Search results

The article explores the candidate's practice in village head elections, such as vote-buying, brokerage networks, and cultural aspects. We argue that a candidate's victory is determined by the material aspect only, but there are other practices that candidates use to minimize the mobilization of material resources and even resistance. This research is a case study, bound by time and place, and is holistic. We collected data by relying on observation and interviews with many relevant informants in the Pilkades (village head elections) Tumbang Habaon, Central Kalimantan. Through this study, we found that every candidate has engaged in the practice of buying votes and appointing orang kepercayaan (right-hand man) to reach out to voters. However, the material resource practices we observe are not a determinant of a candidate's victory. We analyzed voters' views that they chose because of the candidates' past actions' concrete manifestations, which reflected the Dayak cultural values, namely Hapahari and Handep. In contrast to previous research, candidates believe more in material and spiritual aspects. We broaden his proposition that the candidate's cultural actions drive voter beliefs without resisting the mobilization of material resources.

Programme doctoral en Sciences économiques ; In the first chapter (« Optimal Vote Buying » coauthored with Leon Musolff, Princeton University), we analyze a vote buying problem. We show that bribing a supermajority can be cheaper due to pivotal considerations. When a large number of committee members receive a bribe, they do not expect to be pivotal in the election. As a result, it is sufficient to offer them a small amount of money in exchange for their vote. Due to this mechanism, it turns out that the vote buyer generally prefers to bribe a supermajority.In the second chapter (« Voting and contributing when the group is watching » coauthored with Emeric Henry, Sciences Po) we study the interaction between the way members vote on rules and their subsequent behaviors. This analysis applies to groups who choose their own rules and who care about their image. We study how players' considerations depend on the visibility of the process. We show that multiple norms can emerge. We discuss the problem of a social planner and the implications for welfare.The last chapter (« Military service and political participation » coauthored with Etienne Fize) investigates the impact of the French military service on political behaviors. Exploiting the suspension of mandatory conscription for French men, we find a significant and positive impact of military service on turnout. This effect ranges from 3.6 percentage points for the first round of the presidential election of 2012 to 8.9 percentage points for the second round of the legislative elections. We also investigate the impact of conscription on political preferences and we find that former conscripts are significantly more nationalist and conservative. ; Le premier chapitre de cette thèse, intitulé « Optimal Vote Buying » (co-écrit avec Leon Musolff, Princeton University) s'intéresse à la corruption de comités. Il s'agit d'une contribution théorique dans laquelle nous montrons qu'il est généralement peu onéreux de corrompre une large majorité de membres du comité. En effet, lorsque le comité est largement corrompu, les membres considèrent que l'option soutenue par celui qui corrompt le comité sera probablement plébiscitée. Aucun vote ne peut alors faire basculer l'élection et les membres du comité sont prêts à accepter un pot-de-vin modeste en échange de leur vote.Dans le deuxième chapitre (co-écrit avec Emeric Henry, Sciences Po) nous étudions les interactions entre le vote et les normes sociales. Nous analysons un modèle dans lequel un groupe choisit sa propre règle. Dans une première étape, chaque membre vote pour ou contre une règle. Une fois le règlement établi, les membres du groupes choisissent une action dont les conséquences dépendent de la règle choisie. Nous étudions comment le vote et le comportement ultérieur interagissent.Enfin, le dernier chapitre (co-écrit avec Etienne Fize) traite de l'impact du service militaire obligatoire en France sur les comportements politiques. Nous trouvons d'une part que les individus ayant fait leur service militaire sont plus enclins à voter. Pour les élections de 2012, nous estimons que l'effet est de l'ordre de 4 points de pourcentage pour les élections présidentielles et atteint les 9 points pour le second tour des élections législatives. Nous étudions également les conséquences sur les préférences politiques. Nous trouvons que les anciens conscrits sont plus à droite.

The presidential and municipal elections provided voters with a wide choice of political options, and were generally characterized by a respect for fundamental rights and freedoms. Nevertheless, pervasive allegations of vote-buying and the fact that virtually all campaign coverage in the media had to be purchased underscored the need for continued reform. Certain challenges remained, exemplified in the processing and tabulation of results after the first round of voting. A certain lack of transparency in the Central Election Commission's (CEC) decision-making and the inability of the CEC to take timely decisions, if at all, on critical issues were of particular concern. (ODIHR/Pll)

In Political Parties, Business Groups, and Corruption in Developing Countries, Vineeta Yadav tackles the puzzle of corruption by analyzing the role that business lobbying plays in it. Combining focused studies of legislative institutions and business groups in India and Brazil with a broader survey of corruption in sixty-four developing democracies, Yadav shows how systems with powerful parties rather than ones with powerful individual legislators encourage the most corruption. A rigorous comparative examination of the connections between political institutions, lobbying, and corruption, this work will reshape our understanding of how developing democracies can both discourage and encourage bribery, vote buying, and influence peddling.

We consider a class of dynamic collective action problems in which either a single principal or two competing principals vie for the support of members of a group. We focus on the dynamic problem that emerges when agents negotiate and commit their support to principals sequentially. We show that competition reduces agents' welfare with public goods, or if and only if there are positive externalities on uncommitted agents, and increases agents' welfare with public bads. We apply the model to the study of corporate takeovers, vote buying, and exclusive deals. (JEL D42, D62, D72, D82, G34, H41)

To explore how democratisation is transforming Indonesia's rural elite, we examine two village head elections in Central Java. Despite the competitiveness of these elections, the campaigning modes employed by candidates, especially vote buying, points to elite continuity, because only wealthy villagers can compete for office. Moreover, links with higher state officials remain important for village elites, allowing them to win political support by obtaining projects from local government. However, rather than being incorporated as subordinates in a bureaucratic hierarchy as during authoritarian rule, village elites are now true rural brokers, exercising considerable leverage in their relations with the state. (J Southeast Asian Stud /GIGA)

AbstractThe Mensalão trial was Brazil's most important political corruption trial ever and an emblematic ex post accountability success. More than 28 individuals were convicted in relation to a legislative vote-buying scheme, many by the very officials they helped appoint. We relay the trajectory of the scandal cum trial, explain its successful prosecution and assess its implications. The article argues that the Mensalão has proved pivotal for Brazil's institutional and legal advances and asks – more than a quarter of a century after a new constitution – whether the country is entering into a stronger, more enduring relationship with the rule of law.

Are ostensibly demand-driven public programs less susceptible to political clientelism even when private goods are allocated? We investigate this conjecture using expenditure data at the local level from India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. By focusing on one state where accountability and transparency mechanisms have been employed and implementation efforts have been applauded, we do not find evidence of blatant vote buying before the 2009 election but do find that patronage played a small part in fund distribution after the 2009 election. Indeed most variation in expenditures is explained by the observed needs of potential beneficiaries, as the scheme intended.

In theory, under the conditions of open electoral competition, an active civil society and institutions that guarantee accountability, clientelism and vote-buying lose their attraction and disappear in the long run. Based on an analysis of political processes in the Federal District, this article examines the survival and transformation of political clientelism in democratic Mexico. An attempt is made to evaluate the causes and consequences of the persistence and continued relevance of political clientelism, placing emphasis on the diversification of "client supply" in the context of local democratization. This diversification increasingly includes the provision of individualized benefits relating to public security, in exchange for political support. Adapted from the source document.

We study an Illinois state government program called "member initiative spending" and examine the extent to which three competing theories can explain the program's allocations among Illinois's 118 House districts. We show that member initiative monies distributed before the 2000 general election were disproportionately allocated to districts that were politically competitive, represented by legislative leaders, or represented by moderate legislators. Our analysis supports theories that claim budgetary decisions made by elected officials are tactical, and it shows that the Illinois decision makers who allocated member initiative funds sought to distribute them in a way that would be most beneficial in the sense of vote buying.

Theories of organization of legislatures have mainly focused on the U.S. Congress, explaining why committee systems emerge there, but not explaining variance in organization across legislatures of different countries. To analyze the effects of different constitutional features on the internal organization of legislatures, we adopt a vote-buying model and consider the incentives to delegate decision rights in a game among legislative chambers. We show how presidential veto power and bicameral separation can encourage a legislative chamber to create internal veto players or supermajority rules, while a unicameral structure can encourage legislators to delegate power to a leader. (JEL D72)

Artikel ini menjelaskan tentang politik uang yang terjadi pada Pilkada di Provinsi Bengkulu tahun 2015. Metode yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah kualitatif, dengan menggunakan teknik pengumpulan data yaitu wawancara dan dokumentasi. Sedangkan yang menjadi sasaran penelitian ini adalah Bawaslu, KPUD dan Tim Sukses. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa bentuk politik uang terdiri dari vote buying sebanyak 33 kasus, vote trading sebanyak 2 kasus dan club goods sebanyak 1 kasus. Semua laporan tersebut tidak ditindaklanjuti karena tidak memenuhi syarat formal dan materil serta kedaluwarsa, kecuai kasus PPK Singaran Pati yang digugat pasangan Sultan-Mujiono ke Mahkamah Konstitsi. Meskipun MK akhirnya menolak gugatan tersebut berdasarkan pertimbangan ambang batas suara antara pemohon dan peraih suara terbanyak dengan selisih diantara keduanya sebesar 14%.

I examine across‐state distributions of procurement contracts from 1984 to 2004 to test two hypotheses that a presidential electoral connection explains geographic patterns in federal spending. Both hypotheses are derived from a basic vote‐buying theory and are assumed to be conditioned by the president's term. The first hypothesis is that, during first terms, the president will direct a disproportionate amount of procurement dollars per capita to battleground states. The second is that, during first terms, states that gave winning presidential candidates a disproportionately large share of their popular vote will benefit this way. I reject both and, therefore, challenge the generalizability of important extant work. Instead, I find that states that gave presidents disproportionately fewer of their popular votes in the reelection receive more procurement dollars per capita—that is, there is a counterintuitive second‐term effect.