Suchergebnisse

Harmonization and Prospects of Profit Taxes in the EU Law The Master's thesis examines the elements of corporate income tax, the steps already taken to unify the tax at the European Union level and the prospects for tax harmonization. The master's thesis is divided into three parts. The first part analyzes the elements of corporate income tax - conception, tax payers, tax periods, tax rates. In the second part of the thesis, tax harmonization, tax competition and the adopted harmonization acts in direct taxes are analyzed. In the area of direct taxation, the EU has adopted several directives. The most important of these are the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, which aims to eliminate double taxation on distributed profits between parent and subsidiary companies. The interest and royalty payments Directive. These interest and royalty payments shall be exempt from any taxes in that State provided that the beneficial owner of the payment is a company or permanent establishment in another Member State. The Merger Directive provides for tax deferral of the taxes that could be charged on the income or capital gains derived by the shareholders of the transferring or the acquired company from the exchange of such shares for shares in the receiving or the acquiring company. EU Member States have also signed a convention on elimination of double taxation (Arbitration convention) to eliminate double taxation in specific situations. For example, where branches of multinational companies (associated companies) which are based in different EU countries are taxed by more than one EU country as a result of an upward adjustment in its profits in another EU country. This part also analyzes competition in taxation, which was one of the main reasons that led to harmonization. The final part of the thesis examines the existing initiatives in the harmonization of corporate income tax and assesses the perspectives. The EU Commission has submitted a draft Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), which aims to establish new criteria for the calculation of corporate income tax. The European Commission considers that the different corporate tax systems hinder the functioning of the internal market and the free movement of capital. However, Member States are afraid that such unification of the base can lead to full harmonization and tax rate harmonization at EU level. Looking ahead, the author distinguishes various positions, appreciates the possibility of harmonization not only from a legal or economic point of view, but also through the prism of political climate in the Member States. The main criterion that will be the biggest obstacle to harmonizing corporate income tax will remain the unanimity requirement in tax matters. The EU is already taking the initiative to abolish the requirement for unanimity, so changes in the voting system is the only way to see any changes in the harmonization process in the future.

When studying attitudes towards redistribution, surveys show that individuals do care about fairness. They also showthat the cultural environment in which people grow up affects their preferences about redistribution. In this article weinclude these two components of the demand for redistribution in order to develop a mechanism for the culturaltransmission of the concern for fairness. The preferences of the young are partially shaped through the observationand imitation of others' choices. More specifically, observing during childhood how adults have collectively failed toimplement fair redistributive policies lowers the concern during adulthood for fairness or the moral cost of not supportingfair taxation. Based on this mechanism, the model exhibits a multiplicity of history-dependent stationary states that mayaccount for the huge and persistent differences in redistribution observed between Europe and the United States. Italso explains why immigrants from countries with a preference for greater redistribution continue to support higherredistribution in their destination country.

When studying attitudes towards redistribution, surveys show that individuals do care about fairness. They also showthat the cultural environment in which people grow up affects their preferences about redistribution. In this article weinclude these two components of the demand for redistribution in order to develop a mechanism for the culturaltransmission of the concern for fairness. The preferences of the young are partially shaped through the observationand imitation of others' choices. More specifically, observing during childhood how adults have collectively failed toimplement fair redistributive policies lowers the concern during adulthood for fairness or the moral cost of not supportingfair taxation. Based on this mechanism, the model exhibits a multiplicity of history-dependent stationary states that mayaccount for the huge and persistent differences in redistribution observed between Europe and the United States. Italso explains why immigrants from countries with a preference for greater redistribution continue to support higherredistribution in their destination country.

The article analyses the role of a Parliament Speaker as a leader of one of the main institutions in representative democracy. The analysis is based on the premises of the theories of neoinstitutionalism and political leadership; the basic types of roles a speaker may have in different political systems are reviewed; and the established Lithuanian practice is studied accordingly. There are constitutional, statutory, traditional and ceremonial, procedural, and administrative functions and powers that are usually attributed to the Speaker, but the primary function of the presiding officer of a parliament is to conduct debates in parliament, to control its agenda as well as to represent the institution. While performing one's tasks, the Speaker may be seen as a party asset as in the US Congress or a neutral chairman as in the UK House of Commons, however, neutrality by many scholars is seen as a basic feature attributed to this office. The studies conducted in the framework of institutionalisation of parliaments highlight several criteria inherent in highly-institutionalised legislatures such as professionalism of its leadership (i.e. long congressional career path) and "well-boundedness" of an institution (i.e. no lateral entry from outside), among other things. Scholars also highlight that it is not only formal powers but also subjective factors depending on a concrete personality that define the authority and the actual role the Speaker plays in the political process. The role of a Speaker of the Seimas is analysed based on theoretical criteria. After examination of the legal basis, status, formal powers of the Speaker of the Seimas as well as other factors, it is possible to conclude the following: The role of the presiding officer of the Parliament in Lithuania has changed since the beginning of the independence period due to changing constitutional arrangements, legal framework and political circumstances; despite the existence of collective bodies in the Seimas – the Board of the Seimas and the Conference of Chairs, at present Speaker of the Seimas is an individual leader.Although formally it is the second highest position in the hierarchy of state officers having mandate to substitute the head of the state, according to the established informal practice it is only the third official in terms of political power, being overshadowed by Prime Minister. That is why, it is only the "third choice" for politicians in their political career. Speaker of the Seimas can be described as a "party asset" type of a Speaker because of his/her relatively broad procedural powers and active political role played by the person despite the formal requirement to suspend one's membership in the party group – there were several Speakers who retained their formal party leadership while in office. • A selection mechanism for the Office of the Speaker, i.e. inter-party negotiations for the governing coalition, is by far the most important informal variable defining the choice of the person and his/her behaviour later on while in office. Political conjuncture also stipulates relative instability of the Office and the change of Speaker without completing their full term (which is a rather seldom phenomena in Western parliaments). Party discipline and necessity to form a ruling coalition overrides even a secret ballot procedure in election of a Speaker thus diminishing the authority of an institution (the cases of re-voting for Arūnas Valinskas and a sudden replacement of Vydas Gedvilas by Loreta Graužinienė in the middle of their term). • Despite the weakness and instability of the party system in Lithuania, with "newcomers" in the Parliament and the highest political offices, there is a tendency to elect persons with longer previous parliamentary experience for the Office of Speaker, especially from long-established parties. However, the prestige and authority of Speaker often depends on subjective factors and concrete personality occupying the position. Not only the circumstances of the time but also the personality of the politician shape the role and tasks the Speaker performs.In view of the essential role of political leaders in the building of institutions, the analysis of a Speaker's role in a new democracy seems to be especially meaningful, thus providing an important additional insight into the institutionalisation studies of legislatures. ; Šiame straipsnyje, remiantis neoinstitucionalizmo ir politinės lyderystės teorijų nuostatomis, analizuojami parlamento pirmininko pareigybės statusas, vaidmuo ir reikšmė parlamento institucionalizacijos kontekste, pristatomi mokslinėje literatūroje nurodomi šios pareigybės tipai, pagrindžiamos teorinės prielaidos analizuoti Seimo Pirmininko pareigybę. Remiantis išskirtais kriterijais, analizuojami Lietuvos Respublikos Seimo Pirmininko vaidmuo ir reikšmė politikos procese, per Lietuvos nepriklausomybės istoriją susiformavęs šios pareigybės tipas, jis lyginamas su atitinkamais Vakarų valstybių modeliais.

Economic insecurity has attracted growing attention in social, academic and policy cir- cles. However, there is no consensus as to its precise de_nition. Intuitively, economic insecurity is multi-faceted, making any comprehensive formal de_nition that subsumes all possible aspects extremely challenging. We propose a simpli_ed approach, and character- ize a class of individual economic-insecurity measures that are based on the time pro_le of economic resources. We then apply our economic-insecurity measure to data on political preferences. In US, UK and German panel data, and conditional on current economic resources, economic insecurity is associated with both greater political participation (sup- port for a party or the intention to vote) and notably more support for parties on the right of the political spectrum. We in particular _nd that economic insecurity predicts greater support for both Donald Trump before the 2016 US Presidential election and the UK leaving the European Union in the 2016 Brexit referendum.

Economic insecurity has attracted growing attention in social, academic and policy cir- cles. However, there is no consensus as to its precise de_nition. Intuitively, economic insecurity is multi-faceted, making any comprehensive formal de_nition that subsumes all possible aspects extremely challenging. We propose a simpli_ed approach, and character- ize a class of individual economic-insecurity measures that are based on the time pro_le of economic resources. We then apply our economic-insecurity measure to data on political preferences. In US, UK and German panel data, and conditional on current economic resources, economic insecurity is associated with both greater political participation (sup- port for a party or the intention to vote) and notably more support for parties on the right of the political spectrum. We in particular _nd that economic insecurity predicts greater support for both Donald Trump before the 2016 US Presidential election and the UK leaving the European Union in the 2016 Brexit referendum.

Economic insecurity has attracted growing attention in social, academic and policy cir- cles. However, there is no consensus as to its precise de_nition. Intuitively, economic insecurity is multi-faceted, making any comprehensive formal de_nition that subsumes all possible aspects extremely challenging. We propose a simpli_ed approach, and character- ize a class of individual economic-insecurity measures that are based on the time pro_le of economic resources. We then apply our economic-insecurity measure to data on political preferences. In US, UK and German panel data, and conditional on current economic resources, economic insecurity is associated with both greater political participation (sup- port for a party or the intention to vote) and notably more support for parties on the right of the political spectrum. We in particular _nd that economic insecurity predicts greater support for both Donald Trump before the 2016 US Presidential election and the UK leaving the European Union in the 2016 Brexit referendum.

Economic insecurity has attracted growing attention in social, academic and policy cir- cles. However, there is no consensus as to its precise de_nition. Intuitively, economic insecurity is multi-faceted, making any comprehensive formal de_nition that subsumes all possible aspects extremely challenging. We propose a simpli_ed approach, and character- ize a class of individual economic-insecurity measures that are based on the time pro_le of economic resources. We then apply our economic-insecurity measure to data on political preferences. In US, UK and German panel data, and conditional on current economic resources, economic insecurity is associated with both greater political participation (sup- port for a party or the intention to vote) and notably more support for parties on the right of the political spectrum. We in particular _nd that economic insecurity predicts greater support for both Donald Trump before the 2016 US Presidential election and the UK leaving the European Union in the 2016 Brexit referendum.

Economic insecurity has attracted growing attention in social, academic and policy cir- cles. However, there is no consensus as to its precise de_nition. Intuitively, economic insecurity is multi-faceted, making any comprehensive formal de_nition that subsumes all possible aspects extremely challenging. We propose a simpli_ed approach, and character- ize a class of individual economic-insecurity measures that are based on the time pro_le of economic resources. We then apply our economic-insecurity measure to data on political preferences. In US, UK and German panel data, and conditional on current economic resources, economic insecurity is associated with both greater political participation (sup- port for a party or the intention to vote) and notably more support for parties on the right of the political spectrum. We in particular _nd that economic insecurity predicts greater support for both Donald Trump before the 2016 US Presidential election and the UK leaving the European Union in the 2016 Brexit referendum.

In recent years considerable social pressure has been brought to bear on commodity food chains throughout the world. Events such as the introduction of bioengineered crops, the discovery of BSE in beef and instances of food contamination directly leading to human illness have focused attention on the food supply chain. Traditionally the operations of commodity-based food chains attracted relatively little attention from anyone not directly involved in agriculture and food systems. And, even with those logistical and marketing systems, their low margins and scale efficiencies tended to inhibit innovation. Now, however, the tension between social pressures and food chain economic efficiency has become an issue of concern. On the one hand, loud voices \"demand\" rapid and dramatic change to the commodity-based system to provide each consumer with any physical and information attribute that might be of interest. Conversely sector decision makers know that consumers, voting with their pocketbooks, will discipline those food chains that venture too far in adding costs to final products. This setting extends beyond, however, the normal marketing question of whether sufficient numbers of consumers will buy a new product and at a sufficiently high price to attain profitability. In food chains today, decision makers are besieged with messages that are contradictory and paradoxical. For example, at the same time that there is a potential threat that US commodity exports are being restrained because of international resistance to bioengineered crops, US soybeans and cotton exports (both primarily produced from bioengineered seeds) are at record levels (Abbott, 2001). Because every supply chain is a collection of economic transactions, it is natural to expect economic analysis to be able to provide insights as to the future directions of the food system. Stated very simply, one would expect that, if consumers are willing to pay for additional product attributes (both physical and informational), agricultural and food systems would respond to provide those attributes. However, it is always difficult to estimate what consumers will actually pay for attributes they are not now receiving. And specific consumer segments, potentially delineated by income, geography, demographics or several other criteria, may have markedly different preferences for these attributes. Food chains, themselves, are systems and change often requires substantial initial investment, which can forestall innovation even if an the long run such change would be economic. Further, if the presence or absence of a certain attribute is imposed by government regulation, the competitive dynamics of change can be significantly different than would be the case if such regulations didn't exist. Despite these complexities, private and public sector decision makers with interest in food supply chains have to make decision today whose outcomes will be significantly affected by the future resolution of these paradoxes. The purpose of this paper is to describe an innovative conceptual approach and to present a specific analytic framework that can be employed to enhance the understanding of the \"paradoxical\" forces pressing for change and the likely future directions of change.

In recent years considerable social pressure has been brought to bear on commodity food chains throughout the world. Events such as the introduction of bioengineered crops, the discovery of BSE in beef and instances of food contamination directly leading to human illness have focused attention on the food supply chain. Traditionally the operations of commodity-based food chains attracted relatively little attention from anyone not directly involved in agriculture and food systems. And, even with those logistical and marketing systems, their low margins and scale efficiencies tended to inhibit innovation. Now, however, the tension between social pressures and food chain economic efficiency has become an issue of concern. On the one hand, loud voices \"demand\" rapid and dramatic change to the commodity-based system to provide each consumer with any physical and information attribute that might be of interest. Conversely sector decision makers know that consumers, voting with their pocketbooks, will discipline those food chains that venture too far in adding costs to final products. This setting extends beyond, however, the normal marketing question of whether sufficient numbers of consumers will buy a new product and at a sufficiently high price to attain profitability. In food chains today, decision makers are besieged with messages that are contradictory and paradoxical. For example, at the same time that there is a potential threat that US commodity exports are being restrained because of international resistance to bioengineered crops, US soybeans and cotton exports (both primarily produced from bioengineered seeds) are at record levels (Abbott, 2001). Because every supply chain is a collection of economic transactions, it is natural to expect economic analysis to be able to provide insights as to the future directions of the food system. Stated very simply, one would expect that, if consumers are willing to pay for additional product attributes (both physical and informational), agricultural and food systems would respond to provide those attributes. However, it is always difficult to estimate what consumers will actually pay for attributes they are not now receiving. And specific consumer segments, potentially delineated by income, geography, demographics or several other criteria, may have markedly different preferences for these attributes. Food chains, themselves, are systems and change often requires substantial initial investment, which can forestall innovation even if an the long run such change would be economic. Further, if the presence or absence of a certain attribute is imposed by government regulation, the competitive dynamics of change can be significantly different than would be the case if such regulations didn't exist. Despite these complexities, private and public sector decision makers with interest in food supply chains have to make decision today whose outcomes will be significantly affected by the future resolution of these paradoxes. The purpose of this paper is to describe an innovative conceptual approach and to present a specific analytic framework that can be employed to enhance the understanding of the \"paradoxical\" forces pressing for change and the likely future directions of change.

The thesis focuses on the epistemic (cognitive) character of democratic institutional practices and the protection of basic liberties in Mill's political thought, using it as a basis for the interpretation of institutional political proposals and moral standards within his theory. Mill addresses various issues and offers proposals that often seem to be motivated by different reasons and lead to diverse, sometimes even incompatible, results. I hold that identifying the epistemic criteria within Mill's proposals can serve as a basis for unifying his political thought. Furthermore, it can help us resolve the tension between political and epistemic values present in contemporary discussions. The thesis analyses several underinvestigated ideas in Mill's political thought. It characterizes Mill as an epistemic democrat and sets his theory in the broader explanatory framework related to the justification of collective decision-making procedures. My work follows Mill's sophisticated argumentation from its roots in utilitarian moral theory to its implications in liberal democracy. This thesis has three parts. In the first part (first, second and third chapter), I discuss and elaborate on the two basic criteria Mill uses to evaluate different forms of government (or different decision-authorization procedures). Furthermore, I analyze Mill's argument for the epistemic value of political disagreement, which establishes Mill as an epistemic liberal and represents a foundation for his future characterization as an epistemic democrat. In the second part (fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh chapter), I fully develop the epistemic interpretation of Mill's political thought, arguing that Mill values democracy for its instrumental epistemic qualities. Additionally, I analyze and evaluate epistemic arguments for various mechanisms Mill introduces to filter the public will, thus protecting decision-authorization and decision-making procedures from incompetence, vehemence and negligence. These filtering mechanisms include public balloting, advocacy as a model of political representation, division of epistemic and political labor between the representative body (the parliament) and expert bodies (legislative commissions and executive government), as well as the limited autonomy and authority of the local government. Finally, I emphasize Mill's epistemic justification of plural voting proposal and his views on the epistemic value of partisanship. In the third part of the thesis (eighth chapter), I address the alleged problem of paternalism and indicate how epistemic interpretation can help us preserve consistency in Mill's political thought. The thesis offers a novel interpretation of Mill's political philosophy and discusses its possible application in the contemporary world, particularly concerning the division of epistemic and political labor between the representative and the executive branch of government and the role of experts in democratic decision-making procedures. ; Temeljni problem kojim se bavi disertacija jest određenje epistemičkog (spoznajnog) značaja demokratskih institucionalnih praksi i zaštite temeljnih sloboda u Millovoj političkoj misli kao osnove za interpretaciju institucionalnih političkih rješenja i moralnih standarda u njegovoj teoriji. Mill se bavi različitim temama te predlaže rješenja koja ponekad izgledaju kao da su motivirana različitim razlozima i vode do različitih, pa i suprotstavljenih, ishoda. Smatram da određenje epistemičkog kriterija među političkim rješenjima koja nudi može služiti kao osnova za objedinjenje njegove misli. Pored toga, može služiti i za povezivanje Milla s rješenjem napetosti između političkih i epistemičkih vrijednosti koja je prisutna u suvremenim raspravama. Milla se karakterizira kao epistemičkog demokrata te se njegova teorija stavlja u širi okvir opravdanja kolektivnih procedura donošenja odluka. Disertacija slijedi Millovu sofisticiranu argumentaciju od njenih korijena u utilitarističkoj moralnoj teoriji do njenih implikacija u liberalnoj demokraciji. Disertacija je podijeljena u tri dijela. U prvom dijelu (prvo, drugo i treće poglavlje) izlažu se i pojašnjavaju dva temeljna kriterija koja Mill koristi kako bi evaluirao različite oblike vlasti (ili različite procedure autorizacije političkih odluka). Nadalje, analizira se Millov argument za epistemičku vrijednost političkog neslaganja, kojim se Milla predstavlja kao epistemičkog liberala i na osnovi kojeg se temelji buduća karakterizacija Milla kao epistemičkog demokrata. U drugom dijelu (četvrto, peto, šesto i sedmo poglavlje) razvija se epistemička interpretacija Millove političke misli te se utvrđuje kako Mill cijeni demokraciju zbog njezinih instrumentalnih epistemičkih kvaliteta. Nadalje, analiziraju se i evaluiraju epistemički argumenti za razne mehanizme koje Mill uvodi kako bi filtrirao javnu volju, te tako zaštitio procedure donošenja i autorizacije političkih odluka od neznanja, ishitrenosti ili nemara. Ovi mehanizmi uključuju prijedlog javnog glasanja, zastupništvo kao model političkog predstavljanja, podjelu političkog i epistemičkog rada između predstavničkog tijela (parlament) i stručnih tijela (komisije za izradu zakona, izvršna vlast), kao i ograničenu autonomiju i autoritet lokalne vlasti i uprave. Završno, naglašava se Millovo epistemičko opravdanje prijedloga višestrukog prava glasa te njegova razmišljanja o epistemičkoj vrijednosti političkih stranaka. U trećem dijelu disertacije (osmo poglavlje) obrađuje se pretpostavljeni problem paternalizma te se pokazuje kako nam epistemička interpretacija pomaže sačuvati konzistentnost unutar Millove političke misli. Disertacija nudi originalnu interpretaciju Millove političke filozofije te razmatra njene moguće primjene na suvremeni svijet, osobito vezano uz podjelu epistemičkog i političkog rada između predstavničke i izvršne vlasti te uz ulogu stručnjaka u procedurama demokratskog odlučivanja.

Barring a legal miracle, Louisiana's congressional elections
this fall will occur with only one majority-minority district using the 2022
map.

That's the implication of the Louisiana Western
District three-judge panel's decision
in Callais v. Landry handed
down earlier this week. In a 2-1 decision – with the two Republican former
Pres. Donald
Trump district judge appointees under the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals doubling
up on Democrat former Pres. Bill
Clinton-appointed Appellate Judge Carl Stewart – the court ruled the map
enacted earlier this year violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution and enjoined its use That map came about only because the 2022 plan
was enjoined
preliminarily by a Middle District judge with plaintiffs presumed to
prevail on the question of declaring that map in violation of the Voting Rights
Act.

The panel majority took the offered layup when the
Louisiana Legislature in special session produced a map with an M/M district stretching
from Shreveport to Baton Rouge and Lafayette, splitting them all and
dismembering Alexandria along the way. At five points it hung together by only
a single precinct, and at one point it forced another district to be one
precinct wide squeezed on the other side by Texas. It was a district not even its
legislative progenitors would admit had any actual commonality other than it
had to be M/M.

All of this made it easy to declare the entire map
unconstitutional, much less that it didn't differ a whole lot from a district
also as part of a map declared unconstitutional three decades ago, upon which
the majority drew. While race as an overriding factor among several traditional
criteria for reapportionment can be valid when a jurisdiction otherwise can't
prevent dilution of a definable minority group that votes largely for particular
candidates and often against the majority's preference, that minority also must
be reasonably compact geographically. The panel majority observed that the
dispersed nature of black residents in Louisiana outside of the southeastern portion
of the state didn't satisfy this condition, and thus the environment wasn't
such that the distribution of the minority outside of that area of the state
could be used to permit race to override all other considerations.

In reading Stewart's dissent, one wonders whether
he paid attention during the trial. He bought the defense's argument – the
state plus intervenors in the Middle District case Robinson v. Landry who
tried to leverage their case into this one – that political considerations
which can be a legitimate reapportionment criterion, in this instance trying to
ensure certain GOP incumbents were protected, were at least as important. This treats
as if it didn't exist that the entire reason that politics entered the fray was
the exercise came about only because of the imperative to draw a map guided by
race, out of the fear the Robinson case would be allowed to enter a remedial
phase where the Middle District would impose its own two M/M district map. As
the plaintiffs' lead lawyer noted, politics was entirely downstream of race
that negates Stewart's musings.

Next week, approximately nine days prior to the
time Republican Sec. of State Nancy Landry
says the state needs to start preparing for fall elections that necessitates
knowing the congressional district boundaries, a status conference occurs that
should lead to the remedial phase where a new plan gets drawn. The Legislature
will be unable to act before then given its calendar and the panel is unlikely to
be prepared to put its own plan in place by May 15. That would lead the state
to petition lifting the Robinson injunction to use the 2022 map, whether
by the circuit or Supreme Court, for this fall.

That will succeed, for a number of reasons. First,
Callais speaks to a constitutional violation rather than the statutory violation
alleged in Robinson. Second, Callais was a trial on the merits of
the 2024 map, whereas Robinson never had a trial but preliminarily
halted use of the 2022 map on the belief a trial would show that map defective;
thus, that map remains in play as there is merely suspicion that it broke the
law as opposed to a determination that its substitute violated the Constitution.
Third, although the intervenor part of the defense filed a desperation heave of
an appeal
to the Court, it will bat that away because there's nothing new here: the
jurisprudence it established in Shaw v. Reno and successor
cases, including the Hays
v. Louisiana case that looked at the similar district, set clear guardrails
that clearly confine this case. The panel's ruling will stand. (The Robinson plaintiffs also have filed
to reopen their case, but that also will be too little, too late.)

Further, whatever comes from the remedy phase
itself will be challenged that will permit the 2022 map to linger. Highly likely
the end product won't differ too much from the 2022 map not only because the
plaintiffs have priority being on the winning side in establishing the remedy plan,
but also because of the skepticism that the majority showed. While not as egregiously
using race, other two M/M options that the Robinson intervenors advanced
would run afoul of the compactness standard the majority laid out in Callais
– which directly rebukes the standard used in Robinson and begs for the
Court eventually to intervene after circuit disposition. Keep in mind that the Robinson
proportionality argument – if about a third of the state's population is black,
then about a third of its congressional districts must be black – created a
standard never affirmed by any other court in a trial.

Scrutiny over that is the course GOP Atty. Gen. Liz Murrill seems determined to
follow. Even if miraculously the panel chose a two M/M option, she said she will challenge
whatever ruling comes about saying the Court must provide clear standards.
Here is where checkmate probably will occur for a two M/M map, because in the operative
case that guided the Robinson outcome that led to Callais the
Court practically begged for a challenge to the relevant part of the Voting Rights
Act on constitutional grounds – which Callais has teed up.

Regardless of whether the Court eventually goes
ahead and declares that race cannot be any more preferred than other
reapportionment criteria – and from its previous decision-making a majority
seems receptive to that – this will take time. The state has to have a map and
quickly, and the 2022 single M/M plan jurisprudentially has the fewest warts for
this fall, and perhaps even for 2026 depending upon how long the legal
machinations to follow drag on. By contrast, the relatively swift movement of Callais
that produced a decision before May against
the odds means likely five Republican/one Democrat representation of all incumbents
this fall.

International audience ; We compare inequality aversion in individuals and teams by means of both within- and between-subject experimental designs, and we investigate how teams aggregate individual preferences. We find that team decisions reveal less inequality aversion than individual initial proposals in team decision-making. However, teams are no more selfish than individuals who decide in isolation. Individuals express strategically more inequality aversion in their initial proposals in team decision-making because they anticipate the selfishness of other members. Members with median social preferences drive team decisions. Finally, we show that social image has little influence because guilt and envy are almost similar in anonymous and non-anonymous interactions.