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Definitions for the Law of the Sea elucidates undefined terms and phrases used in The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) itself, as well as terms used in its analysis. Based on nearly a decade of work by the American Branch of the International Law Association's Law of the Sea Committee, the volume provides clear definitions based on usage in the Convention, rather than geographical or geological concepts

AbstractWe analyze two donors providing long‐ and short‐run aid to one receiving (poor) country, and who may give aid in coordinated or non‐coordinated fashion. An elite controls receiver policy, and diverts resources away from a poor target group. When strategic moves are simultaneous, there is excessive wasteful short‐run aid diversion, which could be made worse by donor cooperation. When donors move first, aid is lower, donor utility is higher, and donors should always cooperate. Investments, by the receiving country and due to long‐term aid, is greater and the solution more efficient when investments are complements than when they are substitutes. The model characterizes donors that may be considered as "gullible", or as "skeptical". The former type gives generously but its aid is largely wasted; the latter gives less aid, but also wastes less. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Does the introduction of UN forces impact terrorism? We argue that at least initially, UN peacekeeping missions may significantly shift the local conflict bargaining process, creating incentives for terrorist and insurgent groups to increase their attacks against civilians. UN missions create a symbolic endpoint to initial negotiations, alter the balance of power between combatants, and may change the relationship between local combatants and the civilian population they rely on for support. We test this argument using monthly data from 12 African countries, analyzing the risk of terrorism at the local level. We find that the introduction of UN forces in an area significantly increases the short-term risk of terrorism, but longer missions in the country reduce this risk.

Signed (p. 34 and 49): George L. Hatheway, Benj. R. Stevenson, Wm. Wedderburn. ; Dated (p. 49): "Fredericton, New Brunswick, October, 1871." ; Cover title. ; Electronic reproduction. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; 44

AbstractAs members of democratic institutions, state legislators must frequently collaborate with each other to achieve their varied goals. Given the increased attention to questions of polarization and gridlock, scholars should be particularly interested in understanding legislator decisions to collaborate across party lines. This article is primarily concerned with how institutional arrangements—specifically term limits—structure legislators' decisions to cosponsor bills with partisan opponents. Using data on bill cosponsorship from 41 states (82 chambers), we demonstrate that term limits reduce bipartisan cosponsorship even when controlling for average legislative tenure. We argue that term limits accomplish this by altering the incentives that legislators face. In addition, we demonstrate that the effect of term limits depends on the level of legislative professionalization. When professionalization is high, the negative effect of term limits on bipartisan cosponsorship is particularly pronounced.