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THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER IS TO ASSESS THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE PROMISE OF FOREIGN POLICY INNOVATION IN THE AREA OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION UNDER THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN MATCHED BY PERFORMANCE. THE AUTHORS COMPARE THE FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR OF THE U.S. TOWARD THE U.N. UNDER CARTER WITH THAT DURING THE NIXON-FORD ADMINISTRATIONS.

The EU seeks extensive partnership with other international organizations when it comes to security challenges. This is puzzling as the EU relies for its resources mostly on its member states. The relations between the EU and other international organizations have thoroughly been studied, yet scholars rarely question the actual rationale for partnership. We start from resource dependency theory which explains that almost all organizations are dependent on the resources of their partners. Yet we extend this theory by distinguishing between macro, meso and micro-level dependencies. To illustrate resource dependencies between the EU and other international organizations, we analyse EU's peacebuilding policies in Kosovo, Mali and Armenia. By accounting for macro- and micro-level dependencies we provide a more holistic perspective than conventional meso-level explanations. Our contribution is therefore to expand the scope of the resource dependency theory and provide a framework to analyse dependencies between the EU and other international organizations.

There are important connections between the ideals embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution and policies that the United States pursues in the United Nations and other international institutions. The concepts inherent in the American Revolution, the doctrine that government should rest on the consent of the governed, and the doctrine of limited government, could have provided a basis for American involvement in international politics or for American isolation. During the nineteenth century, the latter was followed, except that the United States ex panded its commercial relations with other countries as had been implied in the Constitution. By proposing the League of Nations, Woodrow Wilson attempted to establish an institu tional framework within which American participation in international politics would be consistent with American ideals. A similar effort was made during World War II. The United States was crucial in structuring the world order that emerged. Achievement of American ideals in this world order has proved to be a complex and demanding task: early euphoria yielded to disillusionment. The U.S. now appears to have a more mature understanding of its shortcomings and the importance of other countries' ideals. It has evidenced a willingness to engage in international institutions to attain American ideals in the same way as within domestic institutions.

As the pressure to invite international election monitors rose at the end of the Cold War, states refused to grant the United Nations a dominant role. Thus, today multiple intergovernmental, regional, and international non-governmental organizations often monitor the same elections with equal authority. This article examines the costs and benefits of this complex regime to highlight some possible broader implications of regime complexity. It argues that the availability of many different organizations facilitates action that might otherwise have been blocked for political reasons. Furthermore, when different international election monitoring agencies agree, their consensus can bolster their individual legitimacy as well as the legitimacy of the international norms they stress, and thus magnify their influence on domestic politics. Unfortunately the election monitoring example also suggests that complex regimes can engender damaging inter-organizational politics and that the different biases, capabilities, and standards of organizations sometime can lead organizations to outright contradict each other or work at cross-purposes.

In 1919 a pioneering generation of scholars, social policy experts, and politicians designed an unprecedented international organizational framework for labour politics. The majority of the founding fathers of this new institution, the International Labour Organization (ILO), had made great strides in social thought and action before 1919. The core members all knew one another from earlier private professional and ideological networks, where they exchanged knowledge, experiences, and ideas on social policy. In this study, one key question is the extent to which prewar "epistemic communities", such as the International Association for Labour Legislation (IALL), and political networks, such as the Second International, were a decisive factor in the institutionalization of international labour politics. In the postwar euphoria, the idea of a "makeable society" was an important catalyst behind the social engineering of the ILO architects. As a new discipline, international labour law became a useful instrument for putting social reforms into practice. This article also deals with how the utopian idea(l)s of the founding fathers – social justice and the right to decent work – were changed by diplomatic and political compromises made at the Paris Peace Conference. The article thus reflects the dual relationship between idealism and pragmatism.

We show how major shareholders can exploit their power over international organizations to hide their foreign-policy interventions from domestic audiences. We argue that major powers exert influence bilaterally when domestic audiences view the intervention favorably. When domestic audiences are more skeptical of a target country, favors are granted via international organizations. We test this theory empirically by examining how the United States uses bilateral aid and IMF loans to buy other countries' votes in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Introducing new data on voting behavior in the UNSC over the 1960-2015 period, our results show that states allied with the US receive more bilateral aid when voting in line with the United States in the UNSC, while concurring votes of states less allied with the US are rewarded with loans from the IMF. Temporary UNSC members that vote against the United States do not receive such perks.