Suchergebnisse

The 1st and 2nd Additional Protocols introduced a new rule which prohibits attacks against works and installations containing dangerous forces, even if they represent military objectives, because those dangerous forces could have a negative impact on civilians. It is not very sure that these rules became a part of the customary law, but practice shows that states are aware of the considerable risks which would emerge. As a consequence, states recognize that, in any armed conflict, it is necessary to take special precautionsin order to avoid releasing these dangerous forces and not cause any threats among civilians. According to the two protocols, this requirement of taking precautions is applicable to any kind of armed conflict.Keywords: customary international law; international conflicts; noninternational conflicts; Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention.

Desde el momento de la expedición de los Convenios de Ginebra de 1949, ha existido una confusión latente entre los Estados que atraviesan situaciones de violencia interna acerca de si existen o no conflictos armados no-internacionales en sus territorios nacionales, dado que ni el Artículo 3 Común a los Convenios ni el Protocolo Adicional II de 1977 definen qué es un conflicto. Por tanto, este documento investigativo busca aclarar mediante el análisis de la legislación, jurisprudencia y doctrina vigentes este asunto, delimitando cuál es el margen de aplicación del Derecho Internacional Humanitario a los conflictos armados no-internacionales. Posteriormente, se busca aclarar otro interrogante común: ¿el Derecho Internacional Humanitario aplica exclusivamente a los Estados Parte, o aplica también de manera directa a los agentes no estatales? Finalmente, este documento busca proponer muy brevemente, una solución plausible a la problemática de la confusión que una ausencia de definición clara sobre conflicto armado plantea, en detrimento claro de la protección que en los conflictos debe brindárseles en todo momento a los hors de combat o población protegida.

That humanitarian rules were applicable in armed conflicts was accepted long before the nineteenth century, but the fact that non-international armed conflicts were regarded as beyond the ambit of international regulation meant that the application of such norms to internal armed conflicts was certainly not a matter of course. Towards the end of the eighteenth century there had been a move towards the application of the laws of warfare to non-international armed conflicts as well as international conflicts, but this was based on the character of the conflicts and the fact that both were often of a similar magnitude, rather than any humanitarian concern to treat the victims of both equally. Not until the nineteenth century did the application of the laws of war to non-international armed conflicts become a widespread issue in international law.

This article analyzes the undermined importance of the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) case law in interpreting international humanitarian law (IHL) and its relationship with public international law. It examines how the ICJ has elevated IHL to customary law, declaring it "intransgressible" and equating it with jus cogens, and identified particular obligations for the parties in conflict. The article studies how the Court has clarified the relationships between customary IHL with the law of treaties and has declared which elements of IHL constitute the most basic principles of humanity, applicable whether it is an international or non-international armed conflict. Finally, the text analyzes how the Court, has discouraged counterproductive separations between the application of IHL and international human rights law.