Suchergebnisse

While states and non-state armed groups often engage in militarised conflict over contested territory, at other times they co-govern in a tenuous equilibrium. Using a survey of over 1,600 Kurdish soldiers (Peshmerga) and elite interviews, we investigate local variation in shared governance in one such context – the disputed territories of northern Iraq. Despite the area being under Kurdish military control, the Iraqi government continued to provide services in districts where it had pre-existing infrastructural capacity. However, in revenue-producing districts, Kurdish actors appropriated infrastructural power to provide services themselves. This illustrates that non-state governance strategies, and their outputs, can vary locally.

This article examines the role of junior cadres in rebel group fragmentation. I argue that in a centralised rebel group factions will emerge when leaders block junior cadres' access to senior decision-making bodies. Junior cadres who want to influence the organisation's politics therefore face a choice between remaining within the rebel group and exiting it. Factionalising is a way to redress grievances by aggrieved junior cadres who deem peaceful mechanisms for upward mobility ineffective. Using original datasets and personal interviews, I find strong evidence supporting my argument in the case of Palestinian Fatah.

This paper examines the hitherto unexplored subject of nonstate rebels seeking the status of sole representatives. Why do nonstate armed groups seek the status of sole representatives?, What strategies do they employ to achieve the status of sole representatives?, Is the status merely symbolic, or does it fetch tangible benefits? These research questions are explored by treating Sri Lanka's LTTE as a case study. Primary and secondary data formed the basis of the analysis. The LTTE used three strategies to achieve a hegemonic disposition within the Tamil community. They are: (1) elimination of rival groups, (2) incorporation of some groups, and (3) battlefield efficacy. The rebels used the claim of sole representation to ensure bilateral talks with the government, get the ban on it lifted, and control the proposed interim administrative structure. The strategy worked to a certain extent, but at least partially contributed to its downfall in 2009.