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Election is a democratic party that guarantees freedom, justice and equality for individuals in determining leaders in the executive and legislative fields. In every stage of the election process, there must be opportunities for problems, errors and violations such as violence, buying and selling of votes, and manipulation. It is undeniable that violations that include manipulation of election regulations, voter choice and electoral administration in the implementation of the recapitulation of the results of the vote count at the district level, still color the implementation of elections. The purpose of this study is to find out, analyze and describe the forms and factors that influence electoral malpractice in the recapitulation of the results of the calculation of the votes acquired by the candidates for members of the Waropen Regency DPRD at the district level in the 2019 Election. The research method uses a qualitative descriptive approach. Collecting data using in-depth interview techniques and active observation. Research informants are Election Organizers and Secretariats and Election Contestants. Data analysis techniques through the stages of preparation, codification, topic description, and data presentation. The results of the study indicate that there were electoral malpractice actions that occurred before and during the recapitulation of the results of the counting of district-level votes in the Election for Candidates for Members of the Waropen Regency DPRD in 2019 in the form of manipulation of voter choices and manipulation of electoral administration. Factors that influence the occurrence of electoral malpractice are the negligence of the election organizers and the existence of vote buying by election participants (candidates) against the election organizers

Why do people vote in autocratic elections? Until now, most answers to this question have argued that people vote because they expect a material reward, such as patronage or a direct transfer via vote-buying, or as a way of rewarding the regime for its economic performance. I argue that citizens also vote for different non-economic, expressive reasons, such as a sense of civic duty or a desire to improve the democratic process. I present data from an original quasi-national public-opinion survey conducted in Cameroon, which shows that expressive reasons for voting can explain more variation in voting behavior than economic reasons. These different motivations challenge the implications of existing models of democratization by explaining how some of the poorest electoral autocracies have withstood decades of economic stagnation.

AbstractEco‐certifications offer consumers the opportunity to vote with their money for more sustainable methods of production. While consumer‐facing eco‐labels are mostly recognized and consumed in western countries little is known about their performance in expat societies. This study applies world society theory to a sample of Arab, Western, and South Asian United Arab Emirates (UAE) residents to test whether globalization causes assimilation of familiarity, attitudes, and buying frequencies for major eco‐labels. The results show that respondents with Western ethnicities are more familiar with eco‐certifications. However, Arab, and South‐Asian citizens report similar or higher levels of importance for the purported benefits of eco‐certifications. Among respondents familiar with eco‐certification, we found no differences in buying frequency by ethnic group. Findings related to ethnicity support world society theory because social, environmental, and quality ideals converge among different ethnic groups in the UAE.

In the US Senate, roll calls are held in alphabetical order. We document that senators early in the order are less likely to vote with the majority of their own party than those whose last name places them at the end of the alphabet. To speak to the mechanism behind this result, we develop a simple model of sequential voting, in which forward-looking senators rely on backward induction in order to free ride on their colleagues. Estimating our model structurally, we find that this form of strategic behavior is an important part of equilibrium play. We also consider, but ultimately dismiss, alternative explanations related to learning about common values and vote buying. (JEL D72, D82, D83)

Politik uang dalam perhelatan pemilu legislatif tahun 2019 di Kabupaten Tasikmalaya adalah keniscayaan yang sulit dihindarkan. Jauh sebelum pemilu berlangsung, Bawaslu merilis Indeks Kerawanan Pemilu (IKP) 2019 sebagai upaya preventif terjadinya pelanggaran dalam pemilu. Berdasarkan hasil IKP 2019 Kabupaten Tasikmalaya memiliki tingkat kerawanan tinggi menempati urutan pertama dalam subdimensi kampanye dengan skor 77,08, dimana politik uang termasuk bagian di dalamnya. Pasca pemilu berlangsung, laporan pelanggaran banyak diterima Bawasalu, lima diantaranya menyangkut pelanggaran politik uang dan hanya ada satu kasus yang terbukti memenuhi syarat formil dan materil sehingga bisa sampai pada putusan pengadilan.Maksud dari penelitian ini mencoba untuk mengungkap bagaimana bentuk dan jaringan patron-klien politik uang yang terjadi pada pemilu legislatif tahun 2019 di Kabupaten Tasikmalaya. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode deskriptif kualitatif, dengan teknik pengumpulan data dengan wawancara, dokumentasi dan studi literatur. Hasil penilitian mengungkapkan bahwasannya praktik politik uang dalam pemilu legislatif tahun 2019 di Kabupaten Tasikmalaya banyak terjadi, hanya saja ada yang dilaporkan secara resmi ke Bawaslu dan ada yang dibiarkan begitu saja tidak dilaporkan. Ada enam jenis politik uang yang ditemukan, diantaranya: Vote buying, Individual gifts, Vote Tradding, Club goods, Services and activities dan Pork Barrel Project. Dari keenam jenis politik uang tersebut, kasus yang paling dominan ditemukan adalah vote buying sebanyak lima laporan yang resmi diterima Bawaslu, dengan pola penyebaran praktiknya melibatkan tim sukses yang didominasi oleh jaringan keluarga dan jaringan sosial. Strategi politik uang juga berpengaruh signifikan terhadap meningkatnya partisipasi pemilih di Kabupaten Tasikmalaya. pada pemilu 2014 partisipasi pemilih di Kabupaten Tasikmalaya mencapai angka 65 persen dan terjadi kenaikan partisipasi pemilih pada pemilu serentak tahun 2019 menjadi 71 persen.

What are the effects of natural disasters on electoral results? Some authors claim that catastrophes have a negative effect on the survival of leaders in a democracy because voters have a propensity to punish politicians for not preventing or poorly handling a crisis. In contrast, this paper finds that these events might be beneficial for leaders. Disasters are linked to leader survival through clientelism: they generate an in-flow of resources in the form of aid, which increase money for buying votes. Analyzing the rainy season of 2010-2011 in Colombia, considered its worst disaster in history, I use a difference-in-differences strategy to show that in the local election incumbent parties benefited from the disaster. The result is robust to different specifications and alternative explanations. Moreover, places receiving more aid and those with judicial evidence of vote-buying irregularities, are more likely to reelect the incumbent, supporting the mechanism proposed by this paper.

Nigeria's electoral system has been fraught with several challenges from the time of changing from manual accreditation/voting to electronic voters' accreditation/voting since March2015. Prior to 2015, Nigeria has tried several voters' registration and voting system, not limited to the manual open-ballot option-A4 brought about by the then General Ibrahim Babangida Administration in 1990s or the secret ballot voting system introduced later by successive electoral commissions. Despite transiting from manual-based voters accreditation to electronic-based voters accreditation via the use of smart card reader (SCR) and Permanent Voter Card (PVC) in 2015 general elections introduced by then INEC Chairman Prof. Attahiri Jega, there are still issues relating to rigging, malfunctioning of the smart card readers, electoral violence, snatching of ballot papers, vote buying, falsification of poll results, disenfranchisement of eligible registered voters and so on. All these anomalies still cast aspersion on the integrity of elections conducted by INEC – the Nigeria's electoral umpire. This paper attempts to identify the problems associated with the Nigeria's current electronic accreditation using biometric smart card readers (SCRs) and Permanent voters' cards (PVCs) and subsequent manual(offline) voting. This paper introduced automated online/web-based voting system integrated with biometric authentication system to identify or accredit genuine registered voters. This new innovation will enable eligible voters to vote from anywhere irrespective of the electoral ward or polling unit they registered in. This new voting system will save cost, reduces ballot box snatching, vote buying and mass thumb printing; it will discourage bribery, corruption and electoral fraud amongst others. This innovation will give more chance for all registered voters to vote from any location using computers or devices connected to the internet. This can make the result of voting from several polling units to be collated simultaneously and in ...

Among topics discussed: Early background; voter registration; Ruby Hurley; NAACP voting drives; attempts to have blacks named to county school board; Ronnie Walker; U.S. Department of Justice and rezoning voting districts; changing board member replacement laws; pressure on Dollar as a school teacher‑activist; lack of control over the school board and local press; vote buying; election mismanagement; registration locations; ward elections and the city council; U.S. census; fighting against the one man county commission; black and white voting patterns; NAACP political forums; voting in Lumber City; white control over employment and its effect on voting patterns; improvements in black political status. ; Beulah Clark Dollar was an NAACP leader from Telfair County. The interview was conducted at the annual state NAACP convention, Brunswick, Ga., October 13‑14, 1989.

Can there be democracy in America at work? The historical division between democracy in politics and hierarchy in the economy is under strain. Hierarchical interests in the economy are shifting their model of power into politics, and yet a commitment to revive the law is resurgent. Central examples are the proposed Accountable Capitalism Act, Reward Work Act, Workplace Democracy Acts, and Employees' Pension Security Acts. They would create a right for employees to elect 40% of directors on $1 billion company boards, a right for employees to elect one-third of directors on other listed company boards, and require one-half employee representation on single-employer pension plans. All challenge long held myths: that labor's involvement in corporate governance is foreign to American tradition, that when codified in law labor voice is economically inefficient, that the legitimate way to have voice in the economy is by buying stocks, or that labor voice faces insurmountable legal obstacles. This article shows these myths are mistaken by exploring the history and evidence from 1861. The United States has one of the world's strongest traditions of democracy at work. Economic democracy has not been more widespread primarily because it was suppressed by law. Americans favor voice at work, while asset managers who monopolize shareholder votes with 'other people's money' enjoy no legitimacy at all. The article concludes that, even without federal government, and by recreating themselves as laboratories of democracy and enterprise, states can adapt the current proposals and rebuild a living law.

What is the relationship between ballot reforms and electoral malpractice? This article contributes to the growing comparative politics literature on the causes of election fraud in democratizing countries using the case of the 19th-century United States. We examine the adoption of the Australian ballot and disenfranchisement laws, and estimate their effects on multiple types of election fraud. Using a new measure of fraud in elections to the House of Representatives from 1860 to 1930, we find that the Australian ballot and disenfranchisement measures reduced vote-buying and voter intimidation. However, we further find that the Australian ballot had an "iatrogenic effect" of increasing registration and ballot fraud. Voting secrecy therefore led to substitution of one illicit electoral tactic for another.

This article examines the relationship between territorial representation and fiscal redistribution in the European Union. Given that small states are vastly overrepresented in both the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, models of legislative vote-buying predict that overrepresented member states will be systematically favored in the distribution of EU fiscal transfers. Empirical analysis of each manifestation of the EC or EU from 1977 to 1999 reveals a strong linear relationship between votes and transfers per capita during each period. This is true for both agricultural and regional development transfers as well as total net transfers. The paper concludes by reflecting on the importance of the connection between representation and redistribution as the European Union prepares to enlarge.

We present a model of influence over collective decisions made through voting. We show how an outside party offering incentives to a committee can manipulate the committee's decisions at no cost and induce inefficient outcomes. A key condition is that the outsider be able to reward decisive votes differently. Inefficiency results from voting externalities. We relax all initial assumptions to investigate how to insulate committees. We study different information settings, credibility assumptions, payoff structures (voters caring about the collective decision and about their own votes), and incentive schemes (offers contingent on pivotal votes, individual votes, vote shares, and the collective decision). We analyze when voting should be made secret; we elucidate the role of individual accountability and various political institutions in preventing vote buying. We discuss implications for lobbying, for clientelism, for decisions in legislatures, boards, and central banks, and for the efficiency of democracy. Adapted from the source document.

In the first chapter (« Optimal Vote Buying » coauthored with Leon Musolff, Princeton University), we analyze a vote buying problem. We show that bribing a supermajority can be cheaper due to pivotal considerations. When a large number of committee members receive a bribe, they do not expect to be pivotal in the election. As a result, it is sufficient to offer them a small amount of money in exchange for their vote. Due to this mechanism, it turns out that the vote buyer generally prefers to bribe a supermajority. In the second chapter (« Voting and contributing when the group is watching » coauthored with Emeric Henry, Sciences Po) we study the interaction between the way members vote on rules and their subsequent behaviors. This analysis applies to groups who choose their own rules and who care about their image. We study how players' considerations depend on the visibility of the process. We show that multiple norms can emerge. We discuss the problem of a social planner and the implications for welfare. The last chapter (« Military service and political participation » coauthored with Etienne Fize) investigates the impact of the French military service on political behaviors. Exploiting the suspension of mandatory conscription for French men, we find a significant and positive impact of military service on turnout. This effect ranges from 3.6 percentage points for the first round of the presidential election of 2012 to 8.9 percentage points for the second round of the legislative elections. We also investigate the impact of conscription on political preferences and we find that former conscripts are significantly more nationalist and conservative. ; Le premier chapitre de cette thèse, intitulé « Optimal Vote Buying » (co-écrit avec Leon Musolff, Princeton University) s'intéresse à la corruption de comités. Il s'agit d'une contribution théorique dans laquelle nous montrons qu'il est généralement peu onéreux de corrompre une large majorité de membres du comité. En effet, lorsque le comité est largement corrompu, les membres considèrent que l'option soutenue par celui qui corrompt le comité sera probablement plébiscitée. Aucun vote ne peut alors faire basculer l'élection et les membres du comité sont prêts à accepter un pot-de-vin modeste en échange de leur vote. Dans le deuxième chapitre (co-écrit avec Emeric Henry, Sciences Po) nous étudions les interactions entre le vote et les normes sociales. Nous analysons un modèle dans lequel un groupe choisit sa propre règle. Dans une première étape, chaque membre vote pour ou contre une règle. Une fois le règlement établi, les membres du groupes choisissent une action dont les conséquences dépendent de la règle choisie. Nous étudions comment le vote et le comportement ultérieur interagissent. Enfin, le dernier chapitre (co-écrit avec Etienne Fize) traite de l'impact du service militaire obligatoire en France sur les comportements politiques. Nous trouvons d'une part que les individus ayant fait leur service militaire sont plus enclins à voter. Pour les élections de 2012, nous estimons que l'effet est de l'ordre de 4 points de pourcentage pour les élections présidentielles et atteint les 9 points pour le second tour des élections législatives. Nous étudions également les conséquences sur les préférences politiques. Nous trouvons que les anciens conscrits sont plus à droite.