World sometimes is really strange! And Italy it's a typical country of the world, full of contradictions, in many fields. You can think easily to some of them: Italy is one of the countries with a larger number of Unesco heritage sites but Italian people always prefers to go abroad to spend their holidays instead then discover their country. Another one? The national consciousness it's absolutely no part of Italian way of life, at least if you make a comparison with other countries, like USA, Switzerland, Germany, in which the flag honours, the spirit to be part of a global one country (with a precise identity) is an integrant part of each individual mind. In Italy people recognize them like Italian only when the national football team plays the World Championship!Would you like to have another example of Italian citizens contradictions? Very easy… Please, ask to an Italian guy "Do you vote for Berlusconi?" The common answer is "Absolutely not". And you can believe to students or young people that historically are more on left side in politics. You can believe to working people, to blue collars that generally forecast their rights more protected by a left government. You can believe to old people that remember with no happiness Fascism period.But all, really all people, white collar, managers, shopkeeper, trader, housewives, will tell you "I do not vote for Berlusca" [Berlusca is the nickname of Silvio Berlusconi, done simply imitating the dialect of Milan, region in which the new Italian Prime Minister is born].And yet? Berlusconi, the magnate of media, has won for the third times in 14 years the national elections! And this time has been a real triumph like percentage, moreover considering that the coalition of Silvio this time had lost the party of Casini, the real center, so Silvio has won only with his party and with Lega Nord (Northern League, a former sort of separatism movement transformed in federalism movement). Unbelievable… or not?We can analyze the vote and thinking about:1) Italy from 2001 to 2006 has had the second Berlusconi government and began a period of big economic crisis, especially due to Euro money introduction. On top on this it's however necessary a consideration: many European countries have introduced Euro, but not all suffered that internal prices increasing, especially because many of them put some ad hoc measures, not done in Italy. 2) Nevertheless the Italian people dissatisfaction, in 2006 Romano Prodi won the elections (with his center-left coalition) for really few few votes. And, truth to tell, no one has never discovered if Prodi really won. In fact there has been many claims about votes calculation never definitively resolved.3) The period 2006-2008 has been a real disaster for Italian economy and all social classes have been very frustrated, also for some government decisions absolutely not aligned with a center-left coalition (taxes increasing for all social classes…), only in part due to a real necessity to improve the Italian government economy and sometimes taken only for non sense.4) After Prodi government debacle, Prodi declared to exit from the political scene and, behind him, the left and center-left begun some insider fighting that caused the birth of a great center-left party (that of Veltroni) and three minor left party. Veltroni got the direct support only of Di Pietro movement (Di Pietro was the magistrate that killed the first Italian republic in '94 discovering a big business and politics corruption).5) On the center-right and right side, Berlusconi and Fini (right) joined in a new movement and Lega Nord associated with them. The extreme right instead practically disappeared and Casini decided to remain alone.And so? It was easy to think that Italian people, burned by the last 2 years government, would have given confidence to center-right coalition, captained by Berlusconi.But in which way to not think to scandals of some Berlusconi guys in the past, of some promises never maintained, to some clowning impression in international meetings? The point is that there wasn't neither isn't a real alternative to Berlusconi or Verltroni!So we (Italian citizen) can only hope that Berlusconi could apply his perspicacity and intuition (that provide him to be a real best in class in business) in choosing the right men (Ministers) to guarantee a solid future to Italy. The secret is no Berlusconi, but his men and the freedom that they will have to act for the wellness of the country.The possibilities to improve the actual state of the economy, decrease percentage of unemployment, let people more satisfied are big, but the problems are also many! First of all infrastructures (a disaster now: road, high speed train, link to Sicily…), the Alitalia (the national airline, to be sold urgently), the criminality and the illegal immigration, the public health, the school system, the taxes too high… A solution?Try to have like model the Spain (that in 15 years has really had tangible progress) associated with the Italian imagination, like i.e. to promote a real tax federal system (like promised by Lega Nord to people) and to help South of Italy not with money but with projects that permit a real development, but also (if no one reach the goal) to delete any incentive to southern Italy and especially to government people.That's to say to consider politic goals like common management tasks, and politician salary like managers salary, with a relevant percentage depending from reaching or not business objectives… A dream? May be… but Berlusconi is considered a manager and like a magician in many fields… Corresponsal en TorinoItalia
En la enorme mayoría de los países con sistemas democráticos y liberales (independientemente de que sean republicanos o no), el acto eleccionario por medio del cual se eligen aquellos que integrarán diversas instancias de gobierno, constituye un momento privilegiado de la vida política.En el caso de Italia, eso sigue siendo así. Sin embargo, una buena parte de los observadores internacionales se preguntan cómo es posible que la ciudadanía italiana siga participando electoralmente, una y otra vez, y a veces hasta con cierto entusiasmo, cuando desde el fin de la Segunda Guerra mundial se han sucedido 62 gobiernos en 57 años. Es decir, en ese período, Italia ha elegido más de un gobierno por año.Marc Lazar, Profesor de la "Libera Universitá Internazionale degli Studi Sociali Guido Carli" de Roma y de "Sciences Po" de Paris publicó hace ya dos años un libro cuyo título era por demás explícito: "Italia a la deriva". En él se enumeran alguno de los múltiples problemas que la aquejan históricamente: el atraso del "mezzogiorno", la persistencia de la influencia de la Mafia, una ley electoral barroca que complica la formación de mayorías parlamentarias estables, la ineficiencia crónica de los servicios públicos y, en especial, el atraso significativo que la enseñanza superior y la investigación científica han ido acumulando en estas últimas décadas.Pero, aunque la enorme mayoría de los 47 millones de electores tienen fuertes dudas de que estos problemas se arreglen mediante esta elección, lo cierto es que el domingo y lunes pasados, los italianos eligieron una composición política del Parlamento y del Senado que permite asegurar que el conservador Silvio Berlusconi será designado Primer Ministro. Esta reaparición de Berlusconi ocurre luego de una breve experiencia de centro izquierda de Romano Prodi que no llegó a cumplir dos años de duración. El triunfo de Berlusconi fue contundente: con el 46.5% en la Cámara de Diputados obtiene una sólida mayoría que, además, seguramente reconfirmará en el Senado una vez que el conteo final de votos del extranjero esté concluido. Las bases parlamentarias de su gobierno parecen aseguradas.Sin embargo, el retorno de Berlusconi difícilmente puede ser considerado como una promesa de grandes novedades. En realidad, si algo había mostrado tendencia a cambiar, era su contrincante de centro izquierda, Walter Veltroni. Éste, sacando las conclusiones del fracaso de Prodi, creó un nuevo Partido Demócrata que dejó de lado la multitud de pequeños partidos de izquierda y extrema izquierda que habían envenenado la gestión del gobierno anterior. Veltroni, exitoso alcalde de Roma, con un perfil moderado, conciliador y "buonista", cultivó durante toda la campaña un discurso que oscilaba entre el de Tony Blair y el de Barack Obama y declaró querer "…un partido demócrata a la italiana pero estilo americano…". Aunque derrotado en las elecciones, al menos logró parte de su objetivo: "Nos hemos presentado sin alianzas, corriendo un riesgo, para hacer un favor a la democracia", declaró Veltroni y, en efecto, eliminando el modelo de coalición aisló a pequeños partidos como el Comunista, el Socialista, los Verdes o Refundación Comunista que, al no obtener al menos 4% de representación en el Parlamento y al menos 8% en el Senado, estarán por primera vez en muchos años fuera del Legislativo.El ganador, en cambio, poco de nuevo parece tener que ofrecer si no es un discurso menos estridente y lo que parece ser una genuina preocupación por los tres grandes problemas que tendrá que enfrentar. En primer lugar hay en curso una crisis financiera internacional que, dada su persistencia y probable profundidad, golpeará a una economía italiana en una situación interna muy precaria. La baja productividad de grandes sectores de la economía y la fortaleza del euro frenan el crecimiento, y plantean serios problemas salariales a los jóvenes, a grandes sectores de trabajadores poco calificados y a jubilados y pensionistas. Pero quizás el tercer problema sea el más difícil de superar: Berlusconi, con su estilo carismático, imprevisible e incluso provocador fue instaurando, desde su primer gobierno en 1994, un clima de tensión y polarización política que ya Italia no parece estar dispuesta a admitir. Quizás por eso el Berlusconi de esta elección haya sido un candidato bastante más sobrio, discreto y respetuoso que el que fuese en sus anteriores campañas y períodos de gobierno.En cualquier caso, frente a los problemas financieros y económicos acuciantes, el Berlusconi que, presentándose como un campeón del liberalismo, en realidad en sus anteriores gobiernos llevó a cabo un "liberalismo colbertista", ya no podrá librarse a ese juego de espejos. El urgente relanzamiento de la economía requiere medidas de ajuste y un rigor presupuestal que no admite medias tintas. Y, en esas condiciones, la pregunta de rigor es la de saber si, desde el punto de vista político, este nuevo gobierno Berlusconi no reencontrará los mismos obstáculos con los que tropezó el anterior gobierno de centro-izquierda. ¿Hasta dónde el nuevo partido de Berlusconi, el "Pueblo de la Libertad", será capaz de disciplinar a fuerzas como la "Liga del Norte" (que dobló su representación parlamentaria) o la derechista "Alianza Nacional" que, en gran medida, están en la base de su triunfo?De replantearse, ahora en el campo conservador, el escenario que derrotó a Prodi, el nuevo gobierno tendrá, probablemente, la vida breve. *Catedrático de Ciencia PolíticaDepto de Estudios Internacionales.FACS – ORT - Uruguay
The rehabilitation of urban environments by giving old buildings new functions is an old practice, but policies meant for encouraging rehabilitation trace their American origins back to the 1960s with the growing criticism of urban renewal plans and the rise of historic preservation values. In the U.S., historic rehabilitation has proven to be a way of revitalizing cities which have faced deindustrialization, disinvestment and shrinking tax revenues. Built heritage is especially vulnerable in these places because of the willingness of city governors to attract investment and development at any costs. This willingness of local authorities to let developers run amock in their cities might prove to be a bad strategy in the long run, even though it can bring capital back into the city fairly quick. In a climate of toughening regional and global competition over tourism and the location of business headquarters, the images and cultures of cities have gained an increasing importance. Careful and well planned redevelopment of the built environment has an crucial role to play in the re-imaging of industrial cities. Not including the new jobs and other direct economic benefits of rehabilitation, historic structures carry a large part of a city's character and identity, ingredients desperately sought after when cities need to get an edge and show why they are worth visiting or relocating to. This paper has argued that successful rehabilitation not only makes use of the historic built environment, but also that it has the potential of renegotiating and redefining the history of a city (or at least parts of it). In this way rehabilitation can prove to have great public benefits in making new spaces available for public access and civic intercourse. City governors should not just look at quick economic benefits. A city where the urban fabric has been destroyed through profit-oriented and shortsighted development runs the risk of having gone into a dead end. A more prosperous future for the population, not just the developers, might instead be found in democratically planned and financially scaled down solutions in which the built environment is systematically reused. American developers and cities have proven to be successful in making rehabilitation financially successful for the property owner. Considerably less interest have been shown for the public benefits of these projects, often making them into isolated enclaves lacking legitimacy among the public and causing conflicts within the neighborhood. Developers are repeatedly accused of gentrification, displacement and for ignoring the public need for affordable housing. Despite the unclear public benefits these projects are often heavily subsidized on federal, state as well as city level. After having dealt with the growing general importance of cultural policies for cities, U.S. policies on historic rehabilitation are discussed and two large redevelopment projects in Baltimore and Durham presented. After that a Swedish case of inner city redevelopment through rehabilitation is presented, showing a contrast in both national policy and local practice. Swedish redevelopment has not been subsidized in the same generous manner as in many states of the U.S., and it has been more integrated into urban planning. In the Swedish case the city governors were not interested in preserving the built environment, but due to disinvestment new construction did not occur. In the 1970s, there was a consensus between leading politicians and local developers that preservation values would not be allowed to stand in the way of development. Until the early 1980s there was also a lack of local public support for preserving industrial buildings, as in many deindustrialized cities where industry has come to symbolize unemployment and stigmatization. The unique environment of the Industrial Landscape was finally preserved not through the actions of local government, but of architectural historians and curators representing government authority. Development of the historic district needed close monitoring at a national level since the developer had a very strong influence on local politics. In Swedish preservation policies local authorities have the possibility to landmark and protect environments much in the same way as in many U.S. cities with preservation commissions. If an urban plan seems to interfer with preservation goals, however, national authorities have the possibility of intervening in a similar way to that of state preservation offices in the U.S. In the 1990s development within the Industrial Landscape went into a more mature and democratically influenced phase in which goals of public access and attractiveness became increasingly important. The lesson from Sweden shows that redevelopment through rehabilitation can be affordable and that it does not need a whole lot of public subsidy. It also shows that the historical and aesthetic values need to be stressed in order for the development project to win the public support that is needed in a democratically lead community. The political leadership in this city, paralyzed by economic crisis, was heavily influnced by the developer, who was a large property owner in the city. But through monitoring, academic research and participation in public debate by preservation professionals, the table was turned and the preservation of the Industrial Landscape gained more and more support from the city in the 1980s. Instead of giving subsidies to the developer, the government located a national museum of labor to the district at a time in which economic support was badly needed. This showed that successful rehabilitation was possible here and that it would have considerable public benefits. Finally, it is also argued that the historical experiences of the national preservation movements have influenced the way rehabilitation is carried out. In Sweden, historic preservation has largely been a task for national government, whereas in the U.S. it has to a large extent been organized through national and local non-profit organizations buying up properties and lobbying for preservation causes. In this way historic preservation has been more integrated in Swedish urban politics, whereas in the U.S. preservationists have been identified as just one interest among others.
Социальные трансформации последних 12-15 лет в России привели к заметным изменениям социальной структуры общества, росту социального неравенства. Хотя первоосновой этого неравенства оставались отношения типа «власть-собственность», отношения между поколениями, неравенство разных возрастных групп в пространстве новых социально-экономических возможностей и перспектив также давно обратили на себя внимание. Однако это внимание в основном СМИ, которые предлагают, естественно, политизированный и популистский «угол зрения» на социальные проблемы разных поколений. СМИ способствовали оформлению социально-возрастной группы (класса) пожилых, идентифицируя их как «самое обездоленное поколение». На что сегодня может рассчитывать пожилое население России, каковы изменения в этой сфере социальной политики? Этим вопросам посвящена статья санкт-петербургского социолога И.А. Григорьевой. ; Social transformations of the recent years in Russia led to changes in the social structure of the society. Inequality of various age groups in the space of new social and economic opportunities drew special attention. Thus «Russian party of pensioners» was created in 2003. Demographic transformations in the structure of the population, connected with its ageing, demand changes in the goals of the social policy, harmonization of the interests of various social and age groups with the prospects of the society's development. However since the beginning of the 1990-es the consideration of the social problems of the elderly has been so politicized that even the attempts of rationalizing the context of discussion turn out to be unsuccessful. The analysis of Soviet social policy reveals that though it was usually declared as the social policy of institutional distributing type, providing the equality of all citizens, in reality it was built on the combination of different approaches. Thus, the policy in relation to the elderly was usually based on the principles of rewards for merits, when the «achievement» or «merit» of a citizen was considered as the execution of labour or military duty. The right for the social security of the Great Patriotic war veterans is the most developed as compared to the social rights of other categories of Soviet citizens. Their exclusive status corresponds with ideology principles of working achievement and meritocracy selection, which really underlied Soviet social policy. As early as in the 1990-es the system of benefits supported and developed the selective principles formed earlier. The necessity of reforming and rationalizing the social liabilities of the state, including those in the form of benefits, about which there were many debates during the last 10-15 years is faced both with the incompetence of officials and with the opposition of the society. One should also take into account that there are no economic shifts or state transformations that could change the confidence formed among the elderly population in their right to worthy pension, the responsibility for which is held by the state. It is necessary to change the situation with the elderly, but each step must be considered, well thought-out and widely discussed with various groups of the population. Even young people must understand that old age is the only social risk which nobody can avoid. It is necessary to conduct civil enlightenment of the population, though its results will not become apparent immediately. Otherwise the refusal of the state from usual social liabilities will inevitably stimulate protests of the population. One cannot build mutual rights and responsibilities only on moral categories, on the idea of a «duty», because the society is in the state of anomie and crisis of values. The experience of various countries shows that obligatory retirement insurance is the most perfect longterm mechanism of contractual relations between generations, between the state and the population. At the same time the age of retiring on a pension established by the legislation of a country is perceived by the society as «natural». #####> Summaries171 ##### 41 In Russia there has still remained a low age of retiring and benefits which lower it. But age benefits have at least three reverse sides: -first of all, in the framework of such previous experience and age requirements the conflict between working people and pensioners will always be reproduced. -the second problem is connected with the low level of compensation of lost working income in today's pension. -thirdly, in Russia as nowhere else in the world, there is a big gap between the elderly population and the population of pension age. Nowadays in the most successful countries the retirement takes place at the age of 67. But for all working people there is an opportunity of part-time work, allowing to work in adequate regime. Such regime of employment may be considered as an instrument allowing to remain in «usual» society for a longer time. Federal laws, program documents, connected with the formation of a new type of the social policy have so far a contradictory character, and the ability of well-known politicians to coordinate the interests of different groups raises deep doubts. The emphasis given to the problem in mass media publications promotes tension and forms the feeling of disaster. Only in the most recent years there appeared the works aimed not at the estimation of the losses of the population, but at the research of methods of households' adaptation to modern conditions. At the time of late socialism it seemed that the predominance of the elderly people in the authority led to the stagnation. But nothing prevents the renovation of social order to a greater extent than unrestrained youth radicalism and attempts to jump over the obstacles of traditional culture. The most important task of reforming is the development of social interactions, ability to achieve acceptable agreements concerning moot points of the development of the society, such as the renewal of the priorities of social policy.
Surmounting the traditional capitalism, the capitalist private property and estrangement takes place by way of shifting from industrial economy to an economic system based on knowledge and information, formation of a new system of values of the modem man and transformation of a national state under the influence of processes of globalization of the economy and the society. The global economy and international financial markets arc the main indications of a forming new world order and a net-like boundless global informational society.One of the basic features of the informational economic system or informational economy of the end of the 20th - beginning of the 21st century is transformation of financial institutions into centers of national and international accounting and financial globalization. The positive and negative appraisals of financial globalization arc the emergence of a new configuration of the world economy: transfer from the regulated state system to the liberal model of money flow management. The main players on that financial market arc the global institutional investors in the new institutional forms of financial conglomerates uniting the banks, insurance. pension and investment (mutual, hedge, venture) funds as well as other companies of the financial environment - institutions distributing and re-distributing the financial resources of the world.The financial market of the world consist' of an aggregate of financial and crediting organizations that play the role of mediators in re-distributing the financial assets of the world between the creditor and the debtor, the sellers and the buyers of financial resources. The world insurance market is a part of the financial market existing as an independent economic phenomenon and forming as an aggregate of national and regional markets, undergoing a number of changes under the influence of the globalization process.Globalization of the world insurance market expresses itself as a process of obliterating legal and economic barriers between national insurance economies caused by the changes in the world economy and aiming at forming a global insurance space. This phenomenon demonstrates itself in the following processes actively going on since the 90-ies of the 20th century:1. Concentration and centralization processes reflecting in:• concentration of the world insurance and re-insurance capital which expresses itself in mass mergers, uptakes and absorptions, formation of strategic alliances of insurance and re-insurance companies on the global insurance market, as well as formation of traditional insurance companies on this has is;• wide-scale fusion of insurance, bank and crediting capital leading to formation of transnational financial groups;• concentration on the market of insurance mediators expressing itself in formation of huge international insurance brokerage companies by way of merging and buying up small and medium companies;• concentration of users of insurance services expressing itself in growing capitalization and changing their demand for traditional insurance services;2. Modification of traditional forms and types of insurance services, development of new insurance products:• fusion of insurance and financial services and emergence of alternative insurance and re- insurance, securitization as a new way of organizing insurance coverage based on asset management of the insurers and the insurants;• changing demand fur "mass" insurance services, in particular activation of the insurers participation in pension insurance against the background of demographic aging of the population in countries of developed economy, crisis of the concept of the "welfare" state and reduced participation of the state in payment of old-age and disability pensions;• expansion of the sphere of usage of the private commercial insurance: insurance against political and military risks, insurance of credits and guaranties. insurance against informational risks. etc.3. Change of market environment under conditions of:• full computerization of producers and users of insurance products and implementation of the Internet for sales/purchase of insurance and reinsurance services;• increasing devastation of insurance losses resulting from the development of urbanization, technical progress, cost increase of private and corporal property, influence of global climate changes;• expansion of access to foreign insurers and re-insurers on previously "closed" national markets of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America and Asia;• universal liberalization of sales of insurance products caused by liberalization of state and supra-state regulation of financial and insurance markets.The process of globalization and convergence, alongside with opening wide access possibilities for separate countries to the financial resources of the world, contains in itself unforeseen risks related to weakening of regulation by the state and uncontrolled transfer of capital through state borders.Simultaneously with liberalization of state regulation, common universal "play rules" for the players of the global financial market arc being worked out, because " . one of the tasks for the 21st century is to find a way to combine some national sovereignty with financial unification . " [6, p. 29]. The latter facilitates conversion of national markets into constituting parts of the world market. A number of intergovernmental institutions and international financial organizations are engaged in working out and implementation of common standards and codes of behavior for all spheres of financial activities. also in the insurance sector.The financial globalization and formation of financial conglomerates of various organizational-institutional forms strengthens national, international and regional currency and financial instability. Therefore in scientific circles a question is regularly raised about the necessity of additional instruments for regulation on the world level. ; Straipsnyje aptariamas Lietuvos draudimo rinkos formavimasis pasaulinės globalizacijos sąlygomis. Nagrinėjamas klausimas yra aktualus, kadangi kiekvienos valstybės viena iš normalaus egzistavimo ir finansinių santykių reguliavimo sąlygų yra tinkamas draudimo verslo organizavimas. Tyrimas yra analitinio pobūdžio, atliktas remiantis Lietuvos Respublikos įstatymais, naujo Draudimo įstatymo projekto, Lietuvos ir užsienio šalių autorių publikacijomis šia aktualia Lietuvos draudimo verslui tema.
El present treball d'investigació, ha enfocat alguns dels problemes que en aquests díes ha preo-cupat tant a autoritats del Estat de Puebla com a profesionals de distintes disciplines relacionades amb les transformacions del territori. Entre els problemes es troba la magnitut del procés de crei-xement en la Zona Metropolitana de la Ciutat de Puebla (ZMCP), que avui día es troba en una en-creuada y s'ha de decidir quin ha de ser el seu desenvolupament futur, si ho volem, sostenible i racional. Per això, des de la perspectiva de la ciutat sostenible, s'ha intentat analitzar i comparar dues àrees metropolitanes: una situada a Espanya, el Vallés i l'altra, situada a Mèxic, Puebla. En aquest sentit, es destaquen elements importants que replantejen la construcció mateixa de la ciutat. Per la primera s'ha destacat, sobretot, la forma d'edificació, en la mateixa línia de la seva expansió física, en la racionalizatció dels recursos, en els usos i aprofitament del sòl urbanitzat, en la transformació de dels fems sòlids i líquids, en definitiva, l'ordenació del territori i les seves virtuts. Per la segona, tenir en compte l'evolució de la Zona Metropolitana del Vallés i aplicar alguns criteris de sosteni-bilitat per a la seva ordenació territorial per mitjà d'un model matemàtic. D'aquesta manera, es planteja la reestructuració de l'àrea metropolitana actual per un nou model de ciutat que es distingueixi amb una proposta de ciutat sostenible, igual que una sortida a la crisi de les actuals conurbacions. En conseqüència, tenir en compte las virtuts, així com le seves possi-bilitats de aplicabilitat; a més, que respongui a les necesitats dels seus habitants, del entorn físic i natural inmediat: armonitzar entre home-naturalesa, espai-societat, territori-medi ambient, i ciutat sostenible-ordenació territorial. Amb la base en el model d'urbanització actual del Vallés, on el municipi té competència urbanís-tica, permet d'alguna manera incidir en la presa de decisions per la modificació dels usos del sòl. A més, per la influència que prén de les polítiques urbanes de Barcelona, i del reordenament del te-rritori per a un bon ús del sòl. Aquestes experiències enriqueixen els criteris de sostenibilitat i do-nen major influència en la ordenació del territori, exemple que desitjo destacar per a el cas de Pue-bla. De totes maneres, s'ha plantejat modelitzar una part de la problemàtica que actualment està afec-tant la Zona Metropolitana de Puebla. Concretament amb relació a les vicisituts de la vivenda; ja que com a element important en la reestructuració del territori, urgeix una resolució per a benefici dels habitants de la regió. ; The present investigation work, has approached some of the problems that have worried the authorities of the State of Puebla and professionals of different disciplines related with the actual transformations of the territory so much. Among the problems there is the magnitude of the process of growth in the Metropolitan Area of the City of Puebla (ZMCP) that nowadays is in a crossroad and should decide which must be its future development if we want it, sustainable and rational. For it, from the perspective of the sustainable city, the intent has been made to analyse and to com-pare two metropolitan areas: one located in Spain, the Vallés and the other one, located in Mexico, Puebla. In this sense, the important elements that restate the same construction of the city stand out. The first one has stood out, mainly for the construction form, in the same line of their physical ex-pansion, in the rationalization of the resources, in the use of the urbanized floor, in the transforma-tion of the solid and liquid waste, in definitive, the territorial planning and its virtues. For the sec-ond, one has to take into account the evolution of the Metropolitan Area of the Vallés and to apply some sustainability approaches for its territorial planning by means of a mathematical model. One also thinks about the restructuring of the current metropolitan area for a new city model that is distinguished with a proposal of sustainable, the same city that has been successful to the crisis of the current conurbations. In consequence, to take into account these virtues, as well as their possi-bilities of applicability; that also responds to the necessities of their inhabitants, of the immediate physical and natural environment: to harmonize among man-nature, space-society, territory-half ambient, and sustainable-planning of the territory of the city . Based on the pattern of the current urbanization of the Vallés, where the municipality is of urban competition, it somehow allows to impact in the taking of decisions for the modification of the uses of the floor. It also receives influence from the urban politicians from Barcelona, for the re-ordination of the territory for a good use of the floor. These experiences enrich the sustainability approaches and give a wider influence in the planning of the territory, example that I want to high-light for the case of Puebla. It has been thought however about making a model of a part of the problem that is affecting the Metropolitan Area of Puebla at the moment. Especially in relationship to the vicissitudes of the housing; since it is an important element in the restructuring of the territory, merit to be solved for the inhabitants' and for the region benefit. ; Postprint (published version)
Immediately after the dicision of the Ambasador's Council of July 28, 1920,concerning the division of the Cieszyn Silesia, it became clear thet the said delimitation did not win the acceptance of any serious political forces in Poland. The Polish state's difficult international situation, however, made the Polish authorities abandon the idea of resolving the Zaolzie question by force. Fruitless negotiations were, at the same time, conducted to obtain the cossion of at least a part of the disputed territory in Poland's favour and various diplomatic interventions were undertaken to improve the situation of the Polish population inhabiting the Zaolzie Silesia. In spite of the low efficiency of such initiatives, in 1925 the political relation between Poland and Czechoslovakia were normalised and a liquidation agreement was signed, which led to a normalisation of mutual relations in the divided area. The actions of the Polish Republic in relation to the Zaolzie were influenced by various factors that were difficult to harmonise. One of them was the necessity to subjugate the Zaolzie question to the atate's general interests, which included an acceptance of the Versailles status quo, and attempts to find a platform of co-operation with Czechoslovakia in view of the growing German threat. Another factor was the desire to maintain the Polish national character of the Zaolzie motivated by the reluctance to give up that territory in an unequivocal way. The expectation of a cooperation with Czechoslovakia in the international context led to the policy of letting bygones be bygones. The democratic nature of the Chechoslovak state afforded a possibility of making the defence of the Polish national rights the responsibility of the Polish deputies in the parliament in Prague. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried then to persuade the leaders of the Polish community in the Zaolzie to assume a more activistic attitude. At the same time, the Polish Consul in Moravska Ostrava supported financially the institutions of the Polish national life nad tried to resist the assimilating policy of the Czech authorities. This tactics brought, up to a point, some results, but it did not prevent all attempts at an assimilation on the part of influential Czech organisations and bussiness circles, neither did it safeguard the conditions of the national life in the Zaolzie so as to obviate the need for the steady flow of the Polish financial aid without which the Polish educational and cultural institutions would not survive. In the late 1920s and early 1930s a rapprochement between Warsaw and Prague seemed to substantiate the hopes for a betterment of the situation of the Poles in the Zaolzie. In the wake of such hopes there appeared Polish-Czechoslovak societies and Czechoslovak-Polish clubs. These clubs reised high expectations in the consular centre in Moravska Ostrava, which hoped that they would help to break down the barriers between the Polish and Czech population and to obtain the support of influential Czech circles for the postulates of the Polish minority. The most committed members of the clubs (just like all, with no exceptions, Polish cosuits in Moravska Ostrava) were treated, however, with great suspicion and aversion by the Czech nationalist circles, as well as by the personalities representing the views of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The most far-reaching initiative, that is the idea of calling a reconciliation conference concerning the matters of the Cieszyn Silesia in 1932, ended in a fiasco. Such factors as the way the 1930 sensus was carried out, the obvious deterioration of the living standards at the time of the Great Depression, and the attitude of the persons responsible for the Czech foreign policy who insisted on all Polish citizens leaving Czechoslovakia before "equitable" negotiations with Poland could begin, signalled the end of the period in which a positive and active conduct of the Polish population could seem an efficient antidote to the growing pressure for assimilation. The political events of 1933 changed the perception of the chances for a cooperation between Poland and Czechoslovakia, both of them being situated between Germany and the Soviet Union, which, in early 1934, made the representatives of the Polish Republic change their policy in the Zaolzie. From then, on the support of the Polish authorities and society for the Polish minority was emphasised, also a pressure was being exerted on the Czechoslovak government by means of an organised press campaign in Poland. The Czechoslovak government, however, did not yield under pressure, and assumed an intransigent attitude, taking this opportunity to get rid of a certain number of the Poles in the Zaolzie. The assimilation of the local Poles both of a natural kind and enforced by political and economic pressure seemed to the Czech authorities to be the best way to pacify this important borderline region. The tactics to which the Polish side resorted did not then lead to an improvement of the situation of the ethnic Poles in Czechoslovakia, it had, however, a different result, namely it aroused the national feelings and kindled the hopes for the Polish state's stronger support for the minority aspirations. In Poland, on the other hand, the internal situation in Poland's southern neighbour state, beginning with the elections of 1935, started to be looked at from the perspective of the apparently imminent crisis. In view of this, while the idea of an intensive propaganda camping was abandoned, the Czech policy in relation to the ethnic minorities was carefully watched, and the internal integration of the Polish community in the Zaolzie was strongly supported.
El present treball d'investigació, ha enfocat alguns dels problemes que en aquests díes ha preo-cupat tant a autoritats del Estat de Puebla com a profesionals de distintes disciplines relacionades amb les transformacions del territori. Entre els problemes es troba la magnitut del procés de crei-xement en la Zona Metropolitana de la Ciutat de Puebla (ZMCP), que avui día es troba en una en-creuada y s'ha de decidir quin ha de ser el seu desenvolupament futur, si ho volem, sostenible i racional. Per això, des de la perspectiva de la ciutat sostenible, s'ha intentat analitzar i comparar dues àrees metropolitanes: una situada a Espanya, el Vallés i l'altra, situada a Mèxic, Puebla. En aquest sentit, es destaquen elements importants que replantejen la construcció mateixa de la ciutat. Per la primera s'ha destacat, sobretot, la forma d'edificació, en la mateixa línia de la seva expansió física, en la racionalizatció dels recursos, en els usos i aprofitament del sòl urbanitzat, en la transformació de dels fems sòlids i líquids, en definitiva, l'ordenació del territori i les seves virtuts. Per la segona, tenir en compte l'evolució de la Zona Metropolitana del Vallés i aplicar alguns criteris de sosteni-bilitat per a la seva ordenació territorial per mitjà d'un model matemàtic. D'aquesta manera, es planteja la reestructuració de l'àrea metropolitana actual per un nou model de ciutat que es distingueixi amb una proposta de ciutat sostenible, igual que una sortida a la crisi de les actuals conurbacions. En conseqüència, tenir en compte las virtuts, així com le seves possi-bilitats de aplicabilitat; a més, que respongui a les necesitats dels seus habitants, del entorn físic i natural inmediat: armonitzar entre home-naturalesa, espai-societat, territori-medi ambient, i ciutat sostenible-ordenació territorial. Amb la base en el model d'urbanització actual del Vallés, on el municipi té competència urbanís-tica, permet d'alguna manera incidir en la presa de decisions per la modificació dels usos del sòl. A més, per la influència que prén de les polítiques urbanes de Barcelona, i del reordenament del te-rritori per a un bon ús del sòl. Aquestes experiències enriqueixen els criteris de sostenibilitat i do-nen major influència en la ordenació del territori, exemple que desitjo destacar per a el cas de Pue-bla. De totes maneres, s'ha plantejat modelitzar una part de la problemàtica que actualment està afec-tant la Zona Metropolitana de Puebla. Concretament amb relació a les vicisituts de la vivenda; ja que com a element important en la reestructuració del territori, urgeix una resolució per a benefici dels habitants de la regió. ; The present investigation work, has approached some of the problems that have worried the authorities of the State of Puebla and professionals of different disciplines related with the actual transformations of the territory so much. Among the problems there is the magnitude of the process of growth in the Metropolitan Area of the City of Puebla (ZMCP) that nowadays is in a crossroad and should decide which must be its future development if we want it, sustainable and rational. For it, from the perspective of the sustainable city, the intent has been made to analyse and to com-pare two metropolitan areas: one located in Spain, the Vallés and the other one, located in Mexico, Puebla. In this sense, the important elements that restate the same construction of the city stand out. The first one has stood out, mainly for the construction form, in the same line of their physical ex-pansion, in the rationalization of the resources, in the use of the urbanized floor, in the transforma-tion of the solid and liquid waste, in definitive, the territorial planning and its virtues. For the sec-ond, one has to take into account the evolution of the Metropolitan Area of the Vallés and to apply some sustainability approaches for its territorial planning by means of a mathematical model. One also thinks about the restructuring of the current metropolitan area for a new city model that is distinguished with a proposal of sustainable, the same city that has been successful to the crisis of the current conurbations. In consequence, to take into account these virtues, as well as their possi-bilities of applicability; that also responds to the necessities of their inhabitants, of the immediate physical and natural environment: to harmonize among man-nature, space-society, territory-half ambient, and sustainable-planning of the territory of the city . Based on the pattern of the current urbanization of the Vallés, where the municipality is of urban competition, it somehow allows to impact in the taking of decisions for the modification of the uses of the floor. It also receives influence from the urban politicians from Barcelona, for the re-ordination of the territory for a good use of the floor. These experiences enrich the sustainability approaches and give a wider influence in the planning of the territory, example that I want to high-light for the case of Puebla. It has been thought however about making a model of a part of the problem that is affecting the Metropolitan Area of Puebla at the moment. Especially in relationship to the vicissitudes of the housing; since it is an important element in the restructuring of the territory, merit to be solved for the inhabitants' and for the region benefit. ; Postprint (published version)
Nuestra sociedad hoy se encuentra transformada. Hay una percepción mayoritaria, tanto en el mundo académico, como en la opinión pública en general, de que el tipo de sociedad en que vivimos actualmente no es el mismo de hace unas décadas. Sin embargo, no se trataría tan solo del proceso natural de desarrollo y cambio social que caracteriza a cualquier comunidad, sino que parece evidente que se trata de una transformación mucho más trascendental: la idea de un cambio epocal, entendido como la reformulación general del modelo de modernidad instalado durante los últimos dos siglos.¿Cómo se manifiesta esto en la vida cotidiana? Los modelos societales concretos que tienen por referencia dicha modernidad occidental, implican, para el sujeto, mundos fundados sobre las instituciones. Es decir, donde hay una correspondencia entre personalidad, estructura social y cultura. Y también hay una confluencia entre cada ética con su moral, es decir, existen principios éticos claros, que se expresan en normas de conducta, que llamamos moral. Hay una correspondencia entre valores, normas y conducta, lo que le otorga a cada individuo la posibilidad de encontrar claramente el sentido de su existencia. Hoy, dicha correlación ya no aparece como evidente, dada la confluencia con un nuevo modelo societal emergente.Los distintos princ1p1os éticos emergentes en la sociedad actual, no tiene aún instituciones que los expresen. La instalación progresiva del pluralismo, va posicionando una dificultad en la posibilidad del sujeto de encaminar su vida en torno a determinados valores de significación última -"reservas de sentido"- que estén exentos de cuestionamientos.Esto significa que haya una permanente posibilidad de crisis subjetivas ointersubjetivas de sentido, al no haber valores compartidos que permitan determinar la acción correcta en los diversos ámbitos de la vida. Esto puede entenderse como la relativización de los sistemas de valores y los esquemas de interpretación. Cada aspecto del mundo en general y de la vida en particular queda sujeto a múltiples interpretaciones y esquemas de acción. El "fin de las certezas" corresponde al repliegue de las reservas de sentido que permiten encaminar los proyectos biográficos en torno a determinados valores orientadores que le otorgan significación.En nuestro país, el impulso de la modernización en las últimas décadas, así como los efectos de los procesos de globalización, van dando lugar a problemáticas de este mismo tipo. Después de la Dictadura, con el retorno a la democracia, van perdiendo relevancia las viejas representaciones político-ideológicas en la conformación del proyecto de vida. Van quedando atrás las motivaciones de carácter colectivo, el sentido comunitario, para dar lugar a crecientes procesos de individuación e individualismo.Las decisiones acerca de la vida están siendo cada vez más sustentadas envalores eminentemente personales, fenómeno que aparece con especial fuerza en las nuevas generaciones.En este sentido, diremos que hay una doble relación entre el modelo sociocultural chileno y nuestras juventudes. Las transformaciones culturales del país determinannuevas configuraciones o sustratos valóricos en las prácticas juveniles, al tiempo que estas acciones van decantando en la posible emergencia de un nuevo modelo sociocultural.Los valores y símbolos con que se orientaba tradicionalmente la vida vanhaciéndose difusos, pero tampoco se instala con propiedad una nueva orientación valórica compartida. Los y las jóvenes hoy tienen una débil identificación con la política y también con la religión, pero todavía no aparecen nuevos referentes que contribuyan al otorgamiento de sentido en el curso de sus vidas.Las juventudes se ven, así, obligadas a enfrentar el problema de la incertidumbre, llevando a cabo sus construcciones autobiográficas a partir de convencimientos propios, con materiales dispersos y cooperaciones inestables.Este estudio se levanta, entonces, como un intento por ir comprendiendo la maneraen que los mundos juveniles van dando solución al problema de la "crisisnormativa", esto es, a la incapacidad de un modelo de sociedad histórica porestablecer normas morales claras, que se correspondan con principios éticosdeterminados. La pregunta que nos guía es por las particulares configuraciones devalores que van delimitando un sentido en el accionar juvenil, y cuáles son losámbitos donde el problema de una moral fragmentada se manifiestan con mayorfuerza para ellas y ellos.La importancia de poder estudiar este segmento de la población, es que en los y las jóvenes yace el cambio. Desde ellos y ellas es posible vislumbrar, con mayorclaridad, los caminos posibles que recorrerá la sociedad en una (potencial)institucionalización de un nuevo modelo sociocultural.Para acceder a la comprensión de este fenómeno, se recurrió a una estrategiametodológica cualitativa, en tanto ella permitiría la libre manifestación de losintereses informativos, creencias y deseos de los sujetos en la conversación. Estos discursos -en principio- espontáneos, hacen surgir relaciones de sentido complejas, difusas y a veces encubiertas, que sólo se pueden configurar en un contexto significativo global, pues no alcanzan a aprehenderse a partir de las respuestas estereotipadas y descontextualizadas propias de un cuestionario cerrado. Como técnica, por su parte, se recurrió a la de Grupo de Discusión, que permite, por su forma, acceder de mejor manera a un discurso que se encuentra diseminado en lo social.Finalmente, cabe señalar que la presente investigación fue realizada en el marcodel proyecto FONDECYT N° 1070105: "Cultura juvenil y producción valórica enestudiantes de educación secundaria y de educación superior", del que se obtuvo elfinanciamiento y las unidades de información que permitieron su desarrollo. El trabajo, tanto teórico como de campo, se realizó entre los meses de agosto de 2007 y marzo de 2008.
This thesis consists of three essays in econometrics. The first part of the thesis, consisting of chapters one and two, treats novel estimators aiming at distributional effects. In the first chapter, I introduce a methodology to estimate the joint distribution of multiple outcome variables. The second chapter incorporates censoring, a prevalent challenge when analyzing duration data, into distribution regression methods. Finally, the third chapter analyzes a reform in the health care sector. Chapter 1 introduces Multivariate Distribution Regression (MDR), a semi-parametric approach to model the joint distribution of several outcome variables. Typically, researchers are interested in the effects on multiple outcomes when the latter are correlated (see Patton, 2012, for an overview). For instance, this is the case for the impact of a crisis on asset prices. Asset prices co-move tightly as they depend on common factors such as market cycles. A shock on one price index may thus affect many other indices. In addition, the effect could vary across the distribution of the prices - a peculiarity that MDR accounts for. Essentially, MDR estimates the impact of interest at every point of the outcome's distribution. MDR's most obvious advantage is its flexibility. Existing methods, such as copula models, typically impose a parametric form of the dependence structure across outcomes (i.e. Klein et al., 2019). In contrast, MDR does not require equally restrictive, parametric assumptions. Thus, the effects estimated using MDR describe the underlying mechanisms more accurately. Further, MDR generalizes two well-known estimators: (i) the empirical multivariate cumulative CDF by allowing for covariates and (ii) univariate Distribution Regression (DR) by considering multiple outcomes. Building on earlier work in the field (Chernozhukov et al., 2013), I establish that MDR consistently estimates the regression coefficient process. Further, I show that coefficients are well-behaved and converge to a Gaussian process, with the bootstrap being a consistent tool to assess the asymptotic distribution. To illustrate the usefulness of MDR, I estimate the effect of disability insurance benefits on labor supply responses among Swiss households. Generally, receiving these benefits is related to lower incentives to supply labor (i.e. Autor et al., 2016). Autor et al. (2019) find that spouses increase their labor supply once their partner is disabled. My results indicate that spouses of low-income partners do respond as suggested by Autor et al. (2019). Yet, among average to high-income households, the need to compensate for the financial loss appears less immediate. In Chapter 2, co-authored with Blaise Melly, we incorporate censoring into the univariate DR model. The resulting estimator, censored distribution regression (CDR), allows studying how the covariates' effects vary over time. From a theoretical perspective, CDR represents a generalization of three existing estimators. In particular, CDR simplifies (i) to the Kaplan-Meier estimator in the absence of covariates Kaplan and Meier (1958), (ii) to distribution regression in the absence of censoring, and (iii) to Cox's proportional hazard estimator in the absence of heterogeneity (Cox, 1972). As our main results, we establish weak convergence of the coefficient process to a Gaussian process. The standard tool to analyze duration data is Cox's proportional hazard model, which assumes time-constant effects. On many occasions, this assumption seems too restrictive. For instance, job search behavior differs during unemployment. In this context, we apply the CDR estimator to estimate the effect of potential benefit duration (PBD) on unemployment spells. Search models suggest that faced with the upcoming exhaustion of benefits, individuals intensify their search efforts and lower their target wages (Krueger and Mueller, 2016; Marinescu and Skandalis, 2021). Our results indicate that PBD has a negligible effect for short-term unemployed but a strong and significant effect for the long-term unemployed. This is in line with an increased likelihood of finding a job once the benefits are close to exhaustion. In Chapter 3, co-authored with Tamara Bischof, we address how physicians respond to changes in their financial incentives. We exploit plausibly exogenous changes in the fee structure for medical services in the outpatient sector. The tariff partners, the health care providers and insurances, failed to reach an agreement on how to reform the outdated tariff scheme TARMED. In response, the federal government set the new fees, causing a revenue loss of up to 40% for single physicians. Previous research suggests that physicians may respond in two different ways: Faced with a revenue loss, physicians can (i) substitute from low-paying to more attractive services and (ii) increase their overall health care supply (i.e. Clemens and Gottlieb, 2014; McGuire and Pauly, 1991; Yip, 1998). Our main goal is to disentangle these two channels and to quantify their relative importance. Our results are threefold. (i) We find that providers raise (lower) the volume of services that have become relatively more (less) attractive. (ii) Physicians increase their overall volume of services and treat more patients when they lose a significant share of their revenue. (iii) Finally, a comparative exercise indicates that volume expansions are far more important than substitution responses. In particular, a revenue loss of 5% leads to an increase in the overall supply of roughly 3% whereas we do not observe a significant rise in substitution responses. Concerning policy implications, our results suggest (i) that gradual fee changes may prevent strong and costly reactions due to more considerable revenue losses. (ii) Further, policy-makers could directly incentivize physicians to provide services that are of high value for consumers.
Instantáneas I La historia de las izquierdas: Viejos y nuevos desafíos "La historiografía del movimiento obrero latinoamericano está delimitada por dos presupuestos teóricamente discutibles. Por un lado, al ver su desarrollo através del prisma de la 'Modernidad', se recurre a un conjunto de variables indicativas económicas que refuerzan empíricamente la idea de un continuo industrial progresivo. Por otro lado, la 'modernidad' a nivel político se expresaen el ascenso progresivo de la clase obrera y de la sociedad según sean las formas y grados de participación política. El tránsito lineal e irreversible de lo prepolítico a lo político o la cristalización de una serie continua de lo tradicional-autocrático-democrático signan las opciones de esta historiografíaobrera paradigmática". Ricardo Melgar Bao, El movimiento obrero latinoamericano. Historia de una clase subalterna, Madrid, Alianza, 1988, p. 18. Si bien el movimiento anarquista, el movimiento socialista y sus familias políticas se habían convertido en objeto de la indagación histórica muy tempranamente en la Argentina gracias a la labor de historiadores militantes como Diego Abad de Santillán, Jacinto Oddone y Sebastián Marotta, su incorporación a los estudios académicos data del último medio siglo. En las décadas de 1970 y 1980 las izquierdas emergen en los estudios académicos—pensemos por ejemplo en El anarquismo y el movimiento obrero en Argentina, la obra clásica de Iaacov Oved, de 1978— aunque todavía subordinadas a las historias del movimiento obrero. La Biblioteca Política Argentina que dirigió Oscar Troncoso desde 1983 para el Centro Editor de América Latina acompañando (y al mismo tiempo alimentando) el despertar de la vida política después de siete años de dictadura militar, ofreció un amplio catálogo de estudios sobre las izquierdas, donde predominaban todavía los historiadores militantes de las décadas anteriores (Jacinto Oddone, Alicia Moreau, Oscar Arévalo, Leonardo Paso, Norberto Galasso), a los que se habían sumado nuevas obras provenientes del periodismo y el ensayismo político (Emilio J. Corbière, García Costa, Hugo Gambini, Dardo Cúneo, etc). De todos modos, esta colección le abrió espacio a una nueva generación de historiadores profesionales del movimiento obrero y de las izquierdas que vieron aparecer allí sus primeras obras (Juan Carlos Torre, Hugo del Campo, Mónica Gordillo, Edgardo Bilsky, Ricardo Falcón, Arturo Fernández, Dora Barrancos, entre muchos otros). En colecciones paralelas a la de Troncoso aparecieron también los primeros trabajos de Cristina Tortti y de Juan Suriano, y se reeditó la Historia del Movimiento Obrero en fascículos dirigida por Alberto Pla. Fueron pocos los investigadores que perseveraron en la historia obrera durante las décadas de 1980 y 1990, cuando ese campo conocía un reflujo tanto a nivel local como global. Algunos ensayaron estrategias de renovación temática y metodológica (Hugo del Campo con sus estudios sobre la corriente sindicalista, Juan Carlos Torre con los sindicatos peronistas, Mirta Lobato con las mujeres obreras, Leandro Gutiérrez con la cultura obrera, por mencionar sólo algunos casos). Paralelamente, la historia obrera clásica era sostenida a contracorriente por dos centros independientes, CICSO y PIMSA. En contrapartida, una verdadera oleada de producción sobre las izquierdas tuvo lugar durante los últimos 20 años. Con el nuevo siglo, "las izquierdas" ingresaron por derecho pleno en el campo académico. En un principio empujados por la efervescencia de la "historia reciente", en años posteriores decenas de jóvenes investigadores desarrollaron tesis de grado y posgrado que excedieron el universo de las organizaciones armadas de la nueva izquierda, abordando diversos momentos y figuras del anarquismo, el socialismo, el sindicalismo, el antiimperialismo, el comunismo, el antifascismo, el trotskismo, el maoísmo, el guevarismo y las más diversas familias políticas de las izquierdas argentinas. Los últimos veinte años vieron sucederse coloquios y congresos sobre las izquierdas, obras individuales y colectivas, colecciones editoriales, revistas especializadas, ediciones de fuentes, centros de documentación, programas de investigación colectiva y un sinnúmero de manifestaciones que, finalmente, terminaron por convertir a "las izquierdas" en objeto de la investigación histórica con plena legitimidad académica. Si en la década de 1970 los investigadores profesionales consagrados al estudio de las izquierdas se contaban con los dedos de una mano, medio siglo después constituyen un campo que moviliza varias decenas de investigadores. El repliegue de la historia obrera tradicional dejó libre un espacio de visibilidad para el despliegue de las fuerzas y los movimientos de las izquierdas mismas, independiente de su peso mayor o menor dentro del movimiento obrero. Asimismo, los cuestionamientos a la historia política tradicional fueron desplazando el interés desde la dimensión institucional de los partidos políticos (los congresos, el comité central, el programa, la línea política) a una historia centrada en las diversas manifestaciones de la cultura de izquierdas, como los procesos de subjetivación militante, la construcción de los liderazgos y los roles de género, la división militante entre trabajo manual y trabajo intelectual, la circulación de impresos, los cursos de formación, las lecturas canónicas y las prohibidas, el rol tenso de los intelectuales al interior de las organizaciones políticas, la dimensión comunicacional de la prensa y de las revistas, la lucha por la conquista militante del espacio urbano; el rol de la música colectiva y de la gráfica en la construcción de un imaginario de izquierdas; el rol de los exiliados, los viajeros, los congresistas, los emisarios en la construcción de redes nacionales, continentales e internacionales que permitieron exceder el nacionalismo metodológico de los estudios sobre la "izquierda argentina". El CeDInCI, fundado en 1998, se instaló justamente en esa encrucijada historiográfica. Para recelo de muchos "ortodoxos" de la antigua historia obrera (a medias profesional, a medias militante), la "cultura de izquierdas" estaba inscripta, incluso en plural, en su propio nombre. De modo que el CeDInCI fue desplegando a lo largo de sus 22 años de vida un programa historiográfico en el que perdían peso y legitimidad el análisis de los programas y los pronunciamientos en los que el historiador trataba de encontrar una mayor o menor correspondencia con la "realidad", privilegiando la dimensión de la experiencia militante en toda su complejidad, las dinámicas y los conflictos inherentes a los grupos humanos, el estudio de los procesos de construcción simbólica, los rituales y las ceremonias militantes y toda la dimensión imaginaria de la cultura de izquierdas. La antropología, el psicoanálisis, la sociología, el socioanálisis, la teoría política, el marxismo crítico, la teoría feminista y los estudios de género fueron los principales aliados en esta estrategia de repensar la historia de las izquierdas, declinada en plural, a la luz de la historia social de la cultura. Resistiendo la "desviación culturalista" de este programa, la antigua historia militante logró conquistar cierto espacio dentro del universo académico. Mantuvo hasta donde pudo la centralidad de la historia obrera, sustancializando las clases sociales e hipostasiando la dimensión del conflicto. Abordó la trayectoria de las izquierdas tal como habituaba a hacerlo el Comité Central: según su capacidad para llevar la conciencia verdadera a la clase obrera, lo que se traduciría en su mayor implantación en tales o cuales gremios. La historia de los intelectuales de izquierda fue escrita según su mayor o menor capacidad de inclinar su cerviz frente a la dirección política. La cultura, en tanto que nivel de la superestructura, fue pensada en términos del "frente cultural", un espacio que debía ser atendido oportunamente, sin amplificarse más allá de que lo que Engels ya había dejado establecido. La historia de una corriente política de la izquierda era entendida como la historia de su capacidad para implantar bastiones en el movimiento obrero con vistas a la revolución. Aunque apelara más de una vez a citas de autoridad de Gramsci, la política era concebida en términos de "asalto" o de "guerra de maniobras", antes que como "guerra de posiciones". Por eso esta perspectiva produjo sobre todo historias endógenas del socialismo, el comunismo o el trotskismo donde las disputas hegemónicas entre las fuerzas sociales aparecen apenas esbozadas en un evanescente telón de fondo. Enormes esfuerzos de meritoria investigación en hemerotecas y archivos se ha visto malogrados por esta matriz empobrecida de historia social y política desde la cual la construcción hegemónica, que empieza justamente más allá del plano corporativo de la organización obrera, no puede ser siquiera pensada. En esta literatura están ausentes incluso las categorías mismas que permitirían aprehender la historia de las izquierdas en toda su complejidad, en su densidad y en su drama histórico. Estos modos de concebir y narrar la historia de las izquierdas están en el centro de las objeciones que formula Roy Hora en "Izquierda y clases populares en la Argentina, 1880-1945", un ensayo sumamente estimulante y provocativo aparecido hace pocas semanas en la revista Prismas. Hora parte de un hecho incuestionable: la incapacidad de las izquierdas históricas para romper cierto "techo de cristal" pues "rara vez superaron el 10 % de los sufragios en elecciones libres y competitivas". Y si bien su ensayo aborda el ciclo histórico que concluye en 1945, no sería difícil proyectar esta constatación, con los ajustes del caso, sobre la segunda mitad del siglo XX. El fondo de esta dificultad hegemónica no se debería tanto a problemas de "incomprensión" de las dirigencias políticas de izquierda (el elitismo de los socialistas, el frentismo oportunista de los comunistas o el sectarismo de los trotskistas, por poner algunos casos) como en la capacidad integradora del "país más capitalista y moderno de América Latina". Incluso los historiadores de las izquierdas más reconocidos —José Aricó, Ricardo Falcón, Juan Suriano— habrían subestimado los alcances del potencial integrador de un mercado de trabajo que, signado por los altos salarios en términos comparativos a escala internacional, la capacidad de ahorro, el progreso ocupacional, la movilidad social ascendente e incluso la incorporación a las filas de las clases propietarias, había modelado en la experiencia de los trabajadores un horizonte de progreso que se habría erigido en un "obstáculo formidable" para la radicalización de sus demandas. A esa experiencia en el mundo laboral habrían venido a sumarse otras dimensiones de la integración social, política y cultural como el crecimiento del sistema de salud pública, el aumento de la alfabetización y la expansión del sistema público de educación así como el carácter liberal de la Constitución nacional con su reconocimiento a los diversos credos y cultos, con su libertad de prensa, de opinión y de asociación, a los que vino a añadirse la apertura del régimen político a partir de 1916. Contra el arraigado retrato de una sociedad expulsiva que habría nacido de un sobredimensionamiento del ciclo que se abre con la Ley de Residencia y que alcanza su clímax en la Semana Trágica de 1919, o del que se abre con el golpe militar de 1930, Hora nos devuelve la imagen de una República abierta a acoger a las sucesivas oleadas de perseguidos de Europa, desde los communards de 1871 hasta los republicanos españoles de 1939, pasando por los socialistas expulsados por las leyes de Bismark e incluso por los anarquistas italianos de fines del siglo XIX (pp. 56-57). El autor no desconoce, desde luego, los momentos represivos del Estado sobre los trabajadores, pero los considera "poco significativos" (p. 57) en términos relativos (comparados con otras experiencias a un lado y otro del Atlántico), además circunscriptos a momentos excepcionales (1902, 1910, 1919, 1920-21, 1930, 1943) y focalizados en actores políticos particulares: el anarquismo entre 1902 y 1921, el comunismo entre 1930 y 1945. Por fuera de estas circunstancias accidentales, "la evidencia histórica indica que, en repetidas ocasiones, las autoridades mediaron en los conflictos entre capital y trabajo, a veces a solicitud de los propios asalariados", antes incluso que los radicales llegaran al gobierno (pp. 57-58). El ensayo de Roy Hora tiene el mérito indiscutible de cuestionar los alcances interpretativos de ciertos relatos endógenos fundados sobre todo en las propias fuentes partidarias, ofreciendo un cuadro histórico en el que las izquierdas son reconsideradas dentro del abanico de posibilidades de organización, movilización y transformación social que ofrecía una formación social determinada. Al mismo tiempo, pone sobre el tapete los supuestos de buena parte de los estudios de historia de las izquierdas que concebían a las condiciones para el despliegue de un proyecto inspirado en el deseo de cuestionar el orden sociopolítico como una suerte de invariante histórica, colocándolas de ese modo por fuera de la historia humana. En este relato alternativo, las clases no aparecen sustancializadas ni definidas a priori, sino que se constituyen sobre una experiencia colectiva que, en última instancia, se asienta en las peculiaridades del capitalismo argentino. Buscando explicaciones más allá de los errores programáticos o los aciertos interpretativos de las izquierdas, el ensayo se desplaza del análisis del registro discursivo para inscribirse en el plano de las condiciones económicas, sociales y políticas en que se forjaran las clases populares bajo el influjo de un proyecto de impronta moderada y laborista, y en el que sólo en circunstancias históricas específicas se sintieron atraídas por los discursos impugnadores del orden establecido. Las dificultades de las izquierdas en erigir un partido de clase con arraigo de masas no se derivaban entonces de las otrora llamadas "condiciones subjetivas" —las concepciones políticas de las fuerzas de izquierda— sino de las propias "condiciones objetivas" que ofrecía la Argentina de la primera mitad del siglo XX: una "sociedad sin rígidas fronteras de clase y cuyas jerarquías se hallaban sometidas al efecto disolvente de la movilidad social y ocupacional", en la que "la cultura asociativa trabajó en contra de la aspiración a construir una subcultura obrera autónoma —sindicato, club social y deportivo, biblioteca y centro cultural— como la que forjaron las experiencias socialdemócratas europeas más exitosas" (p. 57). No es difícil adiviniar aquí la actualización de algunas hipótesis avanzadas en la obra obra ya clásica de Leandro Gutiérrez y Luis Alberto Romero, Sectores populares, cultura y política. Buenos Aires en la entreguerra (1995). Pero las hipótesis de Gutiérrez y Romero son radicalizadas con el apoyo de una serie de investigaciones de sólido nivel académico que fueron abriéndose paso a lo largo del último medio siglo para constituirse en lo que Eduardo J. Míguez ha denominado la "nueva ortodoxia revisionista". Es así que Roy Hora puede sustentar su argumentación no sólo en su considerable obra previa sino en la abundante producción de la tradición historiográfica en la que se inscribe —y que remite a los nombres de Roberto Cortés Conde, Ezequiel Gallo, Eduardo J. Míguez, Hilda Sabato, Pablo Gerchunoff y Lucas Llach, entre varios otros, así como a figuras provientes de otros espacios, como Natalio Botana o Luis Alberto Romero. La "reacción neoclásica" (como la llamó el propio Cortés Conde) terminó por constituir una escuela (en el sentido amplio del término) cuyas primeras obras nacieron a comienzos de la década de 1960 en el espacio del IDES y en las últimas décadas, a medida que iba arrojando el lastre del cepalismo y estilizando su teoría de la modernización, se fue asentando sobre todo en el ámbito de la Universidad Torcuato Di Tella y en la de San Andrés. El ensayo de Hora, más allá de señalar matices sutiles en torno a las interpretaciones de autores como Aricó, Falcón y Suriano, tiene por blanco implícito ese conjunto de estudios sobre las izquierdas que "suelen mirar el problema del lugar político de las clases laboriosas con los ojos sesgados de los impugnadores del sistema. Enfocados en los momentos de crisis antes que en los más frecuentes y extendidos de normalidad, suelen apoyarse en relatos sobre la organización obrera que sobreestiman la importancia de sus grupos disidentes, entonces minoritarios, y en la prensa militante que promovía sus reclamos. En este sentido, esa literatura ofrece un ejemplo típico de los sesgos de interpretación nacidos de una selección parcial de la evidencia documental, amén de más interesada en la retórica de combate que en las prácticas concretas y el contexto más amplio en que se desplegaba la acción colectiva" (p. 56). La crítica es certera y la polémica que viene a abrir es sin lugar a dudas auspiciosa. Difícilmente se podría estar en desacuerdo con una perspectiva que invita a desustancializar las clases sociales en pos de una concepción relacional de las fuerzas sociales y que convoca a pensar los alcances y los límites de las corrientes políticas no sólo en el juego de su propio campo sino también en sus propias condiciones materiales-sociales de existencia. Pero el marco histórico que ofrece como alternativa corre el riesgo equivalente de las corrientes que impugna, aunque en un sentido opuesto. Es que frente a los relatos históricos construidos sobre los momentos de crisis, Hora levanta un modelo alternativo focalizado "en los más frecuentes y extendidos de normalidad". El punto de partida es el año 1880, donde no aparecen trazas de "acumulación primitiva", violencia constitutiva, pillaje, apropiación, trabajo forzado ni "campaña del desierto". El capitalismo argentino y su modelo liberal parecen haber nacido inmaculados. Es significativo que el autor no se proponga pensar la historia argentina conforme una dialéctica de crisis recurrentes y ciclos de normalidad siempre provisorios, sino como un proceso de inserción internacional, modernización capitalista e integración social exitosos en el mediano plazo, al menos hasta el inicio de la "decadencia argentina". A la inversa de las perspectivas que critica, en este relato funcionalista del proceso histórico el conflicto social no sólo es excepcional sino que queda rebajado al rango conceptual de mero accidente histórico. Frente al "luchismo" de ciertas perspectivas ciegas a los momentos de negociación, no deja de ser oportuno recordar que en 1902, mucho antes de las experiencias de diálogo y negociación entre Estado y trabajadores que ensayará el gobierno radical de Hipólito Yrigoyen, incluso dirigentes anarquistas como Constante Carballo y Francisco Ros podían ingresar a la Casa Rosada a dialogar con dos poderosos ministros de Estado. Sin embargo, resulta poco convincente la secuencia posterior que ofrece Hora como ilustración de sus tesis —la asamblea de estibadores que no refrendó el acuerdo de sus líderes, la humillación que afectó el prestigio de los ministros, la imagen de debilidad que ofrecía el propio presidente Roca ante la oposición— que terminaría por explicar el estallido de la primera huelga general de la Argentina (noviembre de 1902) y a la sanción de la Ley de Residencia ese mismo mes como el resultado de un encadenamiento (evitable) de accidentes. En la comprensión de este proceso han desaparecido las condiciones materiales invocadas en la argumentación central —manifiestas en los reclamos de los distintos gremios que se fueron escalonando a partir de las demandas iniciales de los estibadores, que pedían cargar bolsas que no superaran los 65/70 kilos. ¿ Es posible que circunstancias perfectamente plausibles como la "humillación" de los ministros o la necesidad de Roca de demostrar firmeza hayan derivado en la sanción de una Ley votada en forma express por las dos cámaras que venía a violentar nada menos que la sacrosanta Constitución liberal de 1853, y que se mantuvo vigente durante más de medio siglo, desafiando hasta el año 1958 los sucesivos intentos de derogación? Como diría el viejo Hegel: pequeñas causas, grandes efectos.1 La huelga misma aparece en el relato como un hecho accidental que podría haberse evitado si los actores se hubieran comportado conforme a su racionalidad esperada, de no ser por el "influjo indebido" que los anarquistas ejercían "sobre el común de los trabajadores". Pero el ejemplo muestra exactamente la situación inversa: son los líderes anarquistas los que negociaron con el gobierno mientras que fue la asamblea de los estibadores la que los desautorizó. Desde luego que puede estudiarse la racionalidad propia de las huelgas de masas, pero es muy difícil, sino imposible, pensar la dinámica de acumulación de demandas materiales y simbólicas propias de los grandes procesos colectivos desde la teoría del racional choice. La racionalidad del comportamiento de aquellas franjas de los obreros migrantes que acompañaron la experiencia del radicalismo primero y del peronismo después es perfectamente comprensible. También la de aquellos que lograron ascender rápidamente en la escala social y alcanzaron altos grados de integración social, política y cultural, adhiriendo incluso a la ideología liberal, en alguna de sus variantes. Pero no debería ser difícil concebir una voluntad de transformación radical del orden social por parte de los que, en la división del trabajo, les tocó acarrear bolsas de 100 kilos en sus espaldas, ni de los que trabajaban 14 horas diarias, ni de los cientos de miles o incluso de los millones de "perdedores" que pagaron los costos de la modernización argentina. El riesgo de pensar la historia "desde el lugar de los impugnadores del sistema" cede aquí su lugar a otro riesgo (sobre el que la historiografía contemporánea suele ser mucho más indulgente): pensar la historia con los ojos sesgados de los integradores del sistema. Roy Hora es convicente al mostrar los límites de los relatos convencionales de historia de las izquierdas autocentrados en su propio despliegue y documentados con sus propias fuentes, pero la productividad historiográfica del modelo tan sólidamente funcionalista que ofrece como alternativa genera toda una batería de interrogantes. Enfatizando los ciclos de normalidad por sobre las crisis, los procesos de integración sobre los de exclusión, el consenso sobre la violencia, la negociación sobre el conflicto, el modelo histórico que ofrece invierte más que supera aquel que vino a impugnar. Las condiciones de posiblidad de la izquierda quedan pues acotadas a la emergencia accidental de un conflicto de clase, para terminar clausurándose una vez que el error se corrige, el conflicto desaparece y el sistema retorna a las rutinas de la normalidad. En su esquema, quizás podrían comprenderse el fracaso ineluctable del anarquismo más allá de 1912 o los límites insalvables de corrientes como el sindicalismo revolucionario en sus años de mayor radicalidad, el trotskismo (o el clasismo de la décadas de 1960 y 1970, si lo proyectáramos sobre el período posterior), pero difícilmente podría explicarse la imposibilidad de las corrientes más reformistas (el socialismo, o el comunismo desde 1935 en adelante) en franquear el "techo de cristal". En este modelo, la ideología que mejor corresponde a la racionalidad de los actores no es otra que el liberalismo. ¿Cómo pensar desde allí fenómenos ya no de la maginitud de las grandes huelgas generales, sino procesos culturales como la tradición antiimperialista de las izquierdas? No tendrían otro interés que el de ideologías de la desviación, en definitiva funcionales a ese latinoamericanismo dependentista que llevó a la Argentina a apartarse de su inserción "en el mundo". Incluso los empeños de las izquierdas por realizar el "programa mínimo" habrían derivado en los altos costos laborales y en el déficit público que aún hoy continuarían gravitando en el corazón de la decadencia argentina. Queda flotando la pregunta si las izquierdas son siquiera pensables desde esa perspectiva, donde sus vertientes más radicales aparecen desplazadas al cuadro de una anomalía, y las izquierdas reformistas reducidas a una astucia de la razón liberal. Colectivo editor 1 Para una discusión argumentada y documentada con la historiografía que ha relativizado o acotado la incidencia efectiva de Ley de Residencia y la Ley de Defensa Social (Barry, Zimmerman, Suriano) para considerarlas como el punto de partida de una serie regular de dispositivos de disciplinamiento por parte de la élite, véase el reciente trabajo de Marina Franco, "El estado de excepción a comienzos del siglo XX: de la cuestión obrera a la cuestión nacional", en Avances del Cesor,vol. 16, nº 20,Universidad Nacional de Rosario, 2019.
Las empresas tienen su fuente de crédito en los elementos objetivo-patrimoniales que integran el patrimonio de la organización empresarial. Normalmente, se produce un desfase entre el volumen y el importe de la actividad que desarrollan y las necesidades de crédito que conlleva y los elementos patrimoniales que aseguran el cumplimiento de las obligaciones. Las necesidades de crédito para el desarrollo de la actividad empresarial ordinariamente son superiores a las garantías patrimoniales que se pueden emplear para la cobertura del cumplimiento de los compromisos que se asumen1. En los momentos en los que una empresa atraviesa una situación de dificultades económicas, se suele producir un encarecimiento del crédito, unido a una exigencia injustificada o abusiva de garantías. Asimismo, las contrapartes de los empresarios suelen exigir el otorgamiento de garantías para mantener las relaciones que resultan necesarias para la continuidad de la actividad empresarial. Por todo ello, cuando se declara el concurso, ordinariamente, los elementos patrimoniales del activo libres de cargas se pueden haber reducido considerablemente y haberse incrementado la insuficiencia patrimonial para la satisfacción colectiva de los acreedores no garantizados. En consideración a los problemas que se plantean en este tipo de situaciones, en el Derecho tradicional de quiebras, se tipificaban una serie de supuestos para facilitar la rescisión de las garantías constituidas en el periodo anterior a declaración de la quiebra. Con esta clase de medidas se pretendía dejar sin efecto frente al concurso el otorgamiento de aquellas garantías que se hubieran constituido de forma abusiva. Ahora bien, esto suponía una restricción para acceder al crédito y para lograr el mantenimiento de las relaciones, lo que aumentaba las dificultades para continuar la actividad y evitar la quiebra. Las acciones rescisorias constituyen una medida que plantea una tensión ineludible con el principio de seguridad jurídica. De ahí, la necesidad de que los supuestos de hecho que determinan que se pueda proceder a la rescisión, deban estar plenamente justificados y claramente definidos, desde la perspectiva de los fines de la ordenación del concurso. A este respecto, en el tratamiento de la rescisión de las garantías constituidas antes de la declaración del concurso y, en general, de las refinanciaciones y de los acuerdos alcanzados en situaciones de dificultades económicas resulta necesario lograr un difícil equilibrio para facilitar la realización de aquellos actos que sean adecuados para hacer posible la continuidad de la empresa y, al mismo tiempo, para que puedan quedar sin efecto los actos abusivos y los que supongan una disminución injustificada del patrimonio del concursado. La aprobación de la Ley Concursal en 2003 supuso llevar a buen término el proceso de reforma de la normativa concursal, lo que significó una mejora y la superación, en buena medida, del centenario Derecho de quiebras vigente en el Código de Comercio. Una de las modificaciones más importantes que introduce la Ley Concursal es la derogación del régimen de retroacción y de las acciones rescisorias especiales previsto en los artículos 878 a 882 del Código de Comercio. La retroacción determinaba, conforme al tenor literal, la nulidad de todos aquellos actos realizados desde la fecha a la que se retrotraían los efectos de la declaración de la quiebra. A su vez, el rigor en la configuración de la retroacción impedía o dejaba sin efectividad la aplicación de las acciones rescisorias especiales. La Ley Concursal española opta por la técnica de la rescisión como instrumento de reintegración. La configuración normativa de la acción rescisoria pretende objetivar en lo posible el ejercicio de la acción, y, con esta finalidad, se exige como únicos presupuestos que el acto resulte perjudicial y que se realice en los dos años anteriores a la declaración de concurso. En este sentido, no tiene en cuenta la buena fe de la contraparte ni la situación de insolvencia del deudor en el momento de realizar el acto. En materia de efectos, el legislador prevé las consecuencias de la rescisión tan solo respecto de los contratos, pero no respecto de los actos unilaterales, tales como los pagos, ni tampoco da un tratamiento específico a las relaciones accesorias como la constitución de garantías. La calificación del crédito que surge a favor de la contraparte se califica en todo caso como crédito contra la masa, salvo que se aprecie mala fe, en cuyo caso el crédito se considera como subordinado. En el caso de los pagos y de las garantías, el crédito cuyo pago se rescinde o respecto del que se rescinde la garantía, tiene la calificación que corresponda en el concurso, ya que este crédito, como tal, no se ve afectado por la rescisión. La indeterminación y la equívoca delimitación normativa del concepto de perjuicio, la irrelevancia del elemento subjetivo de la buena fe y el inapropiado tratamiento de los efectos ponen de manifiesto que no se ha producido la ruptura completa deseada con respecto al anterior régimen de retroacción del Código de Comercio en consideración a la naturaleza rescisoria de las acciones de reintegración. En este sentido, la influencia o la vinculación del Código de Comercio en la configuración de la acción rescisoria en la Ley Concursal es mayor de lo que podría parecer. Ello plantea un problema estructural y también un problema funcional. Un problema estructural porque la configuración de la acción rescisoria no se ha realizado conforme a la estructura técnica más adecuada de la rescisión desde un punto de vista teórico-jurídico. Ello supone, a su vez, un problema funcional porque, el hecho de que la acción no este correctamente configurada, dificulta su aplicación en relación con las operaciones económicas de intercambio, pues la rescisión determina la obligación de satisfacer el crédito frente a la contraparte de forma inmediata como deuda de la masa. Estas deficiencias inciden especialmente respecto de las garantías y los pagos. La manera en que está configurada la acción rescisoria en Derecho español conduce a que la posibilidad de que se plantee el ejercicio de la misma se incremente en relación con aquellos actos de disposición que consistan en la realización de pagos y en el otorgamiento de garantías, pues en estos casos se produce como consecuencia de la rescisión un incremento de la masa activa por efecto de la reintegración. La configuración de la acción rescisoria afecta de forma particularmente relevante a las refinanciaciones, ya que esta clase de operaciones implican normalmente el pago de obligaciones no vencidas y el otorgamiento de nuevas garantías. Por otro lado, la regulación de la acción rescisoria, al igual que la Ley Concursal, se dirige a lograr los fines tradicionales del Derecho de quiebras, esto es, la liquidación del patrimonio del concursado para la satisfacción colectiva de los acreedores. La referencia a la continuidad de la actividad del deudor que se hace en la Exposición de motivos de la Ley no se materializa de manera efectiva en el régimen que se establece. En materia rescisoria, no se establecían excepciones a la rescisión para facilitar acuerdos que puedan favorecer la solución de las dificultades económicas cuando una empresa todavía no es insolvente. A raíz de la crisis económica iniciada en 2008, se hicieron patentes las deficiencias señaladas en el tratamiento de la reintegración. Por un lado, suponía un obstáculo para llevar a cabo refinanciaciones para hacer posible la continuidad de las empresas solventes pero excesivamente endeudadas y, por otro, una vez declarado el concurso, la acción rescisoria resultaba poco efectiva por la consideración del crédito de la contraparte como deuda de la masa. La gravedad y la importancia sistémica de la crisis, en especial, en el sector financiero, han llevado a adoptar medidas urgentes y a establecer una regulación en el que los acuerdos de refinanciación que cumplan con los requisitos exigidos no puedan ser objeto de rescisión. Los problemas indicados en relación con la Ley Concursal y sus sucesivas reformas justifican el estudio de los ordenamientos de Derecho comparado. Por un lado, se analiza el Derecho italiano, que es el que presenta mayores similitudes con el Derecho español, que contiene un régimen rescisorio contrastado y que, a su vez, presenta una problemática que hasta cierto punto se asemeja a la que se encuentra en nuestro ordenamiento en la medida en que se ha configurado la acción rescisoria desde la perspectiva de los fines tradicionales del Derecho de quiebras. Por ello, el estudio del Derecho italiano se realiza de manera bastante pormenorizada para analizar las similitudes y el contraste con el Derecho español. Por otro lado, se hace un estudio del Derecho norteamericano. El interés de este ordenamiento consiste fundamentalmente en que el tratamiento de la rescisión no se hace desde los fines tradicionales del Derecho de quiebras, sino desde la perspectiva de la reestructuración de la empresa como forma de resolver las situaciones de dificultades económicas y los supuestos de insolvencia. Una vez expuesto el Derecho comparado, se analiza en detalle el Derecho español. En primer lugar, se compara el régimen vigente con el previsto en el Código de Comercio, para apreciar en qué medida ha influido en la configuración de la acción rescisoria en la Ley Concursal. A continuación se procede al estudio de los acuerdos de refinanciación. Se analiza la normativa introducida en las sucesivas reformas de la Ley Concursal y su incidencia en el tratamiento de la rescisión de las garantías, todo ello a partir de la evolución experimentada desde el año 2009 y, a su vez, en contraste con el Derecho italiano, por sus similitudes con la norma española, y con el Derecho norteamericano, en la que las refinanciaciones se regulan en el marco de un procedimiento concursal orientado a la reestructuración empresarial. Posteriormente, se analiza la cuestión de la contextualidad de las garantías y de su carácter oneroso o gratuito y, en particular, se estudia de forma detallada la rescisión de las garantías otorgadas entre sociedades pertenecientes al mismo grupo. También en esta parte, resulta de especial interés el contraste con el Derecho italiano. Para finalizar, se han tratado supuestos específicos de rescisión, como pueden ser la rescisión de las garantías otorgadas para asegurar el contrato de cuenta corriente y apertura de crédito o la especialidad del artículo 10 de la Ley del Mercado Hipotecario. La última parte está dedicada al estudio de los efectos de la rescisión, en consideración, naturalmente, a los supuestos en los que la rescisión tiene por objeto la constitución de garantías. El planteamiento metodológico de esta tesis doctoral responde a un planteamiento tradicional en el pensamiento jurídico que se dirige, por una parte, a facilitar la interpretación del Derecho positivo y, al mismo tiempo, pretende comprender y hacer una crítica del régimen vigente a partir de la experiencia comparada y de la teoría general del Derecho. Este planteamiento metodológico permite ofrecer una solución interpretativa a determinadas cuestiones que suscita el régimen vigente de las acciones rescisorias concursales y, sobre todo, trata de comprender cuáles son las razones por las que se plantean tensiones en Ley concursal en la regulación de la reintegración y su incidencia con respecto a las garantías. Al mismo tiempo, la relevancia del estudio de la rescisión desde esta perspectiva trasciende las cuestiones meramente teóricas o dogmáticas y contribuye a poner de manifiesto cómo las deficiencias en la forma en que se configura estructuralmente la acción rescisoria tiene trascendencia desde el punto de vista de política jurídica y presenta una incidencia significativa en consideración a los fines que se pretendan alcanzar. ; The companies have his its source of credit in the objective-patrimonial clcments that integrate the heritage of the managerial organization. Nonnally, a Iack of coordination takes place betwcen the vohnne and the ammrnt of the activity that they develop and tite credit nceds úiat he(she) carries and the wealth assets that assure the fulfillment of the obligations. The credit needs for Úle development of the mmiagerial aclivity ordinarily are superior to Úle patrimonial guarantees úiat cm1 be used for Úle coverage ofthe fulfillment ofthe collllnitments Urnt are assumed. In the moments in which a company is going through a situation of cconomic difficullies, there is usually an increase in credit, coupled with an unjustified or abusíve dermmd for guarantees. Likewise, the caunterparts of the entrepreneurs usually demand the granting of guarantees to maintain the relationships tlrnt are necessary for the continuity of the business acthity. For all these re,isons, when Uie bankmptcy is declared, ordinarily, the patrimonial elements of the assct free of charges may have been c-0nsiderably reduced and thc insufficient equity for the colleclive satisfaction of the unsecurcd crcdilors rnay have increased. In consideration of the problems that arise in úiis type of situation, in the traditional Bmlkruptcy Law, a series of cases were typified to facilítate Úle rescission of ú1c guarm1tees constituted in Úle period prior to the declaration of bankmptcy. With fuis kind of me,isures, it was intendcd to nullify thc grm1ting of füose guarantees that had been conslituted in an ahusive rnmmer. However, this mean! a restriction to access crcdit and to maintain. the relalionships, which in.creased the difficulties to contim,e the actiYity and avoid bankrnplcy. The rescission actions constitute a measure that poses an inescapable tension with the principie of legal security. Hence, the need for tite factual assumptions Urnt detennine Uiat rescission can procced, must be fully justificd and clearly defmed, from tite perspeclive ofthe purposes ofthc ordination of the bankcruptcy. In this regard, in Úle treatrnent of úie rescission of the guarantees created before the declaralion of insolvcncy and, in. general, of the rcfinancing and of the agreements rc,iched in situations of ecouonúc difficultics, it is necessary to achicve a difficult balance to facilitate the realization of !hose acts that are suitable to make possible the contirnúty of the cornpany and, at tite sarne time, so úrnt the abush•e acts and !hose tliat supposc an unjustificd decrease of füe assets of the insolvent one can be"ithout. The approval of the Bankruptcy Law in 2003 supposed to bring to a successful conclusion the proccss of reform of !lle insolvency regulalions, which mean! an irnprovement and the improvement, to a large eJ>ient, of ¡he centenary Bankruptcy L,iw in force in the Commercial Code. One of the most importan modifications introduccd by the Bankruptcy Law is úie rcpeal of the retrpactive aclion regirne and tite special rescission aclions provided for in articles 878 to 882 of the Commercial Code. Toe feedback determinet, in aocordance with the wording, tlle mrllity of ali those acts performed from the date to which the effects of the declaration of bankruptcy were retroactive. In turn, the rigor in the confíguration of the feedback prevented or rendered ineffective the application of special rescission actions. The Spanish Bankruptcy Law opts for the rescission techniqne as an instrument of reintegration. The normative configuration of the rescission action aims to objectify as muchas possible the exercise of the action, ami, for this pul]lOse, it is reqiúred as thc only assumptions that the act is bannful and that it is carried out in the two years prior to the declaration of insolvency. In thls scnse, it does not take into account the good faith of the counterparty or the insolvency situation of the debtor at the time of performing the act. 1n temJS of effects, the legislator foresees the consequences of temúnation only in respect of contracts, but not in respect of unilateral acts, sucb as pa)mcnts, nor does it give a specifíc treatment to accessory relationships sucb as tbe constitution of gnarnntees. Tbe qualification of tbe credit tbat arises in favor of tbe counterparty is qualifíed in any case as a credit against the estate, unless bad faith is shown, in wbicb c,ise the credit is considered as subordinate. In the c,ise of payments and guarantees, the credit wbose pa)menl is ternúnated or with respect to which the guarantee is tenninated, has the c-0rresponding qualifíc,ition in the tender, since this credit, as such, is not affected by the rescission. Tbe indetemúnacy aud misleading nonnative delimitation of tbe concept of harm, thc irrelevance of the subjective element of good faith and the inappropriate treatrnent of tbe effects show that the complete break desired has not occurred with respect to the previous regirne of retroaction of the Commercial Code in consideration of the rescission nature of the reintegration actions. In this sense, the influence or linkage of the Commercial Code in the configuration of the rescission action in the Baukruptcy Law is greater thao it might seern. This poses a structural problem and also a functional problern. A structural problern because the configuralion of the rescission actiou has uot been carried out according to the most appropriate techrucal structure of the rescission from a theorelic,il,juridical point of view. Tlús supposes, in tum, a fuuctional problem because, the fact that the action is not correctly configured, hinders its applicatiou in relatiou to the economic operations of exchange, since the terrnination deternúnes the obligation to satisfy the credit against the counterparty. Innnediate forrn as debt of the 111ass. These deficiencies have a particular impact 011 guarantees and payments. The mamier in which the rescission action is configured in Spanish Law leads to the possibility that the exercise of the same he raised in relation to those acts of dispositiou that consist in rnaking payments and granting guarantees, since in these cases, aut increase in the active mass due to reintegration occurs as a cousequence of the terminatiou. The configuration of the rescissiou action affects in a particularly relevan! way the refiuancing, since thls kind of operations nornrnlly involve tbe patment of uunrntured obligations and the grauting of new guarantees On the other hand, the regulation of the rescission action, like the Bankruptcy Law, is airned at achleving the traditional bankruptcy law purposes, that is, the liquidation of the bankrnpt's assets for the collective satisfactiou of the creditors. The reference to tbc continuity of tlte debtor's activity that is made in the Staternent of Motives of tbe Law does not rnaterialize effectively in the regime that is established. As regards rescission, no exceptio11S to termination were established to facilitate agreernents that may favor the solution of economic difficulties wheu a c-0rnpany is not yet insolvent. Following the ccouomic crisis that began in 2008, the deficiencies uoted in the treatrnent of reintegration became apparent. On the one hand, it was an obstacle to carrying out refinancing to make possible the continuity of the solvent but excessively indebted compmúes and, on the other hand, once the bm1kruptcy was declared, the rescissiou actiou was uot very effective due to the COIJSideratiou of the credit of the coU11terparty as debt of the mass. The severity and systemic irnportmicc of the crisis, especially in the financial sector, have led to the adoption of urgen! measures aud the establishment of a regulation in which refínaucing agreements that comply withthe required reqnirements cau uot be rescinded. The problems indicated in rclation to the Bankrnptcy Law and its successh-e reforms juslify the study of comparative law systerns. Ou the one hand, the Italian Law is analyzed, wlúch is the one that has greater similarities with Sparush Law, wbich c-011tains a contrasted rescission regime and which, in turn, presents a problem tlrnt to a certain extent resembles that found in our order to tl1e exteut that the rescission action has been configured from thc perspectirn of tl1e traditional purposes of bankn,ptcy law. For this rcason, the study of Italian Law is carried out in a very detailed way to analyze the similarities and the contras! wiU. Spanish Law. On the other hand, a study of NorUi American Law is made. The interest of this arder consists essentially in the fact that the rescission treatrnent is not done from the traditional bankmptcy law purposes, bnt from tbe perspectiye of U.e restructuring of tbe company as a way of resolving situations of econornic difficulties and the assumptions of insolvcncy. Once comparative law is exposed, Spanish law is analyzed in detail. In thefust place, the current regime is compared with the onc envisaged in the Commercial Code, in order to assess to what e"ient it has influenced the configuration of the rescission action in the Bankn1ptcy Law. Nex! wc proceed to the study of rcfimmeiI1g agreements. The regulations introdl!ced in thesl!ccessh'e amemlmen!s to the Bankruptcy Law and its impact on the treatment of the rescission of tbe guarantees are analyzed, ali from the evolution e,qx:rienced sine-e 2009 and, in 1nm, in contrast with Italian Law , by its similarities with the Spanish Law, and with the North American Law, in which thc refinanciI1g is regulated in the framework of a bankruptcy procccding aimed at corporate rcstructuring. Subsequently, the issue of the conte"iuality of the guarantees and thcir oncrous or gratuitous naturc is analyzed aud, in particular, tlte rescission of tite guarantees granted between companies belonging to the smne group is studied in de!ail. Also in this part, the contras!wilh ltalian law is of special interest. Finally, specific cases of rcscission llave been addressed, such as thc rcscission of tlte guarantees granted to secure the curren! acmunt and credit opening contract or tite specialty of articlc 10 LMH. Thc last part is devoted to the study of tite effects of the rcscission, in considcration, naturally, to the cases in which the termination is aimed at the constitution of guarm1tees. 11ie methodological approach of this PhD rcsponds to a traditional approach in legal thinking that aims, on the one hand, to facilitate the interprctation of positive law and, at thc same time, secks to understand and make a critique of the current regíme from the comparative e"-¡,eríence and tite general theory of Law. This methodological approach allows us to offer mi interpretative solution lo ccrtain íssues raised by the curren! regime of bankn1ptcy rescission actions and, above all, tries to understand what are the reasons for tensions a.rising in bmlkruptcy law in the regulation of reintegration and its incidence with respect to guarm1tecs. At thc same time, the relevance of the study of tite rescissíon from tltis perspective transcends tite merely theoretical or dogmatic issues and contributes to show how the deficiencies in tite way in which the rescission aetion is configured structurally have transccndence from the point ofview ofpolitics legal and has a significan! incidence in consideration oftlte pmposes lo be achieved.
Este libro contiene la selección de los mejores trabajos de investigación y desarrollo tecnológico postulados y presentados al CIINATIC2014. El Congreso Internacional en Innovación y Apropiación de las Tecnologías de la Información y las Comunicaciones - CIINATIC es una iniciativa de la Red de Decanos y Directores de Ingeniería de Sistemas y Afines del Nororiente Colombiano, red compuesta por las siguientes universidades: Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana Seccional Bucaramanga, Universidad Francisco de Paula Santander, Universidad Autónoma de Bucaramanga y Unisangil. En la versión de este año se contó con el patrocinio de Colciencias, la Gobernación de Santander y su Secretaria de tecnologías de la información y las comunicaciones. El libro ofrece una mirada a la Innovación y la Apropiación de las TIC en Colombia, desde la diversidad de los diferentes aportes incluidos. Todas las comunicaciones fueron evaluadas por pares académicos con reconocimiento y visibilidad internacional. Esperamos que este libro se constituya en un referente sobre el estado del arte de las TIC en el Oriente Colombiano. ; Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana (UPB) ; OTRI Estratégica Oriente ; Universidad del Magdalena ; Universidad de los Andes (ULA) ; Universidad Francisco de Paula Santander (UFPSC) ; Unisangil ; Universidad Industrial de Santander (UIS) ; SENA ; La identificación por radiofrecuencia en la gestión de la cadena de suministro: una mirada desde el laboratorio de logística UIS…. Capítulo 1 Análisis técnico basado en estándares internacionales para la implementación del Data Center de apoyo a la gestión tecnológica y de formación por competencias en el CEET del SENA Distrito Capital…… Capítulo 2 Voto electrónico con SSL/TLS e IPSEC…… Capítulo 3 Red abierta, libre y neutral para la ciudad de Cúcuta……. Capítulo 4 Implementación de una experiencia de usuario a través de una aplicación móvil para la personalización de productos usando realidad aumentada……. Capítulo 5 Aplicación del Webcast como estrategia de instrucción para el aprendizaje significativo en la enseñanza de Fisiología Médica…… Capítulo 6 Pruebas de seguridad en aplicaciones web como imperativo en la calidad de desarrollo del software……. Capítulo 7 Sistema de comunicación OFDM Óptico-Criptográfico…… Capítulo 8 Análisis de las principales amenazas de la base de datos utilizando MS SQL Server…… Capítulo 9 Entorno de aprendizaje para la toma de decisiones en sistemas dinámicos complejos……. Capítulo 10 Sistema de información web para la gestión investigativa de sistemas automatizados (SIGSA)…… Capítulo 11 Formación de formadores en Blended Learning…… Capítulo 12 Pensamiento ausubeliano en el paradigma constructivista articulado en las tecnologías de la información y la comunicación…… Capítulo 13 TIC y formación académica: una mirada desde los docentes de la UPB-Bucaramanga…… Capítulo 14 Estrategia digital para reducir el consumo de papel en la corporación autónoma regional del Chocó – CODECHOCO…… Capítulo 15 Algoritmos y sistemas instrumentados de seguridad y control distribuido para la automatización de los procesos en la planta piloto de la UNAB…. Capítulo 16 Detección de ataques de denegación de servicio basada en la estimación del ancho de banda disponible…… Capítulo 17 Plataforma NetFPGA para la clasificación de tráfico de red…. Capítulo 18 Educación en creatividad para la innovación y desarrollo tecnológico en ingeniería……. Capítulo 19 Lineamientos para definir estrategia para la gestión dinámico sistémica de la cooperación en proyectos de software libre…. Capítulo 20 Análisis de la teoría de la mente humana basada en el reconocimiento de patrones…… Capítulo 21 Una nueva forma de concebir la memoria: entre la filosofía de la mente y el aprendizaje automático. Capítulo 22 Aplicación de la educación formativa a las tecnologías de la información y la comunicación (TIC) y seguridad de la información digital…. Capítulo 23 Orientación de la fase preliminar de TOGAF para su aplicación en proyectos de arquitectura empresarial en universidades: revisión de literatura…. Capítulo 24 "IN" Seguridad de la información y delitos informáticos en Colombia……. Capítulo 25 Propuesta de redes para la implementación del observatorio A TIC…… Capítulo 26 Sistema de gestión de proyectos integradores para la facultad de ingeniería de sistemas e informática - Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana seccional Bucaramanga…. Capítulo 27 Modelo empírico que permite evaluar el rendimiento de la red LAN basada en el estándar Homeplug AV para la transmisión de voz sobre el protocolo IP…. Capítulo 28 Optimización de una red HAN sobre PLC mediante el uso de la teoría de juegos cooperativos en un escenario realista…. Capítulo 29 Adaptación del modelo LTI de canal PLC a las condiciones de la red eléctrica colombiana…. Capítulo 30 ; This book contains the selection of the best research and technological development papers postulated and selected for CIINATIC2014. The International Congress on Innovation and Appropriation of Information and Communication Technologies - CIINATIC is an initiative of the Network of Deans and Directors of Systems Engineering and Afin of the Colombian Northeast, a network made up of the following universities: Universidad Ponti fi cia Bolivariana Seccional Bucaramanga, Francisco de Paula Santander University, Autonomous University of Bucaramanga and Unisangil. This year's version was sponsored by Colciencias, the Government of Santander and its Secretariat for information and communication technologies. The book offers a look at the Innovation and Appropriation of ICT in Colombia, from the diversity of the different contributions included. All communications were evaluated by academic peers with international recognition and visibility. We hope that this book becomes a reference on the state of the art of ICT in the Colombian East.
n/a ; Timeline of key events: March 2011: Anti-government protests broke out in Deraa governorate calling for political reforms, end of emergency laws and more freedoms. After government crackdown on protestors, demonstrations were nationwide demanding the ouster of Bashar Al-Assad and his government. July 2011: Dr. Nabil Elaraby, Secretary General of the League of Arab States (LAS), paid his first visit to Syria, after his assumption of duties, and demanded the regime to end violence, and release detainees. August 2011: LAS Ministerial Council requested its Secretary General to present President Assad with a 13-point Arab initiative (attached) to resolve the crisis. It included cessation of violence, release of political detainees, genuine political reforms, pluralistic presidential elections, national political dialogue with all opposition factions, and the formation of a transitional national unity government, which all needed to be implemented within a fixed time frame and a team to monitor the above. - The Free Syrian Army (FSA) was formed of army defectors, led by Col. Riad al-Asaad, and backed by Arab and western powers militarily. September 2011: In light of the 13-Point Arab Initiative, LAS Secretary General's and an Arab Ministerial group visited Damascus to meet President Assad, they were assured that a series of conciliatory measures were to be taken by the Syrian government that focused on national dialogue. October 2011: An Arab Ministerial Committee on Syria was set up, including Algeria, Egypt, Oman, Sudan and LAS Secretary General, mandated to liaise with Syrian government to halt violence and commence dialogue under the auspices of the Arab League with the Syrian opposition on the implementation of political reforms that would meet the aspirations of the people. - On October 26, the Ministerial Committee held discussions in Damascus with President Assad. - The establishment of the Syrian National Council (SNC) in Istanbul, the first opposition coalition of different groups, but failed to gain international recognition because of deep divisions. November 2011: Syrian government agreed to implement a new Arab Action Plan (attached) endorsed by LAS Ministerial Council to end all acts of violence, release detainees, withdraw Syrian military and armed forces from cities, and ensure freedom of movement for journalists and observers throughout the country. -LAS Ministerial Council suspended the membership of Syria (November 16), and imposed economic sanctions (November 27) and some member states withdrew their ambassadors from Damascus, as it failed to comply with the Action Plan. December 2011: Negotiations with Damascus were resumed and an agreement is finally reached on the implementation of the Action Plan. LAS Observer Mission was deployed in Syria to monitor the implementation of the plan (December 24). - The Mission later submitted a report (attached) covering the period from 24 December 2011 to 18 January 2012 in accordance with the mandate conferred by the protocol concluded between the Syrian government and LAS. The report was divisive among the members of the Arab League, as it blamed both the regime and the opposition for the violence. January 2012: LAS Ministerial Council adopted resolution 7444 (attached) which called on the Syrian President to immediately hand over power to his deputy in order to begin the process of a political transition, which would include negotiations with the opposition, the formation of a national unity government, and the holding of elections. The resolution also, requested the Chair of the Arab Ministerial Committee and the Secretary General to brief the United Nations Security Council on the developments and get it to endorse the plan. - On January 22, Saudi Arabia withdrew its monitors, followed by the other GCC members on January 24. - On January 28, the Secretary-General of LAS announced the suspension of the activities of the observer mission, given the serious deterioration of the security situation. - On January 31, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr Al-Thani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar, Chair of the Arab Ministerial Committee and Dr. Nabil Elaraby, Secretary General of the League of Arab States briefed the Security Council (attached) on Arab efforts and called on the council to adopt a draft resolution submitted by Morocco, supporting Arab League resolution 7444 (which called on the Syrian President to hand over power to his deputy) February 2012: - On February 4, Russia and China vetoed a draft Security Council resolution (attached), tabled by Morocco (the Arab member of the Security Council) and others. - On February 12, the Arab League adopted its resolution 7446 (attached), practically "transferring the file" to the United Nations Security Council. - On February 16, the issue was taken to the General Assembly, which adopted its Resolution 66/253, calling-among other things- for the appointment of a Special Envoy. - On February 23, former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan was appointed as the Joint Special Envoy (JSE) of the United Nations and the League of Arab States on the Syrian crisis, to facilitate a peaceful Syrian-led and inclusive political solution. - On February 24, and upon the initiative of President Sarkozy of France, the first meeting of the Group of Friends of the Syrian People was held in Tunis, with the participation of more than 60 countries and representatives from the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the European Union, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Arab Maghreb Union and the Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf States to discuss the worsening situation in Syria. The group noted the Arab League's request to the United Nations Security Council to issue a resolution to form a joint Arab-UN peacekeeping force following a cessation of violence by the regime, and called on LAS to convene a meeting of all disparate opposition groups to agree on a clear statement of shared principles for a transition in Syria. The meeting recognized the SNC as a legitimate representative of Syrians seeking peaceful democratic change. Text of the Conclusions of the Meeting. March 2012: The SNC formed a military council to organize and unify all armed resistance. - The JSE, Kofi Anan, submitted a six-point peace plan to the UN Security Council (which the council adopted in April in its resolution 2042), that called for commitment to a Syrian-led political process, achieve an effective United Nations supervised cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties, ensure provision of humanitarian assistance, intensify the release of arbitrarily detained persons, ensure freedom of movement for journalists and respect the freedom of demonstrating peacefully. It was later approved by the Syrian government, and the opposition remained skeptical. April 2012: United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) was established by United Nations Security Council resolution 2043 (attached) initially for a 90-day period, to monitor a cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties and to monitor and support the full implementation of the Joint Special Envoy's six-point plan on ending the conflict in Syria. June 2012: The Action Group for Syria, with the participation of the Secretary Generals of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and the European Union High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, chaired by the JSE, met in Geneva and adopted the Geneva Final Communique (attached) which called for the establishment of a transitional governing body, with full executive powers, as part of the agreed principles and guidelines for a Syrian-led political transition. July 2012: The Syrian Opposition meeting was held under the auspices of LAS in Cairo, and reached an agreement on a national compact and a detailed transition plan. The two documents complemented the guidelines and principles laid out by the Action Group in Geneva. August 2012: UNSMIS mandate came to an end owing to an intensification of armed violence and use of heavy weapons. - Prime Minister Riad Hijab defected, and US President Obama's first direct threat of force against Syria, if Assad's regime deploys or uses chemical or biological weapons, calling such action a "red line" for the US. - Joint Special Envoy, Kofi Annan announced his resignation because of the Security Council failure to reach binding resolutions; Lakhdar Brahimi succeeded Annan as the Joint Special Representative of the United Nations and the League of Arab states for Syria (JSR). September 2012: Egypt hosted the high level preparatory meeting of the regional Quartet on Syria on September 10, which included Turkey and Saudi Arabia key backers of the Syrian Revolution, and Iran the major supporter of al-Assad regime, in an initiative to bring together regional powers to voice their positions on how to end the Syrian conflict. - On September 17, the Quartet's ministerial meeting took place in Cairo; Saudi Arabia opted out while Iran proposed a peace plan which called on all parties to cease violence and stop all financial and military support to the opposition, and suggested the deployment of observers from the quartet's nations to Syria. The participants failed to reach an agreement. October 2012: a four-day ceasefire attempt was announced towards late October, in respect to Eid al-Adha Holiday, which was breached on the first day in Homs, Aleppo and Damascus. November 2012: National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SOC) was formed in Qatar, responding to repeated calls from their Western and Arab supporters to create a cohesive and representative leadership, it excluded Islamist militias. December 2012: US, Britain, France, Turkey and Gulf states formally recognized SOC as "legitimate representative" of the Syrian people. January 2013: the Emir of Kuwait hosted the first pledging conference on Syria, international donors pledged more than $1.5bn to help civilians affected by the conflict in Syria. March 2013: LAS Ministerial Council adopted resolution 7595 (attached) to recognize SOC as the "sole legitimate representative" of the Syrian people and called on the SOC to establish an executive body to take up Syria's seat. April 2013: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State, released a recorded audio message announcing Jabhat al-Nusra as an extension of al-Qaeda in Iraq and Syria. The leader of al-Nusra, Abu Mohammad al-Joulani, refused the merger. Divisions among the jihadists emerged. - Hezbollah's involvement deepened when it led the ground assault on Al-Qusayr, a Sunni town in Homs province by the Lebanese border. August 2013: The Assad regime was accused of using chemical weapons in Eastern Ghouta to kill hundreds of civilians. The government denied using chemical weapons. President Obama sought congressional authorization for the use of force. September 2013: UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2118 (attached) requiring the Syrian regime to dismantle its chemical weapons arsenal by mid-2014, and avoid military strikes. December 2013: US and Britain suspended "non-lethal" support for rebels in northern Syria after reports Islamist rebels seized some bases of Western-backed Free Syrian Army. January 2014: the Geneva II Conference on Syria was held in Montreux on January 22, and attended by 37 states, 4 organizations and both Syrian parties. Iran was invited by SG Ban Ki- Moon on January 19, the Opposition declared its refusal to attend if Iran was not excluded, the US viewed Iran's invitation "as conditioned on Iran's explicit and public support for the full implementation of the Geneva Communique"; Iran refused any preconditions to the talks, and refused to endorse the Geneva Communique specially the transitional governing body. February 2014: two rounds of negotiations to discuss: 1- ending violence and 2-combating terrorism, 3-transitional governing body, national institutions, and 4- national reconciliation and national debate. The Syrian government refused to discuss a transitional government and insisted on discussing combating terrorism. The talks came to a halt. May 2014: JSR Brahimi announced his resignation because of the lack of progress and failure to agree on an agenda. - Iran proposed a political settlement of four points; a comprehensive cease-fire at national level, forming a national unity government consisting of the regime and the internal Syrian opposition, by transferring presidential powers to the government whereby the government will enjoy wide-ranging powers in years to come, and preparation for presidential and parliamentary elections. - Syrian rebels withdrew from the Old City of Homs, under an Iranian brokered deal and facilitated by the UN, after three years of Syrian government bombardment and siege. June 2014: President Assad held presidential elections, he was re-elected for another seven-year term allegedly winning 88.7% of the votes. July 2014: UN Secretary-General announced the appointment of Staffan de Mistura as his Special Envoy for Syria (SE)- NOT as a joint envoy with LAS. August 2014: US-led coalition began its airstrikes against the Islamic State in Iraq and expanded its strikes to Syria the following month, focusing on the city of Raqqa. September 2014: SE held his first round of consultations with concerned capitals, since taking up his office, it included his a visit to Damascus where he met with President Assad, senior officials and the tolerated internal Syrian opposition. October 2014: SE focused on establishing a series of local ceasefires, "freeze zones", starting with Aleppo, which aimed at the de-escalation of violence and allowance of the return of normalcy to it. February 2015: SE briefed the Security Council members on the 17th, announcing Syria's willingness to halt all aerial bombardment over Aleppo for a period of six weeks. It was not clear when would the freeze go into effect, reporting that a date would be announced from Damascus. June 2015: Egypt hosted the second Syrian Opposition meeting in Cairo, which excluded the National Coalition and announced a new road map to resolve the crisis which did not abolish Assad's government. July 2015: SE announced that his office would facilitate intra-Syrian working groups to generate a "Syrian-owned framework document" on the implementation of the Geneva Communiqué. Main themes of the groups were Safety and Protection for All, Political and Constitutional Issues, Military and Security Issues, and Public Institutions, Reconstruction and Development. September 2015: Russia conducted its first airstrikes against IS in Syria. The US and the Syrian Opposition claim it is targeting rebel-held areas instead. October 2015: First meeting of International Syria Support Group (ISSG) took place in Vienna, it included China, Egypt, the EU, France, Germany, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and the United States. They agreed on a nine-point plan, but still had substantial divisions on the future of Assad. It was the first time Iran and Saudi Arabia were brought to the same table. November 2015: Second meeting of the ISSG was held in Vienna adding LAS to its members. They set a time frame to prepare for a parallel ceasefire and political process by January 2016 that would lead to credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance within six months, followed by the drafting of a constitution and elections within 18 months. Jordan was tasked to develop a list of groups and individuals identified as terrorists, and Saudi Arabia to hold a meeting to unify the Syrian opposition and prep for the talks with the government. December 2015: - Syrian political and armed opposition factions met in Riyadh, to agree on a common position to negotiate with Syrian government, and resulted in the formation of the High Negotiating Committee (HNC). The main Kurdish group was excluded, while Islamist hardliners such as Jaysh Al-Islam and Ahrar Al-Sham were present. - The Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) joined the follow-up meeting of the ISSG in New York, Saudi Arabia and Jordan briefed the group on their tasks. There was no agreement on the list of identified terrorists, especially with Russia's insistence on adding Ahrar Al-Sham to the list, which is considered pivotal to the unified Opposition bloc. - UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2254 (attached) which reaffirmed the road map set out by the ISSG and urged the Support Group to apply pressure on the Syrian parties to put an immediate end to the indiscriminate use of weapons against civilians, and allow unimpeded access to humanitarian aid convoys. January 2016: the SE sent out invitations to the Syrian participants, in accordance with the parameters outlined in Security Council resolution 2254, to start on the 25th with proximity talks and had expected to last for six months. The HNC requested assurances of goodwill from the government as precondition to beginning of talks, such as release of prisoners or lifting of sieges. February 2016: Talks were delayed and lasted two days before they were suspended for three weeks. - The ISSG met on the margins of the Munich Security Conference and decided that humanitarian access will commence same week of meeting to besieged areas, and an ISSG task force would elaborate within one week modalities for a nationwide cessation of hostilities. - The US and Russia announced the adoption of the terms for a cessation of hostilities in Syria, and proposed that the cessation of hostilities commence at 00:00 (Damascus time) on February 27, 2016. The cessation of hostilities does not apply to "Daesh", "Jabhat al-Nusra", or other terrorist organizations designated by the UN Security Council. - The Security Council endorsed the announcement in its resolution 2268 (attached). March 2016: SE announced March 9 set as target date of resumption of talks in Geneva. On March 14, SE resumed the intra-Syrian proximity talks in Geneva, which mainly discussed procedural matters to reach a shared list of principles and relied on Security Council resolution 2254 as its agenda. - SE briefed the Security Council on the cessation of hostilities which lowered overall levels of violence and more than 238,000 people had been reached with humanitarian aid. - On the same day, President Putin announced the withdrawal of most Russian forces from Syria, after it had largely fulfilled their objectives in Syria, and SE stated that it would have a positive impact on the negotiations. - On March 17, the PYD announced the establishment of a federal system in Kobane, Afrin and Cizire cantons in northern Syria, and its Constituent Assembly of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria-Rojava (DFNS) announced its final declaration. Both the Syrian government and other opposition affiliates denounced the plan, as well as the United States. - On March 24, the SE ended the first round by submitting a paper on the commonalities between the Syrian sides regarding the future of Syria and would help structure the next round that would address political transition. - Syrian government forces retook Palmyra from the Islamic State, with Russian air assistance. April 2016: The SE paid visits to Amman, Beirut, Damascus and Tehran ahead of the new round of talks. - The third round of proximity talks were set to start on April 13, which coincided with the parliamentary elections in the government-controlled areas in Syria. The SE met with the High Negotiations Committee delegation (Syrian Opposition) in Geneva and was expected to meet with the Syrian Government delegation within the following days. - During the 13-27 April round of negotiations, the SE developed a Mediator's Summary that identified eighteen points necessary to move forward on political transition arrangements. - on April 28, airstrikes in Aleppo on al-Quds hospital supported by both Doctors Without Borders and the International Committee of the Red Cross, which killed dozens of civilians and medical personnel. May 2016: The Security Council adopted unanimously resolution 2286 (attached) which called for the protection of civilians and medical facilities during armed conflict. - On May 4, the US-Russia brokered a 48-hour ceasefire in which helped reduce the violence, and was later extended for another 72 hours. - On May 9, France held a ministerial Friends of Syria meeting in "Paris Format", attended by the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, the European Union, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and Jordan, and issued a statement that called on the resumption of negotiations, unimpeded access of humanitarian assistance and the implementation of international law obligations to the protection of civilians. - Later on the same day, the United States and Russia issued a joint statement on Syria to reconfirm their commitment to intensify their efforts to implement a nationwide ceasefire and promote humanitarian assistance in accordance to security council resolution 2254. - On May 17, the fourth meeting of the ISSG took place in Vienna and reaffirmed its determination to strengthen the cessation of hostilities, to ensure full and sustained humanitarian access in Syria, and to ensure progress toward a peaceful political transition. Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands and Spain joined the group. June 2016: The SE announced that the time is not yet right for a resumption of the intra-Syrian talks because of the escalation of violence in Aleppo, Idlib, Latakia and other rural areas around Damascus, but the intention is to begin an official third round as soon as possible. - Riad Hijab, the Coordinator of the Opposition High Negotiations Committee, proposed a nationwide truce throughout the month of Ramadan. - On June 16, Jan Egeland Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria announced that 16 of the 18 besieged areas have been reached since the humanitarian taskforce started in late February. - On June 21, the SE briefed the United Nations General Assembly on the situation in Syria regarding the cessation of hostilities and humanitarian assistance access, as for the resumption of talks, it is yet to be decided and the OSE currently holds technical meetings with the parties on core issues. July 2016: - On July 6, the Syrian army declared a three-day nationwide "regime of calm" in respect to Eid al-Fitr holidays nonetheless pro-regime forces continued to engage in clashes and airstrikes across the country, particularly near the flashpoints of Damascus and Aleppo City. - On July 14, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow to discuss a proposal for bilateral military cooperation in the Syria; The proposal calls for the establishment of a 'Joint Implementation Group' (attached) based in Amman, Jordan to "support deliberate targeting" of Syrian Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra and "maximize independent but synchronized efforts" against ISIS in Syria, according to a draft memorandum leaked by the Washington Post. - On July 25, Stephen O'brien, the Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, briefed the security council (attached) on the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Aleppo due to the escalation of violence over the Castello Road, the last access route in and out of eastern Aleppo, and the continuous attacks on medical facilities. O'brien called on the security council not to allow turning Aleppo into another besieged area where 250,000 to 275,000 people reside, and called to establish a weekly, 48-hour humanitarian pause to enable humanitarian aid deliveries across borders. - On July 28, the Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu announced, right after the Syrian government announced it has cut off the Castello Road and encircled the city of Aleppo, setting up three humanitarian corridors in Aleppo City to allow in food and medical aid, and help people flee the besieged city; the fourth corridor would be established in northern Aleppo near the Castello Road to allow the withdrawal of armed insurgents, and appealed to the Syrian government to provide guarantees to the amnesty provided to rebels to lay down their weapons. - On the same day, Abu Mohammed al-Julani, Jabhat al-Nusra's Leader announced split from al- Qaeda and mentioned that its new name would be Jabhet Fateh al-Sham, in order to get the group off the terrorist list and "to remove the excuse used by the international community – spearheaded by America and Russia – to bombard and displace Muslims in the Levant: that they are targeting al-Nusra Front, which is associated with al-Qaida". - On July 29, the SE commented on the Russian initiative in a press stakeout, that it should take into consideration a few improvements such as putting the 48-hour humanitarian pause into place on a sustainable basis irrespective of the humanitarian corridors; and suggested "to actually leave the delivery of aid through corridors to the UN and its partners"; and stressed that civilians should leave voluntarily, and given the option of leaving to areas of their own choice. August 2016: - On August 1, a Russian helicopter was downed near Saraqeb, in rebel-held Idlib province, on its way back to Russia's main air base in Hmyeim in the western province of Latakia, killing the five Russian military personnel on board. The downing of the helicopter marked the single deadliest event for Russia since its air campaign began in Syria on September 29, 2015. No group claimed the shooting down of the helicopter. - Since then, Russian warplanes conducted retaliatory airstrikes against several small opposition-held areas in the vicinity of Saraqeb. Syrian rebels accuse Russia of using incendiary munitions while conducting airstrikes against Idlib City on August 7, suggesting that Russia intended to achieve punitive and deterrent effects against opposition forces in the province. - In the early weeks of August, rebel forces launched a major assault, known as the "battle for Aleppo", on government-held southwestern towns of Aleppo City, to break the siege, and control supply lines in the south connected to eastern Aleppo. They claimed breaking the siege and capturing Ramouseh Artillery Academy, parts of the cement plant and Khan Touman-Ramouseh road. Intense fighting between warring parties continues to claim control over previously lost vicinities. - On August 9, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Turkish President Recep Tayip Erdogan in St. Petersburg, after the Turkish President officially apologized for the downing of a Russian military aircraft on June 27, 2016, and announced during a press conference that they discussed lifting of Russia's ban on imports of Turkish products, resumption of charter flights, the Turkish Stream project, Syrian settlement, and anti-terrorism efforts. - On August 10, Lieutenant-General Sergei Rudskoi, a senior Russian Defence Ministry official, announced a daily three-hour ceasefires in Aleppo, starting August 11, to allow humanitarian convoys enter the city safely, and would run from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. local time. - On August 16, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that Russian aircrafts took off from Iranian airbase Hamedan to carry out airstrikes on ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra-held facilities in the provinces of Aleppo, Idlib and Deir ez-Zour. - On August 18, the SE adjourned the HTF meeting as humanitarian convoys could not reach any of the besieged towns during the month, and called for at least a 48 hour humanitarian pause in Aleppo to deliver UN humanitarian assistance, through the Castello Road, to all parts of Aleppo City. - Also, on August 18, the Syrian government forces, unprecedentedly, launched strikes against Kurdish forces in Hasakeh in Northern Syria, after pro-government National Defense Forces (NDF) were engaged in clashes with the military wing of the Kurdish Workers Party, known as Asayish. The Syrian government claimed that "Asayish had escalated their acts of provocation attacking state establishments, stealing oil and cotton, disrupting examinations, carrying out abductions, and causing a state of chaos and instability, in addition to targeting positions of the Syrian Arab Army which required a suitable response by the Army as it targeted the sources of artillery fire and the gatherings of armed elements responsible for these criminal actions." - On August 19th, while the Kurdish fighters pushed back government forces and their allies, the Pentagon threatened to shoot down Syrian government aircrafts as they pose a threat to the US Special Forces deployed in the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) area. - On August 21, it was announced that a truce agreement had been reached between YPG and NDF, through Russian mediation, to start on August 21, 2016 at 17:00, which involved evacuating the wounded and transporting them to hospitals in Qamishli, and restore the situation to how it was prior to the clashes and hold talks on August 22 to resolve the remaining unresolved issues. - On August 22, most likely the ceasefires agreement failed as fighting escalated. - On August 24, Turkey and the International Coalition Air Forces launched "Operation Euphrates Shield" offenses to support the Free Syrian Army aligned with U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces SDF against IS militants in Jarablus, in northern Syria. - On August 26, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, addressing a joint press conference after their meeting in Geneva, announced that they failed to reach a breakthrough deal on military cooperation and a nationwide cessation of hostilities in Syria, saying they still have issues to resolve before an agreement could be announced. - On August 27, Kurdish militias targeted Diyarbakir airport in southeast Turkey, near the borders with Syria. Turkey retaliated by warplanes and artillery on targets held by Kurdish-backed forces the following day, despite US pentagon's criticism of the fighting. September 2016: - On September 4, Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildrim announced that Turkish military forces and Ankara-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) had successfully purged the border region, from Azaz to Jarablus, from "terrorist organizations." - On September 9, the US and Russia reached a deal which called for a nationwide ceasefire in Syria, and unimpeded humanitarian access to all besieged areas starting on September 12th. If sustained for seven continuous days, the U.S. and Russia would establish a Joint Implementation Center (JIC) in order to share intelligence and coordinate airstrikes against both ISIS and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra). - On September 21, the cessation of hostilities deal was implemented with regular violations, while the Syrian government continued to block humanitarian access to opposition-held districts of Eastern Aleppo City despite the agreement. - On September 17, the US-led coalition accidentally launched an air strike on Syrian government forces in Deir ez-Zour. - On September 19, a UN humanitarian convoy was shelled near Urum al-Kubra near Aleppo, killing 20 humanitarian aid workers and drivers, and destroying 18 out of 31 trucks. The US blamed Russia and the Syrian government for the attack; the latter declared unilaterally the end of the ceasefire agreement. - On September 20, the UN temporarily suspended its humanitarian aid to Syria after the attack, while international powers failed to reach a consensus to restore the ceasefire during an acrimonious UN Security Council Meeting on September 21st as well as two separate meetings of the International Syria Support Group on September 20 and September 22. - On September 22, the Syrian government announced a new military offensive in the rebel-held eastern Aleppo, and further escalation in a bombing campaign by Russian and Syrian airstrikes that had already intensified the day before. - On September 25, the Security Council Meeting discussed the recent escalation of violence in Aleppo after the Syrian government announced its intention to retake all of Aleppo City, and the SE called on the Security Council to "to press for a cessation of violence, and for the protection of civilians, and the civilian infrastructure; secondly to press for weekly 48-hour pauses in the fighting to ensure that the United Nations and its partners can reach eastern Aleppo, without preconditions from either the Government or the Opposition; and thirdly to press for medical evacuations of urgent cases." - On September 27, the Syrian government launched a large scale ground offensive in eastern Aleppo, and state media announced that it recaptured the central district of Al-Farafirah northwest of the Aleppo Citadel. - On September 29, the YPG set conditions to participate in operations to seize IS-held Raqqa City: the US provides arms to the YPG, recognizes its autonomy of the Federation of Northern Syria, and ensures that the Syrian Kurds are officially invited to participate in peace talks. October 2016: - On October 1, continuous airstrikes in eastern Aleppo damaged a major hospital codenamed M10, which was partially closed because of the raids. - On October 2, Stephen O'brien, the Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, urged warring parties and their supporters to bring about a cessation of all hostilities, a medical evacuation system for eastern Aleppo, and regular unimpeded humanitarian access to eastern Aleppo, and he reiterated his plea to the Security Council for a 48-hours weekly humanitarian pause in fighting, at the very least. - In an official statement, the Syrian Army offered amnesty to fighters and their families to leave Aleppo under guarantee of safe passage to other rebel-held areas, after the Syrian regime forces recaptured strategic areas on the northern outskirts of the city. - On October 3, the EU announced an emergency humanitarian initiative for Aleppo, in cooperation with the United Nations and civil society organizations, in order to facilitate the urgent delivery of basic life-saving assistance to civilians in eastern Aleppo, and ensure medical evacuations with focus on women, children and the elderly. The EU has mobilized 25 million euros to support its humanitarian partners' response to cover medical, water and sanitation, and food assistance in Aleppo. The HNC issued a statement welcoming the European initiative to protect civilians in Aleppo. - The Security Council began negotiations over a draft resolution, circulated by France and Spain, which demanded all parties to the Syrian conflict "implement and ensure full implementation of cessation of hostilities, including an end to all aerial bombardments", and called on the US and Russia to "undertake joint efforts to stabilize the situation in Syria, with special measures for the Aleppo region", as well as the UN Secretary-General to propose options for a UN-supervised monitoring mechanism of the ceasefire and to "take further measures" in case of non-compliance of any party, without invoking chapter 7 of the UN Charter. The French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault headed to Moscow and Washington to push for a vote on the draft resolution. - The United States suspended talks with Russia on trying to end the violence in Syria and accused Moscow of not complying with its commitments under the ceasefire agreement and would withdraw all personnel that were dispatched to prepare for military cooperation with Russia. - On October 4, Prince Zeid Ra'ad, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, warned over the use of incendiary weapons in Syria, and demanded bold initiatives such as limiting the use of the veto by the permanent members of the Security Council to refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Russia rejected Zeid's call. - The Russian Defense Ministry declared its deployment of S-300 missile system to its Tartus naval base in Syria. - On October 6, the SE offered in a press conference to escort up to 1000 al-Nusra fighters to bring an end to the bombardment by Russian and Syrian forces to Idlib or anywhere else of their choice. While the Russian Defense Ministry announced it would shoot down US-led coalition jets if the US launches airstrikes against pro-government forces in Syria, after American officials had discussed using limited airstrikes to force government forces to halt its raids on Aleppo. - On October 7, Russia called for a Security Council emergency meeting to hear the SE's briefing (attached) on the situation in Aleppo, while the Russian Parliament ratified Moscow's deal with Syria on its "indefinite" deployment of forces. - On October 8, the Security Council held a meeting on Aleppo, and voted on the Russian-drafted resolution calling for the revival of the ceasefire deal, without mention of ending military fights in the city, and on the French-drafted resolution. The French draft received eleven votes in favor, China and Angola abstained, while Russia and Venezuela voted against. The Russian text only received four votes in favor of China, Egypt and Venezuela, Angola and Uruguay abstained, while the remaining nine council members voted against. - On October 9, France announced its intention to call the ICC for war crimes investigation in Syria, and shall contact the ICC Prosecutor on how to launch these investigations, putting into consideration that the only way is through the Security Council referral, which had been vetoed before by Russia in May 2014. - On October 13, the Deputy Special Envoy for Syria Ramzy Ezzeldin Ramzy confirmed the Syrian Government's approval of the October aid plan and for convoys to reach 25 of 29 besieged and hard-to-reach areas across Syria, but not to eastern Aleppo and three parts of the rural Damascus province. - On October 15, US Secretary of State John Kerry hosted a meeting on Syria in Lausanne, with the participation of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and seven foreign ministers from the region, from Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Jordan and Egypt, with the presence of the SE. The meeting failed to reach a joint statement on how to end the bombardment of Aleppo or on the aid delivery to the besieged towns. - On October 16, the UK's Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson held a meeting with his US, French and German counterparts and "like-minded" Gulf Arab states on the Syrian conflict in London. The UK and the US announced their consideration of imposing more sanctions against Russia and the Syrian Government to halt their ongoing raids on Aleppo. - On October 17, the European Council condemned the Syrian regime and Russia for their deliberate and indiscriminate bombardment of civilians and infrastructure in Eastern Aleppo, and called for a monitored cessation of hostilities, lift of sieges, and a nationwide sustainable humanitarian access. - On October 18, the Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu announced the cease of Russian and Syrian airstrikes on Aleppo to hold an 8-hour humanitarian pause on October 20th, in order to allow civilians and medical evacuations through six humanitarian corridors, and expected militants would withdraw with their weapons through two corridors, one via the Castello Road and the other near the souq al-Hai area in the south of the city. It was later announced that the eight-hour pause will be extended to eleven hours for four days. The armed opposition groups (AOGs) rejected the proposal in a joint statement claiming that "the initiative came at the same time as forced displacement operations are being carried out by the Assad regime in the Damascus suburbs of al-Mouadamiya, Qudsiya and al-Hama, and before that in Daraya." - On October 20, in conclusion of the EU summit, the EU failed to reach an agreement on imposing sanctions on Russia for the escalation of violence in Aleppo, and stated that "the EU is considering all available options should the current atrocities continue." The unilateral ceasefire took effect, and the Syrian Army declared that it would last for three days while artillery exchanges erupted around a crossing point near the rebel-controlled Bustan al-Qasr district shortly after the pause began. The Secretary-General and the SE briefed the General Assembly in an informal session on the situation in Syria, in response to an initiative led by Canada, after the Security Council failed to take action to end the aerial bombardment on Aleppo and revive peace efforts. - On October 21, the United Nations Human Rights Council held a special session on the deteriorating situation of human rights in Aleppo, upon the request of Britain (letter attached) that was submitted on behalf of a core group of 11 Western and Arab states. The Council adopted a resolution by a 24 in favor vote, seven against and 16 abstentions. It urged "the immediate implementation of the cessation of hostilities, and demanded that the regime and its allies put an immediate end to all aerial bombardments of and military flights over Aleppo city. The Council demanded that all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities and its supporters, promptly allowed rapid, safe, unhindered and sustained humanitarian access, including across conflict lines and borders." The Council further "requested the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic to conduct a comprehensive, independent special inquiry into the events in Aleppo, and identify all those responsible for alleged violations and abuses of international human rights law. It further requested the Commission of Inquiry to support efforts to ensure that perpetrators of alleged abuses and violations be held accountable, and to provide a full report of the findings of its special inquiry to the Human Rights Council no later than its thirty-fourth session." - On October 22, the humanitarian pause expired without any evacuations made and without further renewal despite the UN request. No medical evacuations had been made as no security guarantees had not been granted as requested by the UN. - On October 23, Turkey intensified its strikes targeting IS militants and Kurdish YPG forces in the town of al-Bab, in an attempt to sweep them away from its borders. The Turkish-backed FSA gained control over three areas of Tuways, al-Gharz and Tlatinah south of Akhtarin in northern Aleppo two days later. - On October 25, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov stated Moscow's willingness to restore the ceasefire in Aleppo and that the Western-backed opposition forces should be separated from terrorist groups in order to be able to move forward; after the UN had blamed all parties for the failure of evacuating injured people in Eastern Aleppo during the three-day ceasefires and called for "a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire so that life-saving humanitarian activities, including medical evacuations, can resume," meanwhile the Syrian Ambassador to Moscow ruled out any opportunity to restore the ceasefires. - On October 26, a school in the village of Haas, in rebel-held Idlib, was hit by a raid of airstrikes, causing the death of twenty-two children and six teachers. The UN Secretary-General called for an immediate investigation on this attack, as it could amount as war crimes if deliberate. Russia denied its responsibility and claimed that the damage was not consistent with an airstrike. - On October 27, Virginia Gamba, the head of the UN-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism, presented the mechanism's findings to the Security Council. The report indicated that of the nine cases the JIM investigated, the Syrian regime used chlorine gas against civilians in three cases and the IS used mustard gas in one case. In the remaining five cases, the JIM investigated allegations that the government dropped chlorine bombs in rebel-held areas. While the JIM could not make a conclusive determination in three of these five cases, it was able to establish that government airstrikes had occurred and the presence of a toxic substance, but it was unable to fully determine the link between the two, or the actors responsible. Russian Ambassador Vitaly Churkin questioned the JIM's findings, and expressed reservations over the US-draft resolution to extend the mandate of the mechanism for another year, which would end on 31 October 2016. - The EU added ten top Syrian officials to its sanctions list who are held responsible for "violent repression against the civilian population in Syria." - On October 28, Syrian rebels relaunched Aleppo counter-attack aiming to break the siege imposed on Eastern Aleppo. The factions included the FSA and Jaish al-Fath targetting government-held Western Aleppo. - Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem met with his Russian and Iranian counterparts in Moscow to discuss counterterrorism, the cessation of hostilities and improvement of humanitarian operations, and the resumption of the intra-Syrian talks. The three ministers held a joint press conference following their meeting. - On October 30, SE condemned Syrian rebels for the indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas in Western Aleppo, raising the number of casualties in the last 48 hours. - On October 31, the Security Council extended the mandate of the UN-OPCW JIM until November 18, 2016. November 2016: - On November 1, in a teleconference with the leaders of the Russian Armed Forces, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu mentioned that Russia had halted air strikes on eastern Aleppo for 16 days, following western criticism over a Russian-Syrian government assault that killed civilians and destroyed infrastructure. - On November 2, DM Shoigu announced that it would enforce a 10-hour humanitarian pause in Aleppo on November 4, to allow civilians and fighters to exit the city through eight safe corridors. - On November 4, despite the announced unilateral ceasefire in Aleppo, there were no sign of civilians or fighters leaving the city, and opposition fighters vowed to continue fighting to break the siege. - On November 6, the SDF declared the launch of Operation "Wrath of the Euphrates" in the IS capital of Raqqa, which aimed at surrounding and isolating the city as an initial phase, in coordination with the US-led coalition airstrikes. The SDF had rejected any Turkish role to liberate the city. - On November 8, the Russian Defense Minister Shoigu announced that the first attack from the Admiral Kuznetsov, the aircraft carrier, and heavily armed escort ships were to bomb rebel positions in Aleppo. - On November 10, Jan Egeland, Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria, declared in a press stakeout following the weekly HTF meeting that Eastern Aleppo had run out of food rations, and that the UN had proposed an initiative of four elements which included delivery of food and medical supplies, medical evacuations and access for health workers. - On November 11, the OPCW Executive Council condemned all parties for the use of chemical weapons in Syria, after voting on a US-tabled text in a closed session. The text was supported by 28 members, including Germany, France, the United States and Britain; it was opposed by Russia, China, Sudan and Iran, and there were nine abstentions. - On November 15, Russia launched its "major operation" targeting the IS and Jabhat al-Nusra's positions in Idlib and Homs provinces. Heavy airstrikes and barrel bombs pounded Eastern Aleppo after the pause declared by Russia and the Syrian Government on October 18. It is considered the first mission operated from the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov. - The Third Committee of the UN General Assembly adopted a draft resolution tabled by Saudi Arabia on the human rights situation in Syria, by a vote of 116 in favor, to 15 against with 49 abstentions. It called upon the Syrian regime and the IS to cease using chemical weapons, and stop their attacks on civilians. - On November 17, the UN Security Council adopted the US-draft resolution to extend the mandate of the UN-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism to 18 November 2017. - On November 20, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem held talks with the SE in Damascus, on the latest escalation of violence, the targeting of medical facilities and infrastructure, and the humanitarian initiative in Eastern Aleppo. The UN proposal of the withdrawal of al-Nusra fighters while maintaining the opposition's local administration of Eastern Aleppo; the proposal was rejected by the Syrian Government and called it a violation of "national sovereignty". - On November 23, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean Ayrault announced that France would hold a meeting on Syria early December 2016. - On November 24, Jan Egeland Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria briefed the press on the HTF meeting and the assistance deliveries of the month of November, not being able to reach besieged areas because of the absence of government approvals for convoys to enter and the escalation of violence. Egeland stated that the UN had received written approvals of the AOGs in eastern Aleppo and Russian support of the UN four-point plan, and still waiting for the government's approval. - On November 27, the rebels in Khan al-Shih town, in the outskirts of Damascus, handed in their weapons, as part of a local agreement with the Syrian government to withdraw to rebel-held Idlib province, so as government siege would be lifted. It was the only town not under government control on a major supply route from Damascus to Quneitra, in southern Syria. - On November 29, Egypt, New Zealand and Spain put in blue their draft resolution calling to put an end to all attacks on Aleppo, and allow unimpeded humanitarian access for the period of 7-days with consideration of further extension. The draft was later vetoed on 5 December by Russia and China, Venezuela voted against, and Angola abstained. It is Russia's sixth veto on a Syria draft resolution, and China's fifth veto. - After the Acting High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Kim Won-soo briefed Council members during Syria's chemical weapons consultations; the P3 announced they would circulate a draft resolution to impose sanctions on Syria for its use of chemical weapons against its own population. - On November 30, upon the request of France and the UK to hold an emergency meeting on Aleppo, SE Staffan de Mistura, USG Emergency Relief Coordinator Stephen O'brien and UNICEF Regional Director Geert Cappelaere briefed the Security Council on the situation in Aleppo, who agreed on the growing number of civilians fleeing eastern Aleppo and the dire need for safe humanitarian access. December 2016: - On December 1, ten AOGs announced the formation of 'Jaysh Halab' in Eastern Aleppo, in an attempt to unite their efforts to lift the siege and restore the districts where the pro-government militias took over in northeast and east Aleppo. It was led by Abu Abdul Rahman Nour, a senior commander in 'Jabhat al-Sham'. While Jan Egeland, Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria, and the SE briefed the press on the humanitarian situation in Aleppo after the HTF meeting; they mentioned that over 400,000 IDPs are in west Aleppo, and UN convoys reached reached all towns under the Four-Towns Agreement, including Madaya, al-Foua and Kafraya, and Zabadani, and that the December Plan was yet to be approved by the Syrian government. - On December 3, the Syrian armed forces and its supporting militias advanced into east Aleppo, taking over 60 percent of the city that was once under rebel control since mid-2012. More than 80,000 civilians fled the area since the beginning of the regime's offense on November 15. - On December 7, AOGs called for a five-day ceasefire in Aleppo, and medical and civilian evacuations without mentioning the withdrawal of their fighters as demanded by Moscow and Damascus. Meanwhile, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Germany to discuss the evacuation of opposition-held districts of Eastern Aleppo, and no agreement was reached. While leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the UK and the United States released a joint statement on the situation in Aleppo calling for an immediate ceasefire and the resumption of political negotiations. - On December 8, the SE briefed the Security Council in closed consultations after the Russian announcement that it paused its operations in eastern Aleppo to allow the evacuation of civilians. Jan Egeland had said, after the weekly HTF meeting, that the co-chairs are "poles apart" on a united humanitarian diplomacy. IS launched a major offensive on Palmyra, seizing a number of gas fields in the north and few mountains in the south. - On December 9, the General Assembly adopted the Canadian-drafted resolution A/RES/71/130, which calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the implementation of resolutions 2268 and 2254. The resolution passed by a vote of 122 to 13, with 36 abstentions. Russia, Iran and China opposed the resolution. - On December 10, Paris hosted a meeting of "like-minded" counterparts on Syria; it brought together US Secretary of State John Kerry, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson and Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, along with Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. They discussed the humanitarian situation, and called for a ceasefire and a post Aleppo plan, as Syrian government forces neared victory over rebels there. - On December 11, ISIS recaptured the city of Palmyra in Eastern Homs Province forces despite heavy air support provided by Russia. - On December 13, the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon briefed the Security Council on the situation in Aleppo, the growing number of IDPs and allegations of torture and executions. Meanwhile, AOGs agreed to evacuate their remaining positions in eastern Aleppo after the Syrian government recaptured the city and following an agreement between Russia and Turkey. The evacuation was initially scheduled to take place on 14 December, but was delayed after Iran called for simultaneous evacuations from the besieged Shi'a-majority towns of Fu'ah and Kafraya in Idlib Province. - On December 15, the LAS held an emergency meeting at the level of representatives, based on Qatar's request, and adopted resolution 8105 condemning the attacks on civilians in Eastern Aleppo. - On December 19, the Security Council unanimously adopted the French-drafted resolution 2328 which demanded that the UN and other relevant agencies to carry out adequate and neutral monitoring of evacuations from eastern Aleppo, ensure the deployment of staff members for this purpose, and emphasized that the evacuations of civilians must be voluntary and to final destinations of their choice. Also, the LAS Ministerial Council welcomed resolution 8106 reiterating the necessity to establish a full cease-fire in Aleppo in accordance with the Security Council resolution 2328, and condemned terrorism in all its forms and crimes committed against civilians by ISIS, Fateh al- Sham Front, and that actions of both the Syrian regime and other militant groups may amount to war crimes. - Following the adoption of resolution 2328, the Office of the Special Envoy for Syria announced "the intention of the United Nations to convene the intra-Syrian negotiations mandated by Security Council resolution 2254 in Geneva on 8 February 2017." - On December 20th, the foreign and defense ministers of Russia, Turkey and Iran held parallel trilateral meetings in Moscow, despite the assassination of the Russian Ambassador to Turkey Andrey Karlov on December 19, and adopted the "Moscow Declaration" by which they agreed to act as guarantor powers for a peace accord between the Syrian government and the opposition. - On December 21, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution establishing a mechanism to assist in the investigation of serious crimes committed in Syria since 2011. The resolution received 105 votes for, with 52 abstentions, and 15 votes against (Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Burundi, China, Cuba, DPRK, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Nicaragua, Russia, South Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe). The UN Secretary-General submitted the report of the UN Headquarters Board of Inquiry that was established to investigate the humanitarian convoy incident in Urum al-Kubra on 19 September 2016., which stated that there is no enough evidence to conclude that the convoy was deliberately attacked. - On December 22, the Syrian army announced its full control over Aleppo, after the evacuations of the remaining rebel fighters. Evacuations had faced many delays because of Iran's demands to evacuate 1500 individuals from the opposition-besieged towns of Zabadani and Madaya. On the following day, the Russian military deployed a battalion to clear the city from improvised explosive devices. - On December 23, USG Stephen O'brien briefed the Security Council, upon the request of France, "on the modalities of the evacuation of civilians and delivery of humanitarian aid in East Aleppo." Meanwhile, Syrian government forces bombed the water pumping station during its raid on opposition-held Wadi Barada, disrupting water supply to Damascus. - On December 26, Kazakhstan accepted the Russian proposal to host peace negotiations between the Syrian government and opposition forces to find a solution to the Syrian crisis, in January 2017. - On December 27, the Russian and Turkish foreign ministers agreed to implement a nationwide ceasefire in Syria, separate moderate opposition groups from UN designated terrorist groups, and prepare for the Astana talks. - On December 28-30, the DFNS met in the city of Rmeilan to approve the draft constitution, known as the social contract, which was adopted on January 29, 2014 to form its administrative system and prepare for elections. Kurdish leaders voted to drop the word "Rojava" from the official name to include other ethnic and religious components in northern Syria. - On December 29, Russia and Turkey submitted the countrywide ceasefire plan to the warring parties, which had taken effect at midnight on 30 December 2016 Damascus time. - On December 31, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2336 in support of the Russian- Turkish agreement and the meeting to be held in Astana on 23 January 2017. January 2017: - On January 2, the Russian and Turkish air raids targeted IS militants in northern Syrian city of al-Bab; while 10 rebel factions threatened they would suspend talks regarding Astana until the ceasefire is fully implemented because of "major and frequent violations" in the rebel-held areas of Wadi Barada and Eastern Ghouta near Damascus. - On January 5, the SE welcomed the nationwide ceasefire, and the Security Council resolutions on Aleppo and Astana talks, in a press briefing after the weekly HTF meeting. Jan Egeland Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria, voiced disappointment over the government's denied aid access to 5 out 21 locations including places in Rural Damascus, Homs and Hama. - On January 6, the Russian military started to cut down on its presence in Syria, Military Chief Valery Gerasimov mentioned that the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov would be the first to withdraw from the Mediterranean. - On January 8, Syrian government airstrikes resumed on Wadi Barada after failing to reach an agreement with opposition groups to repair the damaged water springs. Later on January 14th, the retired army officer Ahmad al-Ghadban who negotiated the deal to restore the water was killed amid heavy clashes between rebels and pro-regime forces. Both sides accused each other. - On January 12, the US imposed sanctions on 18 senior Syrian officials who were connected to the development and use of chemical weapons including chlorine gas against civilians. It marked the first time the US sanctioned Syrian military officials. While Russia and Turkey signed an agreement to coordinate their airstrikes against terrorists in Syria. - On January 13, the Syrian state television accused Israel of targeting Mezzeh Airbase outside of Damascus. - On January 14, IS launched a major offensive against pro-regime forces (Hezboallah) in Deir al-Zor Province, cutting the communication between the military base and the city. - On January 16, the High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini will host an international conference on the future of Syria in Brussels, which "aims to identify with regional partners common ground on the post-conflict arrangements and examine the scope for reconsciliation and reconstruction of Syria." - On January 19, an agreement was reached in Wadi Barada, allowing regime maintenance teams to enter the area to fix the water pipes and grant rebels amnesty or safe passage to opposition-held Idlib. - On January 20, IS militants destroyed Palmyra's Tetrapylon with only four of sixteen columns still standing, and the facade of its Roman Theatre. The UNESCO condemned the act as a new war crime. - Russia and Syria concluded a bilateral agreement on expanding and modernizing of the Russian Naval Facility in Tartus. The agreement extends the current lease for the next forty-nine years with automatic extensions and permits the simultaneous deployment of up to eleven warships to the port. - On January 23-24, indirect talks between the Syrian government and opposition were held in Astana; the delegations refused to sign the joint declaration issued by Russia, Turkey and Iran, on setting up a "trilateral mechanism" to monitor and enforce the ceasefire. The new US administration was invited, despite Iran's objection, and was represented by its ambassador to Kazakhstan. The UN SE was present, and hoped Astana talks would support the intra-Syrian negotiations to be held in Geneva in February. - On January 24, the Russian delegation shared its draft of the Syrian Constitution with the Syrian delegations, and advocated the creation of a Constitutional Committee consisting of members of both delegations. - On January 23-24, Finland and UN agencies hosted the Helsinki Conference on Supporting Syrians and the Region, which launched the 2017-2018 Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP). - On January 25, the US President Donald Trump called for establishing safe zones for refugees in Syria, after suspending visas for Syrians and other middle eastern states. President Trump later held telephone conversations with Saudi King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz and United Arab Emirates Armed Forces Deputy Supreme Commander Mohammed bin Zayed on January 29 to seek their support for his unidentified initiative. - On January 28-30, 1100 opposition fighters and 750 civilians evacuated Wadi Barada to Idlib Province, after reaching a reconciliation deal with pro-regime forces. The Syrian Forces reached Ain Fijeh spring to restore water to Damascus. - On January 30, the US delivered armored vehicles, medium and heavy weapons to SDF, in an attempt to isolate IS in al-Raqqa City. - On January 31, the SE briefed the Security Council in a closed session on the outcomes of the Astana talks and the upcoming intra-Syrian talks in Geneva, which was pushed to February 20. He mentioned if the Syrian opposition could not form an inclusive delegation by 8 February, he would select its representatives himself. The Council members welcomed the International Meeting on Syria in Astana, in a press statement. February 2017: - On February 6, high-level experts from Russia, Iran, Turkey, Jordan and the UN held their first technical meeting in Astana to discuss the implementation of the ceasefire mechanism, and cooperation on humanitarian issues; they agreed on the Concept Paper on the Joint Group. The Joint Group held its first meeting and managed to identify all areas controlled by IS and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham; the participants received two draft documents prepared by the Russians to be discussed in future Joint Group meetings, which are the Protocol to the Agreement on the mechanism to record violations of the cessation of hostilities in Syria announced on December 30, 2016 and the Procedure for imposing sanctions on violators, as well as the Regulation on Reconciled Areas. - On February 7, Amnesty International released its report (attached) on mass executions of as many as 13,000 detainees at Saydnaya Military Prison. Syrian authorities rejected the accusations. - On February 9, Russian airstrikes mistakenly kill three Turkish soldiers and injured eleven others near al-Bab city held by Turkish Armed Forces as part of Operation Euphrates Shield. Both sides agreed to strengthen their coordination. - On February 10-11, the HNC met in Riyadh and formed a delegation of 21 members, headed by Nasr al-Hariri; it included one representative each from the Cairo and Moscow groups. The HNC stated (Arabic statement attached) that the goal of the negotiations was a political transition under U.N. auspices in which Assad had no role in the future of the country. - On February 12, Turkish President Recep Erdogan stressed that the Operation Euphrates Shield aims to establish a five-thousand square kilometer 'safe zone' that includes Al-Bab, Manbij, and al-Raqqa City in Northern Syria. The safe zone would require the implementation of a no-fly zone, mentioning that he had discussed the issue with both the U.S. and Russia. - On February 13, the SE sent out invitations to the Syrian delegations for the intra-Syrian negotiations set to begin on February 23. - On February 15-16, the second round of talks took place in Astana a day later than scheduled; the opposition delegation was represented by only 9 armed groups from 14 groups which attended the first meeting; no direct meetings between the Syrian delegations were held and it ended without a final statement. The three guarantor states agreed to the Concept Paper on the Joint Group of the trilateral mechanism to observe the ceasefire, share information regarding the investigation of violations and promote confidence-building measures such as the release of detainees and abductees. - On February 17, a meeting between the "like-minded" states on Syria was held on the margins of the Bonn G20 Summit, and discussed Syria peace talks in Geneva. - On February 18, Turkey offered the US two proposals for an offensive against IS in al-Raqqa City that excludes the YPG. The preferred proposal calls for the insertion of opposition groups backed by Turkey into Tel Abyad in Northern al-Raqqa Province in order to advance against al- Raqqa City through a twelve-mile-wide corridor through terrain currently held by the SDF. The second proposal calls for opposition groups in Operation Euphrates Shield to advance more than one hundred miles from Northern Aleppo Province to Western al-Raqqa Province. - On February 21, the US CIA froze assistance to the FSA and its affiliated factions fighting in Northwestern Syria, after they came under an attack from Hay'at Tahrir al-sham HTS (successor of Jabhat Fateh al-Sham) in January. The aid included salaries, training, ammunition and in some cases guided anti-tank missiles. - On February 23, a fourth round of the intra-Syrian talks commenced in Geneva with no expectations of a breakthrough; the SE reiterated that that resolution 2254 sets the framework of the negotiations, which calls for the establishment of credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance, and sets a timeline for drafting a new constitution and holding free and fair elections within 18 months. A day before in the ISSG Ceasefire Task Force meeting (CTF), Russia had called on the Syrian Government to halt aerial bombings during the discussions. - The Opposition groups backed by the Operation Euphrates Shield fully seized al-Bab in Northern Aleppo Province, after three months of clashes. - On February 24, the SE shared a paper on procedural issues, in bilateral meetings with the Syrian parties. The HNC held the Cairo and Moscow platforms responsible for the delay of direct talks, as they participated separately. - While Iraq conducted its first cross-border airstrikes against IS in Deir ez-Zour Province on the Syrian-Iraqi Border. The F-16 airstrikes were coordinated with the Syrian Government through a joint intelligence-sharing unit in Baghdad that includes Iraq, Syria, Russia, and Iran. Also, The U.S. provided intelligence in support of the operation. - On February 25, HTS claimed responsibility of a suicide attack on the State Security and Military Intelligence Offices in Homs City, killing at least forty pro-regime officers including Military Intelligence Branch Chief Brig. Gen. Hassan Dabul, so as to undermine the ongoing peace talks. The attacks prompted heavy airstrikes on al-Waer District, the Opposition's last strong-hold in the city. The HNC condemned the terrorist attack as per the Government's ultimatum. - On February 28, the UN Security Council voted on the French-British draft resolution which sought to ban the sale or supply of helicopters to the Syrian Government, and to blacklist 10 government and related entities involved in the production of chemical weapons. Nine countries voted in favor; Bolivia voted against the text, while Ethiopia, Egypt and Kazakhstan abstained. Russia casted its sixth veto backed by China. Britain and France had circulated the text in mid- December 2016, in response to the OPCW report findings proving government use of chlorine gas in three cases of the nine investigated cases. It was put on hold to asses US policy on Syria, the US later became a co-penholder after its unilateral sanctions on 18 Syrian senior officials on January 12. March 2017: - On March 1, the Independent Commission of Inquiry on Syria issued its report on the violations committed by warring parties in the last battle of eastern Aleppo, and considered the targeting of vital civilian infrastructure, withholding the distribution of humanitarian aid, and the use of civilians as human shields and forced evacuation agreements amount to war crimes. - On March 2, the Syrian forces backed by Russian airstrikes and Shi'a militias recaptured the city of Palmyra for the second time after heavy clashes. - On March 3, the fourth round of talks concluded with a political agenda for the upcoming round, which comprises of three baskets addressing the establishment of credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance, drafting a new constitution, and holding free and fair elections within 18 months. A fourth basket was added upon the request of the Syrian Government to address "strategies of counter terrorism, security, governance and also medium-term confidence building measures." - On March 6, Russia announced a ceasefire in Eastern Ghouta until March 20, despite the continuation of airstrikes and mutual shelling. - On March 7, the US-allied SDF agreed to handover six villages near Manbij, on the frontline with Turkey-backed rebels to Syrian government control, under a Russian-brokered deal, in an attempt to stop further Turkish incursion. - On March 8, the SE de Mistura briefed the Security Council on the course of the talks, which aims to address the aforementioned baskets in parallel, and concluded that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed unless the sides decide otherwise." The Syrian groups are invited to resume talks on March 23. - Meanwhile, Russian, US, Turkish high-level military officials met in Antalya to discuss additional coordination measures and "operational de-confliction of military operations" in northern Syria. - On March 13, a Russian-brokered agreement was reached to evacuate rebel fighters from Homs city, which would be carried out within six to eight weeks, between 10,000-15,000 people were expected to leave Homs in weekly batches. The neighborhood was besieged by regime forces since 2013. - On March 14, the EU unveiled its plan in Syria "in contributing to a lasting political solution under the existing UN-agreed framework and in helping to build resilience and stability in the country, as well as supporting post-agreement reconstruction once a credible political transition is underway." - On March 14-15, the third round of talks was held in Astana, even though the AOGs had called for the postponement of the meeting to assess the commitment to the declared ceasefire in Eastern Ghouta. Invitations were sent to the United Nations, the United States and Jordan. On March 14, preliminary consultations were held while a plenary meeting was due on March 15. The results of the intra-Syrian consultations were expected to be discussed. Talks failed to reach any significant agreement, and the three guarantor states issued a joint statement, and scheduled the next high-level meeting in Astana on May 3-4, 2017 and agreed to hold preliminary expert consultations on April 18-19, 2017 in Tehran. - On March 15, two suicide bombs targeted Damascus on the sixth war anniversary; one of them hit the main judicial building, and both killed 74 people and wounding a hundred other. It was later claimed by Fateh al-Sham Front. - On March 18, rebels began to evacuate al-Waer neighborhood in Homs City, to the opposition-held northern town of Jarablus on the borders with Turkey. - On March 20, the EU imposed sanctions against four Syrian high-ranked military officials related to the use of chemical weapons. The ban includes assets freeze and travel ban, and it is considered the first time the EU blacklists military officials. - On March 21, the US-led coalition dropped the SDF fighters on the southern side of the Euphrates to to cut the Aleppo - al-Raqqa Highway. the SDF launched an operation to seize the Tabqa Dam west of al-Raqqa City on March 22 with extensive support from the US. - On March 22, a US-led coalition strike on a center for displaced families in al-Mansoura town held by ISIL in northern Raqqa, killed 33 people. Earlier this month, the coalition declared that its raids in Syria and Iraq unintentionally killed at least 220 civilians. - On March 23-31, the fifth round of talks in Geneva was held despite of the escalation of fighting in Damascus and Hama; the SE shared non-papers with all Syrian sides with some political principles reached during the five rounds, and received their comments and amendments. - On March 24, Russia proposed a draft resolution on the use of chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq, that was reviewed in April 2016 and the UN Security Council did not support it. It was co-authored by China and Russia. Meanwhile, the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution condemning the indiscriminate attacks against civilians, forced displacement of populations, and called to hold all those responsible to account. - On March 27, the second phase of evacuations from al-Waer neighborhood took place, moving 466 citizens and 129 fighters. Meanwhile, the UN SE briefed the LAS Ministerial Council on the recent developments of the Geneva intra-Syrian talks and the Astana process. - On March 28, Russia condemned the US-led coalition airstrikes on the Tabqa Dam, and accused it of trying to "completely destroy critical infrastructure in Syria and complicate post-war reconstruction as much as possible." It further claimed that the coalition destroyed four bridges over the Euphrates river. - On March 29, the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres addressed the annual Arab Summit, which was held in the Dead Sea, Jordan. He appealed to the Arab leaders to set aside differences and end the Syrian war. - An agreement was brokered by Iran and Qatar to swap Shi'ite citizens from the two pro-government towns of al-Foua and Kafraya, in the northwestern province of Idlib besieged by rebel fighters, with Sunni fighters and their families from the opposition-held towns of Zabadani and Madaya besieged by pro-government forces. The agreement was due to start on April 4 and would last 60 days; it included a ceasefire in the areas south of Damascus, aid deliveries, and the release of 1,500 prisoners held by the government. - On March 31, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson disclosed during his visit to Ankara that "longer-term status of President Assad will be decided by the Syrian people" and defeating ISIL is its priority, while U.S. Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley said the priority was no longer "getting Assad out"; it was later reiterated by the White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer's briefing. April 2017: - On April 3, the European Foreign Affairs Council chaired by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini took place in Luxembourg, and adopted the EU Strategy on Syria. It held the Syrian regime responsible for the violations against human rights, and reaffirmed that "there can be no lasting peace in Syria under the current regime." - On April 4-5, the EU and its co-sponsors hosted the Brussels Conference on Supporting the future of Syria and the region. The co-chairs declaration took note of UN appeals requesting $8 billion in 2017 to cover the required needs inside Syria and its neighboring countries, and announced pledges raised worth about $11 billion for humanitarian aid programs. - On April 4, an alleged chemical attack on Khan Shaykhun in the province of Idlib was carried out during a Syrian government air raid on the city, which claimed the lives of at least 72 civilians. Russia denied its responsibility and claimed that Syrian airstrikes targeted a rebel chemical weapons warehouse which leaked poisonous gas. While the implementation of the evacuation deal of 30,000 people from the four towns of Kafraya, al-Foua, Madaya and Zabadani was delayed because of reservations of their residents. All 16,000 residents of al-Foua and Kafraya are expected to leave under the deal. - On April 5, the UN Security Council was briefed on the attack by the Acting High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Kim Won-soo on the reported use of chemical weapons in Khan Shaykhun. The US, UK and France had informally circulated a draft resolution which demands that the Syrian government must provide the JIM and the FFM with flight plans and logs of April 4, the names of all helicopter squadron commanders and provide access to air bases where investigators believe chemical attacks may have been launched. Russia criticized the text, and produced its own draft; it did not condemn neither the attack nor the Syrian government, but rather expressed deep concern over the alleged "incident with chemical weapons" and called for a full-scale investigation. Later on April 6, the ten elected members (E10) of the Security Council met at ambassador level to express their frustration for not being included in the negotiating process and discussed an alternative text which would substitute language in the P3 draft on the Syrian government's obligation to provide information on its activities with agreed language from resolution 2118. Neither resolution were tabled for a vote. - On April 6, the US waged retaliatory airstrikes against al-Shayrat airbase outside of Homs, where the chemical attack was launched. 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles had hit the airfield in Syria. The missiles were aimed at Syrian fighter jets and other infrastructure. - On April 7, Bolivia called for a Security Council briefing after the US airstrikes, and Russia announced its suspension of "the Memorandum of Understanding on Prevention of Flight Safety Incidents in the course of operations in Syria signed with the US." - On April 11, the White House released a declassified report drawn up by the National Security Council which confirmed that the Assad regime used sarin gas on its own people, and accused Russia for shielding for its allies. - On April 12, the Security Council held a meeting to vote on the P3 revised draft resolution (4th draft), which incorporated the language from resolution 2118 proposed in the E10 draft; after the SE had provided the council with his monthly briefing on the assessment of the intra-Syrian talks held in Geneva. Ten members voted in favor of the text, China, Ethiopia and Kazakhstan abstained, while Bolivia joined Russia in voting against it. It is Russia's eighth veto against a Syria-related resolution. - On April 14, the evacuation of residents from the Shi'ite towns of al-Foua and Kafraya (besieged by opposition groups) began and their convoys headed towards the government-held Aleppo; meanwhile rebel fighters and their families left the town of Madaya (besieged by government forces) and headed towards Idlib. While the evacuation from Zabadani was delayed and expected to begin later the day. The four towns agreement began with the exchange of thirty prisoners and nine bodies on April 12. The evacuations resumed after a suicide attack that targeted a government loyalties convoy killing some hundred people including women, children and rebel fighters on April 15. - On April 19-20, over 2000 opposition fighters and civilians were evacuated from the besieged towns of Zabadani and Madaya in exchange for the evacuation of nearly 8000 pro-regime fighters and civilians from the besieged towns of al-Foua and Kafraya in Idlib Province. - On April 24, the US sanctioned 271 Syrians employed by the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center, related to the development of chemical weapons. The sanction froze the individuals' assets and prohibited US companies to conduct business with them. May 2017: - On May 3-4, military experts from the three guarantors held technical consultations ahead of the two-day fourth round of the Astana process, with the participation of the Director of the UN Mine Action Service Agnes Marcaillou. The SE de Mistura and Nawaf Uasfi Tel, Political Adviser to Jordan's Foreign Minister attended as observers, and the US was represented at a higher-level (for the first time) by US Assistant Secretary of State for Middle East Affairs Stuart Jones. - Despite the Syrian Opposition delegation suspended their participation in opposition to the ongoing bombardments across Syria, the three guarantors signed the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in Syria, setting up four "de-escalation zones" in Idlib, parts of Homs, Eastern Ghouta, and parts of Deraa and al-Quneitra provinces in southern Syria. The Syrian government welcomed the Russian initiative while the Opposition rejected Iran's involvement as a guarantor. - On May 5, Russia sought UN endorsement to the agreement reached in Astana, and circulated a draft resolution calling on member states to contribute to the implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation zones in Syria. The resolution failed to pass for a vote on May 8, as western member states had reservations on the draft. - On May 6, Riad Seif was elected as the sixth president of the SOC, beating Khaled Khoja with 58 votes from the 102 member coalition. He would replace the current head Anas al-Abdeh, who was elected in March 2016. Also, Abdulrahman Mustafa and Salwa Ktaw were elected as vice presidents. - On May 8, the evacuation process of the government-besieged Damascus suburb of Barzeh began, around 1,022 people, including 568 rebels, headed towards Idlib and northern town of Jarablus near the Turkish borders; the second convoy of 700 rebels moved on May 12. While Walid al-Muallem, the Syrian Foreign Minister, rejected any international forces under UN supervision to monitor the de-escalation zones deal. Meanwhile, the White House approved providing arms to Kurdish fighters as support to their operation to retake al-Raqqa City, despite Turkey's strong opposition. - On May 16, the FFM's report confirmed the use of sulfur mustard in the attack on Aleppo on Sept. 16, 2016, and was made public. The report was raised to the UN Security Council on May 5. The FFM, also, confirmed in its report, regarding its investigation of the April 4 attack on Khan Shaykhun, the use of sarin-gas or a sarin-like substance. The FFM is only mandated for indicating whether chemical weapons were used, while the JIM is mandated to determine responsibility for the attacks. - While the US Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned ten additional entities for providing support to the Syrian regime. - On May 16-19, the UN SE held the sixth round of the Intra-Syrian talks in Geneva, which ended without covering the four baskets of the agenda, only focusing on the constitutional issues. The SE shared a proposal with the parties to establish "a Technical Consultative Mechanism on Constitutional and Legal Issues;" the proposal would identify "options for the process of constitutional drafting, and for the conduct of a national conference/national dialogue, and identify for review specific options for ensuring a sound constitutional and legal basis for any framework agreed in Geneva embodying a package and including providing for credible, all-inclusive, non-sectarian governance," and that is through UN-facilitated expert-level meetings with both Syrian sides. - On May 18, while the EU Parliament adopted a resolution pertaining the EU Strategy on Syria, which the European Council for Foreign Affairs had passed on 3 April 2017; the US-led coalition's airstrikes destroyed a pro-Syrian regime convoy of the Iraqi Shi'ite militia of Kata'ib Imam Ali, that advanced along the Damascus-Baghdad Highway towards al-Tanf base (where the US, UK and Jordan train fighters of Jaysh Mughawir al-Thawra against IS in Eastern Syria). - On May 20-21, the evacuation of nearly 3000 people, some 700 fighters and their families, was completed from al-Waer district, the last opposition-held district in the province of Homs. According to Talal Barazi, Governor of Homs, more than 14,000 people had left al-Waer in several phases since the "reconciliation deal" began to be implemented in March. Among them were some 3,700 rebels, allowed to leave with their light weapons. Russia later deployed 50 to 150 Military Police into the district. - On May 22, the SE briefed the Security Council on the latest developments, and on the last round of the Intra-Syrian talks. He commended the Astana process for the reduction of violence in the agreed de-escalation areas, and urged its guarantors to finalize their agreement addressing the subjects of detainees, abductees and humanitarian demining. The SE asserted that the rounds' focus on legal and constitutional issues does not rule out "the principle of parallelism" in addressing the agenda, and that a new consultative process at a technical level was introduced to discuss relevant constitutional and legal matters. - On May 25, NATO leaders agreed in Brussels to become full members of the Global Coalition against ISIS; the organization would not engage in combat operations, but would provide air refueling to the Coalition's aircrafts, capacity building through the deployment of special forces to train local partners, and would establish an intelligence information cell to ensure information-sharing on foreign fighters. - On May 29, the final convoy of fighters and their families moved from the opposition-held besieged district of Barzeh in Damascus to Idlib Province; estimately more than 4000 fighters and civilians were evacuated from Barzeh and Eastern Ghouta under the Russian-brokered deal. - On May 30, the US delivered its first shipment of arms to the Kurdish-led SDF, which had advanced against IS in the eastern outskirts of al-Raqqa, seizing eight villages and taking control over the Ba'ath Dam. - On May 31, Russia's Grigorovich-Class Frigate Admiral Essen and Kilo-Class Submarine Krasnodar launched four cruise missiles targeting IS near Palmyra; it targetted arms depots of fighters relocating from al-Raqqa to Eastern Homs. Russia had notified the US, Turkey, and Israel of the strikes-On June 2, EU High Representative Federica Mogherini met with newly-elected President of the Syrian Opposition Council (SOC), Riad Seif, and Syrian Interim Government (SIG) Prime Minister, Jawad Abou Hatab, to discuss the political process and EU support for Syrian resilience. Both parties reiterated their commitment to the UN-led Geneva process. June 2017: -On June 4, pro-government forces gained control of Maskanah city, the last remaining ISIS stronghold in Aleppo governorate. The advances brought pro-government forces within 10 km of Raqqa's provincial border. -US-backed SDF captured a hydroelectric facility (Baath Dam) from ISIS militants, securing the final of three major dams along the Euphrates river. -On June 5, pro-government forces captured the areas of al-Alb, Bir Dahlon and Sharot Dahlon in Eastern Homs governorate, reportedly capturing over 6,000 sq km of ISIS-held territory. -On June 6, US-backed SDF announced the launch of the fifth phase of the campaign to capture Raqqa, ISIS' self-declared capital, with forces advancing from the north, east and west and the US-led Coalition supporting the offensive with air and artillery strikes. - The US-led Coalition conducted airstrikes against pro-government forces advancing near al- Tanf, a de-confliction zone in southeastern Syria. This marks the second strike in the area in less than a month, amid escalating tensions between the US and Iran-backed forces over control of Syria's southeastern frontier. - On June 8, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with the UNSE de Mistura in Moscow to discuss "the consolidation of the cessation of hostilities, the fight against terrorism, the continuation of the political settlement on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 2254," according to the Russian Presidential Envoy for the Middle East and North Africa and Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov. The consultations were held prior to the fifth round of the Astana Process, which was set to take place in June, but was later postponed till the month of July. -On June 9, during a press briefing in Geneva at the conclusion of a meeting of the humanitarian task force set up by the International Syria Support Group (ISSG), the SE declared that the time was not right to resume the UN-led intra-Syrian talks. -On June 13, the WFP delivered food to more than 80,000 displaced people in seven hard-to-reach areas in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor governorates in northern Syria, where regular deliveries of humanitarian assistance had been suspended for over three years. -On June 14, Chairman of the CoI, Paulo Pinheiro, expressed concern for the "staggering loss of civilian life" caused by US-led Coalition airstrikes as part of the Raqqa campaign, stating that airstrikes had led to the displacement of 160,000 civilians. He also stressed that the Astana agreement had led to a reduction in violence in just one of the four zones outlined in the memorandum. -On June 15, during a briefing to Council members, UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, noted that "some progress" had been made in the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013) on the elimination of chemical weapons in Syria. However, she highlighted the continued lack of safe access to two above-ground stationary facilities scheduled for destruction under OPCW supervision. -Pro-government forces targeted the opposition-held neighborhoods of Jobar and Eastern Ghouta in the first major attack since the announcement of four "de-escalation zones" at the Astana talks in May. Syrian Armed Forces seized the Arak gas field in the region of Badiya, which had been captured by IS since 2015; the SAF declared that it recaptured 20 percent of the Badiya region. -On June 16, the Office of the Special Envoy for Syria declared that it had facilitated a meeting of technical experts from three opposition groups: the High Negotiating Committee, the Cairo Platform and the Moscow Platform as part of a technical consultation process announced at the end of the sixth round of intra-Syrian talks. The meetings focused on the timeline and process for drafting a new constitution. -On June 17, the SE announced that the seventh round of intra-Syrian talks would begin in Geneva on July 10, with further rounds tentatively planned for August and September. -The Syrian government declared a 48-hour ceasefire in the southern city of Daraa. The agreement, reportedly brokered by Russia, the US and Jordan, comes after an escalation in violence between pro-government forces and AOGs in Daraa. -On June 18, US-led coalition forces shot down a piloted Syrian government aircraft in southern Raqqa province. According to the Coalition statement, the aircraft was downed after it displayed hostile intent and advanced on coalition forces. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) released a statement following the incident claiming that the US shot down the Syrian jet while it was conducting an offensive against ISIS, and accusing the US of failing to use the "de-confliction channel". The MOD statement announced that Russia was cutting off participation in the de-confliction channel pending an investigation and that all kinds of airborne vehicles operating in combat mission zones west of the Euphrates River would be tracked by Russia as air targets. -Iran launched several ballistic missiles targeting ISIS positions in eastern Syria, reportedly carried out in retaliation for a terrorist attack in Tehran two weeks prior. This was Iran's first missile attack abroad in 15 years and its first in the Syrian conflict, representing an escalation of its role. -On June 19, the Syria Institute and PAX published the Sixth Quarterly Siege Watch Report, covering events from February to April 2017. -On June 20, an American fighter jet downed an "Iranian-made" armed drone in southern Syria after it "displayed hostile intent" when it approached coalition forces stationed at a base located in a de-escalation zone. It marked the second time in a month that the US had shot down an armed drone near Tanf camp. -On June 21, after opening a new front to the south of Raqqa, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) came within several kilometers of fully encircling the city after having already surrounded Raqqa to the north, east and west. - Turkey deployed reinforcements to the towns of Azaz and Marea in northern Syria, held by turkey-backed Syrian opposition forces, in preparation of anticipated battles with its rival Kurdish forces. - French President Emmanuel Macron, contradicting previous French policy, that France sees "no legitimate successor" to Assad and no longer considers his departure as a precondition to resolve the ongoing conflict. On July 5, the president met with Riad Hijab, Head of the HNC, to reiterate France's support to the Syrian Opposition. -On June 22, Turkish and Russian troops were deployed to Syria's northern Idlib province as part of a de-escalation agreement brokered by Russia, Turkey and Iran in May. - WFP announced that the first aid convoy had reached 15000 civilians in the city of Qamishli by land route, since it had been inaccessible in 2015, and humanitarian aid was sent through air drops instead. -On June 24, the Syrian government released 672 detainees in a move it said was aimed at bolstering the reconciliation process. -On June 27, the SE briefed the Council on the situation in Syria, expressing his readiness to facilitate direct talks between the Syrian government and opposition either at a formal or technical level. -On June 28, OPCW-JIM published its sixth report updating the SC on the status of its review of two cases identified by the FFM concerning incidents reported in Umm Hawsh in Aleppo Governorate in September 2016 and Khan Shaykhun in Idlib Governorate on April 4, 2017. -On June 29, OCHA head Stephen O'brien briefed the Council on the humanitarian situation in Syria, noting that despite a reduction in violence in some areas of the country, humanitarian convoys remained unable to reach civilians in besieged and hard-to-reach places due to bureaucratic restrictions. O'brien also detailed the Secretary-General's monthly report on the situation in Syria, released June 23, that highlighted the Astana memorandum signed by Iran, Russia and Turkey in May and the escalation of anti-ISIS operations in Syria. -The OPCW released a report on progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons program, verifying the destruction of 25 of the 27 chemical weapons production facilities previously declared by the Syrian government. However, the OPCW continues to express consideration that the initial declaration was incomplete. July 2017: -On July 1, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) launched a strike against pro-government positions near al-Baath in Quneitra governorate in response to two stray artillery shells fired from Syria that landed in the Golan Heights. This is the fifth Israeli strike on pro-government positions near the area of al-Baath within a week. -On July 3, the UNSC appointed Catherine Marchi-Uhel to head the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism, the UN legal team tasked with collecting and preserving evidence of the most serious crimes committed in Syria since 2011 to be used by national courts or an international tribunal. The Mechanism was established by the General Assembly on December 21, 2016 despite fierce resistance from Russia, which had previously used its veto status to block criminal investigations into the conflict. -The Syrian Army announced the suspension of all combat operations in the southern governorates of Daraa, Suweida and Quneitra for four days ahead of upcoming peace talks in Astana, Kazakhstan. It is the second unilateral ceasefire by the Syrian Army; it had announced a ceasefire in Daraa along the border with Israel on June 17. -On July 4-5, the fifth round of Astana talks co-sponsored by Russia, Iran and Turkey, convened in the Kazakh capital. The talks failed to finalize details on the boundaries and monitoring mechanisms of the four safe zones agreed to during the fourth round of Astana talks in May. In a joint statement, the guarantors welcomed the establishment of an expert-level joint working group tasked with finalizing the operational and technical parameters of the de-escalation zones, and scheduled the next Joint Working Group meeting in Tehran, on August 1-2. -On July 6, Edmond Mulet, head of the three-member leadership panel of the OPCW-JIM briefed Security Council members on the June 28 report of its investigations into the culpability for chemical attacks in Syria and urged the international community to allow the Mechanism to conduct its work in an independent and impartial manner. -On July 7, the United States, Russia and Jordan reached a ceasefire and "de-escalation" agreement for southwestern Syria to take effect July 9. The specificities of an enforcement mechanism and the precise boundaries of the ceasefire zone. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that the ceasefire would cover the areas of Daraa, al-Suweida and Quneitra governorates without providing exact boundaries. The ceasefire agreement in southwestern Syria is separate from the Astana memorandum, and was reached during the meeting between US President Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Hamburg. The SG welcomed the ceasefire announcement, calling it a significant step towards reducing violence and humanitarian access in Syria; while Israel voiced its objections on the deal. -On July 10, the seventh round of UN-led intra-Syrian talks convened in Geneva. The UN-sponsored talks were scheduled to focus on four points: drafting a new constitution, combating terrorism, governance and elections. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov expressed hope that the talks would help solidify de-escalation zones created through the Astana process. The SE stated that de-escalation zones can be beneficial but must only be interim measure to avoid the partition of Syria. The Geneva talks ended July 14 with no apparent progress. Representatives of the HNC accused the Syrian government of refusing to enter into serious negotiations. The SE noted that there had been "no breakthrough, no breakdown" during the talks and expressed hope that recent international momentum would push the parties face-to-face for substantive discussions. -On July 11, SOHR reported that it had "confirmed information" that ISIS leader Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi had been killed in the eastern province of Deir Ezzor. US-led Coalition Spokesperson Colonel Ryan Dillon could not confirm the report, nor could various media sources or Iraqi or Kurdish officials. -On July 12, following the opening of a land route connecting Aleppo to Hasakah governorate, WFP announced that it had successfully delivered food aid to two locations in the Raqqa governorate for the first time in three years. -On July 13, Brett McGurk, US Special Envoy for the Global Coalition fighting ISIS, revealed that Russia had expressed willingness to deploy military police to monitor compliance and prevent violations of the recently implemented ceasefire in southwestern Syria. -On July 14, Russia's parliament approved an agreement between Russian and Syrian officials that provides for the long-term deployment of Russian aircraft and personnel to Syria. Defense Minister Nikolay Pankov said the deal will help legalize Russia's military activities in Syria "within an international framework". -France proposed the creation of a contact group comprised of permanent members of the UN Security Council and regional actors to support UN efforts to formulate a political road map after the conflict ends. -On July 17, the EU added 16 scientists and military officials to the list of those targeted by sanctions against the Syrian regime due to their suspected involvement in a chemical attack against civilians in April. - The Syrian army, backed by Iranian-militias managed to seize oil fields of Wahab, al Fahd, Dbaysan, al-Qseer, Abu al Qatat and Abu Qatash and several other villages in the southwest of Raqqa province, while Russian strikes targeted the town of Sukhna, the gateway to Deir ez-zour. - The Turkish state-run Andalou Agency exposed ten US military locations in northern Syria, giving exact numbers of US and French special forces stationed there. The US-led Coalition against ISIS condemned Turkey for "leaking sensitive military information shared between two allies." -On July 19, it was made public that President Donald Trump ended a covert CIA program that provided arms and training to Syrian rebel groups. The program was a central feature of the Obama Administration's policy in Syria. -On July 20, 150 fighters from the Turkey-backed Euphrates Shield operation had crossed from Turkey through Bab alhawa to support Ahrar al-Sham in its fight against Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), dominated by the Fateh al-Sham faction formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra, in Idlib. -On July 21, the SG submitted to the Security Council the forty first report on the humanitarian situation in Syria for the period from 1 to 30 June 2017, highlighting the approximately 20,000 people displaced across northeast Syria in June due to the Raqqa offensive. According to the report, the Syrian government removed medical supplies sufficient for more than 84,000 treatments. -Hezbollah and the Syrian Army launched a joint offensive against militant groups in the town of Arsal and the western Qalamoun mountain range along the Lebanon-Syrian border, an area purported to hold over 3,000 militants, including al-Qaeda-linked insurgents and members of ISIS. -On July 24, 14 heads of mission in Geneva signed a letter addressed to Security Council President, Chinese Ambassador Liu Jieyi, raising "serious concerns" about the implementation of seven Security Council resolutions on humanitarian access and urging Liu to raise the issue at the upcoming Council meeting. The signatories include the United States, Saudi Arabia, Britain, France Turkey, Qatar, Japan, Australia, the European Union, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Canada and Italy. -General Sergei Rudskoi, chief of the Russian General Staff, announced the deployment of Russian military police to monitor compliance after a ceasefire, mediated by the Egyptian government, was declared in the Eastern Ghouta area of Damascus on July 22. Despite the reported ceasefire, part of the four proposed "de-escalation zones" outlined in the Astana memorandum, Syrian government forces continued to attack several towns in Eastern Ghouta. -On July 26, fighting on the Syrian-Lebanese border near the town of Arsal halted after a ceasefire agreement was reached between Hezbollah and HTS. The cessation of hostilities ended a six-day campaign to drive al-Qaeda-linked militants from the border region, which is also home to tens of thousands of refugees. The agreement included the evacuation of some 1000 HTS fighters, along with more than 6000 Syrians (in nearby refugee camps) from the Lebanese border town of Arsal to rebel-controlled Idlib province, as well as exchange of prisoners between Hezboallah, HTS and the Lebanese Armed Forces, which later took place on August 1. -On July 27, Ursula Mueller, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, briefed Council members on the humanitarian situation in Syria, noting that despite reduced violence, there had not been a noticeable increase in areas reached for aid delivery. -The Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates addressed two letters to the UNSG and the Security Council calling for immediate action in the militant-besieged towns of Kefraya and al-Foua. -The US-led coalition fighting ISIS told its local Syrian allies that they must exclusively fight ISIS, a directive that prompted Shohada al-Quartyan to depart a joint coalition base in Southern Syria to carry out independent operations against Syrian regime forces. -On July 28, the OPCW released its monthly report, noting that the security situation now allows safe access to confirm the condition of the final two above-ground facilities with planning underway to verify their destruction. -On July 30, for the first time in five years, UN aid was delivered to almost 7,2000 people in besieged al-Nashabiye located in Eastern Ghouta, a rebel-held area on the outskirts of Damascus. August 2017: -On August 2, the evacuation of at least 7,000 people, including al-Qaeda-linked fighters and refugees, from Lebanese border enclave of Arsal for rebel-controlled Idlib province commenced. The transfer agreement, the largest formal repatriation of refugees to Syria since 2011, was carried out without the involvement of aid groups generating concern about the welfare of the refugees. -On August 3, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced a ceasefire in northern Homs and southern Hama, in what is being billed as the third of four planned ceasefires agreed to under the Astana memorandum. Russia deployed police military to several checkpoints in northern Homs, later on August 4. Opposition groups called for a guarantor role for Turkey. According to SOHR, the ceasefire, which covered territory populated by more than 147,000 people, held for the first 10 hours before experiencing repeated violations by pro-government and rebel forces. -The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria of the Human Rights Council (CoI) called on the international community to recognize the crime of genocide being committed against the Yazidis in Iraq. -On August 8, experts from the guarantor states met in Tehran to discuss ways to strengthen the de-escalation zones and determine the agenda for the upcoming sixth round of Astana talks. -On August 8-11, twenty-four FSA-affiliated groups formed new group "Liwa Tahrir Deir ez- Zour" to liberate the province of Deir ez-Zour from IS; the new faction welcomed any cooperation with local and international parties, ruling out the SDF. -On August 9, OCHA expressed concern about the safety and protection of an estimated 10,000- 25,000 people trapped inside Raqqa without access to safe drinking water for 48 days. Due to the fighting on the ground, the UN has currently no access to Raqqa city. - Russian Permanent Representative to the UN Vasily Nebenzya briefed the Security Council on the progress of establishing de-escalated zones in Syria, behind closed doors, and called on the UN to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in those areas. -On August 10, SDF US-backed forces encircled ISIS militants in central Raqqa, effectively cutting off ISIS' last remaining route to the Euphrates. -On August 12, the Syrian government captured al-Sukhna, the final ISIS stronghold in Homs governorate, as part of its multi-pronged campaign to take eastern Syria. The recent gains position the pro-government coalition 50 km (30 miles) away from Deir ez-Zour province, the last major ISIS foothold in Syria. -On August 14, approximately 300 FSA-affiliated Saraya Ahl al-Sham fighters and 3,000 refugees began evacuating the Lebanese border town of Arsal as part of a repatriation agreement brokered in early August between Lebanese and Syrian officials. Lebanon's Maj. Gen. Abbas Ibrahim, who is overseeing the transfer, said that civilians will head to the government held area of Assal al-Ward. The rebel fighters and their families are destined for the rebel-held town of al- Ruhaiba in the Eastern Qalamoun region where, according to Hezbollah's Al-Manar TV, they have been granted amnesty by the Syrian government. Their departure leaves the Islamic State as the last militant force straddling the border near Arsal. -Nearly 50,000 people remain stranded on the Jordanian border, in an area known as the berm, and are facing an increasing scarcity of food, healthcare and other basic services. The UN stressed that it will continue to support Jordanian authorities in the protection of affected Syrians. -On August 17, the UNSC adopted a presidential statement, read by Council President for August and Ambassador of Nigeria, Joy Ogwu, in support of a political transition process in Syria in accordance with the principles of the Geneva Communique. The adoption of the text signals, for the first time in two years, the consensus of the Council and its five permanent members on the need to establish a transitional government. -On August 17-20, Damascus hosted the 59th International Trade Fair, for the first time since 2011, and involved hundreds of delegations and private companies from at least forty-three states including Russia, Iran, China, and Egypt. -On August 20, President Assad announced in a speech before Syrian diplomats that Syria would not work with any Western nations until they ended their support for opposition and insurgent groups. -On August 21, UN experts launched an investigation into purported weapons deals between Syria and North Korea after two shipments to a Syrian government agency responsible for its chemical weapons program, the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC), were intercepted. -Saudi-based High Negotiations Committee (HNC) met with delegations from the moderate Cairo and Moscow camps in Riyadh in an effort to establish a unified front for upcoming peace talks. Despite pressure from international allies calling for a more pragmatic approach, the HNC refused to accept a transition scenario in which Assad retained power. -On August 22, the next round of Astana talks was pushed back from late August to mid- September to allow the guarantor states to hold a technical meeting to set the meeting agenda. -On 23 August, a joint monitoring center was established in Amman for the southwestern de-escalation zone, which is located in the provinces of Daraa and Quneitra. The center is tasked with ensuring ceasefire compliance, ensuring humanitarian access and other forms of civilian assistance. -On August 24, the UN called for a humanitarian pause in US-led Coalition airstrikes on Raqqa to permit civilians to leave the city. This comes after the release of an Amnesty International report calling for greater protection efforts for the estimated 20,000 remaining civilians in Raqqa. -On August 25, the Russian army announced that it had dismantled the two remaining Syrian chemical weapons facilities targeted for destruction by OPCW. The OPCW has not confirmed the Russian report. -On August 28, hundreds of ISIS fighters and their families were evacuated from the Lebanese- Syrian border to militant-held eastern Syria following simultaneous Lebanese army and Hezbollah campaigns against ISIS positions. The transfer marks the first time ISIS agreed to a forced evacuation from territory it held in Syria. - The Secretary-General presented his monthly report on the situation in Syria, highlighting the recent efforts to reduce violence through de-escalation agreements and expressing hope that the Astana guarantors will reach an agreement on the finalization of operational and technical modalities for all de-escalation areas. -On August 30, Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura briefed the Security Council on the political path forward which includes a new round of Astana and Geneva talks. The SE highlighted the important role Syrian opposition allies stand to play in fostering cohesion and unity among the AOGs. - In his final address to the Council after two years as Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Stephen O'Brien appealed to members of the Council to take action to end the civil war in the name of common humanity, calling for a referral to the International Criminal Court. -On August 31, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, stressed that the protection and assistance of citizens must take priority before defeating the Islamic State, citing reports of heavy civilian casualties in Raqqa as evidence of the threat the remaining 20,000 civilians face. -US airstrikes stalled a convoy of 300 ISIS fighters and their families in a government-controlled part of the Syrian desert in an effort to prevent their advancement into ISIS-held territory near the Iraqi border. The convoy was traveling from the Syrian-Lebanese border to Syria's eastern province as part of an evacuation deal brokered between ISIS, Hezbollah and the Syrian Army. -Pro-government forces captured strategic al-Bishri mountain overlooking ISIS-controlled Deir Ezzor province, bringing government coalition forces within close range of ISIS positions. September 2017: On September 1, French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian rejected a role for Assad in a political transition in Syria. -The Syrian Islamic Council called for Syria's AOGs to end their fragmentation and unite as one armed body under the Ministry of Defense in the Syrian Interim Government. Ahrar al-Sham, Failaq al-Sham, Liwa Ansar al-Sunnah and Jabha al-Shamiya supported the initiative. -SDF spokesperson, Jihan Ahmad, announced that the SDF had gained control over an estimated 65 percent of Raqqa city after capturing the Old City, the Great Mosque and al-Dariya neighborhood. SOHR reported that the SDF were still fighting to gain control over pockets of the Old City but added that the US-backed opposition forces held more than 90 percent of the surrounding area. -On September 2, Russian Aerospace Forces reported they had destroyed a convoy of 12 ISIS trucks carrying ammunition and weapons in Deir Ezzor province. -It was made public that the British Ministry of Defense had quietly halted its FSA training program and called back its training forces from Syria in late June 2017. -On September 3, pro-government coalition forces gained control of the remaining ISIS stronghold in Hama Governorate after capturing the town of Uqayribat and its surrounding areas. -On September 4, Syrian Interim Government Prime Minister Jawad Abu Hatab was appointed interim Defense Minister as part of a unification initiative launched by the Syrian Islamic Council in early September. Free Syrian Army factions formed a committee to select a Chief of Staff in consultation with the Prime Minister. -On September 5, the Secretary-General submitted the OPCW's forty seventh monthly report on the progress to eliminate chemical weapons in Syria to the Security Council. The report highlighted the preparations underway to confirm the status of the two remaining stationary above-ground facilities now that the security situation allows safe access and the upcoming high- level consultations with Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister, Dr. Faisal Mekdad, to clarify outstanding issues regarding the Syrian government's initial declaration. -Pro-government coalition forces reached the western perimeter of Deir Ezzor city, breaking a three-year ISIS siege of the government-held areas that had impacted 93,500 people. In support of the offensive, a Russian warship located in the Mediterranean Sea launched cruise missiles at ISIS positions near Deir Ezzor. -On September 6, SE Mistura said he expects a national ceasefire to follow shortly after ISIS has been pushed from its strongholds in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor. Although he stressed that the government "cannot announce victory", he called on opposition forces to accept defeat and focus on winning the peace through negotiations in October. -The UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria released a report on the major human rights and humanitarian law violations committed between March and July 2017. The Commission accused the Syrian government of using sarin gas in the April 4 Khan Sheikhoun attack and found US forces culpable of not taking "all feasible precautions" to protect civilians in the March 16 attack on al-Jinah Mosque. -According to Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, experts from Russia, Iran and Turkey made progress towards an agreement "on the parameters, configuration and methods of ensuring security in the de-escalation zone in the Idlib province" in Syria. -On September 7, Israel conducted airstrikes on the Scientific Studies and Research Center, a facility believed to house a chemical weapons manufacturing center, and a military base storing surface-to-surface missiles near government-stronghold Masyaf in Hama province. The Syrian Foreign Ministry called on the Security Council to denounce the airstrikes. -US-led coalition forces fighting ISIS announced that airstrikes had killed two ISIS leaders near Mayadin in the Deir Ezzor province on September 4, 2017. -The Head of the High Negotiations Committee, Riyad Hijab, rejected the SE Mistura's call for the opposition to accept defeat, declaring the UN mediation process a failure and calling on Syrians to demonstrate in support of the continuation of the revolution. On September 8, a convoy of 42 trucks carrying humanitarian aid for 80,000 people reached Deir Ezzor for the first time by land in three years. -US-led coalition surveillance aircraft departed its position monitoring an 11-bus convoy of ISIS fighters and their families after attempting to prevent its advance into ISIS-held territory in Deir Ezzor since August 29. The surveillance aircraft departed the airspace at the request of Russian military officials who were conducting an operation with pro-government forces close to the convoy's position. -The Syrian National Coalition (NCSRF) condemned calls from "regional and external parties" for Western-backed opposition groups Ahmed Al-Abdu and Ussoud Al-Sharqiya to cease fighting government forces in southeastern Syria and withdraw to Jordan. Both groups refused the request. -On September 9, pro-government forces broke a years-long siege of Deir Ezzor airbase and captured the Damascus-Deir Ezzor highway from ISIS. -SDF launched Operation Jazeera Storm to liberate Deir Ezzor province from ISIS. -On September 10, SDF reached the industrial zone to the east of Deir Ezzor city putting the US-backed coalition within 15 km (10 miles) of pro-government forces positioned to the west of the Euphrates river. -On September 11, the Jordanian Foreign Minister, Ayman Safadi, and Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, declared the ceasefire brokered by Jordan, Russia and the United States in the southern Syrian provinces of Daraa, Quneitra and Suweida on July 9 a success and reiterated their commitment to the establishment a de-escalation zone in the area as a step towards achieving a comprehensive cessation of hostilities and a political solution to the crisis. On September 12, pro-government coalition forces continued their push into ISIS-held territory in Deir Ezzor city. Russia and Syria warplanes conduct heavy bombardment in support, killing an estimated 69 people over the course of 72 hours. -Hezbollah leader, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, declared the war in Syria over, referring to the remaining fighting as "scattered battles". -ISIS defectors have massed in Syria's Idlib province with many planning to cross into Turkey before continuing to other parts of the Middle East, North Africa and Europe. -Iran and Syria sign a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in Syria's electricity sector. The arrangement, part of a series of bilateral deals formalizing Iran's role in Syria's reconstruction process, provides for the establishment of a new power generation station in Latakia and the rehabilitation of gas units and power generating plants in Damascus, Aleppo, Deir Ezzo and Homs. -On September 13, the remaining buses of the convoy of ISIS fighters and their families stranded for over two weeks in the Syrian desert reportedly reached Mayadin, in militant-held Deir Ezzor province, following the withdrawal of US surveillance aircraft on September 8 in respect of de-confliction arrangements with Russia. -The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that pro-government coalition forces controlled 85 percent of Syrian territory. SOHR disputed the claim, saying government forces held 48 percent of Syria. -Experts from Russia, Iran and Turkey met ahead of the sixth round of talks in Astana, Kazakhstan to "lay the groundwork" for negotiations on the establishment of de-escalation zone in Idlib province. -On September 14, Col. Ryan Dillon, spokesperson for the US-led coalition fighting ISIS, said SDF forces will not enter Deir Ezzor city, and will instead focus operations on areas south of the city along the Euphrates river. He also said US-backed SDF was in control of 63 percent of Raqqa city. -On September 15, Ahmad Abu Khawla, commander of the SDF-affiliated Deir Ezzor Military Council, declared that it will not allow government forces to cross to the eastern banks of the Euphrates river. -Representatives from Russia, Iran and Turkey reached an agreement on the delineation and monitoring mechanism for the implementation of a de-escalation zone in Idlib province and agreed to position observers in "safe zones". Russia circulated a draft resolution among the permanent members of the Council to welcome the outcome of the Astana talks. -On September 16, the SDF and US Coalition officials accused pro-government forces of attacking one of their positions in the industrial zone east of Deir Ezzor city, injuring 6 SDF fighters. According to US Coalition sources, Russia conducted the airstrike after the United States had denied its request to target the area. Russian Defense Ministry spokesperson Maj. Gen. Igor Konashenkov rejected the allegations, saying warplanes carried out "pinpoint strikes only on Islamic State targets that have been observed and confirmed through several channels." -High-level consultations commenced between the Syrian government and the OPCW aimed at clarifying all outstanding issues regarding Syria's initial declaration of its chemical weapons facilities. -On September 17, a convoy of 80 Turkish military vehicles deployed to Turkey's southern border, close to the Bab Al-Hawa and Rihaniyah crossings with Syria's Idlib Governorate, ahead of the implementation of a de-escalation zone agreement brokered at the recent Astana talks. -On September 18, pro-government coalition forces crossed to the eastern bank of the Euphrates river to within five kilometers of SDF positions. In the first sign of direct contact between the SDF and the pro-government forces, US-led coalition spokesperson Col. Ryan Dillon said "open lines" of communication were being maintained to prevent clashes between the two forces as they converge on ISIS positions. -After capturing the Deir Ezzor Military Airporst from ISIS fighters, pro-government forces began operating combat and supply missions from the airport. -The World Food Programme (WFP) reached formerly besieged parts of Deir Ezzor city by land for the first time since May 2014. WFP has discontinued its high-altitude airdrop operations in favor of road deliveries which will allow for more affordable, sustainable humanitarian access. -In a meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, Members of the "Friends of Syria" Group agreed they will not support reconstruction in Syria until there is a political transition "away from Assad." -During its 36th session, the Human Rights Council held an interactive dialogue with the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria to discuss the continued targeting of civilians and the use of chemical weapons in the conflict, appealing to all parties to redouble their efforts to protect civilians and preserve civilian infrastructure. -On September 19, AOGs led by Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), the Turkistan Islamic Party and Free Syrian Army affiliates launched an offensive against pro-government forces in northern Hama province in an effort to dismantle the de-escalation zone agreement on Idlib province brokered at the recent Astana talks. The offensive sparked intense Russian and Syrian bombardment of opposition-held territory in Hama and Idlib Governorates. Syrian government forces claimed the airstrikes targeted "terrorist supply lines" but SOHR alleged the strikes hit hospitals and towns, killing civilians. -The Syrian government asserted it will not accept Turkish forces on Syrian soil, effectively contradicting
Global Health for All trains a critical lens on global health to share the stories that global health's practices and logics tell about 20th and 21st century configurations of science and power. An ethnography on multiple scales, the book focuses on global health's key epistemic and therapeutic practices like localization, measurement, triage, markets, technology, care, and regulation. Its roving approach traverses policy centers, sites of intervention, and innumerable spaces in between to consider what happens when globalized logics, circulations, and actors work to imagine, modify, and manage health. By resting in these in-between places, Global Health for All simultaneously examines global health as a coherent system and as a dynamic, unpredictable collection of modular parts
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