Background Non-fatal outcomes of disease and injury increasingly detract from the ability of the world's population to live in full health, a trend largely attributable to an epidemiological transition in many countries from causes affecting children, to non-communicable diseases (NCDs) more common in adults. For the Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study 2015 (GBD 2015), we estimated the incidence, prevalence, and years lived with disability for diseases and injuries at the global, regional, and national scale over the period of 1990 to 2015. Methods We estimated incidence and prevalence by age, sex, cause, year, and geography with a wide range of updated and standardised analytical procedures. Improvements from GBD 2013 included the addition of new data sources, updates to literature reviews for 85 causes, and the identification and inclusion of additional studies published up to November, 2015, to expand the database used for estimation of non-fatal outcomes to 60 900 unique data sources. Prevalence and incidence by cause and sequelae were determined with DisMod-MR 2.1, an improved version of the DisMod-MR Bayesian meta-regression tool first developed for GBD 2010 and GBD 2013. For some causes, we used alternative modelling strategies where the complexity of the disease was not suited to DisMod-MR 2.1 or where incidence and prevalence needed to be determined from other data. For GBD 2015 we created a summary indicator that combines measures of income per capita, educational attainment, and fertility (the Socio-demographic Index [SDI]) and used it to compare observed patterns of health loss to the expected pattern for countries or locations with similar SDI scores. Findings We generated 9·3 billion estimates from the various combinations of prevalence, incidence, and YLDs for causes, sequelae, and impairments by age, sex, geography, and year. In 2015, two causes had acute incidences in excess of 1 billion: upper respiratory infections (17·2 billion, 95% uncertainty interval [UI] 15·4–19·2 billion) and diarrhoeal diseases (2·39 billion, 2·30–2·50 billion). Eight causes of chronic disease and injury each affected more than 10% of the world's population in 2015: permanent caries, tension-type headache, iron-deficiency anaemia, age-related and other hearing loss, migraine, genital herpes, refraction and accommodation disorders, and ascariasis. The impairment that affected the greatest number of people in 2015 was anaemia, with 2·36 billion (2·35–2·37 billion) individuals affected. The second and third leading impairments by number of individuals affected were hearing loss and vision loss, respectively. Between 2005 and 2015, there was little change in the leading causes of years lived with disability (YLDs) on a global basis. NCDs accounted for 18 of the leading 20 causes of age-standardised YLDs on a global scale. Where rates were decreasing, the rate of decrease for YLDs was slower than that of years of life lost (YLLs) for nearly every cause included in our analysis. For low SDI geographies, Group 1 causes typically accounted for 20–30% of total disability, largely attributable to nutritional deficiencies, malaria, neglected tropical diseases, HIV/AIDS, and tuberculosis. Lower back and neck pain was the leading global cause of disability in 2015 in most countries. The leading cause was sense organ disorders in 22 countries in Asia and Africa and one in central Latin America; diabetes in four countries in Oceania; HIV/AIDS in three southern sub-Saharan African countries; collective violence and legal intervention in two north African and Middle Eastern countries; iron-deficiency anaemia in Somalia and Venezuela; depression in Uganda; onchoceriasis in Liberia; and other neglected tropical diseases in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Interpretation Ageing of the world's population is increasing the number of people living with sequelae of diseases and injuries. Shifts in the epidemiological profile driven by socioeconomic change also contribute to the continued increase in years lived with disability (YLDs) as well as the rate of increase in YLDs. Despite limitations imposed by gaps in data availability and the variable quality of the data available, the standardised and comprehensive approach of the GBD study provides opportunities to examine broad trends, compare those trends between countries or subnational geographies, benchmark against locations at similar stages of development, and gauge the strength or weakness of the estimates available. Funding Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.
AMÉRICA LATINA Brasil admite haber espiado dependencias de la embajada de Estados Unidos. Para más información:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/05/world/americas/brazil-acknowledges-spying-on-diplomats-from-us.html?ref=worldhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-24828668http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/05/world/americas/brazil-spying/index.html?hpt=wo_c2http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/11/04/actualidad/1383574787_015627.htmlhttp://www.eluniversal.com.mx/el-mundo/2013/impreso/brasil-tambien-ha-espiado-revela-diario-84751.htmlhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/ultimas_noticias/2013/11/131105_ultnot_brasil_espionaje_ministro_wbm.shtml Según sondeos Bachelet ganaría en primera vuelta. Para más información:http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1633786-bachelet-ganaria-en-primera-vuelta Incendio presuntamente intencional daña sede de Bachelet en Chile. Para más información:http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/latinoamerica/incendio-presuntamente-intencional-dana-sede-de-michelle-bachelet-en-chile_13160872-4 Los Zelaya buscan volver al poder en Honduras. Para más información:http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1635144-los-zelaya-buscan-volver-al-poder-en-honduras Elecciones en Argentina: Kirchner derrotada en las legislativas. Para más información:http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/latinoamerica/elecciones-en-argentina_13145902-4http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/latinoamerica/perfil-del-poltico-argentino-sergio-massa_13153376-4 Gobierno argentino encuentra documentos secretos de la dictadura militar. Para más información:http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/05/world/americas/argentina-dictatorship-files/index.htmlhttp://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/11/05/actualidad/1383624001_706481.htmlhttp://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/governo-argentino-encontra-documentos-secretos-da-ditadura-militar-10686218#ixzz2joShCyyF Sismo de 6,5 grados sacude centro de Chile. Para más información:http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/latinoamerica/sismo-de-65-grados-en-chile_13153716-4 Diversos medios analizan las nuevas rutas de la cocaína de America Latina. Para más información:http://www.lemonde.fr/ameriques/article/2013/11/05/en-amerique-latine-les-nouvelles-routes-de-la-cocaine_3508494_3222.htmlhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-24800089 Accidente de avión en Bolivia deja ocho muertos y 10 heridos. Para más información:http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/latinoamerica/accidente-de-avin-en-bolivia-deja-ocho-muertos-y-10-heridos_13159103-4 Ocho países realizan el mayor ejercicio militar aéreo conjunto en Latinoamérica. Para más información:http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/11/05/actualidad/1383609280_789526.html Ley de medios, un golpe a grupo argentino Clarín. Para más información:http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/latinoamerica/ley-de-medios-un-golpe-a-grupo-clarn_13149960-4 Ex presidente de Perú reta a Ollanta a debate. Para más información:http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/el-mundo/2013/reta-ex-presidente-de-peru-a-ollanta-a-debate-963273.html Cuba prohíbe cines privados y venta de artículos importados. Para más información:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-24790569http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/latinoamerica/cuba-prohbe-cines-3d-privados-y-venta-de-artculos-importados_13157084-4 Guatemala pierde interés en integrarse a Petrocaribe. Para más información:http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/ultimas_noticias/2013/11/131105_ultnot_guatemala_retira_petrocaribe_jgc.shtml México: miles de personas celebraron el Día de los Muertos. Para más información:http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1635005-dia-de-los-muertos Maduro decreta el "Día de la Lealtad y el Amor al Comandante Supremo". Para más información:http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/latinoamerica/venezuela-celebrara-el-dia-de-la-lealtad-y-el-amor-al-comandante-hugo-chavez_13160847-4 Venezuela introducirá nuevo tipo de cambio para turistas. Para más información:http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1634235-venezuela-introducira-nuevo-tipo-de-cambio-para-turistas Nicolás Maduro y la militarización de la sociedad venezolana. Para más información:http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/latinoamerica/nicols-maduro-y-la-militarizacin-de-la-sociedad-venezolana_13156470-4 Diversos miedos crecen respecto a capacidad de Brasil de hospedar el próximo Mundial de Fútbol. Para más información:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-24828804 16 personas han muerto por dengue en Nicaragua en este año. Para más información:http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/latinoamerica/16-muertos-por-dengue-en-nicaragua_13157378-4 13 muertos deja enfrentamiento en Matamoros- México. Para más información:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-24803143 Guerrilla colombiana libera rehén estadounidense Para más información:http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/27/world/americas/colombia-farc-american-hostage-released/index.html Andrés Oppenheimer analiza crecimeinto latinoamericano. Para más información:http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/11/02/3725607/andres-oppenheimer-world-ranking.html ESTADOS UNIDOS /CANADÁ Las elecciones parciales en EE UU señalan el camino a la Casa Blanca. Para más información:http://www.lemonde.fr/ameriques/article/2013/11/05/a-new-york-une-revanche-sur-les-riches-avec-bill-de-blasio_3508302_3222.htmlhttp://www.lanacion.com.ar/1635688-nueva-york-elige-nuevo-alcalde-tras-la-era-giuliani-bloomberghttp://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/estados-unidos/los-neoyorquinos-acuden-a-las-urnas-para-elegir-un-nuevo-alcalde_13160877-4http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-24813179http://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/eleicoes-de-nova-york-poem-fim-era-bloomberg-10687146#ixzz2joSYWLJm http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/11/05/actualidad/1383677774_704970.htmlhttp://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21588913-young-recall-clinton-boom-not-scandals-clinton-effect El espionaje de Estados Unidos y la agencia NSA sigue generando tensión internacional. Para más información:http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1634977-la-espia-del-siglo-la-nsa-la-agencia-que-todo-lo-puede-y-todo-lo-vehttp://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/estados-unidos/espionaje-en-estados-unidos-john-kerry-dice-que-el-pas-se-sobrepas_13154238-4 Obama continúa luchando para implementar una reforma en el sistema de salud. Para más información:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-24824653 Obama impulsa reforma migratoria ante empresarios. Para más información:http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/el-mundo/2013/obama-impulsa-reforma-migratoria-ante-empresarios-963220.html Caos y muerte en el aeropuerto de Los Ángeles por atacante solitario. Para más información:http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1634906-detalles-siniestros-del-tiroteo-en-el-aeropuerto-de-los-angeleshttp://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/estados-unidos/evacuan-el-aeropuerto-de-los-ngeles-tras-un-tiroteo_13154760-4 Hallan muerto al autor de disparos en centro comercial de Nueva Jersey. Para más información:http://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/atirador-achado-morto-apos-disparar-em-shopping-de-nova-jersey-10687415#ixzz2joSdm0KI http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1635543-encontraron-muerto-al-tirador-de-nueva-jersey-detras-del-shopping-donde-actuohttp://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/estados-unidos/atacante-se-suicida-tras-abrir-fuego-en-centro-comercial-de-nueva-jersey-eeuu_13160298-4 Guantánamo le cuesta a Estados Unidos 200 millones de dólares al año. Para más información:http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/11/05/actualidad/1383672584_280295.html EUROPA El nacionalismo, la xenofobia y cuestiones migratorias siguen siendo el centro de discusiones en Europa. Para más información:http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/11/04/21303956-thousands-of-russian-nationalist-marchers-raise-specter-of-anti-immigrant-violence?litehttp://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/11/03/actualidad/1383507169_514239.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/05/world/europe/russia-nationalists-press-anti-immigrant-agenda.html?ref=world&gwh=A1E63C4610173C0114D1DC8933FD4D60http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/25/world/europe/europe-migration-lampedusa/index.htmlhttp://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/jovens-voltam-as-ruas-da-franca-para-protestar-contra-deportacoes-10691363#ixzz2joUI5dwO Berlín convoca al embajador británico por espionaje. Para más información:http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/11/05/les-grandes-oreilles-britanniques-en-plein-c-ur-de-berli_3508112_651865.htmlhttp://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/embaixada-britanica-em-berlim-teria-sido-usada-para-espionagem-diz-independent-10689217#ixzz2joUDLPDN http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/11/05/actualidad/1383665180_886243.htmlhttp://www.cnn.com/2013/11/05/world/europe/germany-uk-spy-report/index.html?hpt=ieu_c1 Un fuerte temporal azotó el norte de Europa y dejó por lo menos diez muertos Para más información:http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1633430-un-fuerte-temporal-azoto-el-norte-de-europa-y-dejo-por-lo-menos-diez-muertoshttp://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/europa/temporal-al-norte-de-europa_13146984-4}http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/29/world/europe/europe-severe-weather/index.html Asesinadas a cuchilladas tres personas en el secuestro de un autobús en Noruega. Para más información:http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/11/04/21308934-three-killed-in-norway-bus-attack?litehttp://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/tres-pessoas-morrem-em-sequestro-de-onibus-na-noruega-10682646#ixzz2joUKrwMp http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24824069http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/11/05/actualidad/1383606597_727668.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/05/world/europe/norway.html?ref=world&gwh=C4E420C2A5F8E1A70185F1DDB4DDD8AB La violencia en la zona serbia aplasta el proceso de pacificación de Kosovo. Para más información:http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/11/04/actualidad/1383558828_534421.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/05/world/europe/violence-mars-election-in-kosovo.html?ref=world&gwh=4F5028F6061EA83EFAA63CC3341D932F La Unión Europea retoma el diálogo de adhesión con Turquía tras años de bloqueo. Para más información:http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/11/05/actualidad/1383672260_160362.htmlhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24825002 Diversos medios analizan perspectivas económicas de la Unión Europea. Para más información:http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2013-11/05/content_17083716.htmhttp://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/06/business/eu-predicts-anemic-growth-and-high-unemployment-in-2014.html?ref=world&gwh=EEBF2AAAE54EA8AEEB44B2816F9BC94Chttp://www.lanacion.com.ar/1634353-el-desempleo-en-la-eurozona-bate-un-nuevo-recordhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-24817818 En Ginebra diplomáticos trabajan, sin resultados alentadores, para lograr un acuerdo de paz en Siria. Para más información:http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2013-11/06/content_17083814.htmhttp://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/06/world/middleeast/syria.html?ref=world Miles de cuerpos son encontrados en fosa común en Bosnia. Para más información:http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/01/world/europe/bosnia-mass-grave/index.html Policía alemana recupera 1.500 obras de arte robadas por los nazis. Para más información:http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/11/05/21318847-nazi-art-trove-in-german-apartment-includes-previously-unknown-matisse?litehttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24818541http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1635322-hallan-arte-saqueado-por-los-nazis-valuado-en-us-1350-milloneshttp://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-germany-nazi-art-20131105,0,4039020.story#axzz2joJTEsVh Integrante de Pussy Riot es transferida a cárcel en Siberia. Para más información:http://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/integrante-do-pussy-riot-transferida-para-siberia-10693915#ixzz2joU9cuSt Francia recibe cuerpos de los periodistas franceses asesinados en Mali. Para más información:http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/05/world/africa/france-mali-journalists-killed/index.html?hpt=wo_c2http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24815614 "CNN" analiza nueva regulación del accionar de la prensa en Reino Unido. Para más información:http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/31/world/europe/uk-press-regulation-reaction/index.html Masiva protesta en Madrid por el fallo que liberó a dos etarras Para más información:http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1633062-masiva-protesta-en-madrid-por-el-fallo-que-libero-a-dos-etarras Snowden trabajará en una de las principales páginas web de Rusia. Para más información:http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/europa/snowden-trabajar-en-una-web-de-rusia_13152559-4 ASIA- PACÍFICO/ MEDIO ORIENTE "El Tiempo" de Colombia publica desgarrador articulo que cuenta el drama de las niñas novias de Pakistán. Para más información:http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/medio-oriente/nias-de-cinco-aos-en-pakistn-que-estan-casadas_13144836-4 Según la ONU el 40% de la población siria necesita ayuda humanitaria. Para más información:http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-syria-humanitarian-crisis-20131105,0,3474610.story#axzz2joJTEsVhhttp://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/11/05/actualidad/1383645001_000170.htmlhttp://www.cnn.com/2013/10/31/world/meast/syria-chemical-weapons-opcw/index.htmlhttp://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/onu-40-da-populacao-siria-precisam-de-ajuda-humanitaria-10683911#ixzz2joVz9Zqc http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-iran-us-20131105,0,2110637.story#axzz2joJTEsVhhttp://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/11/05/21315471-nine-million-syrians-need-humanitarian-aid-due-to-war-un?lite Al menos 40 muertos, incluidos siete niños, deja coche bomba en Siria- Para más información:http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/medio-oriente/atentado-en-mezquita-de-damasco-en-sirira_13144675-4 El hambre como arma: la nueva táctica del régimen sirio para ganar la guerra. Para más información:http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1634045-el-hambre-como-arma-la-nueva-tactica-del-regimen-sirio-para-ganar-la-guerra Diplomáticos no logran poner fecha para realizar una nueva conferencia de paz para Siria. Para más información:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24827718http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/el-mundo/2013/siria-sin-acuerdo-de-paz-este-anio-onu-963251.htmlhttp://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/conferencia-de-paz-sobre-siria-adiada-10692998#ixzz2joVspJ98 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/05/world/middleeast/while-few-seem-eager-to-talk-peace-in-syria-un-mediator-wont-stop.html?ref=world Siria destruye instalaciones de producción de armas químicas. Para más información:http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/medio-oriente/armas-qumicas-en-siria_13152535-4http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1634347-siria-destruyo-sus-instalaciones-de-produccion-de-armas-quimicas Muerte del jefe de talibanes dicen que no afectará el proceso de paz en Pakistán. Para más información:http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/01/world/asia/pakistan-violence/index.htmlhttp://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/medio-oriente/muerte-de-talibn-afecto-proceso-de-paz-en-pakistn_13156855-4http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1634761-en-una-ofensiva-con-un-drone-muere-el-lider-taliban-en-paquistanhttp://www.cnn.com/2013/11/04/world/asia/afghanistan-karzai-pakistan-taliban/index.html?hpt=ias_c2 Condenados a muerte 152 acusados por los motines en Bangladesh en 2009. Para más información:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/06/world/asia/152-soldiers-given-death-penalty-over-revolt-in-bangladesh.html?ref=worldhttp://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/11/05/actualidad/1383650531_119779.htmlhttp://www.cnn.com/2013/11/05/world/asia/bangladesh-soldiers-death-sentence/index.html?hpt=ias_c1http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-24817887 India lanza su primera nave exploratoria a Marte. Para más información:http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2013-11/06/content_17083798.htmhttp://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2013/11/05/world/asia/ap-as-india-mars-mission.html?ref=worldhttp://www.cnn.com/2013/11/04/world/asia/india-mars-orbiter/index.html?hpt=wo_c2http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-24729073http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-india-launch-mars-mission-20131104,0,3566545.story#axzz2joJTEsVh No hay signos de un proceso de pacificación en Irak. Para más información:http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/04/world/meast/iraq-violence/index.htmlhttp://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/10/28/21139521-war-weary-iraqis-scared-to-leave-homes-as-violence-reaches-levels-not-seen-since-2008?lite Riad arresta a miles de inmigrantes irregulares tras el fin de la amnistía. Para más información:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-24810033http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/11/05/actualidad/1383663779_618475.html Kerry visita Arabia Saudita. Para más información:http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-us-saudi-rift-kerry-visit-20131104,0,6904287.story#axzz2joJTEsVh Gobierno chino detiene a cinco individuos por ataque en la plaza Tiananmen. Para más información:http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/30/world/asia/china---tiananmen---arrests/index.htmlhttp://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/10/30/21246103-five-arrested-over-tiananmen-square-terrorist-attack-chinese-authorities-say?litehttp://www.lanacion.com.ar/1633422-un-raro-incidente-en-la-plaza-tiananmen-dejo-5-muertos Kerry intenta promover diálogo de paz entre palestinos e israelíes. Para más información:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/06/world/middleeast/kerry-in-mideast-tries-to-prod-israeli-palestinian-talks.html?ref=world Terremoto de magnitud 5.0 sacude a Tokio. Para más información:http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/03/world/asia/japan-earthquake/index.html Inundaciones dejan decenas de muertos al este de India. Para más información:http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/26/world/asia/india-floods/index.html Irán ahorca a 16 presuntos rebeldes tras la muerte de 17 policías. Para más información:http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/medio-oriente/irn-ahorca-a-presuntos-rebeldes-tras-la-muerte-de-policas_13144300-4 Irán y un posible acuerdo sobre su plan nuclear. Para más información:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/06/world/middleeast/iran-says-nuclear-deal-is-possible-this-week.html?ref=world ÁFRICA Morsi desafía a los militares en Egipto. Para más información:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/05/world/middleeast/egypt.html?ref=worldhttp://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2013/11/muhammad-morsi-trialhttp://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/11/04/actualidad/1383532972_935193.htmlhttp://www.eluniversal.com.mx/el-mundo/2013/impreso/mursi-desafia-al-gobierno-egipcio-8220soy-el-presidente-legitimo-8221-dice-84753.htmlhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24801882http://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/presidente-deposto-do-egito-passa-noite-em-hospital-de-prisao-10691700#ixzz2joWgr6Zu http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-egypt-morsi-trial-20131105,0,4510471.story#axzz2joJTEsVhhttp://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/11/02/21288349-two-french-journalists-kidnapped-and-killed-in-northern-mali?chromedomain=worldblog Los rebeldes del M23 anuncian el fin de su lucha armada en el Congo. Para más información:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/06/world/africa/m23-rebels-democratic-republic-congo.html?ref=world&_r=0http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/11/05/actualidad/1383642968_110904.htmlhttp://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2013/11/05/en-rdc-le-gouvernement-annonce-une-victoire-totale-sur-le-m23_3508091_3212.htmlhttp://www.cnn.com/2013/11/05/world/africa/congo-rebels-disarm/index.html?hpt=iaf_c1http://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/derrotado-grupo-rebelde-encerra-insurgencia-no-leste-do-congo-1-10691553#ixzz2joWjLxAmhttp://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/11/05/21318777-congos-defeated-m23-rebels-announce-disarmament-seek-diplomacy?lite Asesinados a tiros dos periodistas franceses secuestrados en el norte de Mali. Para más información:http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2013/11/05/mali-trois-des-ravisseurs-des-journalistes-de-rfi-identifies_3508659_3212.htmlhttp://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/11/02/actualidad/1383414551_209423.htmlhttp://www.lanacion.com.ar/1634953-secuestran-y-asesinan-a-dos-periodistas-franceses-en-mali "China Daily" analiza el rol de Ruanda conectando a África Para más información:http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2013-11/04/content_17077864.htm Túnez extiende su estado de emergencia. Para más información:http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/03/world/africa/tunisia-unrest/index.html?hpt=iaf_c2 28 muertos luego de estampida en Nigeria. Para más información:http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/africa/muertos-en-estampida-en-nigeria_13157615-4 OTRAS NOTICIAS Cada año más de 800.000 personas son víctimas del tráfico humano. Para más información:http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/europa/cada-ao-ms-de-800000-personas-son-vctimas-del-trfico-humano-en-el-mundo_13132278-4 "The Economist" presenta su informe semanal: "Business this week". Para más información:http://www.economist.com/news/world-week/21588134-business-week
The Agbiotech Bulletin Volume 5 Issue 1 January 1997 Published by AG-WEST BIOTECH INC. Code Number:NL97003 Sizes of Files: Text: 48.9K Graphics: No associated graphics files Biotech Discovery Will Boost Oilseed Industry Researchers at the National Research Council's Plant Biotechnology Institute (PBI) in Saskatoon have discovered a genetic modification capable of increasing the oil production of rapeseed by up to 25 per cent. Developing High Erucic Rapeseed The discovery resulted from efforts to increase rapeseed's erucic acid content by adding a yeast gene. The erucic acid content was increased, but overall oil content in the seeds also rose by 25 per cent. Industrial Uses of S.H.E.A.R. Erucic acid and its derivatives, now obtained mainly from H.E.A.R. Brassica napus varieties, are widely used in the chemical industry, where they are considered environmentally friendly and a renewable resource. The main use of the oil is in the manufacture of plastic films, where the derivative erucamide is used as an anti-block, slip promoting agent. More recently erucic acid derivatives have been used in the manufacture of low-calorie food additives and coatings. Substantial Economic Implications Worldwide demand for erucic acid is expected to increase from about 40 million pounds in 1990 to 75 million pounds by 2010. Over the same time frame, demand for the derivative behenic acid is expected to triple to about 102 million pounds. News Ag-West President Resigns Dr. Bill Riley has resigned as President of Ag-West Biotech Inc. and as General Manager of ICAST effective January 5, 1997. Feed Centre Cements Chinese Contacts Four University of Saskatchewan researchers visited China recently to strengthen ties between the Saskatchewan and Chinese feed industry. Red Williams, Phil Thacker, Vern Racz, and David Christensen all of the Department of Animal and Poultry Science lectured at the First International Feed Industry Conference held in Beijing and took part in the official opening of the Ministry of Agriculture Feed Industry Centre (MAFIC) and its new headquarters building. Foiling Aluminum Intolerance Researchers at Agriculture Canada's Lacombe Research Centre are combing oat genetic resources in search of varieties with tolerance to the aluminum found in acidic soils. Fast method of detecting E. coli A seven-hour method of detecting Eschericha coli in food has been developed by Cornell University researchers. E. coli is a food-borne bacteria that causes hemorrhagic colitis and hemolytic uremic syndrome, two problems that can be deadly to children and elderly adults. Wild genes boost rice yield Also at Cornell, plant breeders have discovered genes in wild rice species that may help boost production of some of the world's major agricultural crops. Transgenic Cotton Has "Polyester" Fibres Researchers at Agracetus of Middleton, Wisconsin report the development of a transgenic cotton with some of the properties of polyester. .and Colours Meanwhile, a patent for transgenic colour changes in cotton has been issued to Calgene of Davis, California. Retrovirus-like components identified in corn genome Every living organism has a genome the DNA in each cell's nucleus which includes the active genes that determine the organism's characteristics. However, genes make up only a tiny percent of the genetic material in a cell, begging the question, "What are all those other things?" Scientists find way to eliminate junk genes Purdue University scientists Thomas K. Hodges and Leszek Lyznik have found a way to reduce the guesswork and errors in genetic engineering. The technology, which has been licensed for commercial application to Plant Genetic Systems, could speed the delivery of biotech-derived crops, and possibly even benefit human gene therapy. Scientists Narrow Search for Genes that Starve Worms Scientists at the Agricultural Research Service and Mississippi State University are making progress in their efforts to modify corn to express genes that can "starve" leaf-eating fall armyworms. Transgenic Blue Carnations Commercialized Florigene of Melbourne, Australia will be selling its transgenic blue "Moondust" carnations in Europe and Japan later this year. Regulatory Copyright Law Could Affect Research International treaties being proposed by the World Intellectual Property Organization could inhibit common uses of published research. Events Going Public CIBC's Knowledge-Based Business Unit will be jointly sponsoring a seminar on Taking Your Technology Company Public on Thursday, January 23, 1997. Biopesticides and Transgenic Plants A conference on Biopesticides and Transgenic Plants: New Technologies to Improve Efficiency, Safety and Profitability will be held January 27-28, 1997 in Washington, DC. Direct Seeding Direct Seeding: The Economic Advantage is the theme of The 9th Annual Meeting, Conference, and Trade Show of the Saskatchewan Soil Conservation Association. It will be held February 12-13 at the Saskatoon Prairieland Exhibition, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. Farm Animal Genetics Canadian Farm Animal Genetic Resources at the Crossroads: Crisis or Opportunity? is the topic of an International Speakers Forum planned for February 27-28, 1997 at Le Chateau Cartier in Aylmer, Quebec. Animal Biotech Beijing The Beijing International Conference on Animal Biotechnology will be held June 11-14, 1997 at the China Agricultural University in Beijing, China. Brassica '97 The International Society for Horticulture Symposium on Brassicas and the Tenth Crucifer Genetics Workshop will occur in Rennes, France from September 23-27, 1997. BIOTECH '97 The National Biotechnology Network will be holding BIOTECH '97 in Toronto from March 11-13, 1997 at the Toronto Marriott Eaton Centre Hotel. ABIC '98 Planning is underway for the Agricultural Biotechnology International Conference 1998 (ABIC '98) which will be held June 9-12, 1998 in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. Trends Depressing News Proponents of something called Kondratieff Wave cycles have come out with some depressing future trend forecasts. US Tops Canada in Biotech Support US authorities provide more support for biotech than their Canadian counterparts, laments an article appearing in the Ontario Farmer. Tide Turning For Biotech in Germany According to an item in the journal Science, surveys indicate that 60 per cent of Germans want their country to play a leading role in the development of the European biotech industry. Alliances Ontario Farmers Form Alliance for Biotech R&D A farmer initiated alliance to develop agricultural biotechnology has been formed in Ontario. Ontario Agri-Food Technologies brings together players ranging from the Ontario Federation of Agriculture, growers associations, and the Ontario Cattlemen's Association; to the universities of Toronto, Queen's, Waterloo, and Guelph; to major agricultural companies such as Monsanto, DuPont, Ciba, and Cyanamid. Tech Transfer Beef Development Centre To Facilitate Tech Transfer Years of discussion and planning among Saskatchewan's beef industry, government, and beef researchers has resulted in an innovative concept becoming a reality. Finance AgriBioTech Is Roundup Ready AgriBioTech has licensed Roundup Ready soybean technology from Monsanto, enabling it to market soybeans under its own AgriBioTech label. PGS/AgrEvo Deal Sign of the Times An article in Nature Biotechnology points to the acquisition of the biotech company Plant Genetic Systems by the agri- chemical giant AgrEvo as a key example of the growing value of innovative, patented plant biotechnologies. DE Gains Control of Mycogen DowElanco has bought a controlling share in Mycogen Corp. According to the Wall Street Journal, the purchase is a move to block Monsanto's bid for the agbiotech company. Monsanto To Spin Off Chemicals The directors of Monsanto Co. has approved a plan to spin off its chemical business to existing shareholders, leaving behind the company's more profitable agbiotech, pharmaceutical, and food ingredient business. Issues Biotech Controversy Boon to US Company The European controversy over transgenic crops has been a boon for Genetic ID, a US company that markets a test able to detect genetic alterations in corn and soybeans. European Food Labelling Dismissed as Ineffective Greenpeace has dismissed the European Parliament's move to label transgenic foods as ineffective. Greenpeace believes the move does not go far enough because some biotech-derived foods are exempted. South Africa Considers Biotech Regulation The South African Department of Tourism and Environmental Affairs has released a Green Paper on Biodiversity which also considers the potential environmental impacts of biotechnology in that country. Attitudes Biotechnology, Agriculture and Our Future: A Student's View (The following essay is by Kathryn Gustafson of Macoun, Saskatchewan. Gustafson, who attends Estevan Comprehensive School) Resources Feednews Feednews is the quarterly newsletter of the Feed Resource Centre located at the University of Saskatchewan in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. It carries news and information about international feedstuff markets, opportunities for value-added processing of Saskatchewan feed crops, and developments in animal nutrition. ULearn Centre Offers Ag Resources The ULearn Centre of the Extension Division of the University of Saskatchewan offers a wide range of print material and software to support on-going agricultural education and research. Progrid-TA^R Technology Assessment Progrid is a proprietary methodology for measuring the technical and commercial readiness of technology ventures and products. It is based on the experience of major Canadian technology-intensive corporations, supplemented with the track record of small and medium-size enterprises in bringing new products and services to the market place. Genome Workshop Report The report of the 1996 ISAG Comparative Genome Workshop in Tours, France is now available on the Web. Just click on "Comparative Mapping" and choose whatever format you prefer. People Watch Brandon Research Centre Dr. Karl Volkmar and Dr. Al Moulin have recently transferred to the Brandon Research Centre of Agriculture Canada. IBAC The Industrial Biotechnology Association of Canada recently elected its Board of Directors for 1997. We Welcome Your Input The AgBiotech Bulletin welcomes submissions of news, ideas and articles from subscribers. Information about new developments at your company or institution, notices about new products or resources, or observations about events and opportunities affecting the agbiotech industry will be considered for publication. Credits: The Agbiotech Bulletin is published 12 times per year on behalf of Ag-West Biotech Inc. by Westcross House Publications, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada S7K OR1.
Background Improving survival and extending the longevity of life for all populations requires timely, robust evidence on local mortality levels and trends. The Global Burden of Disease 2015 Study (GBD 2015) provides a comprehensive assessment of all-cause and cause-specific mortality for 249 causes in 195 countries and territories from 1980 to 2015. These results informed an in-depth investigation of observed and expected mortality patterns based on sociodemographic measures. Methods We estimated all-cause mortality by age, sex, geography, and year using an improved analytical approach originally developed for GBD 2013 and GBD 2010. Improvements included refinements to the estimation of child and adult mortality and corresponding uncertainty, parameter selection for under-5 mortality synthesis by spatiotemporal Gaussian process regression, and sibling history data processing. We also expanded the database of vital registration, survey, and census data to 14 294 geography–year datapoints. For GBD 2015, eight causes, including Ebola virus disease, were added to the previous GBD cause list for mortality. We used six modelling approaches to assess cause-specific mortality, with the Cause of Death Ensemble Model (CODEm) generating estimates for most causes. We used a series of novel analyses to systematically quantify the drivers of trends in mortality across geographies. First, we assessed observed and expected levels and trends of cause-specific mortality as they relate to the Socio-demographic Index (SDI), a summary indicator derived from measures of income per capita, educational attainment, and fertility. Second, we examined factors affecting total mortality patterns through a series of counterfactual scenarios, testing the magnitude by which population growth, population age structures, and epidemiological changes contributed to shifts in mortality. Finally, we attributed changes in life expectancy to changes in cause of death. We documented each step of the GBD 2015 estimation processes, as well as data sources, in accordance with Guidelines for Accurate and Transparent Health Estimates Reporting (GATHER). Findings Globally, life expectancy from birth increased from 61·7 years (95% uncertainty interval 61·4–61·9) in 1980 to 71·8 years (71·5–72·2) in 2015. Several countries in sub-Saharan Africa had very large gains in life expectancy from 2005 to 2015, rebounding from an era of exceedingly high loss of life due to HIV/AIDS. At the same time, many geographies saw life expectancy stagnate or decline, particularly for men and in countries with rising mortality from war or interpersonal violence. From 2005 to 2015, male life expectancy in Syria dropped by 11·3 years (3·7–17·4), to 62·6 years (56·5–70·2). Total deaths increased by 4·1% (2·6–5·6) from 2005 to 2015, rising to 55·8 million (54·9 million to 56·6 million) in 2015, but age-standardised death rates fell by 17·0% (15·8–18·1) during this time, underscoring changes in population growth and shifts in global age structures. The result was similar for non-communicable diseases (NCDs), with total deaths from these causes increasing by 14·1% (12·6–16·0) to 39·8 million (39·2 million to 40·5 million) in 2015, whereas age-standardised rates decreased by 13·1% (11·9–14·3). Globally, this mortality pattern emerged for several NCDs, including several types of cancer, ischaemic heart disease, cirrhosis, and Alzheimer's disease and other dementias. By contrast, both total deaths and age-standardised death rates due to communicable, maternal, neonatal, and nutritional conditions significantly declined from 2005 to 2015, gains largely attributable to decreases in mortality rates due to HIV/AIDS (42·1%, 39·1–44·6), malaria (43·1%, 34·7–51·8), neonatal preterm birth complications (29·8%, 24·8–34·9), and maternal disorders (29·1%, 19·3–37·1). Progress was slower for several causes, such as lower respiratory infections and nutritional deficiencies, whereas deaths increased for others, including dengue and drug use disorders. Age-standardised death rates due to injuries significantly declined from 2005 to 2015, yet interpersonal violence and war claimed increasingly more lives in some regions, particularly in the Middle East. In 2015, rotaviral enteritis (rotavirus) was the leading cause of under-5 deaths due to diarrhoea (146 000 deaths, 118 000–183 000) and pneumococcal pneumonia was the leading cause of under-5 deaths due to lower respiratory infections (393 000 deaths, 228 000–532 000), although pathogen-specific mortality varied by region. Globally, the effects of population growth, ageing, and changes in age-standardised death rates substantially differed by cause. Our analyses on the expected associations between cause-specific mortality and SDI show the regular shifts in cause of death composition and population age structure with rising SDI. Country patterns of premature mortality (measured as years of life lost [YLLs]) and how they differ from the level expected on the basis of SDI alone revealed distinct but highly heterogeneous patterns by region and country or territory. Ischaemic heart disease, stroke, and diabetes were among the leading causes of YLLs in most regions, but in many cases, intraregional results sharply diverged for ratios of observed and expected YLLs based on SDI. Communicable, maternal, neonatal, and nutritional diseases caused the most YLLs throughout sub-Saharan Africa, with observed YLLs far exceeding expected YLLs for countries in which malaria or HIV/AIDS remained the leading causes of early death. Interpretation At the global scale, age-specific mortality has steadily improved over the past 35 years; this pattern of general progress continued in the past decade. Progress has been faster in most countries than expected on the basis of development measured by the SDI. Against this background of progress, some countries have seen falls in life expectancy, and age-standardised death rates for some causes are increasing. Despite progress in reducing age-standardised death rates, population growth and ageing mean that the number of deaths from most non-communicable causes are increasing in most countries, putting increased demands on health systems. Funding Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. ; We thank the countless individuals who have contributed to the Global Burden of Disease Study 2015 in various capacities. The data reported here have been supplied by the United States Renal Data System (USRDS). Data for this research was provided by MEASURE Evaluation, funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Collection of these data was made possible by USAID under the terms of cooperative agreement GPO-A-00-08-000_D3-00. Views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of USAID, the US Government, or MEASURE Evaluation. Parts of this material are based on data and information provided by the Canadian institute for Health Information. However, the analyses, conclusions, opinions and statements expressed herein are those of the author and not those of the Canadian Institute for Health information. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics granted the researchers access to relevant data in accordance with licence number SLN2014-3-170, after subjecting data to processing aiming to preserve the confidentiality of individual data in accordance with the General Statistics Law–2000. The researchers are solely responsible for the conclusions and inferences drawn upon available data. The following individuals acknowledge various forms of institutional support. Simon I Hay is funded by a Senior Research Fellowship from the Wellcome Trust (#095066), and grants from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (OPP1119467, OPP1093011, OPP1106023 and OPP1132415). Panniyammakal Jeemon is supported by a Clinical and Public Health Intermediate Fellowship from the Wellcome Trust-DBT India Alliance (2015–20). Luciano A Sposato is partly supported by the Edward and Alma Saraydar Neurosciences Fund, London Health Sciences Foundation, London, ON, Canada. George A Mensah notes that the views expressed in this Article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, National Institutes of Health, or the United States Department of Health and Human Services. Boris Bikbov acknowledges that work related to this paper has been done on the behalf of the GBD Genitourinary Disease Expert Group supported by the International Society of Nephrology (ISN). Ana Maria Nogales Vasconcelos acknowledges that her team in Brazil received funding from Ministry of Health (process number 25000192049/2014-14). Rodrigo Sarmiento-Suarez receives institutional support from Universidad de Ciencias Aplicadas y Ambientales, UDCA, Bogotá, Colombia. Ulrich O Mueller and Andrea Werdecker gratefully acknowledge funding by the German National Cohort BMBF (grant number OIER 1301/22). Peter James was supported by the National Cancer Institute of the National Institutes of Health (Award K99CA201542). Brett M Kissela would like to acknowledge NIH/NINDS R-01 30678. Louisa Degenhardt is supported by an Australian National Health and Medical Research Council Principal Research fellowship. Daisy M X Abreu received institutional support from the Brazilian Ministry of Health (Proc number 25000192049/2014-14). Jennifer H MacLachlan receives funding support from the Australian Government Department of Health and Royal Melbourne Hospital Research Funding Program. Miriam Levi acknowledges institutional support received from CeRIMP, Regional Centre for Occupational Diseases and Injuries, Tuscany Region, Florence, Italy. Tea Lallukka reports funding from The Academy of Finland (grant 287488). No individuals acknowledged received additional compensation for their efforts. ; Peer-reviewed ; Publisher Version
Background: Alzheimer's disease is a common debilitating dementia with known heritability, for which 20 late onset susceptibility loci have been identified, but more remain to be discovered. This study sought to identify new susceptibility genes, using an alternative gene-wide analytical approach which tests for patterns of association within genes, in the powerful genome-wide association dataset of the International Genomics of Alzheimer's Project Consortium, comprising over 7 m genotypes from 25,580 Alzheimer's cases and 48,466 controls. Principal Findings: In addition to earlier reported genes, we detected genome-wide significant loci on chromosomes 8 (TP53INP1, p = 1.4×10-6) and 14 (IGHV1-67 p = 7.9×10-8) which indexed novel susceptibility loci. Significance: The additional genes identified in this study, have an array of functions previously implicated in Alzheimer's disease, including aspects of energy metabolism, protein degradation and the immune system and add further weight to these pathways as potential therapeutic targets in Alzheimer's disease ; The i-Select chips was funded by the French National Foundation on Alzheimer's disease and related disorders. The French National Fondation on Alzheimer's disease and related disorders supported several I-GAP meetings and communications. Data management involved the Centre National de Génotypage,and was supported by the Institut Pasteur de Lille, Inserm, FRC (fondation pour la recherche sur le cerveau) and Rotary. This work has been developed and supported by the LABEX (laboratory of excellence program investment for the future) DISTALZ grant (Development of Innovative Strategies for a Transdisciplinary approach to ALZheimer's disease) and by the LABEX GENMED grant (Medical Genomics). The French National Foundation on Alzheimer's disease and related disorders and the Alzheimer's Association (Chicago, Illinois) grant supported IGAP in-person meetings, communication and the Alzheimer's Association (Chicago, Illinois) grant provided some funds to each consortium for analyses. EADI The authors thank Dr. Anne Boland (CNG) for her technical help in preparing the DNA samples for analyses. This work was supported by the National Foundation for Alzheimer's disease and related disorders, the Institut Pasteur de Lille and the Centre National de Génotypage. The Three-City Study was performed as part of a collaboration between the Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale (Inserm), the Victor Segalen Bordeaux II University and Sanofi-Synthélabo. The Fondation pour la Recherche Médicale funded the preparation and initiation of the study. The 3C Study was also funded by the Caisse Nationale Maladie des Travailleurs Salariés, Direction Générale de la Santé, MGEN, Institut de la Longévité, Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des Produits de Santé, the Aquitaine and Bourgogne Regional Councils, Agence Nationale de la Recherche, ANR supported the COGINUT and COVADIS projects. Fondation de France and the joint French Ministry of Research/INSERM «Cohortes et collections de données biologiques» programme. Lille Génopôle received an unconditional grant from Eisai. The Three-city biological bank was developed and maintained by the laboratory for genomic analysis LAG-BRC - Institut Pasteur de Lille. Belgium sample collection: The patients were clinically and pathological characterized by the neurologists Sebastiaan Engelborghs, Rik Vandenberghe and Peter P. De Deyn, and in part genetically by Caroline Van Cauwenberghe, Karolien Bettens and Kristel Sleegers. Research at the Antwerp site is funded in part by the Belgian Science Policy Office Interuniversity Attraction Poles program, the Foundation Alzheimer Research (SAO-FRA), the Flemish Government initiated Methusalem Excellence Program, the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO) and the University of Antwerp Research Fund, Belgium. Karolien Bettens is a postdoctoral fellow of the FWO. The Antwerp site authors thank the personnel of the VIB Genetic Service Facility, the Biobank of the Institute Born-Bunge and the Departments of Neurology and Memory Clinics at the Hospital Network Antwerp and the University Hospitals Leuven. Finish sample collection: Financial support for this project was provided by the Health Research Council of the Academy of Finland, EVO grant 5772708 of Kuopio University Hospital, and the Nordic Centre of Excellence in Neurodegeneration. Italian sample collections: the Bologna site (FL) obtained funds from the Italian Ministry of research and University as well as Carimonte Foundation. The Florence site was supported by grant RF-2010-2319722, grant from the the Cassa di Risparmio di Pistoia e Pescia (Grant 2012) and the Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze (Grant 2012). The Milan site was supported by a grant from the «fondazione Monzino». The authors thank the expert contribution of Mr. Carmelo Romano. The Roma site received financial support from Italian Ministry of Health, Grant RF07-08 and RC08-09-10-11-12. The Pisa site is grateful to Dr. Annalisa LoGerfo for her technical assistance in the DNA purification studies. Spanish sample collection: the Madrid site (MB) was supported by grants of the Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia and the Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo (Instituto de Salud Carlos III), and an institutional grant of the Fundación Ramón Areces to the CBMSO. The authors thank I. Sastre and Dr. A. Martínez-García for the preparation and control of the DNA collection, and Drs. P. Gil and P. Coria for their cooperation in the cases/controls recruitment. The authors are grateful to the Asociación de Familiares de Alzheimer de Madrid (AFAL) for continuous encouragement and help. Swedish sample collection: Financially supported in part by the Swedish Brain Power network, the Marianne and Marcus Wallenberg Foundation, the Swedish Research Council (521-2010-3134), the King Gustaf V and Queen Victoria's Foundation of Freemasons, the Regional Agreement on Medical Training and Clinical Research (ALF) between Stockholm County Council and the Karolinska Institutet, the Swedish Brain Foundation and the Swedish Alzheimer Foundation. CHARGE AGES: The AGES-Reykjavik Study is funded by National Institutes of Health (NIH) contract N01-AG-12100 (National Institute on Aging (NIA) with contributions from the National Eye Institute, National Institute on Deafness and Other Communication Disorders and National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI)), the NIA Intramural Research Program, Hjartavernd (the Icelandic Heart Association), and the Althingi (the Icelandic Parliament). ASPS/PRODEM: The Austrian Stroke Prevention Study and The Prospective Dementia Register of the Austrian Alzheimer Society was supported by The Austrian Science Fond (FWF) grant number P20545-P05 (H. Schmidt) and P13180; The Austrian Alzheimer Society; The Medical University of Graz. Cardiovascular Health Study (CHS): This CHS research was supported by NHLBI contracts HHSN268201200036C, HHSN268200800007C, N01HC55222, N01HC85079, N01HC85080, N01HC85081, N01HC85082, N01HC85083, N01HC85086, and HHSN268200960009C; and NHLBI grants HL080295, HL087652, HL105756 with additional contribution from the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS). Additional support was provided through AG023629, AG15928, AG20098, AG027058 and AG033193 (Seshadri) from the NIA. A full list of CHS investigators and institutions can be found at http://www.chs-nhlbi.org/pi. The provision of genotyping data was supported in part by the National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences, CTSI grant UL1TR000124, and the National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Disease Diabetes Research Center (DRC) grant DK063491 to the Southern California Diabetes Endocrinology Research Center. Framingham Heart Study (FHS): This work was supported by the National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute's Framingham Heart Study (Contract No. N01-HC-25195) and its contract with A_ymetrix, Inc for genotyping services (Contract No. N02-HL-6-4278). A portion of this research utilized the Linux Cluster for Genetic Analysis (LinGA-II) funded by the Robert Dawson Evans Endowment of the Department of Medicine at Boston University School of Medicine and Boston Medical Center. This study as also supported by grants from the National Institute on Aging: AG08122 and AG033193 (Seshadri). Drs. Seshadri and DeStefano were also supported by additional grants from the National Institute on Aging: (R01 AG16495; AG031287, AG033040), the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (R01 NS17950), and the National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute (U01 HL096917, HL093029 and K24HL038444, RC2-HL102419 and UC2 HL103010. Fundació ACE would like to thank patients and controls who participated in this project. This work has been funded by the Fundación Alzheimur (Murcia), the Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (PCT-010000-2007-18), (DEX-580000-2008-4), (Gobierno de España), Corporación Tecnológica de Andalucía (08/211) and Agencia IDEA (841318) (Consejería de Innovación, Junta de Andalucía). The authors thank to Ms. Trinitat Port-Carbó and her family for their generous support of Fundació ACE research programs. The Rotterdam Study: The Rotterdam Study was funded by Erasmus Medical Center and Erasmus University, Rotterdam; the Netherlands Organization for Health Research and Development; the Research Institute for Diseases in the Elderly; the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science; the Ministry for Health, Welfare and Sports; the European Commission;and the Municipality of Rotterdam; by grants from the Research Institute for Diseases in the Elderly (014-93-015; RIDE2), Internationale Stichting Alzheimer Onderzoek, Hersenstichting Nederland, the Netherlands Genomics Initiative–Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (Center for Medical Systems Biology and the Netherlands Consortium for Healthy Aging), the Seventh Framework Program (FP7/2007-2013), the ENGAGE project (grant agreement HEALTH-F4-2007-201413), MRACE-grant from the Erasmus Medical Center, the Netherlands Organization for Health Research and Development (ZonMW Veni-grant no. 916.13.054). ARIC: The Atherosclerosis Risk in Communities Study (ARIC) is carried out as a collaborative study supported by National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute contracts N01-HC-55015, N01-HC-55016, N01-HC-55018, N01- HC-55019, N01-HC-55020, N01-HC-55021, N01-HC-55022 and grants R01-HL087641, RC2-HL102419 (Boerwinkle, CHARGE-S), UC2 HL103010, U01-HL096917 (Mosley) and R01-HL093029; NHGRI contract U01- HG004402; and NIH contract HHSN268200625226C and NIA: R01 AG033193 (Seshadri). Infrastructure was partly supported by Grant Number UL1RR025005, a component of the National Institutes of Health and NIH Roadmap for Medical Research. GERAD Cardiff University was supported by the Wellcome Trust, Medical Research Council (MRC), Alzheimer's Research United Kingdom (ARUK) and the Welsh Government. ARUK supported sample collections at the Kings College London, the South West Dementia Bank, Universities of Cambridge, Nottingham, Manchester and Belfast. The Belfast group acknowledges support from the Alzheimer's Society, Ulster Garden Villages, N. Ireland R & D Office and the Royal College of Physicians/Dunhill Medical Trust. The MRC and Mercer's Institute for Research on Ageing supported the Trinity College group. DCR is a Wellcome Trust Principal Research fellow. The South West Dementia Brain Bank acknowledges support from Bristol Research into Alzheimer's and Care of the Elderly. The Charles Wolfson Charitable Trust supported the OPTIMA group. Washington University was funded by NIH grants, Barnes Jewish Foundation and the Charles and Joanne Knight Alzheimer's Research Initiative. Patient recruitment for the MRC Prion Unit/UCL Department of Neurodegenerative Disease collection was supported by the UCLH/UCL Biomedical Centre and their work was supported by the NIHR Queen Square Dementia BRU. LASER-AD was funded by Lundbeck SA. The Bonn group would like to thank Dr. Heike Koelsch for her scientific support. The Bonn group was funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF): Competence Network Dementia (CND) grant number 01GI0102, 01GI0711, 01GI0420. The AgeCoDe study group was supported by the German Federal Ministry for Education and Research grants 01 GI 0710, 01 GI 0712, 01 GI 0713, 01 GI 0714, 01 GI 0715, 01 GI 0716, 01 GI 0717. The Homburg group was funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF): German National Genome Research Network (NGFN); Alzheimer's disease Integrated Genome Research Network; AD-IG: 01GS0465. Genotyping of the Bonn case-control sample was funded by the German centre for Neurodegenerative Diseases (DZNE), Germany. The GERAD Consortium also used samples ascertained by the NIMH AD Genetics Initiative. Harald Hampel was supported by a grant of the Katharina-Hardt-Foundation, Bad Homburg vor der Höhe, Germany. The KORA F4 studies were financed by Helmholtz Zentrum München; German Research Center for Environmental Health; BMBF; German National Genome Research Network and the Munich Center of Health Sciences. The Heinz Nixdorf Recall cohort was funded by the Heinz Nixdorf Foundation (Dr. Jur. G.Schmidt, Chairman) and BMBF. Coriell Cell Repositories is supported by NINDS and the Intramural Research Program of the National Institute on Aging. The authors acknowledge use of genotype data from the 1958 Birth Cohort collection, funded by the MRC and the Wellcome Trust which was genotyped by the Wellcome Trust Case Control Consortium and the Type-1 Diabetes Genetics Consortium, sponsored by the National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Human Genome Research Institute, National Institute of Child Health and Human Development and Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation International. The Nottingham Group (KM) are supported by the Big Lottery. MRC CFAS is part of the consortium and data will be included in future analyses. ADGC The National Institutes of Health, National Institute on Aging (NIH-NIA) supported this work through the following grants: ADGC, U01 AG032984, RC2 AG036528; NACC, U01 AG016976; NCRAD, U24 AG021886; NIA LOAD, U24 AG026395, R01 AG041797; MIRAGE R01 AG025259; Banner Sun Health Research Institute P30 AG019610; Boston University, P30 AG013846, U01 AG10483, R01 CA129769, R01 MH080295, R01 AG017173, R01AG33193; Columbia University, P50 AG008702, R37 AG015473; Duke University, P30 AG028377, AG05128; Emory University, AG025688; Group Health Research Institute, UO1 AG06781, UO1 HG004610; Indiana University, P30 AG10133; Johns Hopkins University, P50 AG005146, R01 AG020688; Massachusetts General Hospital, P50 AG005134; Mayo Clinic, P50 AG016574; Mount Sinai School of Medicine, P50 AG005138, P01 AG002219; New York University, P30 AG08051, MO1RR00096, and UL1 RR029893; Northwestern University, P30 AG013854; Oregon Health & Science University, P30 AG008017, R01 AG026916; Rush University, P30 AG010161, R01 AG019085, R01 AG15819, R01 AG17917, R01 AG30146; TGen, R01 NS059873; University of Alabama at Birmingham, P50 AG016582, UL1RR02777; University of Arizona, R01 AG031581; University of California, Davis, P30 AG010129; University of California, Irvine, P50 AG016573, P50, P50 AG016575, P50 AG016576, P50 AG016577; University of California, Los Angeles, P50 AG016570; University of California, San Diego, P50 AG005131; University of California, San Francisco, P50 AG023501, P01 AG019724; University of Kentucky, P30 AG028383; University of Michigan, P50 AG008671; University of Pennsylvania, P30 AG010124; University of Pittsburgh, P50 AG005133, AG030653, AG041718; University of Southern California, P50 AG005142; University of Texas Southwestern, P30 AG012300; University of Miami, R01 AG027944, AG010491, AG027944, AG021547, AG019757; University of Washington, P50 AG005136; Vanderbilt University, R01 AG019085; and Washington University, P50 AG005681, P01 AG03991. The Kathleen Price Bryan Brain Bank at Duke University Medical Center is funded by NINDS grant # NS39764, NIMH MH60451 and by Glaxo Smith Kline. Genotyping of the TGEN2 cohort was supported by Kronos Science. The TGen series was also funded by NIA grant AG034504 to AJM, The Banner Alzheimer's Foundation, The Johnnie B. Byrd Sr. Alzheimer's Institute, the Medical Research Council, and the state of Arizona and also includes samples from the following sites: Newcastle Brain Tissue Resource (funding via the Medical Research Council, local NHS trusts and Newcastle University), MRC London Brain Bank for Neurodegenerative Diseases (funding via the Medical Research Council), South West Dementia Brain Bank (funding via numerous sources including the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE), Alzheimer's Research Trust (ART), BRACE as well as North Bristol NHS Trust Research and Innovation Department and DeNDRoN), The Netherlands Brain Bank (funding via numerous sources including Stichting MS Research, Brain Net Europe, Hersenstichting Nederland Breinbrekend Werk, International Parkinson Fonds, Internationale Stiching Alzheimer Onderzoek), Institut de Neuropatologia, Servei Anatomia Patologica, Universitat de Barcelona. Marcelle Morrison-Bogorad, PhD., Tony Phelps, PhD and Walter Kukull PhD are thanked for helping to co-ordinate this collection. ADNI Funding for ADNI is through the Northern California Institute for Research and Education by grants from Abbott, AstraZeneca AB, Bayer Schering Pharma AG, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Eisai Global Clinical Development, Elan Corporation, Genentech, GE Healthcare, Glaxo-SmithKline, Innogenetics, Johnson and Johnson, Eli Lilly and Co., Medpace, Inc., Merck and Co., Inc., Novartis AG, Pfizer Inc, F. Hoffman-La Roche, Schering-Plough, Synarc, Inc., Alzheimer's Association, Alzheimer's Drug Discovery Foundation, the Dana Foundation, and by the National Institute of Biomedical Imaging and Bioengineering and NIA grants U01 AG024904, RC2 AG036535, K01 AG030514. Data collection and sharing for this project was funded by the ADNI (National Institutes of Health Grant U01 AG024904). ADNI is funded by the National Institute on Aging, the National Institute of Biomedical Imaging and Bioengineering, and through generous contributions from the following: Alzheimer's Association; Alzheimer's Drug Discovery Foundation; BioClinica, Inc.; Biogen Idec Inc.; Bristol-Myers Squibb Company; Eisai Inc.; Elan Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; Eli Lilly and Company; F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd and its affiliated company Genentech, Inc.; GE Healthcare; Innogenetics, N.V.; IXICO Ltd.; Janssen Alzheimer Immunotherapy Research & Development, LLC.; Johnson & Johnson Pharmaceutical Research & Development LLC.; Medpace, Inc.; Merck & Co., Inc.; Meso Scale Diagnostics, LLC.; NeuroRx Research; Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation; Pfizer Inc.; Piramal Imaging; Servier; Synarc Inc.; and Takeda Pharmaceutical Company. The Canadian Institutes of Health Research is providing funds to support ADNI clinical sites in Canada. Private sector contributions are facilitated by the Foundation for the National Institutes of Health (www.fnih.org). The grantee organization is the Northern California Institute for Research and Education, and the study is coordinated by the Alzheimer's Disease Cooperative Study at the University of California, San Diego. ADNI data are disseminated by the Laboratory for Neuro Imaging at the University of California, Los Angeles. This research was also supported by NIH grants P30 AG010129 and K01 AG030514. The authors thank Drs. D. Stephen Snyder and Marilyn Miller from NIA who are ex-o_cio ADGC members. Support was also from the Alzheimer's Association (LAF, IIRG-08-89720; MP-V, IIRG-05-14147) and the United States Department of Veterans Affairs Administration, Office of Research and Development, Biomedical Laboratory Research Program. Peter St George-Hyslop is supported by Wellcome Trust, Howard Hughes Medical Institute, and the Canadian Institute of Health
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As Russian forces steadily advance in the Kharkiv region, it is becoming ever more clear that the Ukraine war has been a disaster for the U.S. defense machine, and not just because our aid has failed to save Ukraine from retreat and possible defeat. More importantly, the war has pitilessly exposed our defense system's deep, underlying, faults.Critics have long maintained that our obsession with technologically complex weapons inevitably yields unreliable systems produced in limited numbers because of their predictably high cost. They are furthermore likely to fail in combat because of the military's lack of interest in adequate testing (lest realistic tests reveal serious shortcomings and thereby threaten the budget.) The unforgiving operational test provided by the Ukraine war has shown that the critics were absolutely right. Successive "game changing" systems - such as the Switchblade drone, the M-1 Abrams tank, Patriot air defense missiles, the M777 howitzer, the Excalibur guided 155 mm artillery round, the HIMARS precision missile, GPS-guided bombs, and Skydio drones endowed with artificial intelligence, were all dispatched to "the fight," as the military like to call it, with fanfare and high expectations. All were destined to fail for reasons rooted in the fundamental problems cited above. The $60,000 Switchblade drone, produced in limited numbers due to cost, proved useless against armored targets and was quickly discarded by Ukrainian troops in favor of $700 Chinese commercial models ordered online. The $10 million Abrams tank not only proved distressingly vulnerable to Russian attack drones but in any case broke down repeatedly and was soon withdrawn from combat, though not before the Russians put several out of action and captured at least one, which they took to Moscow and added to a display of Nato weaponry in a Moscow park that included an M777 howitzer and other items of NATO hardware. The M777 cannon, though touted for its accuracy, has proved too delicate for the rough conditions of sustained combat, with barrels regularly wearing out and requiring replacement in Poland far from the front lines . Notoriously, its 155 mm ammunition has been in short supply. Thanks to the consolidation of the U.S. defense industry into a small number of monopolies, an ill-judged policy eagerly promoted since the Clinton Administration, U.S. domestic production of 155 mm shells is reliant on a single aging General Dynamics plant in Scranton, Pennsylvania, which is struggling to meet its targets. President Zelensky has been loudly demanding more Patriot launchers and missiles to defend Kharkiv, which is curious, given the apparent ease with which the Russians have targeted Patriots defending Kyiv, and the system's declining effectiveness against Russian ballistic missiles. HIMARS long range missiles indeed had a deadly effect on high value Russian targets, such as ammunition dumps, but the Russians adapted by dispersing and camouflaging such dumps and other likely targets.Take it from a Ukrainian: Western Systems "Worthless."Strikingly, many of the failures of U.S. weapons, including the HIMARS, in Ukraine have been due to their reliance on a highly vulnerable guidance system: GPS. The Russians, who have long devoted intense care and attention to electronic warfare, have proven increasingly adept at jamming GPS. This has been most witheringly expressed by Maria Berlinskaya, a pioneer in Ukraine's use of drones and head of the country's aerial reconnaissance support center, who recently stated that "most Western systems have proven to be [worthless]" thanks to Russian jamming. Her gloomy assessment was confirmed in April by none other than William LaPlante, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, who told a CSIS conference how a company (Boeing, though he did not name it) had proposed adapting their small diameter GPS guided bomb as a warhead for the HIMARS. It had been accordingly rushed through development and into production, with little or no testing, and shipped off to Ukraine. "It just didn't work," admitted LaPlante, thanks to Russian GPS jammers that threw it off course and caused it to miss. The same sad fate seems to have befallen the Skydio drone, product of an eponymous Silicon Valley startup, whose AI features trumpeted by the company - "Skydio drones have the compute capacity to see, understand, and react in real time" - did not prevent it from being driven off course by Putin's jammers.Sullivan and His Pals Drank the Kool Aid the Military Poured for Them.Needless to say, none of these assorted failures were anticipated by the U.S. military high command, few of whom would be eager to denigrate the wares of contractors with lucrative post-retirement board seats on offer. We might hope that our senior civilian leadership would be aware of such biases and temper their expectations accordingly. Unfortunately, they drank the Kool Aid, as evidenced for their high expectations for the 2023 Ukrainian counter-offensive. Despite high hopes and lavish supplies of weapons, including tanks, ammunition, drones, intensive training on the territory of NATO allies, and a grounding in U.S. command and control doctrine, the counter-offensive was an immediate and total failure. Planners were apparently caught by surprise by the depth of Russia's (easily visible) defensive fortifications, especially minefields and the effectiveness of its electronic jamming. Ever since then, Ukraine has been steadily retreating, losing in the process its reserves of military manpower.Then There's Corruption.Not all of Ukraine's dire situation can be blamed on the military deficiencies of its major Nato ally. The country's infamous corruption, well known to western governments but generally ignored in the western press, is currently highlighted by its crumbling defenses around Kharkiv. According to an exemplary report by Ukrainian anti-corruption researcher Martyna Boguslavets, published in the Kyiv-based Ukraina Pravda, the huge sums appropriated for building fortifications around the city have simply been stolen. Here is her report (machine translated.)Martyna BoguslavetsChairman of the Anti-corruption Center "Mezha"Where are the fortifications? Kharkiv OVA paid millions to fictitious companiesMONDAY, MAY 13, 2024,Hundreds of millions of hryvnias have probably been stolen from the construction of fortifications in the Kharkiv region, where the [Russians are] now actively advancing. Multi-million dollar contracts for the construction of fortifications, for which a total of 7 billion hryvnias [$173 million] were spent there, were transferred by the Kharkiv OVA [regional military adminsitration] to front companies of avatars.In particular, the Department of Housing and Communal Services (ZhKG) and the fuel and energy complex of Kharkiv OVA concluded direct contracts for the supply of wood for fortifications with companies with signs of fictitiousness.For 270 million [approx $6 million] for wood, information about which is classified, contracts were concluded with FOP Chaus I.O., LLC "Hertz Industry", LLC "Satisbud", LLC "ATT BUILD" and LLC "DEREVOOBROBNE PIDPRIEMSTVO VOSHOD".All of them started making millions immediately within a few months of signing up. Classic - under direct contracts and without competitive procurement.It so happened that the department of the Kharkiv OVA for defense procurement chose newly registered anonymous firms and private enterprises. Moreover, the owners of these firms do not resemble successful businessmen and businesswomen - they have dozens of court cases, from whiskey theft to domestic violence against a husband and mother, some of them are deprived of parental rights and have had enforcement proceedings for bank loans.Another interesting detail - it seems that these beneficiaries do not even know that they are millionaires. After all, they continue to work in shifts "in the fields" and factories.Once again: in OVA, direct contracts for wood for fortifications have been concluded with companies whose "owners" do not even know that they are making millions. This is how military information is classified."Secret" avatars of Kharkiv OVAIt is obvious that contractors for military deals were carefully sought - people who are not rich, with a number of court cases and debts. Some of them are even related to each other.The scheme started with FOP Chaus Ihor Olegovych. Three months after registration, the OVA department concludes direct contracts with him for the supply of wood worth millions of hryvnias.It is interesting that in July 2023, when Chaus just registered the FOP, he had enforcement proceedings for a fine from the police. Earlier, he was found guilty of stealing a pint of Jack Daniels from ATB. He served 100 hours of community service for the stolen whiskey. A successful businessman from the bad 2010sThe "successful businesswomen" scheme was continued. Both are from the city of Kamianske, Dnipropetrovsk region.The first is Victoria Smolyak, owner of Hertz Industry LLC. The company was registered in June 2023, and within a few months it began to earn millions from wood. Again, under direct contracts. In less than a year, the company changes four managers, which is also a sign of fictitiousness.Mrs. Smolyak has not only a limited liability company, but also 5 enforcement proceedings for recovery from banks, courts for evasion of parental duties. A drunk woman committed domestic violence against her mother. Currently, she works at the Dnipro metallurgical plant.Not very similar to the owner of a successful company that earned 116 million [$2.9 million] from the OVA department in 9 months?Send feedbackThe second businesswoman is Natalia Koval. LLC "Satisbud" is registered on it three days after the registration of "Hertz Industry". Another successful company, through which more than [$1.3 million] are finnele.The owner of the company also has a bunch of court cases, in particular, regarding the deprivation of parental rights, being in a public place in a drunken state, committing domestic violence against her husband. As we learned, the woman now works in shifts in the fields.It is interesting that both "Hertz Industry" LLC and "Satisbud" LLC have the same director - Dmytro Knorozov. It is expected, and he also has enforcement proceedings, where he acts as a debtor.Through the following companies - "ATT BUD" and "WOOD PROCESSING ENTERPRISE VOSHOD" the Department of Housing and Urban Development of the Kharkiv Oblast is chasing away millions. Their owners and managers are connected to more than 30 more recently established companies with a wide range of activities.According to this scheme, the naked eye can see how someone, being a member of the government offices, mercilessly registers new companies, using for this purpose people who, due to the circumstances, may not be aware of this. And this someone continues to make money on blood.Ideally, this should become useful information for law enforcement agencies and further exposure of fictitious companies that steal millions from the Armed Forces. After all, most of these dozens of companies are currently dormant and are probably standing by for further participation in schemes for withdrawing funds into the shadows and tax evasion.Notably, Boguslavets' report is based on public documents, available to anyone who cared to probe, which did not apparently include the host of U.S. correspondents covering the war.This article has been republished with permission from Andrew Cockburn's Spoils of War
Las críticasEn el marco de este derrotero por el que ha pasado la tesis de la Paz Democrática, se han montado diversos ángulos de críticas hacia la misma. Una primera vertiente destaca la implausibilidad de las explicaciones que intentan dar cuenta de la supuesta "ley". Así por ejemplo se ha señalado que en momentos de crisis aún en las democracias se produce una reducción del tamaño en el círculo decisor final. O que los dirigentes de los estados no democráticos también enfrentan condicionamientos de índole institucional o por parte de grupos de poder a los que están vinculados. O, incluso, que la opinión pública no es necesariamente una fuerza pacificadora. Asimismo, una crítica de índole realista se refiere a la escasez histórica de democracias que se traduce en pocas oportunidades de conflicto (Peñas, 1997: 133).Otro ángulo ha sido la existencia de serios problemas en la recolección y clasificación de los datos que sustentan la tesis. Su génesis yace en buena medida en la definición de los dos conceptos centrales detrás de la idea de la Paz Democrática: la democracia y la guerra. Sobre el concepto de "democracia" se advierten importantes diferencias en los criterios constitutivos del mismo. ¿Qué es una democracia? ¿Qué rasgos la definen? ¿Cuál es su condición? ¿Son éstas frágiles? Además, existen discrepancias entre las bases de datos y/o bien calificaciones bastante arbitrarias como por ejemplo la consideración en la basePolity II de Francia entre los años 1981 y 1986 como una "anocracia", mientras que El Salvador de la misma época, enfrascado en una cruenta guerra civil sí figuraba como "democracia".En cuanto a las guerras, el criterio de selección de datos más aceptado fue el implementado por Small y Singer que consiste en catalogar como guerra internacional a un conflicto que involucra uno o más participantes estatales y que provoca un mínimo de mil víctimas. Esto excluye intervenciones violentas que causan menos víctimas, pero no por ello políticamente menos significativas o bien las operaciones encubiertas (Salomón, 2001: 247). Tampoco ésta conceptualización da cuenta de las tendencias más modernas en los conflictos internacionales, entre las que se destaca la caída relativa de las disputas interestatales frente a las intraestatales ). En definitiva, "[lo] que caracteriza a nuestros días no es la desaparición de la violencia del sistema internacional ni la ausencia del recurso a la fuerza por parte de los Estados, sino la disminución del número de guerras formalmente declaradas y el aumento de guerras de guerrillas, guerras a través de terceros, subversión interior de los Estados instigada por otros Estados, acciones encubiertas, etc., menos costosas y que no necesitan ser justificadas, por lo menos tanto como una declaración formal de guerra" (Peñas, 1997: 135). Asimismo, los estudios cuantitativos en general han olvidado distinguir entre agresores y agredidos, o también la medición de la intensidad de la guerra (determinar si las democracias causan más muertes que otros Estados). La tesis de la Paz Democrática a su vez no ha logrado dar respuesta a ciertas anomalías que denotan la existencia de variables perturbadoras. Una anomalía es la existencia de zonas de paz en regiones del mundo donde no todas las sociedades son democráticas, como es el caso de América del Sur. Otra es que la correlación entre paz y democracia es más fuerte en el período posterior a la Segunda Guerra Mundial (Farber y Gowa, 1995). Este tipo de anomalías ha llevado a que explicaciones alternativas cobren fuerza. Entre estas, la más destacada es la teoría de Comunidades de Seguridad Pluralistas de Karl Deutsch (1957) que refiere a zonas donde sus miembros tienen la certeza de que sus disputas no se resolverán por medio de la fuerza. También se advierten reajustes y matizaciones de la tesis que debilitan su poder. Un ejemplo es la afirmación de Raymond Cohen (1994) de que la única conclusión razonables es que "los Estados democráticos del área del Atlántico Norte/Europa occidental, compartiendo una serie de circunstancias históricas particulares y una herencia cultural común, han evitado enfrentarse en una guerra" (en Peñas, 1997: 134). Asimismo, es posible encontrar evidencia en contra. Es el caso de la investigación de Charles Kegley y Margaret Hermann (1996) que arroja el interesante resultado de quince casos de intervención militar con uso de la fuerza, entre 1975 y 1995, por parte de democracias estables contra otras democracias estables, de las cuales ocho de ellas correspondían a intervenciones estadounidenses. Más recientemente, Thomas Schwartz y Kiron Skinner (2002: 160-161) identificaron un listado de conflictos que contrarían la tesis o están muy próximos a hacerlo y que hacen a lo que ellos llaman el "problema histórico" de la Paz Democrática:American Revolutionary War, 1775 (Great Britain vs. U.S.)Wars of French Revolution (democratic period), esp. 1793, 1795 (France vs. Great Britain)Quasi War, 1798 (U.S. vs. France)War of 1812 (U.S. vs. Great Britain)Texas War of Independence, 1835 (Texas vs. Mexico)Mexican War, 1846 (U.S. vs. Mexico)Roman Republic vs. France, 1849American Civil War, 1861 (Northern Union vs. Southern Confederacy)Ecuador-Columbia War, 1863Franco-Prussian War, 1870War of the Pacific, 1879 (Chile vs. Peru and Bolivia)Indian Wars, much of nineteenth century (U.S. vs. various Indian nations)Spanish-American War, 1898Boer War, 1899 (Great Britain vs. Transvaal and Orange Free State)World War I, 1914 (Germany vs. Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, and U.S.)Chaco War, 1932 (Paraguay vs. Bolivia)Ecuador-Peru, 1941Palestine War, 1948 (Israel vs. Lebanon)Dominican Invasion, 1967 (U.S. vs. Dominican Republic)Cyprus Invasion, 1974 (Turkey vs. Cyprus)Ecuador-Peru, 1981Nagorno-Karabakh, 1989 (Armenia vs. Azerbaijan)Yugoslav Wars, 1991 (Serbia and Bosnian-Serb Republic vs. Croatiaand Bosnia; sometimes Croatia vs. Bosnia)Georgia-Ossetia, 1991 (Georgia vs. South Ossetia)Georgia-Abkhazia, 1992 (Georgia vs. Abkhazia and allegedly Russia)Moldova-Dnestr Republic, 1992 (Moldova vs. Dnestr Republic and allegedly Russia)Chechen War of Independence, 1994 (Russia vs. Chechnya)Ecuador-Peru, 1995NATO-Yugoslavia, 1999India-Pakistan, 1999 Como se advierte, la teoría de la Paz Democrática se enfrenta a problemas tanto de índole empírica como de índole explicativa. Frente a este tipo de críticas, las reacciones se han dividido entre las defensivas (Maoz, 1997), las que han ignorado los hallazgos, las que han empezado a considerar otros factores (Russett, 1998) y las que se han dedicado a verificar su validez mediante estudios de casos (Elman, 1997). En definitiva, el debate ha sido prolífico y entre una de sus evoluciones más interesantes es la que ha recomendado evitar "las dicotomías simplistas y estudiar el mayor número posible de interacciones entre factores de conflicto internos e internacionales" (Salomón, 2001: 253).La materialización política de la Paz DemocráticaEn el contexto del "optimismo liberal" despertado por el colapso soviético y el fin de la guerra fría, la tesis de la Paz Democrática suscitó gran entusiasmo, sobre todo entre aquellos estudiosos de las Relaciones Internacionales que ansiaban acabar con la hegemonía retórica del realismo-neorrealismo en la disciplina. Como señala Peñas (1997: 130), "la gran virtud de esta tesis (…) es que en su discurso disuelve o reconcilia la escisión entre principios e intereses: una política de extensión de las democracias de libre mercado es a la vez una política éticamente justa y políticamente adecuada". Por tanto, el corolario político de la tesis de la Paz Democrática no es otro que la presunción de que el imperio de la paz y la cooperación internacionales requieren de la democratización de los Estados en el Sistema Internacional. Esto ha dado lugar al plano prescriptivo de los teóricos de la Paz Democrática. El más destacado en este sentido ha sido Russett al recomendar al gobierno en Washington la activa promoción democrática en base a las "pruebas sólidas de que las democracias no se hacen la guerra entre sí". Su propuesta se cuida de no alentar intervenciones militares unilaterales, sino apoyadas y legitimadas por organizaciones como la ONU o la OEA; y sus preceptos, en efecto, se materializaron durante la administración Clinton en la estrategia de Engagement y Enlargement ("compromiso y expansión"), en la que primacía global estadounidense, democracia y libre mercado caminaron de la mano.Pero lejos está de ser la Paz Democrática algo reciente o coyuntural en el discurso de política exterior de Estados Unidos. John Ikenberry sostiene que "[the] American preoccupation with promoting democracy abroad fits into a larger view about the sources of a stable, legitimate, secure, and prosperous international order. This outlook may not always be the chief guiding principle of policy, and it may sometimes lead to error. Still, it is a relatively coherent orientation rooted in the American political experience and American understandings of history, economics, and the sources of political stability" (Ikenberry, 1999). Sus orígenes políticos se remontan, claro es, a Woodrow Wilson quien en 1917 señaló: "A steadfast concert of peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants". De acuerdo con el análisis de Henry Kissinger (1995), Wilson retomó postulados ya volcados en su momento por Thomas Jefferson, a saber: a) que la misión especial de Estados Unidos trasciende la diplomacia cotidiana, y los obliga a servir como faro de libertad para el resto de la humanidad, y b) que la política exterior de las democracias es moralmente superior porque el pueblo es, en esencia, amante de la paz. Esta misma línea de argumentación fue bien visible en la prédica de Harry Truman sobre las naciones libres, en la visión maníquea del "Imperio del Mal" de Ronald Reagan y, además del mencionado Clinton, más recientemente en las administraciones Bush (h) y Obama, como puede verse en los siguientes extractos obtenidos de distintos documentos estratégicos. Estamos en presencia por tanto de una constante de política exterior estadounidense.A National Security Strategy for a New Century, October 1998."…We seek international support in helping strengthen democratic and free market institutions and norms in countries making the transition from closed to open societies. This commitment to see freedom and respect for human rights take hold is not only just, but pragmatic, for strengthened democratic institutions benefit the United States and the world" (p. 33).The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002."…We will (…) use our foreign aid to promote freedom and support those who struggle non-violently for it, ensuring that nations moving toward democracy are rewarded for the steps they take (…) [and we will] make freedom and the development of democratic institutions key themes in our bilateral relations, seeking solidarity andcooperation from other democracies while we press governments that deny human rights to move toward a better future" (p. 4).National Security Strategy, May 2010."… The United States supports the expansion of democracy and human rights abroad because governments that respect these values are more just, peaceful, and legitimate. We also do so because their success abroad fosters an environment that supports America's national interests. Political systems that protect universal rights are ultimately more stable, successful, and secure. As our history shows, the United States can more effectively forge consensus to tackle shared challenges when working with governments that reflect the will and respect the rights of their people, rather than just the narrow interests of those in power" (p. 37).Esta prédica democrática, sin embargo, pareciera marchar a contramano de ciertas realidades. Señala Peñas, "la historia demuestra que las islas liberales no sólo han hecho la guerra por doquier, sino que además han sido responsables de un alto grado de militarización del mundo y han contribuido significativamente a la militarización y los conflictos entre los Estados no democráticos: esta militarización podría poner en peligro la paz democrática que el liberalismo propugna" (Peñas, 1997: 136). Estados Unidos, una de las democracias más importantes a nivel mundial (sino la más), posee en particular una historia reciente de retroalimentación entre militarización y conflictividad en el Tercer Mundo. Vale recordar, cómo a través de la CIA, Washington ayudó armar a la red al-Qaeda para combatir a la ocupación soviética de Afganistán en la década del '80, lo que a la postre generó una guerra civil en dicho país y el surgimiento de un importante enemigo en la figura de Osama Bin Laden, o bien el apoyo a Saddam Hussein durante la guerra irano-iraquí por aquellos mismos años en coexistencia casi paradojal con la venta encubierta de armamento a Irán —destinada a su vez a financiar la guerra sucia de los Contras nicaragüenses contra el gobierno revolucionario sandinista. La invasión a Iraq en marzo de 2003 y el posterior caos del país, también constituye un buen ejemplo del fracaso y los peligros que conlleva la aplicación de una retórica democrático-mesiánica a través de la manu militari.Ciertamente, el repaso de estos eventos despierta temores si se contempla el actual caso de Libia. Allí, la intervención bajo autorización del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas para frenar la crisis humanitaria en curso en el país, por iniciativa de Francia, Estados Unidos, Italia, Gran Bretaña y España (todas democracias), se ha convertido en una operación liderada por la OTAN, donde se está financiando y proveyendo a las fuerzas insurgentes opositoras a Kadafy y en la que el objetivo del cambio de régimen parece cada vez más claro (van Tijen, 2011). A pesar del importante despliegue de poder aéreo y naval, la balanza del conflicto parece no sólo equilibrada sino estancada, contrariando las expectativas iniciales de los mandos políticos y militares occidentales, lo que a su vez augura una potencial inestabilidad en el corto y mediano plazo para todo el Magreb. ¿Es esta la clase de escenario regional que desea la comunidad internacional? ¿Es esto lo que pretenden las principales democracias occidentales? Difícilmente.Resulta por tanto un desafío tan grande como imperioso el lograr romper con la trampa entre democracia, militarización y conflictividad en aumento. Más aún si se advierten datos tan desalentadores como el tamaño del gasto militar de Estados Unidos, el cual eclipsa el gasto correspondiente al resto de las potencias y regiones del planeta.Tal contrariedad entre discurso pacífico-democrático y los hechos, en parte, se explica porque el objetivo estadounidense de la difusión de la democracia liberal a nivel mundial no es el único que compone su política exterior. Existen otros intereses (de seguridad, económicos, poder, etc.) y los medios para conseguirlos no siempre son pacíficos, ni justificables. Desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial, la política exterior estadounidense ha oscilado entre métodos como la negociación, disuasión, unilateralismo y multilateralismo (Barceló Sasía, 2006: 64). En este marco, por momentos el discurso político de la Paz Democrática ha generado la impresión de actuar más como una mera justificación retórica, como un auxilio para encubrir ideológicamente motivaciones de otro orden, antes que como el verdadero leit motif de las acciones emprendidas.Reflexión finalEn definitiva, la Paz Democrática, la idea de que las democracias no guerrean entre sí, cuyo corolario nos dice que la construcción de estados democráticos promueve la estabilidad en las relaciones internacionales, resulta una sugestiva noción desprendida del Liberalismo cuya corroboración científica, a pesar de las frases pomposas que puedan emitirse sobre su certeza y fiabilidad, se encuentra aún en juego. Siendo una tesis por demás atractiva, defendida y cuestionada en el mundo académico, resulta aún más trascendente su estudio dada su cristalización fáctica como supuesto criterio guía en el comportamiento exterior de los Estados democráticos más poderosos a nivel internacional. Los dilemas que ello entraña no son menores, como los intentos recientes y actuales de "democratizar" Medio Oriente y el Mundo Árabe nos recuerdan. Dobles discursos —morales de doble-standard de acuerdo con la célebre crítica de Stanley Hoffman— parecen conjugar anhelos democráticos con intereses geopolíticos y/o geoeconómicos, o más bien encubrir estos últimos bajo el manto de los primeros. En el medio, se resuelven y dirimen en el tablero mundial las corrientes de cambio pacífico o revolucionario, de progreso democrático o de restauración autocrática, las viejas lógicas de poder, de conquista y de influencia, la estabilidad internacional, el porvenir de la guerra y las sombras de la paz. *Candidato doctoral, Universidad Nacional de General San Martín (UNSAM, Argentina). Investigador del Centro de Estudios Interdisciplinarios en Problemáticas Internacionales y Locales (CEIPIL-UNCPBA).Referencias BibliográficasBabst, Dean: "Elective Governments - A Force for Peace", The Wisconsin Sociologist, No. 3 (1964), pp. 9-14.Barceló Sasía, Alejandra: Anti-americanismo: ¿Problema de percepción o de formulación de política exterior? (Puebla: Universidad de las Américas Puebla, 2006). Bremer, Stuart A.: "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965", Journal of Conflict Resolution, No. 36 (1992), pp. 309-341.Chan, Steve: "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall. Are the Freer Countries More Pacific?" Journal of Conjlict Resolution,No. 28 (1984), pp. 617-648. Cohen, Raymond: "Pacific unions: a reappraisal of the theory that 'democracies do not go to war with each other'", Review of International Studies, No. 20 (1994), pp. 202-232.Deutsch, Karl: Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).Doyle, Michael: "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, Part I & Part II", Philosophy & Public Affairs, No.12 (1983), pp. 205-235 y 323-353.Doyle, Michael: "Liberalism and World Politics", The American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (Dec. 1986).Elman, Miriam Fendius (ed.): Paths to Peace. Is Democracy the Answer? (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997).Farber, Henry & Joan Gowa: "Polities and Peace", International Security, No. 20 (1995), pp. 123-146.Harrison, Ewan: "State Socialization, International Norm Dynamics and the Liberal Peace",International Politics, No. 41 (2004), pp. 521-542.Hewitt, J. Joseph, Jonathan Wilkenfeld & Ted Robert Gurr: Peace and Conflict 2008. Executive Summary (College Park, MD: CIDCM, University of Maryland, 2008).Ikenberry, John: "Why Export Democracy?: The 'Hidden Grand Strategy' of American Foreign Policy", The Wilson Quarterly, Vol. 23, no. 2 (Spring 1999).Kant, Immanuel: La Paz Perpetua (Buenos Aires: Longseller, 2001).Kegley, Charles & Margaret Hermann: "How Democracies Use Intervention: A Neglected Dimension in Studies of the Democratic Peace", Journal of Peace Research, No. 33 (1996), pp. 309-322.Kissinger, Henry: La Diplomacia (México: Fondo de cultura económica, 1995).Levy, Jack: "Domestic Politics and War", Journal of Interdisciplinary History, No. 18 (1988), pp. 653-673.MacMillan, John: "Whose Democracy; Which Peace? Contextualizing the Democratic Peace",International Politics, No. 41 (2004), pp. 472-493.Maoz, Zeev & Nasrin Abdolali: "Regime Types and International Conflict, 1817-1976", Journal of Conflict Resolution, No. 33 (1989), pp. 3-35.Maoz, Zeev: "The Controversy over the Democratic Peace", International Security, No. 22 (1997), pp. 162-198.Peceny, Mark: "A Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Peace: The Ambiguous Case of the Spanish-American War", Journal of Peace Research, No. 34 (1997), pp. 415-430.Peñas, Francisco Javier: "Liberalismo y relaciones internacionales: la tesis de la paz democrática y sus críticos", Isegoría, Núm. 16 (1997), pp.119-140.Rendall, Matthew: "'The Sparta and the Athens of our Age at Daggers Drawn': Polities, Perceptions, and Peace", International Politics, No. 41 (2004), pp. 582-604.Risse-Kappen, Thomas: "Democratic Peace - Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument", European Journal of International Relations, No. 1 (1995), pp. 491-517.Rummel, Rudolph: "Libertarianism and Interstate Violence", Journal of Conflict Resolution, No. 27 (1983), pp. 27-71.Russett, Bruce: "A neo-Kantian perspective: democracy, interdependence, and international organizations in building security communities", en Emanuel Adler & Michael Barnett (eds.):Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).Russett, Bruce: Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).Salomón, Mónica: "El debate sobre la «paz democrática». Una aproximación crítica", Revista de Estudios Políticos (Nueva Época), Núm. 113 (Julio-Septiembre 2001), pp. 237-265.Schwartz, Thomas & Kiron K. Skinner: "The Myth of the Democratic Peace", Orbis (Winter 2002), pp. 159-172.Small, Melvin & David Singer: "The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes", Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, No. 1 (1976), pp. 50-69.Snyder, Jack: "Un mundo, teorías rivales", Foreign Policy edición española (dic.-enero 2005).Tovar Ruíz, Juan: "De Königsberg a Kosovo. La Paz Democrática: del planteamiento filosófico al discurso político y su aplicación en el régimen de los protectorados internacionales", Revista Académica de Relaciones Internacionales, núm. 10 (febrero de 2009). Van Tijen, Tjebbe: "NATO's collateral tyrannicide", Open Democracy (7 May, 2011). Walt, Stephen M.: "International Relations: One World, Many Theories", Foreign Policy(Spring 1998), pp. 29-46.Weede, Eric: "Democracy and War Involvement", Journal of Peace Research, No. 28 (1984), pp. 649-664.Wright, Quincy: A Study of War (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1942).
Why did Wilsonian ideals influence AEF actions in the First World War, and how did that affect the United States' involvement in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation? Wilsonian ideals influenced the AEF's actions in the First World War because most American leaders and soldiers shared Wilson's concepts of Progressivism and believed that the United States should play a role in saving Europe. Even if some did not agree with Wilson's politics, most doughboys shared his ideas of American Exceptionalism, and these views affected United States involvement in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation. In merging the two topic areas of Wilson's ideologies and AEF involvement in the war, this essay will attempt to answer how the American doughboy found motivation in the same principles that guided President Wilson. ; Master of Arts in Military History ; Week 11 Final Paper Wilsonianism in the First World War: Progressivism, American Exceptionalism, and the AEF Doughboy Brian P. Bailes A paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts in Military History Norwich University MH 562B Dr. John Broom August 16, 2020 Bailes 2 While the duration of American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) involvement in First World War combat operations remained short compared to the armies of the European powers, the experience had a lasting impact on the United States' status as a global power. President Woodrow Wilson's mediation in the European affair throughout American neutrality, his integration of the AEF into Allied operations, and his contribution to the post-war peace process cast him as a central figure of the conflict as well as a harbinger of United States interventionist foreign policy. Through the more than a century since the end of the war, historians have analyzed and debated various facets of United States belligerency. Historians have explored President Wilson's ideologies and the decision making that ultimately led to him making his April 1917 appeal to Congress for American belligerency. Additionally, historians have expanded on AEF actions in Europe and argued how General Pershing's adamancy on maintaining an independent American command created tension with the Allied leaders. Historians have not connected these two topics to analyze how a reader can conceptually link Wilson's ideas and doughboy exploits in Europe. Why did Wilsonian ideals influence AEF actions in the First World War, and how did that affect the United States' involvement in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation? Throughout the historiography of United States involvement in the First World War, specific themes reoccur as significant areas of consensus. The historiography presents two primary arguments in which historians agree. Historians agree that Wilson's peace objectives drastically differed from those of the Allies, and historians agree that these differences motivated Wilson's decisions regarding how the United States would enter the war. Historians also agree that friction existed between General Pershing and the Allied Commanders once the AEF arrived in Europe and began combat operations. These two commonalities in the historiography remain Bailes 3 relatively constant throughout the past 50 years of historical research, and even when portraying more positive sentiments expressed between AEF and Allied soldiers, historians still note some tension between Pershing and the Allied commanders. Historians agree that Wilson's peace objectives differed significantly from those of the Allies. David Woodford argues that the gap between British imperial interests and Wilson's peace objectives affected the alliance between the United States and England throughout the war.1 William Widenor argues that Wilson failed in achieving his goals during the Versailles Peace Settlement because he attempted to make too many concessions for enduring peace, and he claims that Wilson grew at odds with the Allied leaders at the peace conference.2 George Egerton argues that British policymakers were closely monitoring the dispute within the United States Senate during the Treaty of Versailles conference, and he suggests that British leadership remained skeptical of Wilson's League of Nations.3 Historians capture Wilson's opposing peace aims throughout the European conflict, and they seemingly agree on how these aims influenced Wilson's policies and actions. Some historians cite the most significant gap in peace aims as existing between the United States and France. David Stevenson argues that French leaders were continually at odds with Wilson throughout the war as the French war aims focused much more on their national security, which they saw as requiring the destruction of Imperial Germany.4 Stevenson points out that while Wilson's peace aims differed from England as well as France, many French objectives 1 David R. Woodward, Trial by Friendship: Anglo-American Relations, 1917-1918 (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1993), 7-25, 35-43, 77-80, 125-9, 208-20. 2 William C. Widenor, "The United States and the Versailles Peace Settlement," Modern American Diplomacy, eds. John M. Carroll and George C. Herring (Lanham: SR Books, 1996), 46-59. 3 George W. Egerton, "Britain and the 'Great Betrayal': Anglo-American Relations and the Struggle for United States Ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, 1919-1920," The Historical Journal 21, no. 4 (December 1978): 885-911, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2638973. 4 David Stevenson, "French War Aims and the American Challenge, 1914-1918," The Historical Journal 22, no. 4 (December 1979): 877-894, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2638691. Bailes 4 were more aggressive against Germany as they involved reclaiming land lost to Germany in previous wars, specifically the 1870 Franco-Prussian War.5 Stevenson highlights the fact that Wilson could not get French officials to see the "two Germanys" concept that prevailed in American thinking at the time. While the American public generally saw two Germanys – the autocratic ruling party dominated by the Prussian elite and the German people living under that oppressive regime – Stevenson argues that France only saw Imperial Germany as a total enemy.6 Robert Bruce explains that during the post-war occupation period, the American doughboys perceived Frenchmen as distrustful and hateful toward German soldiers, and this sullied the alliance between France and the United States.7 In line with Wilson's ideology, historians cite Wilson's desire for Europe to achieve a "peace without victory" as he attempted to serve as a mediator during the United States period of neutrality. These historians ultimately conclude that Wilson believed any of the European powers achieving their aims through victory would lead to a continuation of balance of power politics in Europe. They argue that Wilson thought merely putting an end to the fighting would be the only way to achieve lasting peace. Ross Gregory argues that Wilson acted as a persistent mediator throughout the war as he strove for a "peace without victory."8 Arthur Link explains that Wilson believed a "peace without victory" and a "draw in Europe" proved the best solution for establishing a new system to replace the broken power structure in Europe.9 Ross Kennedy portrays Wilson as advocating the United States as a neutral mediator striving for a "peace 5 Stevenson, 884, 892-4. 6 Stevenson, 885. 7 Robert B. Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms: America & France in the Great War (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 2003), 286-95. 8 Ross Gregory, The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1971), 115-6. 9 Arthur Link, "Entry into World War I," Progress, War, and Reaction: 1900-1933, eds. Davis R.B. Ross, Alden T. Vaughan, and John B. Duff (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, Inc., 1970), 141. Bailes 5 without victory" before the U.S. entered the war, then as an advocate of "just peace" after they entered the war.10 Kennedy argues that Wilson blamed the international system that led to power politics and wanted to have a separate voice in the peace process to shape a new diplomatic and global political order.11 Historians point to Wilson's ideology as a reason for his differing peace objectives, and historians point to Wilson's Christian faith as a significant motivation for his progressive philosophy. Lloyd Ambrosius highlights Wilson's four tenets of national self-determination, open-door economic globalization, collective security, and progressive history as the framework in which he envisioned a global order shaped by American democratic ideals that would bring the world to peace.12 Ambrosius examines Wilson's embrace of "American Exceptionalism" and looks at how his Anglo-American bias clouded his vision and prevented him from seeing the various cultural factors throughout the world.13 Ronald Pestritto examines Wilson's progressive form of history while arguing that Wilson saw democracy emerging within society as a phenomenon only natural to specific groups of people, and he only saw a few civilizations as "progressed."14 Pestritto notes Wilson's Christian inspiration, referencing early manuscripts written by Wilson titled "Christ's Army" and "Christian Progress."15 William Appleman Williams argues that Wilson maintained a Calvinist idealism that intensified the existing doctrine 10 Ross A. Kennedy, "Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and American National Security," Diplomatic History 25, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 15, 29, https://doi.org/10.1111/0145-2096.00247. 11 Kennedy, "Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and American National Security," 2-3. 12 Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 2-47. 13 Ambrosius, Wilsonianism, 125-34; Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 33-49; Lloyd E. Ambrosius, "World War I and the Paradox of Wilsonianism," The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 17 (2018): 5-22, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537781417000548. 14 Ronald J. Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 6-61. 15 Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, 23, 40. Bailes 6 based on God's supposed ordination of American influence and expansion in the world.16 Richard Gamble explains that Wilson's vision and rhetoric nested with many of the Christian messages of progressive religious leaders in the United States during the First World War who saw the war as a Christian crusade to spread American ideals.17 Historians seem in unanimous agreement that Wilson's separate peace aims formed the primary impetus for him seeking an independent American presence in the war effort. David Esposito argues that Wilson wanted to have an American presence in the war because he realized that to establish a dominant American voice in the post-war peace talks, the United States needed to make a significant contribution to Allied victory.18 Edward Coffman details the United States' experiences in the First World War by explaining Wilson's desire to gain an independent voice in the peace process.19 David Trask maintains that Wilson wanted to "remain somewhat detached from the Allies" in defeating Imperial Germany to provide Wilson leverage so that he could directly influence the post-war peace process.20 Arthur Link explains that Wilson did see the benefit of not joining the Entente but keeping the United States independent of "any political commitments" with the Allies as providing a chance to ensure an American presence at the peace conference.21 Thomas Knock argues that Wilson faulted the "balance of power" politics of Europe and saw the United States as the actor to save Europe and create a new system of 16 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1959; New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009), 67-112. Page references are to the 2009 edition. 17 Richard M. Gamble, The War for Righteousness: Progressive Christianity, the Great War, and the Rise of the Messianic Nation (Wilmington: ISI Books, 2003), 22-3, 86-208, 254-5. 18 David M. Esposito, "Woodrow Wilson and the Origins of the AEF," Presidential Studies Quarterly 19 no. 1 (Winter 1989): 127-38, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40574570. 19 Edward M. Coffman, The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1968), 5-8. 20 David F. Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 1917-1918 (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1993), 2-6. 21 Link, "Entry into World War I," 141. Bailes 7 diplomacy.22 Overall, historians agree that President Wilson desired very different peace outcomes for a post-war Europe, and this influenced him as he made decisions regarding United States actions throughout the war. In addition to the agreement that Wilson's peace aims differed from the Allies, historians also agree that once the United States did enter the war and the AEF arrived in Europe, friction quickly developed between General Pershing and the Allied commanders. David Trask argues many instances of "increasing friction" existed between Pershing and the French and British command. Trask includes a case where the Allies "attempted to bypass Pershing" by working directly with Wilson even though Wilson had appointed Pershing as Commander in Chief of the AEF.23 Trask argues that Pershing believed that the preceding few years of trench warfare had "deprived the French and even the British of offensive spirit," and he maintains that with Pershing's "open warfare" tactics, his methods of training drastically differed from the Allies.24 Michael Adas cites disagreement between Pershing and the Allied commanders immediately after Pershing arrived in France due to Pershing's unwillingness to listen to the experienced French and British leaders as they tried to suggest ways to employ the AEF.25 Adas argues that Pershing's desire to pursue "open warfare" did not take into account the realities of trench warfare and resulted in costly casualties.26 Russell Weigley cites frequent tensions between Pershing and the Allied commanders, including an example in September of 1918 in which AEF 22 Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest For a New World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 30-69. 23 Trask, AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 38-9. 24 Trask, AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 19. 25 Michael Adas, "Ambivalent Ally: American Military Intervention and the Endgame and Legacy of World War I," Diplomatic History 38 no. 4 (September 2014): 705-7, http://doi.org/10.1093/dh.dhu032. 26 Adas, "Ambivalent Ally," 710. Bailes 8 "traffic congestion" caused a significant disturbance in a visit from Georges Clemenceau.27 Weigley explains that Pershing's belief in "open warfare" would not work due to the enormous American divisions built for the trenches, arguing that Pershing would need "smaller, maneuverable divisions" if he wanted his open warfare to work.28 All historians agree that the issue of AEF amalgamation with the French and British forces served as the primary reason for the friction between the military leaders. David Woodford cites the notion that AEF amalgamation would "undermin[e] the significance of the American military role." Hence, Pershing remained adamant in his stance not to let the Allies use American soldiers to fight under French or British flags.29 Woodward notes that Pershing felt his AEF superior to the Allies as he "believed that the Americans had almost nothing to learn from French and British officers."30 Woodford explains that war aims and peace objectives formed the basis of a fractured Anglo-American relationship that finally crumbled during the peace conference.31 Mitchell Yockelson argues that despite tension between Pershing and the Allied leaders regarding the question of amalgamation, the 27th and 30th Divisions contributed significantly to the Allied effort under British command. Yockelson highlights a fascinating illustration of Pershing's stubbornness in noting that Pershing did not follow the exploits of these divisions even though they proved instrumental in the offensive against the Hindenburg Line.32 As an enduring theme throughout the amalgamation debate, historians point to Pershing's desire for the United States to deliver the decisive blow against Germany with an independent 27 Russell F. Weigley, "Strategy and Total War in the United States: Pershing and the American Military Tradition," Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918, eds. Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 333. 28 Weigley, "Pershing and the American Military Tradition," 341-2. 29 Woodward, Trial by Friendship, 57-8. 30 Woodward, 88. 31 Woodward, 7-80, 112-220. 32 Mitchell A. Yockelson, Borrowed Soldiers: Americans Under British Command, 1918 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), 92-228. Bailes 9 American army. Allan Millett argues that Wilson gave Pershing the explicit directive to keep the AEF separate from the Allies and allowed Pershing the freedom to make decisions on how to integrate the AEF.33 Millett cites Pershing's initial plan to use an AEF offensive on Metz as the critical blow that would decide the war and establish an American contribution to defeating Imperial Germany. Pershing would not have his AEF ready to carry out this offensive until 1919, and his stubbornness in dealing with the requests for amalgamation in the interim "frustrated the Allies."34 Bullitt Lowry narrates Pershing's attempt to shape the post-war peace terms by arguing that Pershing wanted to force Germany into an "unconditional surrender." While Lowry concludes that Pershing's effort to influence the political realm failed, he believed that the only way to "guarantee victory" would be to crush Germany in battle.35 David Woodward argues that Pershing believed that the AEF would decide the war by becoming "the dominant role in the war against Germany."36 Woodward cites Pershing's ideas regarding "the aggressive American rifleman, whose tradition of marksmanship and frontier warfare" could rid the Western Front of trench warfare and execute a great offensive against Germany.37 Historians cite the notion throughout the ranks of the AEF that the United States should remain independent from the Allies, and historians point to the fact that many doughboys saw themselves as superior soldiers to the Allies. Robert H. Zieger argues that "virtually the entire military establishment" agreed with Pershing's desire to have an independent American 33 Allan R. Millett, "Over Where? The AEF and the American Strategy for Victory, 1917-1918," Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present, eds. Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts (Westport: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1986), 237. 34 Millett, "Over Where?," 239. 35 Bullitt Lowry, "Pershing and the Armistice," The Journal of American History 55 no. 2, (September 1968): 281-291, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1899558. 36 Woodward, Trial by Friendship, 81. 37 Woodward, 89, 207. Bailes 10 command.38 Still, Zieger does note that this separate American command relied heavily on the Allies for logistics support, and the AEF "misunderstood the military dynamics of the Western Front."39 Richard Faulkner argues that Pershing's doctrine rested on his belief that the "superior American rifle marksmanship, aggressiveness, and skilled maneuvering" could win the fight for the Allies.40 Faulkner argues that American soldiers saw themselves as intervening in the war effort to help the failing French and British, taunting their British partners by claiming AEF stands for "After England Failed." He devotes a chapter named as such to explain the AEF belief in the superiority of the American fighting man.41 Harold Winton argues that Pershing believed that the United States soldier was superior to his European counterpart.42 Jennifer Keene argues that issues such as the treatment of African-American soldiers and disagreements about which nation contributed the most to the Allied victory created rifts between the two allies.43 In her full text, Keene narrates AEF interactions with their French Allies, and she claims that doughboys saw themselves as superior fighters who could help turn the tide of war.44 Michael Neiberg explains that United States citizens and soldiers came away from the conflict with the belief in the "inherent superiority" of the American system over that of Europe.45 38 Robert H. Zieger, America's Great War: World War I and the American Experience (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 92-102. 39 Zieger, America's Great War, 96. 40 Faulkner, Pershing's Crusaders: The American Soldier in World War I (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2017), 285. 41 Faulkner, 281-304. 42 Harold Winton, "Toward an American Philosophy of Command," The Journal of Military History 64, no. 4 (October 2000): 1059, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2677266. 43 Jennifer D. Keene, "Uneasy Alliances: French Military Intelligence and the American Army During the First World War," Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 1 (January 2008): 18-36, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684529808432461. 44 Jennifer D. Keene, Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 105-11. 45 Michael S. Neiberg, The Path to War: How The First World War Created Modern America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 23. Bailes 11 Even when historians convey a more positive relationship between the AEF and their Allied counterparts, they still address the tension between Pershing and Allied leadership. Robert Bruce portrays a much more positive partnership between the doughboy and his French ally. Bruce documents Marshal Joseph Joffre's visit to the United States after Congress declared war against Germany to muster American support for the French. By comparing France's visit to Britain's, Bruce argues that Joffre established the framework for an intimate Franco-American partnership.46 Bruce maintains that the French respected the American soldier and viewed the entry of the AEF into the war as the saving grace of the Allies. Bruce narrates a bond between doughboys and French troops that increased as they trained and fought together.47 Despite this positive portrayal by Bruce of the French and AEF bond, Bruce still highlights the tension in Pershing's interactions with French commanders as well as noting the general perception amongst French commanders that Pershing thought "he knew everything there was to know about modern warfare."48 Bruce adds that different peace aims and post-war sentiments towards Germany created disagreements amongst American and French soldiers that fractured the relationship built during the war.49 Of note, Bruce suggests that the doughboys harbored what they saw as a "perceived lack of aggressiveness in the French."50 After synthesizing the historiography, the question remains regarding how these two arguments can be linked. Why did Wilsonian ideals influence AEF actions in the First World War, and how did that affect the United States' involvement in the nation's first large-scale 46 Robert B. Bruce, "America Embraces France: Marshal Joseph Joffre and the French Mission to the United States, April-May 1917," Journal of Military History 66 no. 2 (April 2002): 407-441, http://doi.org/10.2307/3093066; Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 32-59. 47 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 86-121. 48 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 128, 143. 49 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 286-95. 50 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 122. Bailes 12 coalition operation? Wilsonian ideals influenced the AEF's actions in the First World War because most American leaders and soldiers shared Wilson's concepts of Progressivism and believed that the United States should play a role in saving Europe. Even if some did not agree with Wilson's politics, most doughboys shared his ideas of American Exceptionalism, and these views affected United States involvement in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation. In merging the two topic areas of Wilson's ideologies and AEF involvement in the war, this essay will attempt to answer how the American doughboy found motivation in the same principles that guided President Wilson. Perhaps a reader will identify that the AEF demonstrated trends in Europe that highlight an "American way of war" that still resonates in United States coalition operations today. When President Wilson brought the United States into the First World War in April of 1917, he sold it as an effort to make the world safe for democracy. In Wilson's war address to Congress, Wilson called Imperial Germany's resumption of their unrestricted submarine campaign "warfare against mankind."51 Wilson maintained that Imperial Germany had given the United States no other choice but to declare war when they resumed their submarine attacks on merchant ships in the early spring of 1917. Still, Wilson furthered his justification for war by appealing to the broader ideal of fighting to defeat the Imperial German autocracy. Wilson described the "selfish and autocratic power" against which a free people needed to wage war.52 Later in his address, Wilson stated that he found hope in what he saw as the restoration of power to the people demonstrated in the Russian Revolution. Wilson saw a pre-Lenin revolution as 51 Woodrow Wilson, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress Calling for a Declaration of War" in "President Wilson," Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President, ed. Mario R. DiNunzio (New York: NYU Press, 2006): 399, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfgbg.15. 52 Wilson, "Declaration of War," 400. Bailes 13 bringing democracy to the people of Russia, and it opened the door for the realization that the Allies fought because "the world must be made safe for democracy."53 Arthur Link comments on Wilson's initial optimism on hearing of the Russian Revolution overthrowing Czar rule.54 While the Russian Revolution took a different turn in the following years, the initial news of the Russian people revolting against the Czar gave Wilson confidence that democracy could spread in Europe since now the Allies truly represented a democratic system. Wilson had spent the first years of the war trying to mediate peace in Europe through United States neutrality, and he tried to negotiate an end to the fighting without a victory for any of the imperial belligerents. Wilson did not see a lasting peace coming to Europe if any of the imperial powers achieved their peace objectives, so he attempted to mediate a truce. Kendrick Clements narrates how Wilson's desire to keep the United States neutral grew at odds with his economic support for the Allies. War for the United States rose to be more likely as Imperial Germany became increasingly aggravated with the United States for supplying aid to France and Britain while professing neutrality.55 Fraser Harbutt argues that at the initial outbreak of war in Europe, leaders as well as citizens of the United States concerned themselves with the economic impacts of the war primarily, and the United States benefited economically by supporting the Allies, specifically in the steel trade.56 Imperial Germany's resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, as well as the capture of Germany's Zimmerman Telegram in January 1917, soliciting an alliance with Mexico, prompted Wilson to support waging war on Imperial Germany. Now American entry into the conflict presented Wilson with some new options for shaping the post- 53 Wilson, "Declaration of War," 401-2. 54 Link, "Entry into World War I," 122-3. 55 Kendrick A. Clements, "Woodrow Wilson and World War I," Presidential Studies Quarterly 34, no. 1 (March 2004: 62-82, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27552564. 56 Fraser J. Harbutt, "War, Peace, and Commerce: The American Reaction to the Outbreak of World War I in Europe 1914," An Improbable War? The Outbreak of World War I and European Political Culture Before 1914, eds. Holger Afflerbach and David Stevenson (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 320-1. Bailes 14 war world. Thomas Knock describes how even though the United States entry into the war meant the essential failure of Wilson's "Peace Without Victory," the international community had seemingly bought into Wilson's concept of "collective security."57 In the previous few years of American neutrality, Wilson had advocated for creating a collection of democratic nation-states to band together to prevent war, and by 1917 the international community seemed interested. Wilson would use American belligerency to shape his new world order for peace. Russia's withdrawal from the war in March of 1918 made the need for a United States presence all the more significant for the Allies. The American soldier would be a crusader of sorts, attempting to cure Europe of the diplomacy of old that had brought her to destruction. The European July crisis of 1914 that erupted in a full-scale war the following month proved to be the culmination of decades of the European balance of power diplomacy that led to rival alliances and an armament race between the feuding dynasties.58 European power politics had dominated the continent for centuries, which inevitably escalated into a world war, and the United States soldier would have the opportunity to save the nations from which most of their ancestors had descended. Michael Neiberg argues that by 1917, the American people felt an obligation to enter the war to save Europe. While the people of the United States supported neutrality initially, Neiberg explains that public opinion swayed over time toward a desire to save Europe from the terror of Imperial Germany.59 The United States Secretary of War from 1916-1921, Newton Baker, published a text almost two decades after the armistice in which he maintained that the United States went to war to stop Imperial Germany and make the world safe for democracy. Baker took issue with the 57 Knock, To End All Wars, 115. 58 James Joll and Gordon Martel, The Origins of the First World War, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2013), 9-291. 59 Neiberg, The Path to War, 7-8, 31-3, 235. Bailes 15 historians of the 20s and 30s who claimed that economic interest influenced the United States entry into the war, and he argued they ignored the necessity of U.S. involvement to stop Germany. Baker explained that the American public remained overwhelmingly critical of the German autocracy and desired to intervene to save the European people.60 Private Alexander Clay of the AEF's 33rd Division demonstrated this sense of duty as he wrote regarding his 1918 deployment to France. As Clay's ship passed the Statue of Liberty while leaving the New York harbor, he thought to himself of the French leader Lafayette's role in securing United States victory during the American Revolution. He wrote that the AEF went to France to "repay the debt of our gratitude to your country for your country's alliance with our country in obtaining liberty from an oppressor England."61 For the United States to effectively reshape the world, there needed to be an independent American command that would ensure the United States contributed to the victory over Imperial Germany, which would give Wilson his seat at the post-war peace talks. In a January 22, 1917 address to the Senate in which he articulated his vision for peace in Europe, Wilson claimed that the warring European nations could not shape a lasting peace. While Wilson still did not advocate for United States intervention at this point, he did state that to achieve peace "[i]t will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination of nations could face or withstand it."62 In this speech, Wilson advocated for a "peace without victory" because he did not envision a peaceful 60 Newton D. Baker, Why We Went to War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1936), 4-10, 20, 160-3. 61 Private Alexander Clay in American Voices of World War I: Primary Source Documents, 1917-1920, ed. Martic Marix Evans (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2001; New York: Routledge, 2013), 19, Kindle. 62 Woodrow Wilson, "Essential Terms for Peace in Europe" in "President Wilson," Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President, 393. Bailes 16 outcome if any of the imperial powers achieved victorious peace terms.63 Wilson reiterated his stance that the United States should play a decisive role in shaping post-war Europe and ensuring that "American principles" guided the rest of the world.64 When the United States declared war against Imperial Germany a few months after this speech, it essentially put Wilson's vision into motion. Diplomatic historian William Widenor argues that Wilson realized that the United States needed to participate in the war "rather than as an onlooker" to achieve his visions for peace.65 Widenor notes Wilson's desire for the United States to enter the war as an "associate" to the Entente as opposed to an "ally," and Widenor maintains that Wilson desired to change the world and "democratize and also, unfortunately, to Americanize it."66 The late international historian Elisabeth Glaser captures the Wilson administration's balancing between maintaining an economic relationship with the Entente powers while attempting to remain "an independent arbiter in the conflict."67 Wilson appointed General Pershing to lead the American effort, and Wilson gave him the simple instruction to keep the American Expeditionary Forces as a command separate from the Allies. In 1928, the Army War College published The Genesis of the American First Army, which documented the details surrounding how the War Department created an independent army of the United States. The text includes a caption from Secretary of War Baker's memorandum to Pershing. Baker informed Pershing of Wilson's order to "cooperate with the forces of the other countries employed against the enemy; but in so doing the underlying idea must be kept in view that the forces of the United States are a separate and distinct component of 63 Wilson, "Essential Terms for Peace in Europe," 394. 64 Wilson, 396-7. 65 William C. Widenor, "The United States and the Versailles Peace Settlement," 42. 66 Widenor, 42-3. 67 Elisabeth Glaser, "Better Late than Never: The American Economic War Effort, 1917-1918," Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918, eds. Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 390. Bailes 17 the combined forces, the identity of which must be preserved."68 The President did give Pershing the authority to decide how the AEF would integrate into Allied operations. Upon Pershing's June 13, 1917 arrival in Paris, he began making decisions regarding AEF employment as it pertained to logistics, training, and an initial American area of operations on the Western Front. With a plan of achieving a force of 1,328,448 men in France by the end of 1918, Pershing needed to ensure his troops were able to build combat power and prepare for war while simultaneously ensuring that he maintained a distinct American command.69 The following 17 months of conflict with American boots on the ground in Europe saw significant political and diplomatic friction between Pershing and the Allied commanders. Pershing attempted to keep his AEF intact while satisfying Allied requests for American soldiers to replace French and British casualties, especially when Germany launched their Spring 1918 offensives. Pershing described in his memoirs that the French and British requested American soldiers to fill their gaps on the front lines when they had each sent diplomatic missions to America shortly after the United States entered the war. Pershing maintained his adamancy against the United States "becoming a recruiting agency for either the French or British," and he recounted that the War Department retained his position as well.70 While Allied leaders ostensibly supported having an independent American army participate in the war effort, the need to replace casualties in the trenches proved to be their immediate concern. Russia withdrawing from the conflict allowed Germany to reinforce their strength on the Western Front and mount a series of offensives. Germany knew they had a limited window of time for victory 68 Army War College (U.S.) Historical Section, The Genesis of the American First Army (Army War College, 1928), Reprints from the collection of the University of Michigan Library (Coppell, TX, 2020), 2. 69 The Genesis of the American First Army, 2-9. 70 John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 1 (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1931), 30-3. Bailes 18 with the United States continuing to build combat power, so they surged in the early months of 1918. Pershing faced a strategic dilemma of trying to support the Allies and get his troops in the fight while simultaneously attempting to build an independent American army. Ultimately, Pershing gave the Allies some of his army divisions as much needed replacements, and he made an effort to ensure that these divisions remained as intact as possible. Pershing endeavored to organize these divisions under a U.S. corps level command, but this corps command proved mostly administrative rather than tactical.71 By the time Pershing activated his independent American First Army, it only spent a few months in combat. The temporarily amalgamated doughboys Pershing gave to the Allies to meet their requests had contributed more to the defeat of Imperial Germany than Pershing's independent army. Mostly because Pershing had interspersed his divisions throughout the French and British fronts to meet the Allied requests for replacements, the American First Army did not activate until August of 1918. The September 20-25 Meuse-Argonne offensive would be the first significant operation for Pershing's independent army.72 David Trask concludes his critique of Pershing by recognizing the contribution that the American soldier played in providing manpower to the Allies. Trask commends the bravery of the American doughboy, but he argues that the amalgamated U.S. divisions contributed more to victory than the American First Army.73 In a similar vein, Mitchell Yockelson contends that the 27th and 30th Divisions who remained under British command throughout the war benefited over the rest of the AEF from extensive training led by the experienced British troops, and they contributed significantly to the Allied 71 The Genesis of the American First Army, 9-46. 72 John J. Pershing, Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing: Commander-in-Chief American Expeditionary Forces. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919), 37-8; The Genesis of the American First Army, 45-58. 73 Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 174-7. Bailes 19 victory.74 Pershing detailed his plans to capitalize on the initiative gained with his Meuse-Argonne offensive to deliver his decisive blow against Germany. The November 11 armistice came before he could achieve his grand vision.75 While the American doughboy played a critical role in providing an Allied victory over Imperial Germany, Pershing never realized his concept of an independent American command autonomously crushing the German army. The American soldier contributed most significantly to the Allied victory by taking part in offensives planned and conducted under the control of French and British Generals. Understanding American motivation during the war effort requires understanding the Progressive Movement taking place in the early-twentieth-century United States. Michael McGerr writes a detailed account of the cause and effect of the Progressive Movement. McGerr describes the wealth disparity brought about by Victorian society and the Gilded Age, and the class conflict emerging from this gave birth to a social and political movement that attempted to enact massive change in the American system.76 McGerr claims that the Progressive Movement attempted such major reform that no social or political action since has tried "anything as ambitious" due to the adverse reactions of such massive change.77 The Progressive Movement engulfed American society and brought about changes in family structures, race relations, and governmental powers. Herbert Croly illustrated the drive for monumental change rooted in the Progressive Movement with his text Progressive Democracy. In his narrative, Croly advocated for a complete overhaul of the American system to achieve freedom and alleviate wealth disparity. Croly saw governmental reform as the method for spreading democracy to all 74 Yockelson, Borrowed Soldiers, 213-23. 75 Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 2, 355-87. 76 McGerr, A Fierce Discontent, 3-146. 77 McGerr, 315-9. Bailes 20 citizens.78 In describing American public opinion during the time of United States entry into World War I, David Kennedy argues that for those Americans who championed progressive ideals, "the war's opportunities were not to be pursued in the kingdom of commerce but in the realm of the spirit."79 While the United States maintained a formidable economic link with the Allies throughout American neutrality, Wilson appealed to American ideals to garner public support for the war. United States entry into the war did not come as the natural development of the Progressive Movement. Still, the American public's reason for supporting the war certainly borrowed progressive sentiments. Wilson championed progressive initiatives that had ingrained themselves in the national mood of early-twentieth-century America. Wilson ran for President in 1912 on the principles he codified the following year in his text The New Freedom. Wilson argued that the Jefferson era of United States democracy had long ended. Wilson maintained that because of the new complexities found in American society, a "reconstruction in the United States" needed to occur to achieve real economic and social freedom.80 Ronald Pestritto articulates Wilson's vision for a governmental system as it relates to a society's history and progress. According to Wilson, the method of government that works for people depends on how far that population has progressed. In that manner, the government should always change to reflect the progression of its people best.81 Pestritto argues that a major theme found in Wilson's 1908 text Constitutional Government in the United States rests in the idea that: [T]here are four stages through which all governments pass: (1) government is the master and people are its subjects; (2) government remains the master, not through 78 Herbert Croly, Progressive Democracy (New York: Macmillan, 1914; New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers; Second printing 2006), 25, 103-18. 79 David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 39. 80 Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom: A Call for the Emancipation of the Generous Energies of a People (New York and Garden City: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1913), www.philosophical.space/303/Wilson.pdf. 81 Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, 34-42. Bailes 21 force but by its fitness to lead; (3) a stage of agitation, when leaders of the people rise up to challenge the government for power; and (4) the final stage, where the people become fully self-conscious and have leaders of their own choosing.82 Wilson epitomized the Progressive Movement's ideals regarding the government adapting to the changes of the people to create a more representative system of government. He would appeal to these principles in advocating for United States intervention in Europe. An underlying sentiment existed within the Progressive Movement that sought to bring about massive change, and this energy extended into the war effort. Lloyd Ambrosius explains the rise of the United States as an imperial power during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. The outcome of the American Civil War created a more powerful central government, and economic growth during the following decades allowed more opportunity for global expansion.83 As the United States extended its global presence, the ideals that formed the nation began to influence foreign policy. David Kennedy writes about the shift in prominent progressives toward support of the war effort. Kennedy references John Dewey as a significant advocate for utilizing the war to satisfy progressive initiatives. According to Kennedy, progressives found appeal in Wilson's reasons for American belligerency in Europe as "a war for democracy, a war to end war, a war to protect liberalism, a war against militarism, a war to redeem barbarous Europe, a crusade."84 Michael McGerr states that the First World War "brought the extraordinary culmination of the Progressive Movement."85 Regardless of the typical progressive view of war, progressives could find merit in Wilson's justification for United States involvement. 82 Pestritto, 37. 83 Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 26-32. 84 Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society, 50-3. 85 McGerr, A Fierce Discontent, 280. Bailes 22 Even though a vast segment of the United States population did not support going to war in Europe, the notion of saving Europe still permeated throughout American society. In a series of essays published in the July 1917 edition of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, multiple thinkers of the time expressed the necessity of the United States entering the war to save Europe. Miles Dawson argued the importance of the United States' mission in the war by documenting the five "fundamentals" that made the United States unique, and he explained the importance of spreading those principles globally. Dawson advocated for the spreading of American ideals throughout the rest of the world.86 George Kirchwey argued that the United States must go to war to defeat Imperial Germany and secure peace. Kirchwey suggested that the war was a fight against an autocratic empire and a crusade to make the world safe for democracy. Kirchwey maintained that the United States needed to lead the effort in creating a world order for peace.87 Samuel Dutton saw the purpose of the United States as transcending party lines. Dutton suggested that the aim of defeating autocratic Imperial Germany needed to be a united American mission.88 Emily Greene Balch wrote that the United States "enters the war on grounds of the highest idealism, as the champion of democracy and world order."89 Walter Lippman argued that once the United States entered the war, they were obligated to fight to make the world safe for democracy. Lippman placed the blame for the war squarely on Germany and their aggression in Belgium and unrestricted submarine warfare. Similar to Wilson in his war address, Lippman drew parallels to the Russian Revolution and the 86 Miles M. Dawson, "The Significance of Our Mission in This War," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 72 (July 1917): 10-13, http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013639. 87 George W. Kirchwey, "Pax Americana," Annals, 40-48, http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013645. 88 Samuel Dutton, "The United States and the War," Annals, 13-19, http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013640. 89 Emily Greene Balch, "The War in Its Relation to Democracy and World Order," Annals, 28-31, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1013643 Bailes 23 importance of it signaling that the Allies truly represented democracy.90 Wilson's reasons for war had found a voice in the academic circles of the United States, and they nested well with the progressive message. Wilson's goals for peace illustrate how Progressive initiatives manifested into the global sphere. In his August 18, 1914 address advocating for the American population to remain neutral during the European conflict, Wilson maintained that the United States held a responsibility "to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend."91 Similarly, when addressing the Senate over two years later communicating his persistent intent of mediating peace in Europe through American neutrality, Wilson criticized the demands for peace submitted by the Entente that sought revenge over Imperial Germany rather than a lasting peace. Wilson instructed that "peace must be followed by some definite concert of power which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again."92 In line with his progressive ideology, Wilson believed in United States intervention in the European conflict that would fundamentally improve their diplomatic system entirely. The United States would intervene in Europe to not only end the conflict but restructure the political climate in a more peaceful, progressive manner. Kendrick Clements argues that Wilson's economic and diplomatic decisions throughout United States neutrality drew him into the war gradually as he continued to side with the Allies. Wilson attempted to maintain his ideals for peace as the United States continued to get closer to belligerency.93 When the United States entry into the war proved virtually inevitable, Wilson 90 Walter Lippman, "The World Conflict in Its Relation to American Democracy," Annals, 1-10, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1013638. 91 Woodrow Wilson, "An Appeal for Neutrality in World War I," 390. 92 Woodrow Wilson, "Essential Terms for Peace in Europe," 392. 93 Clements, "Woodrow Wilson and World War I," 63-81. Bailes 24 ensured that the reasons for fighting aligned with the progressive energy that moved within American society. A religious vigor inspired military action that can be seen as a product of the Progressive Movement as well. Richard Gamble narrates the origin of the opinion that the United States represented a light for the rest of the world, and he describes how this concept brought the nation into the war. Gamble argues that these Christian ideals drove the political climate as Wilson's vision echoed the religious sentiment, and they prompted men to fight.94 Gamble describes the "social gospel" movement that had energized progressive Christians in the United States as extending into the international realm. The same energy that had influenced Christians to enact domestic change had transcended into a desire to improve the world, and Wilson ensured these sentiments carried over into United States foreign policy.95 Ronald Pestritto argues Wilson's religious conviction and explains that Wilson linked his faith with his duty to help shape the rest of the world. Pestritto explains the belief that "America was a key battleground in the victory of good over evil."96 Richard Gamble's mention of literature such as Washington Gladden's 1886 "Applied Christianity" highlights the popular message of progressive faith that nests with Pestritto's argument.97 Wilson illustrated the linkage of religion and progressive reform when he spoke in Denver, Colorado, in a 1911 build-up to his run for the Presidency. Wilson commented that "liberty is a spiritual conception, and when men take up arms to set other men free, there is something sacred and holy in the warfare."98 Wilson went on to champion the necessity of finding truth in the Bible's message, and he concluded by warning against believing "that 94 Gamble, The War for Righteousness, 5-87. 95 Gamble, 69-87. 96 Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, 40-3. 97 Gamble, The War for Righteousness, 49-67. 98 Woodrow Wilson, "The Bible and Progress" in "On Religion," Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfgbg.7, 54. Bailes 25 progress can be divorced from religion."99 To Wilson, Christianity taught the spiritual duty of working toward social progress, and most progressive men of faith believed in these same sentiments which carried over toward United States actions in France. At the core of this Progressive energy and Wilson's peace aims were the sentiments surrounding an idea of American Exceptionalism. Many of the same ideas found in the religious aspect of the need to work for social progression catered to a sense of American Exceptionalism. In the same May 7, 1911 address in Denver, Colorado, Wilson spoke of the greatness of the United States as a direct correlation to the religious zeal and Biblical principles with which the founders had established the nation. According to Wilson, "America has all along claimed the distinction of setting this example to the civilized world."100 Wilson believed that the United States should serve as the model of Christian values for the rest of the world as "America was born to exemplify that devotion to the elements of righteousness which are derived from the revelations of Holy Scripture."101 In his text In Search of the City on a Hill, Richard Gamble describes how the United States narrative utilized an interpretation of divine providence to create an image of a nation built on religious principles that should serve as an example for the rest of the world.102 Lloyd Ambrosius describes the prevalent belief in the early twentieth-century United States that considered the United States a "providential nation" as citizens attempted to justify global expansion.103 If the United States existed as a providential manifestation of God's will, then that could rationalize the spread of the American system into the international realm. 99 Wilson, "The Bible and Progress," 53-9. 100 Wilson, 56. 101 Wilson, 59. 102 Richard M. Gamble, In Search of the City on a Hill: The Making and Unmakng of an American Myth (London: Continuum International Publishng Group, 2012), 6-119. 103 Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and Ameriam Internationalism, 33. Bailes 26 Men of faith found a divine message in the need for the United States to intercede in the global sphere to mold the world in her image. Wilson's brand of progressive history nested well with his idea of American Exceptionalism. Lloyd Ambrosius explains Wilson's fundamental belief that "primitive peoples moved toward greater maturity over the generations."104 Wilson applied this to the history of the United States. As Ronald Perstritto describes, Wilson believed that "the history of human progress is the history of the progress of freedom."105 As people progressed, they, in turn, developed a governmental system that allowed for more representation for its citizens. According to Ambrosius, Wilson believed that "the United States represented the culmination of progressive historical development."106 The American people had achieved real progression in Wilson's historical model, and democracy achieved through the American Revolution solidified his theory. Wilson certainly made this point evident in his writings regarding history. Wilson suggests that "the history of the United States demonstrates the spiritual aspects of political development."107 The United States embodied the ideal form of Wilson's progressive history. Wilson saw it as the responsibility of the United States to spread its exceptional personification of progressive history with the rest of the world. Wilson acknowledged his views on the uniqueness of the United States in his New Freedom. While arguing for progressive reform in the states, Wilson stated that "[t]he reason that America was set up was that she might be different from all the nations of the world."108 Indeed, Wilson believed in the providential nature of the United States, and he desired to shape the rest of the world. 104 Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 236. 105 Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, 37. 106 Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 236. 107 Woodrow Wilson, "The Historian," Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President, 216, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfgbg.10. 108 Wilson, The New Freedom, 16. Bailes 27 Early in the war during the period of United States neutrality, Wilson's reasons for remaining neutral stemmed from his belief in the exceptional nature of the American system and his desire for the United States to stay clear of European affairs. Even in American neutrality, Wilson still sought to mediate a peace in Europe because he perceived a chance to spread the democracy of the United States to Europe. Wilson believed that he needed to mediate in the European conflict because "mere terms of peace between the belligerents will not satisfy even the belligerents themselves," and he questioned whether the Entente and Central powers fought "for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power."109 Wilson's peace aims were in sharp contrast to the Allied leaders, which illustrated his emphasis that the United States should mold a post-war Europe, and this tied directly to American Exceptionalism. While the British leadership concerned themselves with imperial interests, the French sought revenge on Germany from the 1870 Franco-Prussian War. Wilson made it clear in his war address that the United States had "no quarrel with the German people."110 Wilson's vision for a post-war world remained focused on a lasting peace rather than what he perceived as selfish imperial gains or senseless revenge. American Exceptionalism formed the foundation for the interventionist foreign policy of the Progressive Era, and it profoundly motivated Wilson as well as the bulk of American society. Diplomatic historian William Appleman Williams details the rise of the United States as a global power. Williams argues that most Americans in the early twentieth-century United States agreed not only with "Wilson's nationalistic outlook," but they also agreed that the nation should serve as an example for the rest of the world.111 As mentioned previously, Miles Dawson contributed 109 Woodrow Wilson, "Essential Terms for Peace in Europe," 393. 110 Woodrow Wilson, "Declaration of War," 401. 111 Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 86. Bailes 28 to the July 1917 The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science to voice the justification of United States intervention in France. In his text, Dawson defined the five uniquely American fundamentals as: 1. The inalienable right of every man to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness – not as a mere dead saying, but as a living reality. 2. The right of local self-government, within territories possessing or entitled to claim such right, embracing every power of government not expressly granted to the union. 3. The guaranty to each state of a forum for the redress of grievances of one state against another with full power to enforce the verdict of that forum. 4. The guaranty of a republican form of government to each constituent state. 5. The right and duty to maintain the union.112 To thinkers like Dawson, this unique set of traits not only provided United States citizens with a system of government that separated them from the rest of the world, but it inherently gave them a duty to spread the American ideology to the rest of the world. Fundamentally, the idea that the world should take the lead from the United States exemplified the broad theme of American Exceptionalism inspiring AEF actions in the war. With Progressivism and American Exceptionalism at the root of the war effort, the citizen-soldier of the AEF found inspiration in the same rhetoric. Nelson Lloyd described the "melting-pots" of the army cantonment areas in which soldiers who were born outside of the United States "have become true Americans. They have learned the language of America and the ideals of America and have turned willing soldiers in her cause."113 Michael Neiberg argues that a lasting legacy of United States involvement in the war became a unified American mission superseding any cultural allegiance, and "disagreements would no longer be based on ethnicity 112 Dawson, "The Significance of Our Mission in This War," 11. 113 Newson Lloyd, How We Went to War (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922), 58, https://archive.org/details/howwewenttowar00lloyrich/page/n7/mode/2up. Bailes 29 or religion."114 United States entry into the war gave the American citizen-soldier a reason for fighting to preserve a democratic system in Europe, and Wilson's belief that the United States would play a central role became widespread amongst the ranks of the AEF. Lieutenant Willard Hill of the Transport Division and 94th Aero Pursuit Squadron claimed when hearing of the United States entry into the war "that this war is not over yet and that the U.S. troops will play a very decisive factor."115 The purpose of United States entry into the war inspired an idealism that would unify soldiers and champion a belief that the AEF would save Europe from the autocracy of Imperial Germany. Private Willard Newton of the 105th Engineers, 30th Division, exclaimed his joy during the September offensives by stating, "[a]t last we are at the beginning of a real battle between Prussianism and Democracy! And we are to fight on the side of Democracy that the world may forever be free from the Prussian peril!"116 The sentiments of these soldiers expressed a voice that echoed Wilson's desire to utilize an American army to bring peace to Europe, and Pershing dutifully followed his instructions. Pershing's stubbornness in not giving in to the Allies' request to amalgamate troops remained the most significant source of friction between him and the Allied military leaders. Still, Pershing's belief that the doughboy remained a superior warrior to the French and British soldier intensified Pershing's negative feelings toward his Allied counterparts. Pershing did not hide his views regarding coalitions when he wrote early in his memoirs that "[h]istory is replete with the failures of coalitions and seemed to be repeating itself in the World War."117 Russell Weigley argues that Pershing believed "that only by fighting under American command would 114 Michael S. Neiberg, "Blinking Eyes Began to Open: Legacies from America's Road to the Great War, 1914-1917," Diplomatic History 38, no. 4 (2014): 812, https://doi:10.1093/dh/dhu023. 115 Lieutenant Willard D. Hill (Cleburne, Texas) in American Voices of World War I, 47. 116 Private Willard Newton (Gibson, North Carolina) in American Voices of World War I, 140. 117 Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 1, 34. Bailes 30 American soldiers retain the morale they needed to fight well."118 This assertion proved incorrect as those American doughboys who fought under French and British command performed extraordinarily.119 David Trask maintains that Pershing's "presumption that the American troops were superior to others in the war helps explain his stubborn insistence on an independent army even during the greatest crisis of the war."120 Although the German Spring Offensives of 1918 put the Allies in desperate need of replacements, Pershing held his ground in resisting amalgamation. He only agreed to temporary amalgamation after much deliberation. Pershing's plan required maintaining a separate and distinct American force if the United States was to play a critical role in defeating Imperial Germany. This plan did not always synchronize with General Foch's overall plan for the Allied strategy for defeating Imperial Germany. Mitchell Yockelson describes an instance in late September 1918 in which a newly established AEF officers' school near Pershing's headquarters pulled a bulk of American officers from the front lines, which "affected the AEF First Army divisions that were about to attack in the Meuse-Argonne operation."121 United States political leadership back home undoubtedly noticed the friction between Pershing and the Allied leaders. David Woodward mentioned that at one point, Wilson and Secretary Baker intervened to plead with Pershing to be more accommodating to the Allies. According to Woodward, "Pershing proved as immovable as ever when it came to wholesale amalgamation and introducing Americans to trench warfare before he deemed them ready for combat."122 118 Weigley, "Pershing and the U.S. Military Tradition," 335. 119 Weigley, 335. 120 Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 61. 121 Yockelson, Borrowed Soldiers, 127. 122 Woodward, Trial by Friendship, 168-9. Bailes 31 Pershing's doctrine of "open warfare" proved predicated on a firm belief in the exceptional quality of the American fighting man. In his memoirs, Pershing documented his view that the results of the Battle of the Marne had placed the opposing forces in a trench defensive that had taken away their aggression and ability to fight an offensive battle. Pershing maintained that "victory could not be won by the costly process of attrition, but it must be won by driving the enemy out into the open and engaging him in a war of movement."123 Sergeant-major James Block of the 59th Infantry, 4th Division, wrote after an offensive near Belleau Wood that his troops "had proven to ourselves that we were the Hun's master, even in our present untrained condition. The Hun could not stand before us and battle man to man."124 David Trask argues that Pershing's reliance on the rifle and bayonet under his open warfare doctrine limited the AEF's ability to adapt to the combined arms fight as quickly as did the French and British.125 In his Final Report, Pershing praised the Allied training system that prepared his inexperienced troops for combat on the Western Front. Although he admitted that his soldiers needed to learn from the experiences of the combat tested French and British, he stated that "[t]he long period of trench warfare had so impressed itself upon the French and British that they had almost entirely dispensed with training for open warfare."126 Pershing relied heavily on his infantrymen, and he saw the rifle and the bayonet as the superior weapon. He did not factor advances in the machine gun, tanks, and artillery to integrate all lethal assets onto the battlefield. According to Richard Faulkner, Pershing planned on using his troops – who he believed were 123 Pershing, 151-4. 124 Sergeant-major James W. Block (Marquette, Michigan) in American Voices of World War I, 108. 125 Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 19. 126 Pershing, Final Report, 13-5. Bailes 32 better suited for offensive warfare – to "force the Germans from their trenches into open terrain where the Allies' greater resources would then destroy the unprotected enemy army."127 Perhaps nothing exhibited Pershing's obtuse attitude toward his Allied counterparts more than his desire to beat the French in seizing Sedan from the Germans. Pershing outlined his wishes that his "troops should capture Sedan, which the French had lost in a decisive battle in 1870."128 Russell Weigley comments on Pershing's intent "to try to snatch from the French army the honor of recapturing the historic fortress city of Sedan, where the Emperor Napoleon III had surrendered to the Prussians on September 1-2, 1870."129 Sergeant-major Block described the fierce German resistance during the late September Allied offensives. Still, he claimed that "[o]nce the Americans penetrated that line, their advance northward would be comparatively easy. Sedan would fall next."130 The AEF performed well during the offensives in early November, and the crumbling Imperial German army made Sedan easily attainable for either Pershing's Second Army or the Franco-American armies.131 David Trask points out the diplomatic issue that would ensue if Pershing were to "deprive the French army of this honor."132 The new commander of the American First Army, General Liggett, ultimately did not carry out the attack, which undoubtably prevented a political and diplomatic disaster.133 Russell Weigley maintains that Liggett changed plans after "the offended French" updated him of Pershing's plans on November 7.134 The idea that Pershing wished to take away French retribution by giving 127 Faulkner, Pershing's Crusaders, 285. 128 Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 2, 381. 129 Weigley, "Pershing and the U.S. Military Tradition," 342. 130 Sergeant-major Block in American Voices of World War I, 135. 131 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 282-3. 132 Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 174. 133 Trask, 174, 134 Weigley, 343. Bailes 33 his troops a decisive victory and morale boost demonstrated his disconnect from the sentiments of his Allied counterparts. Pershing's belief in the superiority of the American soldier to his French and British counterpart extended to the lower ranks of the AEF. While perhaps sensationalizing his account, Scout Corporal Edward Radcliffe of the 109th Infantry, 28th Division wrote regarding actions around St Agnon "that the French of the 10th or 6th army had fallen back, their officers being shot by our men when they ordered them to retreat."135 In a post-World War I survey, Sergeant Donald Drake Kyler of the 16th Infantry, 1st Division answered a question about what he learned about America and Americans from the war. Sergeant Kyler stated that "Americans are inclined to brag about their systems and accomplishments which may or not be superior to those of other peoples or cultures."136 In many of the accounts of AEF actions in Europe, General Pershing and his doughboys showcased American Exceptionalism. Richard Faulkner devotes a chapter of his text to argue that most of the AEF doughboys perceived inferiority in the French way of life compared to the United States. The majority of white AEF soldiers came away from the war, believing that, in terms of technology as well as general health and welfare, American society remained superior to that of France and England.137 Faulkner makes note that "with the notable exception of the African Americans, the soldiers generally believed that their society was markedly superior to anything they encountered in Europe."138 Sergeant-major Block wrote a letter home to his parents during the post-war occupation period. He wrote of the perception that "Paris makes up for the backwardness of the rest of France."139 135 Corporal Edward Radcliffe in American Voices of World War I, 94. 136 Sergeant Donald Drake Kyler (Fort Thomas, Kentucky) in American Voices of World War I, 196. 137 Faulkner, Pershing's Crusaders, 188-93. 138 Faulkner, 189. 139 Sergeant-major Block in American Voices of World War I, 191. Bailes 34 While the bond formed between the French and British soldiers and the AEF doughboy proved strong, there still seemed to be a sentiment of American superiority amongst the AEF ranks. Tasker H. Bliss, who served as Army Chief of Staff from September 1917 to May 1918, documented the challenge of absent unified Allied command in a 1922 essay. Bliss wrote a detailed piece in which he criticized the lack of a unified Allied mission while praising General Foch and championing his eventual selection as "Allied Commander-in-Chief."140 Bliss condemned the Allied leaders for waiting so long before establishing any sort of unified command, and he argued that for the first years of the war, they fought for their national goals only. Bliss maintained that this hindered United States integration into the war effort as well.141 Charles Pettit wrote an account of his time on the Western Front. Initially serving in the British army, Pettit joined the AEF once they arrived and concluded his 42 months of combat with the Rainbow Division. Pettit commented that "[w]e know why the French and English didn't win the War. They was waiting for us."142 Robert Bruce expands on the relationship between the American and French soldiers during the post-war occupation period. The doughboys believed that the Allied victory had eliminated the threat of autocratic Imperial Germany. At the same time, the French soldiers still demonstrated distrust of the German for fear of a future war. According to Bruce, "Americans did not want to hear about the need to prepare for a future war with Germany. They believed that victory in the Great War and the conversion of Germany to a democracy was enough to end the menace; Americans were unwilling to do more."143 For the AEF doughboy, the United States' actions in the war had saved Europe from the threat of the 140 Tasker H. Bliss, "The Evolution of the Unified Command," Foreign Affairs 1, no. 2 (December 1922): 1-30, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20028211. 141 Bliss, 7-30. 142 Charles A. Pettit in Echoes From Over There: By the Men of the Army and Marine Corps who Fought in France, eds. Craig Hamilton and Louise Corbin (New York City: The Soldiers' Publishing Company, 1919), 107-9. 143 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 289. Bailes 35 Imperial German autocracy. United States' involvement in its first large-scale coalition operation had solidified the dominance of the American soldier and the system for which he fought. The American doughboy contributed significantly to the Allied victory over Imperial Germany. Without American boots on the ground in France, Imperial Germany may have defeated the Allies. Allan Millett argues that Pershing's independent army did not achieve all that Pershing had hoped. Still, Millett maintains that an accurate assessment of the war would be that the "Allies might have lost the war without the American Expeditionary Forces."144 With the Russian withdrawal from the war and Germany's surge in the Western Front in the Spring of 1918, the Allies desperately needed more boots on the ground. AEF actions in Cantigny, Belleau Wood, and the attack on the Hindenburg line proved the value of the doughboys to the Allied victory over Imperial Germany and the Central Powers. Acknowledging the contribution of the American soldier to the Allied victory should remain a critical focus of any study of United States involvement in the war. While the presence of American troops on the ground benefited the Allies and did give Wilson his seat at the post-war peace talks, Pershing did not realize his grand vision of an independent American army crushing Imperial Germany. Bullitt Lowry documents Pershing's desire to capitalize on increasing the United States combat power to continue pressing a weakening German army and deliver a crushing blow.145 The Germans signed the armistice before Pershing could make this happen. While Wilson gained his seat at the peace conference and Pershing did not get his chance to win a tactical victory, the French and British still received their original desires and delivered Germany "harsh armistice terms."146 144 Millett, "Over Where?," 251. 145 Lowry, "Pershing and the Armistice," 286-91. 146 Lowry, 291. Bailes 36 With the eventual collapse of the League of Nations, Wilson never achieved his vision of a new world order for peace. Still, the United States government had established its importance and commenced its entry into the realm of global powers. United States involvement in the First World War helped solidify a national identity as well as establish an American presence on the international stage. Theodore Roosevelt Jr. wrote a letter on May 15, 1919, in which he documented the benefit of the war and what he saw as "Americanizing and democratizing" the soldiers through military service.147 Roosevelt commented that through service in support of the war effort, "love of the men for their country has been deepened, that their sense of real democracy has been sharpened and steadied and that insofar as any possible bad effect goes, the men are more than ever ready and determined to see order and fair play for all."148 In a similar vein, Italian born AEF Sergeant Morini wrote that the war provided him a chance "to make good on my Americanism."149 To Morini, fighting in the war provided him with "the right to the name Yankee all right."150 While the United States' efforts in the war were in support of the Allies, the war became a chance for the nation to claim its identity. A country that had been torn apart by civil war half a century before utilized the war effort to continue to unify and recover its self-proclaimed providence. The war ostensibly became an effort to Americanize its own citizens. The historiography of United States involvement in the First World War presents various arguments. Some historians such as David Trask and Russell Weigley remain critical of General Pershing and his decision making. While some scholarly history shows a narrative less scathing of Pershing, most of the description found in popular history showcases valiant actions of 147 Theodore Roosevelt in Echoes From Over There, 95. 148 Roosevelt, 95. 149 Sergeant Morini in Echoes From Over There, 115. 150 Morini, 115. Bailes 37 Pershing and his efforts in maneuvering the American Expeditionary Forces to achieve victory for the Allies against Imperial Germany. The fact remains that while the doughboys contributed significantly to the Allied victory, they helped the most when they were not fighting Pershing's fight. In his Final Report, Pershing highlights the benefit that the Allies provided to the American forces. In terms of training as well as logistics, the Allies provided the doughboys with the resources they needed to defeat Imperial Germany and the Central Powers effectively.151 Pershing recognized what the Allies had supplied him and his men, but his stubbornness and arrogance still clouded his vision to a degree. While Pershing did build a trusting relationship with the Allied commanders, and his troops were efficient, he did not always operate per their same vision. At times, Pershing's desire to maintain an independent American army superseded his desire to enable the Allied strategy. Pershing strived to meet Wilson's intent of keeping a distinct American command. The question remains if, in carrying out his President's instructions, Pershing prolonged the war and delayed the defeat of the Central Powers. Secondary and primary source literature from the First World War showcases both Wilson's peace aims – which were shaped by his ideology – as well as General Pershing and AEF actions while attempting to remain an independent command in the war. When war broke out in August 1914 in Europe, Wilson tried to mediate a peace while maintaining United States neutrality. When continued trade with the Allies brought the United States into the war in April of 1917, he seized the chance to shape a new world order by establishing an independent American command to defeat Imperial Germany. Primarily because of the Progressive Movement in the United States and the concepts surrounding American Exceptionalism, the American soldier embraced Wilson's ideologies for fighting and fought valiantly to defeat the 151 Pershing, Final Report, 90. Bailes 38 Imperial German autocracy. The Progressive Movement had established itself in American society by the time the citizen-soldier went to war in France, and the principles of American Exceptionalism permeated in virtually every facet of American culture. The American doughboy carried both of these concepts with him to France. Despite Pershing not attaining his decisive blow against the German army, and Wilson not achieving his vision for a new world order, the United States still met a significant amount of Wilson's original intent for entering the war. Wilson's ideologies influenced how the AEF fought in France. As the First World War shaped the United States standing as a global power, it also demonstrated the critical nature of maintaining relationships with coalition partners. Hew Strachan begins the conclusion to his history of the war by stating that "[t]he First World War was a coalition war."152 The American doughboy established a positive relationship with his French and British counterparts. The ability of the American soldier to learn from the experiences of the combat tested Allies, to adapt to the rigors of trench warfare, and to perform well in battle fighting beside his international partners shows the success of the AEF's performance in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation. Despite these successes, the AEF doughboy exhibited American Exceptionalism in the First World War. 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Edited by Craig Hamilton and Louise Corbin. New York City: The Soldiers' Publishing Company, 1919. Evans, Martin Marix, ed. American Voices of World War I: Primary Source Documents 1917-1920. New York: Routledge, 2013. Kindle. Kirchwey, George W. "Pax Americana." The Annals of the American Academy for Political and Social Science 72 (July 1917): 40-48. http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013645. Lippmann, Walter. "The World Conflict in Its Relation to American Democracy." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 72 (July 1917): 1-10. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1013638. Lloyd, Newson. How We Went to War. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922. https://archive.org/details/howwewenttowar00lloyrich/page/n7/mode/2up. Pershing, John J. Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing: Commander-in-Chief American Expeditionary Forces.Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919. ———. My Experiences in the World War. 2 vols. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1931. Bailes 43 Wilson, Woodrow. Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President. Edited by Mario R. DiNunzio. New York: NYU Press, 2006. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfgbg.1-18. ———. The New Freedom: A Call For the Emancipation of the Generous Energies of a People. New York and Garden City: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1913. www.philosophical.space/303/Wilson.pdf.
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Hamas's attack into Israel and massacre of Israelis, followed by Israel's war of obliteration on Gaza backed by the United States, is a political earthquake in the Middle East. Its tremors are shaking up the politics of the Horn of Africa, bringing down an already tottering peace and security architecture. It's too early to discern the shape of the rubble, but we can already see the direction in which some of the pillars will fall.The most obvious impact is that the Israel-Palestine war has legitimized and invigorated protest across the wider region. Hamas showed that Israel was not invincible, and Palestine would no longer be invisible. Many in the Arab street — and Muslims more widely — are ready to overlook Hamas's atrocious record as a public authority and its embrace of terror, because it dared stand up to Israel, America, and Europe.Hamas's boldness has given a shot in the arm to Islamists, such as Somalia's al-Shabaab. As the African Union peacekeeping operation in Somalia draws down, al-Shabaab remains a threat— and will likely be emboldened to intensify its operations both in Somalia and neighboring Kenya.Kenyan President William Ruto gave strong backing to Israel while also calling for a ceasefire. For the U.S. and Europe, Kenya is now the anchor state for security in the Horn — but it desperately needs financial aid if it is to shoulder that burden.The war is consuming Egyptian attention and terrifies President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who is treading a fine line between sponsoring pro-Palestinian protests and suppressing them.Red Sea SecurityThe Red Sea is strategic for Israel. One quarter of Israel's maritime trade is handled in its port of Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba, an inlet of the Red Sea. Eilat is Israel's back door, vital in case the Mediterranean coast is under threat. Israel has long seen the littoral countries of the Red Sea — Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia — as pieces in the jigsaw of its extended security frontier.Historically, Egypt has shared the same concern. Last year, revenues from the Suez Canal were $9.4 billion— its third largest foreign currency earner after remittances from Egyptians working in the Gulf States and tourism. Neither Israel nor Egypt can afford a disruption to maritime security from Suez and Eilat to the Gulf of Aden.The Red Sea is also the buckle on China's Belt and Road Initiative, with China's first overseas military base — strictly speaking a "facility" — in the port of Djibouti near the Bab al-Mandab, the narrow straits between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. More than 10 percent of world maritime trade is carried on 25,000 ships through these straits every year.Having long neglected its Red Sea coastline, Saudi Arabia has reawakened to its significance in the last decade. In the 1980s, amid fears that Iran might block tanker traffic through the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia built an east-west pipeline from the Aqaig oil fields to the Red Sea port of Yanbu al Bahr. Its strategic significance is back in focus.In parallel, the United Arab Emirates is well on track to securing a monopoly over the ports of the Gulf of Aden, which forms the eastern approaches to the Red Sea. It has de facto annexed the Yemeni island of Socotra for a naval base. The UAE is looking for a foothold in the Red Sea proper, and a string of satellite states on the African shore.All these factors intensify the scramble for securing naval bases in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Djibouti is already host to the U.S.'s Camp Lemonnier along with French, Italian, Japanese, and Chinese facilities. Turkey and Russia are actively seeking bases too, focusing on Port Sudan and Eritrea's long coastline.Empowered Gulf StatesWell before the recent crisis, the Horn of Africa was becoming dominated by Middle Eastern powers. This process is now intensified. Decades of competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran for alignment of Sudan and Eritrea has swung different ways. Sudan's General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, formerly political partner of Benjamin Netanyahu and signatory to the Abraham Accord, cut an ill-timed deal with Iran in early October, to obtain weapons, which has embarrassed his outreach to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. More recently, Turkey and Qatar's regional ambitions have clashed with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, especially over the Muslim Brothers — supported by the former, opposed by the latter. The latest emerging rivalry is between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.Saudi Arabia has positioned itself as the regional anchor. While running for president, Joe Biden called Saudi Arabia a "pariah." But it is now indispensable to the U.S.Among the Arab states. the UAE has been the most restrained in condemning Israel for its actions in Gaza. It has also said that it doesn't mix trade and politics— meaning that it will continue to implement the economic cooperation agreements it signed with Israel following on from the Abraham Accords. The UAE is also positioned at the center of the U.S.-sponsored India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC), unveiled at the September G20 summit in India as a response to China's Belt and Road Initiative.The UAE also has a free hand in the Horn of Africa, and in the last five years it has moved more rapidly and decisively than Saudi Arabia.Sudan's Fate between Riyadh and Abu DhabiAfter the eruption of war in Sudan in April, the joint Saudi-American mediation was in large part a gift from Washington to try to mend fences with the Kingdom. Talks in Jeddah resumed in late October, with the modest agenda of a ceasefire and humanitarian access, and a pro forma "civilian track" delegated to the African Union, which has shown neither commitment nor competence.Meanwhile, the Emiratis are backing General Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, known as "Hemedti," who is currently driving the Sudan Armed Forces out of their remaining redoubts in Khartoum. This followed more than six months of fighting in which Hemedti's Rapid Support Forces gained a reputation for military prowess and utter disregard for the dignity and rights of civilians. Despite widespread revulsion against the RSF, especially among middle class Sudanese, UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed al Nahyan, known as MBZ, stuck with his man.In charge of the ruins of Sudan's capital city, Hemedti will soon be in a position to declare a government, perhaps inviting civilians for the sake of a veneer of legitimacy. What's holding him back is the ceasefire talks in Jeddah. His rival, Gen. al-Burhan is meanwhile floating a plan to form a government based in Port Sudan — raising the prospect of two rival governments, as in Libya. The real negotiations there are between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. If the two capitals agree on a formula, the U.S. and the African Union will applaud, and the Sudanese will be presented with a fait accompli.Ethiopia Goes RogueIn Ethiopia, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's rule is underwritten by Emirati treasure. MBZ has reportedly paid for Abiy's vast new palace, a vanity project whose $ 10 billion price tag is paid for entirely off-budget. Abiy told lawmakers that this bill was none of their business as it was funded by private donations, directly to him. Other megaprojects in and around the capital Addis Ababa, such as glitzy museums and theme parks, have similarly opaque finances.Ethiopia's wars have depended on largesse from the UAE. Ethiopian federal forces prevailed against Tigray, forcing the latter into an abject surrender a year ago, on account of an arsenal — especially drones — supplied by the UAE. Abiy is currently rattling his saber against his erstwhile ally, Eritrea, demanding that landlocked Ethiopia be given a port, or it will take one by force. The likely target is Assab in Eritrea, though other neighbors such as Djibouti and Somalia have been rattled too.Eritrea unexpectedly finds itself as a status quo power and is relishing this role, tersely expressing its refusal to join in the confusing discourse from Addis Ababa. It suddenly has allies in Djibouti, Somaliland, Somalia and even Kenya — all of them threatened by Abiy's bellicosity.If Abiy does invade Eritrea, he will violate the basic international norm — the inviolability of state boundaries — and risk plunging his already failing economy deeper into disaster. This will pose a sharp dilemma for the UAE. It is ready to override multilateral principles, but whether it would bail out its errant client in Addis Ababa, and jeopardize its winning position in Sudan, is a different matter. It would also present Saudi Arabia with the dilemma of whether to back Eritrea's notorious dictator, President Isaias Afewerki.America and the Pax AfricanaPeace and security in the Horn of Africa isn't a priority for the Biden administration. Despite a rhetorical commitment to a rule-based international order, Washington has neither protected Africa's painstakingly-constructed peace and security architecture nor brought the Ethiopian and Sudanese crises to the U.N. Security Council.While the American security umbrella was in place over the Arabian Peninsula, the countries of the Horn of Africa had the chance to develop their own peace and security system, based on a layered multilateral structure involving the regional organization, the InterGovernmental Authority on Development, the African Union, and United Nations, with peacekeepers and peace missions funded by the Europeans. This emergent Pax Africana was already imperiled as the U.S. drew down and the Middle Eastern middle powers became more assertive. President Donald Trump authorized his favored intermediaries — Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE — to pursue their interests across the Horn of Africa. The Biden administration has not pulled that back.It's possible that the administration cares about peace, security and human rights in Africa. But for as long as the U.S.'s Horn of Africa policy is handled by the Africa Bureau at the State Department — whose diplomats scarcely get the time of day from their counterparts in the Gulf Kingdoms — Washington's views will remain all-but-irrelevant. The Horn of Africa doesn't make the cut when staffers prepare talking points for President Biden, Secretary of State Antony Blinken or national security adviser Jake Sullivan to speak to their Arab counterparts. It's a prioritization that leaves the region in a deepening crisis, at the mercy of ruthless transactional politics.America's well-established practice of treating Israel as an exception to international law is rubbing off on Israel's allies and apologists across the Middle East, who are actively dismantling the already-tottering pillars of Africa's norm-based peace and security system. Those African countries most in need of principled multilateralism are paying the price.
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America's Global War on Terror has seen its share of stalemates, disasters, and outright defeats. During 20-plus years of armed interventions, the United States has watched its efforts implode in spectacular fashion, from Iraq in 2014 to Afghanistan in 2021. The greatest failure of its "Forever Wars," however, may not be in the Middle East, but in Africa."Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated," President George W. Bush told the American people in the immediate wake of the 9/11 attacks, noting specifically that such militants had designs on "vast regions" of Africa.To shore up that front, the U.S. began a decades-long effort to provide copious amounts of security assistance, train many thousands of African military officers, set up dozens of outposts, dispatch its own commandos on all manner of missions, create proxy forces, launch drone strikes, and even engage in direct ground combat with militants in Africa. Most Americans, including members of Congress, are unaware of the extent of these operations. As a result, few realize how dramatically America's shadow war there has failed.The raw numbers alone speak to the depths of the disaster. As the United States was beginning its Forever Wars in 2002 and 2003, the State Department counted a total of just nine terrorist attacks in Africa. This year, militant Islamist groups on that continent have, according to the Pentagon, already conducted 6,756 attacks. In other words, since the United States ramped up its counterterrorism operations in Africa, terrorism has spiked 75,000%.Let that sink in for a moment.75,000%.A Conflict that Will Live in InfamyThe U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq opened to military successes in 2001 and 2003 that quickly devolved into sputtering occupations. In both countries, Washington's plans hinged on its ability to create national armies that could assist and eventually take over the fight against enemy forces. Both U.S.-created militaries would, in the end, crumble. In Afghanistan, a two-decade-long war ended in 2021 with the rout of an American-built, -funded, -trained, and -armed military as the Taliban recaptured the country. In Iraq, the Islamic State nearly triumphed over a U.S.-created Iraqi army in 2014, forcing Washington to reenter the conflict. U.S. troops remain embattled in Iraq and neighboring Syria to this very day.In Africa, the U.S. launched a parallel campaign in the early 2000s, supporting and training African troops from Mali in the west to Somalia in the east and creating proxy forces that would fight alongside American commandos. To carry out its missions, the U.S. military set up a network of outposts across the northern tier of the continent, including significant drone bases – from Camp Lemonnier and its satellite outpost Chabelley Airfield in the sun-bleached nation of Djibouti to Air Base 201 in Agadez, Niger — and tiny facilities with small contingents of American special operations troops in nations ranging from Libya and Niger to the Central African Republic and South Sudan.For almost a decade, Washington's war in Africa stayed largely under wraps. Then came a decision that sent Libya and the vast Sahel region into a tailspin from which they have never recovered."We came, we saw, he died," Secretary of State Hillary Clinton joked after a U.S.-led NATO air campaign helped overthrow Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi, the longtime Libyan dictator, in 2011. President Barack Obama hailed the intervention as a success, but Libya slipped into near-failed-state status. Obama would later admit that "failing to plan for the day after" Qaddafi's defeat was the "worst mistake" of his presidency.As the Libyan leader fell, Tuareg fighters in his service looted his regime's weapons caches, returned to their native Mali, and began to take over the northern part of that nation. Anger in Mali's armed forces over the government's ineffective response resulted in a 2012 military coup. It was led by Amadou Sanogo, an officer who learned English in Texas and underwent infantry-officer basic training in Georgia, military-intelligence instruction in Arizona, and was mentored by U.S. Marines in Virginia.Having overthrown Mali's democratic government, Sanogo and his junta proved hapless in battling terrorists. With the country in turmoil, those Tuareg fighters declared an independent state, only to be muscled aside by heavily armed Islamists who instituted a harsh brand of Shariah law, causing a humanitarian crisis. A joint Franco-American-African mission prevented Mali's complete collapse but pushed the militants into areas near the borders of both Burkina Faso and Niger.Since then, those nations of the West African Sahel have been plagued by terrorist groups that have evolved, splintered, and reconstituted themselves. Under the black banners of jihadist militancy, men on motorcycles — two to a bike, wearing sunglasses and turbans, and armed with Kalashnikovs — regularly roar into villages to impose zakat (an Islamic tax); steal animals; and terrorize, assault, and kill civilians. Such relentless attacks have destabilized Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger and are now affecting their southern neighbors along the Gulf of Guinea. Violence in Togo and Benin has, for example, jumped 633% and 718% over the last year, according to the Pentagon.U.S.-trained militaries in the region have been unable to stop the onslaught and civilians have suffered horrifically. During 2002 and 2003, terrorists caused just 23 casualties in Africa. This year, according to the Pentagon, terrorist attacks in the Sahel region alone have resulted in 9,818 deaths — a 42,500% increase.At the same time, during their counterterrorism campaigns, America's military partners in the region have committed gross atrocities of their own, including extrajudicial killings. In 2020, for example, a top political leader in Burkina Faso admitted that his country's security forces were carrying out targeted executions. "We're doing this, but we're not shouting it from the rooftops," he told me, noting that such murders were good for military morale.American-mentored military personnel in that region have had only one type of demonstrable "success": overthrowing governments the United States trained them to protect. At least 15 officers who benefited from such assistance have been involved in 12 coups in West Africa and the greater Sahel during the war on terror. The list includes officers from Burkina Faso (2014, 2015, and twice in 2022); Chad (2021); Gambia (2014); Guinea (2021); Mali (2012, 2020, and 2021); Mauritania (2008); and Niger (2023). At least five leaders of a July coup in Niger, for example, received American assistance, according to a U.S. official. They, in turn, appointed five U.S.-trained members of the Nigerien security forces to serve as that country's governors.Military coups of that sort have even super-charged atrocities while undermining American aims, yet the United States continues to provide such regimes with counterterrorism support. Take Colonel Assimi Goïta, who worked with U.S. Special Operations forces, participated in U.S. training exercises, and attended the Joint Special Operations University in Florida before overthrowing Mali's government in 2020. Goïta then took the job of vice president in a transitional government officially charged with returning the country to civilian rule, only to seize power again in 2021.That same year, his junta reportedly authorized the deployment of the Russia-linked Wagner mercenary forces to fight Islamist militants after close to two decades of failed Western-backed counterterrorism efforts. Since then, Wagner — a paramilitary group founded by the late Yevgeny Prigozhin, a former hot-dog vendor turned warlord — has been implicated in hundreds of human rights abuses alongside the longtime U.S.-backed Malian military, including a 2022 massacre that killed 500 civilians.Despite all of this, American military aid for Mali has never ended. While Goïta's 2020 and 2021 coups triggered prohibitions on some forms of U.S. security assistance, American tax dollars have continued to fund his forces. According to the State Department, the U.S. provided more than $16 million in security aid to Mali in 2020 and almost $5 million in 2021. As of July, the department's Bureau of Counterterrorism was waiting on congressional approval to transfer an additional $2 million to Mali. (The State Department did not reply to TomDispatch's request for an update on the status of that funding.)The Two-Decade StalemateOn the opposite side of the continent, in Somalia, stagnation and stalemate have been the watchwords for U.S. military efforts."Terrorists associated with Al Qaeda and indigenous terrorist groups have been and continue to be a presence in this region," a senior Pentagon official claimed in 2002. "These terrorists will, of course, threaten U.S. personnel and facilities." But when pressed about an actual spreading threat, the official admitted that even the most extreme Islamists "really have not engaged in acts of terrorism outside Somalia." Despite that, U.S. Special Operations forces were dispatched there in 2002, followed by military aid, advisers, trainers, and private contractors.More than 20 years later, U.S. troops are still conducting counterterrorism operations in Somalia, primarily against the Islamist militant group al-Shabaab. To this end, Washington has provided billions of dollars in counterterrorism assistance, according to a recent report by the Costs of War Project. Americans have also conducted more than 280 air strikes and commando raids there, while the CIA and special operators built up local proxy forces to conduct low-profile military operations.Since President Joe Biden took office in January 2021, the U.S. has launched 31 declared airstrikes in Somalia, six times the number carried out during President Obama's first term, though far fewer than the record high set by President Trump, whose administration launched 208 attacks from 2017 to 2021.America's long-running, undeclared war in Somalia has become a key driver of violence in that country, according to the Costs of War Project. "The U.S. is not simply contributing to conflict in Somalia, but has, rather, become integral to the inevitable continuation of conflict in Somalia," reported Ẹniọlá Ànúolúwapọ Ṣóyẹmí, a lecturer in political philosophy and public policy at the Blavatnik School of Government at Oxford University. "U.S. counterterrorism policies are," she wrote, "ensuring that the conflict continues in perpetuity."The Epicenter of International Terrorism"Supporting the development of professional and capable militaries contributes to increasing security and stability in Africa," said General William Ward, the first chief of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) — the umbrella organization overseeing U.S. military efforts on the continent — in 2010, before he was demoted for profligate travel and spending. His predictions of "increasing security and stability" have, of course, never come to pass.While the 75,000% increase in terror attacks and 42,500% increase in fatalities over the last two decades are nothing less than astounding, the most recent increases are no less devastating. "A 50-percent spike in fatalities tied to militant Islamist groups in the Sahel and Somalia over the past year has eclipsed the previous high in 2015," according to a July report by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, a Defense Department research institution. "Africa has experienced a nearly four-fold increase in reported violent events linked to militant Islamist groups over the past decade… Almost half of that growth happened in the last 3 years."Twenty-two years ago, George W. Bush announced the beginning of a Global War on Terror. "The Taliban must act, and act immediately," he insisted. "They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate." Today, of course, the Taliban reigns supreme in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda was never "stopped and defeated," and other terror groups have spread across Africa (and elsewhere). The only way "to defeat terrorism," Bush asserted, was to "eliminate it and destroy it where it grows." Yet it has grown, and spread, and a plethora of new militant groups have emerged.Bush warned that terrorists had designs on "vast regions" of Africa but was "confident of the victories to come," assuring Americans that "we will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail." In country after country on that continent, the U.S. has, indeed, faltered and its failures have been paid for by ordinary Africans killed, wounded, and displaced by the terror groups that Bush pledged to "defeat." Earlier this year, General Michael Langley, the current AFRICOM commander, offered what may be the ultimate verdict on America's Forever Wars on that continent. "Africa," he declared, "is now the epicenter of international terrorism."This article has been republished with permission from TomDispatch.