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"Military Defection and the Arab Spring" published on by Oxford University Press.

Investing in human resources in modern organizations implies continuing education and employee training. In this matter, there are various forms of education, such as specialized courses, financial support of foreign language training and postgraduate scholarships, which can be applied. Military organizations cannot be exempted from this practice, because they have continually been affected by various challenges while seeking to make adjustments to their education systems. The truth of the matter is that new approaches to the employment of military forces call for the transformation of military organizations. Not only does the transformation change the organization, but it also transforms the ways in which militaries run the operations. It inevitably calls for a paradigm shift in defense planning and implementation. Thus, a modified form of a military organization will be developed into smaller, faster and highly networked units, able to be deployed in the shortest possible time. Therefore, the question arises as to how a military education system can be transformed in order to make new command and staff structures ready to respond to numerous challenges.

This article examines the basis of military leadership preferences toward war termination, and thus the basis of the associated civil-military divide, within the context of protracted small war. The conventional wisdom posits military leadership preferences as a near-constant in favor of persistence and thus expects a dominant pattern of military obstructionism. However, such a pattern does not hold empirically across the population of small wars. This gap between expectation and evidence derives at least in part from the limits of the bureaucratic-organizational model, focused on the military's desire for resources, autonomy, and influence, that underlies the conventional wisdom. In contrast, this article suggests an alternative model privileging the demands of institutional legitimacy. The legitimacy motive as conceptualized here is particularly salient to the small war context. It accordingly provides a foundation for better understanding variation in military leadership preferences toward war termination and thus variation in the direction and intensity of the civil-military divide. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society/Sage Publications Inc.]

AbstractIn a developing market, where the ownership is highly concentrated and the central governance issue is the conflict between majority and minority shareholders, how do managers with previous military experience (military managers) affect the quality of financial reporting? We use a sample of Chinese listed firms over period 2006–2016, with a total of 16,010 firm‐year observations. Our results suggest that firms with military managers are associated with higher levels of earnings management, through both accrual‐based and real‐activities manipulations. Those firms are more susceptible to financial restatements, qualified audit opinions, and penalties for violation. To alleviate endogeneity problems, we use both the instrumental variable regression and propensity score matching, and our results are robust. In addition, the effect of military managers is more pronounced in state‐owned firms and firms with weak internal control systems. These findings improve our understanding of the link between managerial traits and financial reporting decisions, in an environment where the major governance issue is the conflict between majority and minority shareholders.

Between 1980 and 2016, the percentage of states that partnered in a multinational military exercise (MME) increased twenty-fold. What explains this proliferation? Existing studies focus on the role of major powers and polarity but fail to explain exercises without great powers or the continuous growth of MME participation. I conceptualize patterns of exercises among all members of the international system as networks. Inferential network analysis shows that higher-order effects like popularity, transitivity, and memory increase the probability that states cooperate militarily. Countries with many connections have institutional knowledge and prestige to attract partners. Multinational coalitions form where mutual friends increase trust and create positive feedback. Past cooperation lowers the costs of future partnerships. Empirical analysis shows that the evolving network structure of MMEs is an emergent property driven by these interdependent processes, and that traditional explanations for security cooperation like great powers and alliances decrease in influence over time.

Abstract
Between 1980 and 2016, the percentage of states that partnered in a multinational military exercise (MME) increased twenty-fold. What explains this proliferation? Existing studies focus on the role of major powers and polarity but fail to explain exercises without great powers or the continuous growth of MME participation. I conceptualize patterns of exercises among all members of the international system as networks. Inferential network analysis shows that higher-order effects like popularity, transitivity, and memory increase the probability that states cooperate militarily. Countries with many connections have institutional knowledge and prestige to attract partners. Multinational coalitions form where mutual friends increase trust and create positive feedback. Past cooperation lowers the costs of future partnerships. Empirical analysis shows that the evolving network structure of MMEs is an emergent property driven by these interdependent processes, and that traditional explanations for security cooperation like great powers and alliances decrease in influence over time.

The movement and maneuver have been and will remain over time imperative requirements of military structures in the tactical field. Technological progress has offered high possibilities to maneuvering structures for maintaining their freedom of movement in the tactical field, simultaneously with interdicting/hindering the maneuverability of the opponent. The need to ensure increased mobility of own combat structures in the tactical field, led to the emergence of a new generation of combat engineer support forces, modular and standardized, with a doctrine in line with the requirements of the modern battlefield and especially with an increased adaptation and integration capability of external resource, in order to fulfill its specific tasks. Keywords: mobility; countermobility; movement; maneuver; obstacles

Supplement, c1917: p. [495]-584. ; First issued, 1899-1900, as no. 24 of the Publications of the U. S. Adjutant general's office. Military information division. ; "Authorities": p. vii-ix. ; Mode of access: Internet.

This article analyses the Russian concept of contemporary warfare after the 2008 Russia–Georgia war and the changes that have occurred in the wake of the 2014 military conflict in Eastern Ukraine. This concept is shaped through a dissection of public texts and speeches by Russian military officers, experts and analysts. The article attempts to measure the impact of Russia's military practice in Eastern Ukraine in its stance on contemporary warfare and see what new types of warfare (terminologically speaking) are appearing in Russia's military vocabulary. A vision of the future of types of Russian war is presented, complete with arguments regarding the most plausible case of future local war with respect to Russia. The article furthermore provides a detailed analysis of the interpretations of asymmetrical, network-centric, hybrid warfare, colour revolutions, controlled chaos, and information and electromagnetic warfare in Russia's military thought, which is understood as forms of realisation of contemporary warfare. A quest for the origin of these warfare ideas shows that Russia tends to emulate the military experience of western powers, the US in particular, instead of doing the opposite and acting adaptively and conceptualising its most recent military experience as a vision of modern warfare

This article analyses the Russian concept of contemporary warfare after the 2008 Russia–Georgia war and the changes that have occurred in the wake of the 2014 military conflict in Eastern Ukraine. This concept is shaped through a dissection of public texts and speeches by Russian military officers, experts and analysts. The article attempts to measure the impact of Russia's military practice in Eastern Ukraine in its stance on contemporary warfare and see what new types of warfare (terminologically speaking) are appearing in Russia's military vocabulary. A vision of the future of types of Russian war is presented, complete with arguments regarding the most plausible case of future local war with respect to Russia. The article furthermore provides a detailed analysis of the interpretations of asymmetrical, network-centric, hybrid warfare, colour revolutions, controlled chaos, and information and electromagnetic warfare in Russia's military thought, which is understood as forms of realisation of contemporary warfare. A quest for the origin of these warfare ideas shows that Russia tends to emulate the military experience of western powers, the US in particular, instead of doing the opposite and acting adaptively and conceptualising its most recent military experience as a vision of modern warfare

This article analyses the Russian concept of contemporary warfare after the 2008 Russia–Georgia war and the changes that have occurred in the wake of the 2014 military conflict in Eastern Ukraine. This concept is shaped through a dissection of public texts and speeches by Russian military officers, experts and analysts. The article attempts to measure the impact of Russia's military practice in Eastern Ukraine in its stance on contemporary warfare and see what new types of warfare (terminologically speaking) are appearing in Russia's military vocabulary. A vision of the future of types of Russian war is presented, complete with arguments regarding the most plausible case of future local war with respect to Russia. The article furthermore provides a detailed analysis of the interpretations of asymmetrical, network-centric, hybrid warfare, colour revolutions, controlled chaos, and information and electromagnetic warfare in Russia's military thought, which is understood as forms of realisation of contemporary warfare. A quest for the origin of these warfare ideas shows that Russia tends to emulate the military experience of western powers, the US in particular, instead of doing the opposite and acting adaptively and conceptualising its most recent military experience as a vision of modern warfare

This article analyses the Russian concept of contemporary warfare after the 2008 Russia–Georgia war and the changes that have occurred in the wake of the 2014 military conflict in Eastern Ukraine. This concept is shaped through a dissection of public texts and speeches by Russian military officers, experts and analysts. The article attempts to measure the impact of Russia's military practice in Eastern Ukraine in its stance on contemporary warfare and see what new types of warfare (terminologically speaking) are appearing in Russia's military vocabulary. A vision of the future of types of Russian war is presented, complete with arguments regarding the most plausible case of future local war with respect to Russia. The article furthermore provides a detailed analysis of the interpretations of asymmetrical, network-centric, hybrid warfare, colour revolutions, controlled chaos, and information and electromagnetic warfare in Russia's military thought, which is understood as forms of realisation of contemporary warfare. A quest for the origin of these warfare ideas shows that Russia tends to emulate the military experience of western powers, the US in particular, instead of doing the opposite and acting adaptively and conceptualising its most recent military experience as a vision of modern warfare