - gegenüber dem nationalen Regime der industriellen Beziehungen, den Wirtschafts- und Arbeitgeberverbänden und der Politik. Große Unternehmen bleiben zwar Mitglied in den Verbänden, betreiben aber parallel Unternehmensrepräsentanzen in Berlin, Brüssel und anderen politischen Zentren. In Berlin gibt es inzwischen rund 100 Unternehmensrepräsentanzen. Der Begriff für die Neupositionierung der Unternehmen heißt Public Affairs-Management. Public Affairs hat zwei Dimensionen: Lobbying als intimer Diskurs und issue management als allgemeine Form, Themen zu platzieren. Der Beitrag untersucht das Public Affairs-Management der Berliner Unternehmensrepräsentanzen.Für die Gewerkschaften bedeuten diese Trends, dass sie den Unternehmen auf mehreren Ebenen als Kontrahenten und Partner gegenüber stehen. Im alten System des Rheinischen Kapitalismus waren es vor allem die Wirtschafts- und Arbeitgeberverbände, die als Partner für Kollektivlösungen bereit standen. Als politischer Verband treffen die Gewerkschaften in der Arena der Politik auf die Unternehmen, die ein Public Affairs Management ausbilden und parallel zu ihren Verbänden agieren. Die zunehmende Entfremdung zwischen Gewerkschaften und Parteien zwingt die Gewerkschaften dazu, ihre Aktions- und Einflussformen zu überdenken und zu modernisieren.

This report is intended to provide a brief overview of the various potential restrictions upon or regulation of the lobbying activities of non-profit organizations.

Theories of counteractive lobbying assert that interest groups lobby for the purpose of neutralizing the advocacy efforts of their opponents. We examine the applicability of counteractive lobbying to explain interest group amicus curiae participation in the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions on the merits. Testing the counteractive lobbying hypotheses from 1953 to 2001, we provide strong support for the contention that interest groups engage in counteractive lobbying in the nation's highest court. Our findings indicate that, like the elected branches of government, the Supreme Court is properly viewed as a battleground for public policy in which organized interests clash in their attempts to etch their policy preferences into law.

This review identifies empirical facts about lobbying that are generally agreed upon in the literature. It then discusses challenges to empirical research in lobbying and provides examples of empirical methods that can be employed to overcome these challenges-with an emphasis on statistical measurement, identification, and casual inference. The article then discusses the advantages, disadvantages, and effective use of the main types of data available for research in lobbying. It closes with a number of open questions for researchers in the field and avenues for future work to advance empirical research on lobbying. Adapted from the source document.

Research from parliamentary countries suggests that lobbyists tend to focus their attention on public office holders within the executive government more than those within the legislative branch. To date, however, research studying executive-lobbying relations tends to treat "the executive" and "lobbyists" as two homogenous groups. Yet importantly, not all executive personnel and lobbyists are the same. The executive is made-up of popularly elected politicians, partisan advisors and non-partisan bureaucrats, who vary in their skills, motivations, responsibilities and power within government. Differences also exist in the level of expertise and political representativeness between in-house and consultant lobbyists. Using longitudinal data between 2015 and 2022 from Canada's Lobbyist Registry, this article digs deeper into the executive-lobbying nexus by examining the number of contacts consultant and in-house lobbyists have with different executive personnel—ministers, partisan advisors, senior public servants and non-senior public servants. Although the data shows no meaningful variation tied to differences across partisan-political and administrative personnel within the executive, there is substantive variation in lobbying intensity between upper and lower ranked executive personnel; in-house lobbyists lobby senior political and senior administrative personnel twice as much as consultant lobbyists. These findings are consistent with theory on the expertise and representative function some lobbyists possess, more so than theory emphasizing differences between partisan-political and administrative personnel within the executive.

In this article, we examine the regulation of pollution in open economies when the regulator is influenced by special interest groups. In a setting with free trade, we identify conditions under which a country may unilaterally adopt the stricter regulatory standards of its competitors. In our model, two lobby groups - representing industrial and environmental special interests - influence their government's policy decision. Their lobbying efforts not only depend on the domestic policy, but also on environmental regulation abroad. We find that both market structure and the characteristics of the pollutant are crucial determinants of the political equilibrium: given a local pollutant, the probability of convergence of environmental policies is increasing in the stringency of regulation abroad when product supply is relatively inelastic. This effect is reversed in the case of transboundary pollution. We also extend our framework to cases of imperfect competition.

In this chapter, our goal is to discuss whether and how bank lobbying in the United States leads to regulatory capture. First, we provide an overview of the importance of and motivations behind bank lobbying. Second, we examine the impact of lobbying on banking regulation and supervision by reviewing recent empirical evidence. Third, we discuss the effect of the rising influence of the banking industry on the global financial crisis. Finally, we conclude with policy implications.

Lobbyists choose what to lobby for. If they can precommit to certain policy proposals, their choice will have an influence on the behavior of opposing lobbyists. Hence lobbyists have an incentive to moderate their policy proposals in order to reduce the intensity of the lobbying contest. This logic has been explored in a number of recent papers. I reconsider the topic with a perfectly discriminating contest. With endogenous policy proposals, there is a subgame perfect equilibrium where the proposals of the lobbyists coincide and maximize joint welfare; moreover, this equilibrium is the only one that survives repeated elimination of dominated strategies. Hence there is no rent dissipation at all. A politician trying to maximize lobbying expenditures would prefer an imperfectly discriminating contest.

This paper revisits the well‐known fiscal "Decentralization Theorem" by relaxing the role of the assumption that governments are benevolent, while retaining the assumption of policy uniformity. If, instead, decisions are made by majority voting, the theorem fails. Specifically, (i) centralization can welfare‐dominate decentralization even if there are no externalities and regions are heterogeneous and (ii) decentralization can welfare‐dominate centralization even if there are positive externalities and regions are homogeneous. Similar results are obtained if a benevolent government is subject to lobbying. Hence, the Decentralization Theorem is not robust to relatively minor deviations away from the benchmark of a purely benevolent government.