Suchergebnisse

The idea of democratic rule requires that democratically elected civilian government should have effective authority over the army. The role of national army is purely for defence. Army's direct involvement in politics will undermine its capability to cope with external threats. Indonesia is an example where the army was deeply involved in the country's political affairs. This article shows that Indonesian national army has already possessed political orientation since the beginning of Indonesia's independence. Military and political functions performed by the Indonesian army during revolutionary war has been influential factor in shaping army's doctrine and self-perception of his role as not only the guardian of the state but also political force of the country. The weakness of civilian institutions, elite conflicts and national culture especially Javanese tradition has contributted as well to this situation. The role of Indonesian army in politics has gradually decreased since the reform of Indonesia's political system initiated in 1998.

The article argues that the security forces represent a fundamental building block of fragile authoritarian regimes, they exploit the lack and fill the void of core functions of weak states rather than just representing a "state within a state". In the absence of functioning institutional delineations of competencies and of checks and balances, the security forces assume tasks, functions and roles far beyond their organizational mandate. The security sector contributes to sustaining state fragility, leading to a fundamental crisis of statehood. The article presents findings of a project on the stabilizing and de-stabilizing roles of security forces in Central Asia. (S+F/Pll)

This study examines how defense institutions and personnel are formally organized in Latin America. In a region long plagued by praetorian armies, it is especially important that organizational designs ensure that civilians maintain institutional control over armed forces. For this to occur, it is argued that those designs must incorporate certain principles: (a) enhance the civilian presence in key defense institutions, (b) empower defense ministries, (c) lower the military's vertical authority along the chain of command, and (d) unify civilian power while dividing military power. Based on an examination of legal documents and other data for sixteen Latin American democracies, findings show three general organizational patterns: an ideal—typical defense structure that achieves all four objectives, a second best defense structure that still leaves too much military power unified, and a dual command structure that is least desirable for weakening the defense ministry while coalescing military might high up the ladder of influence.