Die russische Parteienlandschaft vor den Parlamentswahlen (II)
In: Aktuelle Analysen / Bundesinstitut für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, 1999,7
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In: Aktuelle Analysen / Bundesinstitut für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, 1999,7
World Affairs Online
In: Aktuelle Analysen / Bundesinstitut für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, 1998,11
World Affairs Online
In: Aktuelle Analysen / Bundesinstitut für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, 1993,54
World Affairs Online
International audience ; This paper empirically analyzes the evolution of the quality of the sites included in the UNESCO World Heritage List (WHL) from 1972 till 2016 and verifies how consideration of quality affects the conclusions of the literature about the politics of the WHL. The quality of a site is proxied by the number of criteria set by UNESCO that the site satisfies. The analysis shows that, under a fixed stock of cultural and natural capital, as a country increases the number of sites in the WHL, their marginal quality decreases, because countries propose sites of decreasing quality over time. Contrary to previous studies focusing just on the number of sites included in the list, considering quality shows that the country's lobbying power does not matter for inclusion in the WHL, while the quality of its administration does. These results are robust to tests of the stability of the UNESCO evaluation criteria over time and to changes of econometric estimators.
BASE
International audience ; This paper empirically analyzes the evolution of the quality of the sites included in the UNESCO World Heritage List (WHL) from 1972 till 2016 and verifies how consideration of quality affects the conclusions of the literature about the politics of the WHL. The quality of a site is proxied by the number of criteria set by UNESCO that the site satisfies. The analysis shows that, under a fixed stock of cultural and natural capital, as a country increases the number of sites in the WHL, their marginal quality decreases, because countries propose sites of decreasing quality over time. Contrary to previous studies focusing just on the number of sites included in the list, considering quality shows that the country's lobbying power does not matter for inclusion in the WHL, while the quality of its administration does. These results are robust to tests of the stability of the UNESCO evaluation criteria over time and to changes of econometric estimators.
BASE
International audience ; This paper empirically analyzes the evolution of the quality of the sites included in the UNESCO World Heritage List (WHL) from 1972 till 2016 and verifies how consideration of quality affects the conclusions of the literature about the politics of the WHL. The quality of a site is proxied by the number of criteria set by UNESCO that the site satisfies. The analysis shows that, under a fixed stock of cultural and natural capital, as a country increases the number of sites in the WHL, their marginal quality decreases, because countries propose sites of decreasing quality over time. Contrary to previous studies focusing just on the number of sites included in the list, considering quality shows that the country's lobbying power does not matter for inclusion in the WHL, while the quality of its administration does. These results are robust to tests of the stability of the UNESCO evaluation criteria over time and to changes of econometric estimators.
BASE
International audience ; This paper empirically examines how governments actually use environmental taxes, by looking to what extent their resort to this type of taxation is consistent with three alternative interpretations of environmental taxes proposed by the welfare economics theoretical literature: the strict and the loose Pigouvian and the double dividend hypotheses. We also extend our analysis to an alternative vision of politics, the Leviathan model, to verify how governments that are imperfectly accountable use environmental taxes. Each theory leads to alternative testable hypotheses, which we verify on a sample that minimizes the analysts' discretionary evaluations, the EU-28 countries that committed themselves to reducing the greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. The estimates lend support to the strict Pigouvian hypothesis and, to a lesser extent, to a version of the double dividend hypothesis, where personal income taxes are "recycled" by environmental ones. The other interpretations do not appear consistent with the data.
BASE
International audience ; This paper empirically examines how governments actually use environmental taxes, by looking to what extent their resort to this type of taxation is consistent with three alternative interpretations of environmental taxes proposed by the welfare economics theoretical literature: the strict and the loose Pigouvian and the double dividend hypotheses. We also extend our analysis to an alternative vision of politics, the Leviathan model, to verify how governments that are imperfectly accountable use environmental taxes. Each theory leads to alternative testable hypotheses, which we verify on a sample that minimizes the analysts' discretionary evaluations, the EU-28 countries that committed themselves to reducing the greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. The estimates lend support to the strict Pigouvian hypothesis and, to a lesser extent, to a version of the double dividend hypothesis, where personal income taxes are "recycled" by environmental ones. The other interpretations do not appear consistent with the data.
BASE
International audience ; This paper empirically examines how governments actually use environmental taxes, by looking to what extent their resort to this type of taxation is consistent with three alternative interpretations of environmental taxes proposed by the welfare economics theoretical literature: the strict and the loose Pigouvian and the double dividend hypotheses. We also extend our analysis to an alternative vision of politics, the Leviathan model, to verify how governments that are imperfectly accountable use environmental taxes. Each theory leads to alternative testable hypotheses, which we verify on a sample that minimizes the analysts' discretionary evaluations, the EU-28 countries that committed themselves to reducing the greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. The estimates lend support to the strict Pigouvian hypothesis and, to a lesser extent, to a version of the double dividend hypothesis, where personal income taxes are "recycled" by environmental ones. The other interpretations do not appear consistent with the data.
BASE
Aware of the high importance of consumers' private information concerning their willingness-to-buy fair trade goods and taking into account the superior price they are willing to pay for this kind of goods with respect to conventional ones, we choose to feed the debate relative to the appropriateness of the di¤erent potential retailing channels. We use a common agency game framework to analyze the changes in the price level according various schemes of upstream-downstream organization and relationships. It appears that the private information parameter as well as the nature of the relationship between suppliers on the one hand and the retailer on the other hand are the key variables that determine the price paid by consumers. We examine several competitive setting, that proves that only the presence of benevolent retailers can bring the outcome close to the socially optimal one in a simultaneous game whereas a sequential process cannot be implemented if the mainstream firm is not granted the leader role. We also propose other types of organisation (as a dedicated retailer, corresponding to a merged case) and of cooperative equilibrium, the latter resulting as a new direction to consider in order to reduce the double-margin e¤ect of the expropriating one resulting from the competitive schemes.
BASE
Fair trade actors have to deal with a significant degree of information asymmetry as regard their willingness-to-buy such goods and their willingness-to-pay for them. Many debates and controversies have paved the way for the development of fair trade, in particular concerning the distribution channel that had to be preferred. We use a common agency game framework to analyze the changes in the price level according various schemes of upstream-downstream organization and relationships. Both the private information parameter and the nature of the relationship between suppliers are the key variables that determine the price paid by consumers. If the choice of a dedicated structure does not appear relevant when costs or the number of competing producers are high, the framework of a sequential contracting process always results sub-optimal. What really matters is the nature of the firms involved and the convergence of interests. An equilibrium close to the socially optimal issue may emerge.
BASE
Aware of the high importance of consumers' private information concerning their willingness-to-buy fair trade goods and taking into account the superior price they are willing to pay for this kind of goods with respect to conventional ones, we choose to feed the debate relative to the appropriateness of the di¤erent potential retailing channels. We use a common agency game framework to analyze the changes in the price level according various schemes of upstream-downstream organization and relationships. It appears that the private information parameter as well as the nature of the relationship between suppliers on the one hand and the retailer on the other hand are the key variables that determine the price paid by consumers. We examine several competitive setting, that proves that only the presence of benevolent retailers can bring the outcome close to the socially optimal one in a simultaneous game whereas a sequential process cannot be implemented if the mainstream firm is not granted the leader role. We also propose other types of organisation (as a dedicated retailer, corresponding to a merged case) and of cooperative equilibrium, the latter resulting as a new direction to consider in order to reduce the double-margin e¤ect of the expropriating one resulting from the competitive schemes.
BASE
Fair trade actors have to deal with a significant degree of information asymmetry as regard their willingness-to-buy such goods and their willingness-to-pay for them. Many debates and controversies have paved the way for the development of fair trade, in particular concerning the distribution channel that had to be preferred. We use a common agency game framework to analyze the changes in the price level according various schemes of upstream-downstream organization and relationships. Both the private information parameter and the nature of the relationship between suppliers are the key variables that determine the price paid by consumers. If the choice of a dedicated structure does not appear relevant when costs or the number of competing producers are high, the framework of a sequential contracting process always results sub-optimal. What really matters is the nature of the firms involved and the convergence of interests. An equilibrium close to the socially optimal issue may emerge.
BASE
Taxation is the cornerstone of intergovernmental fiscal relations and is especially at stake when authorities address mobile tax bases. The EU case is particularly interesting to tackle. Evidences prove the existence of important tax interactions among member states and both theoretical and empirical analysis shed light on the di¤erent mechanisms at work. Likewise, the improved knowledge relative to tax avoidance strengthens the need to take into account this kind of phenomenom. In this paper we propose to compare various alternative settings to the current system so as to be able to estimate the relevance of granting EU the power to tax and in which way. In order to adopt a general and comprehensive framework, we introduce information asymmetries and examine di¤erent kinds of governments' objective function. We show that the best outcome would be reach if the EU tier only were allocated the power to tax firms' profits but also prove that, in a context of national governments acting in a competitive way aimed at attracting firms, conferring the EU layer the capacity to apply a tax on a base alreeady subject to member states' taxation could improve the current issue.
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In: Journal of democracy, Band 27, Heft 2, S. 101-140
ISSN: 1045-5736
World Affairs Online