A MAVERICK'S SEARCH FOR PEACE
In: Middle East international: MEI, Band 334, S. 13
ISSN: 0047-7249
157249 Ergebnisse
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In: Middle East international: MEI, Band 334, S. 13
ISSN: 0047-7249
World Affairs Online
World Affairs Online
In: Journal of intervention and statebuilding, Band 16, Heft 5, S. 536-544
ISSN: 1750-2985
In: Survival: global politics and strategy, Band 61, Heft 4, S. 45-62
ISSN: 1468-2699
SSRN
In this paper we present a model of war between two rational and completely informed players. We show that in the absence of binding agreements war can be avoided in many cases by one player transferring money to the other player. In most cases, the "rich" country transfers part of its money to the "poor" country. But when the military proficiency of the "rich" country is sufficiently high the "poor" country stops the war by transferring part of its resources to the "rich" country. War cannot be avoided by transfers when inequality of resources is very large or the cost of war is sufficiently low. ; Publicado
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In: Commentary, Band 127, Heft 6, S. 30-38
ISSN: 0010-2601
Halkin, H.: the federation plan. - S. 30-33 Glick, C. B.: The stabilization plan. - S. 34-38
World Affairs Online
In this paper we present a model of war between two rational and completely informed players. We show that in the absence of binding agreements war can be avoided in many cases by one player transferring money to the other player. In most cases, the "rich" country transfers part of her money to the "poor" country. Only when the military proficiency of the "rich" country is sufficiently great, it could be that the "poor" country can stop the war by transfering part of its resources to the "rich" country.
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In: The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, S. 641-665