This research examines the role of the Northern Ireland peace process in the Brexit negotiations between Britain and the EU by chronologically analysing articles published by British and Irish pro-Brexit, pro-EU, and least biased or neutral online media outlets. The time frame for this research starts from the suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly on 9th January 2017 and ends on 29th March 2019, when Britain was expected to formally withdraw from the EU, notwithstanding the postponement of Britain's withdrawal on 21st March 2019. Firstly, this research presents the historical context of the peace process in Northern Ireland. Secondly, this research considers the role of the EU in the Northern Ireland peace process. The EU has funded the Northern Ireland peace process since 1989, particularly through three programmes between 1995 and 2014. The continuation of the fourth programme until 2020 and the establishment of programmes in the future are uncertain as a result of Brexit. Moreover, the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland will become an external EU border after Brexit. This could lead to the return of physical infrastructure on the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland that was removed after the establishment of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, also known as the Belfast Agreement. The physical infrastructure on the border was removed in order to reduce the stereotyping and denigration that previously existed between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, particularly during the Troubles conflict from 1968 to 1998. Thirdly, the chronological analysis determines that Northern Ireland's pro-Brexit and right-wing Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) was inevitably more influential in the Brexit negotiations than Northern Ireland's left-wing nationalist political party that is also active in the Republic of Ireland, Sinn Féin, because Sinn Féin abstains from participating in sittings at the House of Commons, the publicly elected lower house of the British parliament. However, in the Northern Ireland Assembly election that was held on 2nd March 2017, the two main nationalist parties gained more seats than the two main unionist parties for the first time since the partition of the island of Ireland in 1921. In Britain's snap general election to the House of Commons that was held on 8th June 2017, Northern Ireland's unionist parties had less than 50% of the vote, also for the first time since the partition of the island Ireland in 1921, but they still had a higher percentage of the vote than Northern Ireland's nationalist parties. Britain's governing Conservative Party lost its majority in Britain's snap general election, and Conservative Party MP and British Prime Minister, Theresa May, became dependent on the DUP for her working majority in the House of Commons, despite the suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly. Fourthly, this research concludes that the Northern Ireland peace process, or more specifically, the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, was one of the most controversial issues in the Brexit negotiations. The backstop solution was developed to avoid a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. According to the backstop solution, Northern Ireland would remain in the EU Customs Union and the European Single Market in order to prevent the need for border checks until the establishment of alternative arrangements. The British parliament and government's inability to reach a consensus on the withdrawal agreement, which incorporated the backstop solution, ultimately led to the postponement of Britain's withdrawal from the EU on 21st March 2019. Finally, this research recommends the inclusion of media literacy, politics, the history of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, and languages in Britain's compulsory education. This research also suggests that the use of an alternative electoral system in Britain could improve election turnouts, reduce the perceived need for tactical voting, and prevent the dominance of an ineffective two-party system.
Land Ownership and Development: Evidence from Postwar Japan This paper analyzes the effect of land ownership on technology adoption and structural transformation. A large-scale land reform in postwar Japan enforced a large number of tenant farmers who were cultivating land to become owners of this land. I find that the municipalities which had many owner farmers after the land reform tended to experience a quick entry of new agricultural machines which became available after the reform. The adoption of the machines reduced the dependence on family labor, and led to a reallocation of labor from agriculture to industries and service sectors in urban centers when these sectors were growing. I also analyze the aggregate impact of labor reallocation on economic growth by using a simple growth model and micro data. I find that it increased GDP by about 12 percent of the GDP in 1974 during 1955-74. I also find a large and positive effect on agricultural productivity. Loyalty and Treason: Theory and Evidence from Japan's Land Reform A historically large-scale land reform in Japan after World War II enforced by the occupation forces redistributed a large area of farmlands to tenant farmers. The reform demolished hierarchical structures by weakening landlords' power in villages and towns. This paper investigates how the change in the social and economic structure of small communities affects electoral outcomes in the presence of clientelism. I find that there was a considerable decrease in the vote share of conservative parties in highly affected areas after the reform. I find the supporting evidence that the effect was driven by the fact that the tenant farmers who had obtained land exited from the long-term tenancy contract and became independent landowners. The effect was relatively persistent. Finally, I also find the surprising result that there was a decrease, rather than an increase, in turnout in these areas after the reform. Geography and State Fragmentation We examine how geography affects the location of borders between sovereign states in Europe and surrounding areas from 1500 until today at the grid-cell level. This is motivated by an observation that the richest places in this region also have the highest historical border presence, suggesting a hitherto unexplored link between geography and modern development, working through state fragmentation. The raw correlations show that borders tend to be located on mountains, by rivers, closer to coasts, and in areas suitable for rainfed, but not irrigated, agriculture. Many of these patterns also hold with rigorous spatial controls. For example, cells with more rivers and more rugged terrain than their neighboring cells have higher border densities. However, the fragmenting effects of suitability for rainfed agriculture are reversed with such neighbor controls. Moreover, we find that borders are less likely to survive over time when they separate large states from small, but this size-difference effect is mitigated by, e.g., rugged terrain.
Die Inhalte der verlinkten Blogs und Blog Beiträge unterliegen in vielen Fällen keiner redaktionellen Kontrolle.
Warnung zur Verfügbarkeit
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Blogbetreiber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie einen Blog Beitrag zitieren möchten.
Many countries with scheduled elections this year face a difficult choice in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic: how to balance public health considerations with holding a free and fair election. Learn more from NDI Senior Associate and Director of Electoral Programs Pat Merloe and Program Director Julia Brothers as they talk about democratic back-sliding during this crisis, electoral integrity, and ways civil society organizations can still make a difference. Find us on: SoundCloud | Apple Podcasts | Spotify | RSS | Google Play Pat Merlow: In the public health crisis, especially where governments are weak or people are suspicious of governments, trusted voices are really important to get out accurate information. Julia Brothers: Hello, this is Julia Brothers. I'm the Program Director for Elections at the National Democratic Institute. Welcome to Dem Works. JB: Around the world, the COVID-19 pandemic is sewing insecurity among the public, which can be exploited by authoritarians to consolidate power in sideline democratic institutions. It also poses severe technical, political, and social threats to elections themselves. In many countries, the effects of the virus may strain citizen relationships with government and elected [inaudible] officials, intensify political tensions and the potentials for violence, disenfranchise voters and increase conditions for democratic backsliding. Today I'm joined by Pat Merlow, senior associate and director of electoral programs at NDI. Welcome to the podcast, Pat. Thank you for being here. Pat Merlow: Hi, Julia. JB: So the COVID-19 crisis is causing enormous challenges for every country, including those with scheduled elections this year. What are the biggest concerns deciding whether to hold or postpone elections? PM: Elections must be held in ways that safeguard public health and in ways that ensure genuine opportunities for the electorate to vote. Universal and equal suffrage, which is in every modern constitution, means inclusion, not exclusion. So we have to also hold elections in ways where the political parties and the candidates have a fair chance to compete for votes without a playing field that's being manipulated or intentionally or unintentionally tilted in one party's favor. So striking a proper democratic balance of public safety and credible election processes is different and really difficult in every country. Depends a lot on the level of economic and technological development in the country on the nature of social cohesion versus divisions in the country and political polarization. So in many countries where NDI works, the concern is whether authoritarians will rush through elections with undue public health risks in order to gain an electoral advantage or to postpone elections under conditions that advantage their attempts to gain and maintain more power. A second troubling circumstance in countries that are unstable or prone to various kinds of violence, where constrains of the public health crisis can be used by malign actors to flood the population with this information... I mean we're hearing this term infodemic; also hate speech and other means to scapegoat religious or ethnic minorities, LGBTQ people or women in order to gain political advantage. That's not all the countries where NDI works, but even those are neither authoritarian nor fragile states, the COVID-19 crisis is still posing gigantic challenges both on the public health and to electoral integrity. JB: Right. I mean these factors present themselves as challenges to electoral integrity, not just where there might be bad faith actors that are trying to utilize this crisis to consolidate power, but also just in addressing basic issues related to how to make sure that you're maximizing participation during a public health crisis. What are some of the factors that these countries would need to think about in terms of actually implementing elections either during a public health crisis or immediately after. PM: There really are a number of factors that have to be considered. So the first thing that comes to everybody's mind of course is what do you do? Can people actually go to polling places or should they be under some sort of the shelter in place lockdown-like circumstances. That doesn't just affect whether to vote. That really has to do with whether you can register to vote safely or not. In countries where there are not a high level of electronic engagement where the digital divide falls really widely across broad swipes of the population, gathering those people into places to register to vote or to vote is really the only means of doing it. So the question of a postponement becomes really an operative question. Then we're concerned with what are the conditions for the postponement and how does that interrelate with the declarations of states of emergency, whether they're being done properly with the kinds of constraints on limitations on powers or whether they're being done in ways that usurp power. JB: Yeah. I think one of the major concerns, especially thinking about citizens being able to participate in the process, is that during a pandemic, if voters are concerned about going out to vote, chances are that that's not going to be an equal distribution among the population, where there are a vulnerable populations that will be more impacted. You'll see disproportionate levels of low turnout among certain communities like senior citizens or persons with disabilities or women who disproportionately have the burden of childcare and are in a situation where you don't have options for even temporary childcare because of social distancing regulations. Well, this seems like a good place to take a short break. For more than 35 years, NDI has been honored to work with courageous and committed pro-democracy activists and leaders around the world to help countries develop the institution's practices and skills necessary for democracy success. Welcome back. JB: So we talked a bit about the postponements that we're seeing around the world in terms of electoral timelines. Are election observers relevant during electoral delays, especially if there's restrictions on movement in the population if they're under some form of shelter in place or lockdown. PM: Yeah. So Julie, you mentioned that NDI works in more than 70 countries and in fact, working with nonpartisan citizen groups and coalitions and various organizations is one of the hallmarks of NDI's work over more than 35 years now and certainly the 25 years where I've been involved. There's a network of citizen election observers, there are nine of them in various regions of the world and they're amalgamated in more than 250 organizations from 90 countries. Those organizations have been sharing best practices and ideas about what can be done. So let me just quickly mention a couple of them. There are four areas where they have been able to focus. One are ways to assist; that is, to assist public health agencies and the electoral authorities to bring about safe elections and fair elections. The second is ways to address authoritarian opportunism and how states of emergency and various conditions are being used by those who would usurp the citizens of power. The third are ways to address disinformation, hate speech and attempts at hyperpolarization that influence and create unfair conditions for elections. The fourth way is to address, as you mentioned earlier, examples of where a health crisis can lead to disenfranchisement or further tilt the playing field so that it's an unfair circumstance. JB: Yeah, I mean you mentioned especially tracking the authoritarian leaders who are potentially taking advantage of the health crisis to grab power and subvert democracy and in some unstable countries, this can threaten heightened instability. What can election servers be doing to address that or what are they currently doing to address that? PM: The most important thing is citizen election observers in all kinds of countries have been time tested and over the series of elections cycles two, three, even four in many countries, they've built national networks and they've established themselves as trusted voices. In a public health crisis, especially where governments are weak or people are suspicious of government, trusted voices are really important to get out accurate information from the health authorities, accurate information from the electoral authorities about what to do, where to do things and so on. Also, they have networks that can collect information; even during lockdowns. You and I were in a conversation with one of the partner organizations with whom we work in Sri Lanka just last week. The head of that organization is working on a civil society task force. That task force is considering how to gain access to women's shelters, to older people's homes, to places where there's foster children's care, drug treatment centers, and so on because these are vulnerable populations that are being hit hard by the crisis. One of the things that he pointed out in our conversation is that the government is taking advantage of the postponement of the election for electoral advantage by handing out dry goods to citizens and even medical supplies through the political party rather than as an impartial governmental service to the people. So the question that he posed was, even during lockdown, is there a way that our network of over 1,000 people could begin to document this and report it so that we can lift up to the public the nature of this problem that's coming about and see if we can't get some accountability and get them to cut back. So even during a lockdown, it's possible for the citizen observer groups to do things that are extraordinarily relevant. JB: Yeah, I mean it seems like there are certainly opportunities for electoral observers to be monitoring the kinds of things that they would normally be looking at in a pre-election period when their elections are delayed... Issues related to is the government still helping to create conditions for a credible and competitive process in the midst of a public health emergency. Are conditions being put in place to ensure that marginalized populations are not sidelined from the process. But it also kind of expands it a little bit too in that there are these potentially other issues that that groups may consider looking at. Like you mentioned, how health resources are being distributed and what kinds of policy changes are being made and how were those being made? What's the decision-making process around things like delaying the elections, around emergency voting procedures? Are they inclusive? Are all the parties being brought in to them? Is civil society be brought into these discussions and taking a look at some of these new conditions that observers may otherwise not necessarily be monitoring in a pre-election period. I think the other issue here is there are constraints here in terms of potentially being able to deploy a bunch observers out into the field to collect information if you're in a lockdown situation. So it's been interesting talking with groups to see how they're thinking creatively about how they can collect some of this information remotely. What kind of data exists that you can collect whether it's open data sources from the government looking at budgets, looking at how budgets are changing and how resources are moving. You mentioned looking at disinformation, being able to monitor social media and seeing what data could be collected from that. It's been interesting to see how citizen election observers around the world are getting creative and still doing their jobs while being sometimes trapped at home. PM: Absolutely. You mentioned the disinformation... One of the things that we've been seeing is that in Russia for example, they have been making use of the COVID crisis to begin to track people even more carefully to introduce facial recognition technologies and cameras. The term that's been throwing around is cybergulags being created there. With China's facial recognition technologies and the way that's been used to suppress the weaker minorities, China has been introducing that working with governments and other places in the world to try to get that into voter registration so that you have biometric voter registration data that includes facial recognition technology. So in this era, getting access to government decision making, getting access even to the health data and disaggregated by gender, by vulnerable groups and so on is part of the work that election observers normally do. Demanding open electoral data can lead easily to the same kinds of advocacy around open health data. One of the other things I thought that you've touched on that's interesting is the states of emergencies and the relationships between that and postponement. There's more than 45 countries at this point that have postponed elections at the national and sub-national level. Not all of them are problematic by any means, but in a lot of countries, there have been extended states of emergency without any end date. The postponements have no end date on them. One of the things that election observers can do is to join with... And many of them are human rights organizations and bringing about the rules that have been established in the international arena for limiting the duration of states of emergencies, that the measures that are taken have to be proportionate to the nature of the threat to the nation to bring those issues up and do advocacy around them and to help those of us in the international arena be aware of where these problems are in various countries. JB: With that, I think we'll take a quick break. We'll be back after this quick message. One of the things that Secretary Albright has said is that it's absolutely essential for young people to understand that they must participate and that they are the energy behind democracy. You can hear more from other democracy heroes by listening to our Dem Works podcast. It is available on iTunes and SoundCloud. So before the break, we were talking about the role that citizen election monitors are playing in the COVID-19 crisis and its impact on electoral integrity. Are there other considerations that citizen election groups should be thinking about in the need for electoral integrity in their countries? I'm thinking especially related to how groups can make sure that their observers are safe while also being able to collect information and an advocate for critical processes and good governance. PM: That's really a critical question, Julia. A good example that comes to mind is in Mali, which has had very few reported cases of COVID-19, there was a parliamentary election just two weeks ago. The government, for national security reasons, has had to postpone those elections for almost two years and they were really in a phase of saying we need to push it ahead. In fact, there had not been a reported COVID-19 death until just a few hours before the election date. So it went forward and the citizen observers with which NDI has been working in that country in the weeks leading up to that advocated that the polling stations had to have masks for the staff; had to have gloves; had to have hand sanitizers or hand washing stations because hand sanitizer is hard to get in a lot of places in Mali. They made sure that their observers had those materials themselves. I think 1,500 observers went out to polling stations across the country. In their own headquarters and gathering data, there was social distancing that took place and they did a lot of checking in with their observers about how they were doing, how they were feeling over the course of the day. So one thing that the citizen observers can do is to join with organizations that are health advocates for those places where either voter registration is about to take place or voting is about to take place to ensure that the conditions minimize the risk. We just saw this over this past weekend in the elections that were held in South Korea. Whether or not you might think that the election should go forward, there was a country where there's a lot of public confidence in what the government has been doing and in the integrity of the election authorities and voter turnout was not terribly affected by this. So there is something that can be done immediately and as you have mentioned, there are numerous things that can be looked at by citizen observers without ever really leaving their homes or their headquarters. One of those, as you mentioned, is disinformation. Our partners in Georgia, for example, have uncovered a link between Russian propaganda, which has gone up around disinformation around COVID-19 and linking it to destabilizing public trust in Georgia's government. There's a really interesting report that they came out with just last week on that front. So how does COVID-19 and elections interface is something that can be explored in a number of dimensions. JB: We've talked mostly about the work of nonpartisan civil society organizations and their own countries that are confronting this challenge. Is there a role for international election observers on terms of electoral oversight during a public crisis, especially knowing that they will have some of the same if not even more constraints than citizen election monitors? PM: It's a very difficult role at the moment for international election observers. We've been in touch with our colleagues at the African Union and the European Union, at the United Nations and Organization of American States and so on. Many of them have been bringing teams home from countries. Some of them have been postponing or canceling sending teams out. At the same time, there are a number of things that international observers can do. As you mentioned, you can look at things from a distance. You can review the legal framework, which is part of what every international election observation and citizen observers do. You can compare what has been done over the past few cycles of elections, where recommendations have been made, whether those recommendations were acted upon or whether you find the same problem repeating in the next report and prioritize the issues that you might look to and even be able to inform diplomats and others about things that they should be raising with government. You can look at disinformation and other information disorder, hate speech and so on, from afar. Certainly you can tune in with what the critical people inside a country who are working on these issues have been doing. You can conduct some long distance interviews with key people in the citizen groups and in the election authorities and the political leaders to learn their opinions about what the state of play is in the country and their concerns going forward. But when it comes time to put people on the ground, we have to look at travel restrictions. We have to look at countries where foreigners have been seen as people who bring in COVID-19 and there's been violence against them; so security of observers is important. And the numbers of people who may go or where they may be deployed depending upon hotspots in the country and so on. So this is something that over the course of this year will be a challenge. And the next thing will be a challenge for international election observers is that as so many elections are being postponed, they're being postponed probably towards the end of this year or the beginning of next year, which already has many scheduled elections. So there may be an overwhelming demand for which the supply of financial and human resources runs short. JB: It does seem like at this point, especially knowing that international election observers in a lot of the places just can't deploy right now, one of the roles to play here is really trying to raise the voices of the citizen groups on the ground that are able to actually do some on the ground observation. Also keeping in mind, especially for the places we're concerned about authoritarian overreach, thinking about how we can use some of these international mechanisms to push back on democratic backsliding and mitigate tensions in places where it could potentially be a bit more unstable with the current situation. PM: You're right. That's the contribution that the international community can do, too... To really amplify the voices of the citizenry and to augment their efforts to bring about respect for civil and political rights. When you have a network of thousands of citizens who have taken the time and the effort to go out of their homes, into the street, to look at what the nature of the threats of violence or vote buying or intimidation to document how these things of disproportionally driven women or restricted women's political and electoral participation, would they have taken the time to go into polling stations, sometimes under threat or coercion? These people have become a solid core of citizen empowerment in so many countries around the world, and each of those citizens, of course, is using WhatsApp and other ways of talking and they're influencers within a country. They can gather information, they can give accurate information out, but as they report up through their networks, if there's good collaboration between the reputable citizen groups and the credible international election observers and the international community more broadly, we can use that cooperation that we've been working on over the years to try to bring attention, even when it's hard to shine a light directly on problems in countries that are being affected by this crisis and facing political challenges and stress. JB: Well, thank you again, Pat, for joining us. I think this has been a particularly relevant discussion. I'd also like to say thank you to our listeners. To learn more about NDI or to listen to other Dem Works podcasts, please visit our website@www.ndi.org PM: Thank you, Julia and thank you to the listeners.
Political protests are growing in emerging and established emocracies. Since the 1970s, the demand for political participation has become obvious. The 1990s saw more open dialogue-oriented participatory instruments, which began to be implemented in some countries ('century of participation'). The proliferation of participatory instruments in the field of talk centric deliberative democracies has been called the 'deliberative turn' (Dryzek, 2002). A new push is also attributed to the open government data, the movement initiated by the US President Obama's government when it set up its open government data initiative in 2009. These include online and offline participation (Kersting, 2013). It is a practice that most new instruments of participation are implemented at the local level. It is frequently argued that these deliberative forums do not lead to binding decisions. However, compared to elections, the number of citizens participating is rather small and selective. New forms of vote-centric direct democracy such as referenda and other initiatives are implemented in some countries. The paper presents a model of offline and online participation. The focus will be on representative and direct democratic participation. Participation in elections and proliferation of referenda and initiatives will be analysed. Participation in these spheres of numeric democracy can lead to binding decisions. Legal frameworks of different European countries is presented and compared. Is the turnout at the local level small and declining? Who is included and who is excluded? In the empirical part, the article predominantly uses the analyses of the latest survey data from representative comparative opinion polls such as the World Value Survey (WVS). ; Politički protesti postaju učestaliji i u novim i u starim demokracijama. Od 1970-ih insistiranje na političkoj participaciji postaje očigledno. U nekim su se zemljama tijekom 1990-ih počeli primjenjivati otvoreniji, dijalogu okrenuti participativni instrumenti (stoljeće participacije). Bujanje participativnih instrumenata u na pregovore usredotočenim predstavničkim demokracijama naziva se predstavničkim zaokretom (Dryzek, 2002). Novi trend pripisuje se i otvorenom pristupu državnim podacima, pokretu koji je inicirala vlada američkog predsjednika Obame prilikom pokretanja svoje inicijative za otvoren pristup vladinim podacima 2009. To uključuje participaciju na Internetu i izvan njega (Kersting, 2013). Praksa je da se većina novih instrumenata participacije primjenjuje na lokalnoj razini. Često se prigovara da takvi forumi ne vode do obvezujućih rezultata. U usporedbi s izborima, broj građana koji sudjeluju u takvim forumima vrlo je malen i selektivan. Novi oblici izravne demokracije usmjerene na birače, poput referenduma i drugih inicijativa, primjenjuju se u određenim državama. Rad analizira model participacije putem Interneta i izvan njega. U središtu pozornosti je predstavnička i izravna demokratska participacija. Analizira se sudjelovanje na izborima i bujanje referenduma i drugih inicijativa. Participacija u tim sferama brojčane demokracije može dovesti do obvezujućih rezultata. Prikazuju se i uspoređuju pravni okviri u različitim europskim zemljama. Je li izlaznost na lokalnoj razini mala te smanjuje li se i dalje? Tko je uključen, a tko isključen? U empirijskom dijelu rad se uglavnom koristi analizama najnovijih podataka dobivenih iz komparativnih anketa poput World Value Survey (WVS).
Статья посвящена анализу четырех ключевых вопросов, которые, на взгляд автора, позволяют понять результаты выборов в Германии 1928-1933 гг. и которые не имеют однозначных ответов среди исследователей: 1) был ли исчерпан электоральный рост НСДАП на июльских 1932 г. выборах в рейхстаг; 2) голосовал ли немецкий рабочий класс за НСДАП; 3) какова была роль протестного электората и возможностей мобилизации сторонников, а также 4) молодых избирателей. Автор приходит к выводу, что электоральный потенциал НСДАП не был исчерпан на июльских выборах 1932 г. Нацисты потеряли голоса в ноябре 1932 г. не в какой-то одной или нескольких землях, а в целом по стране, и падение было обусловлено понижением явки электората. Среди избирателей НСДАП, возможно, доля рабочих была меньше, чем у СДПГ и КПГ, а крестьян меньше, чем у партии Центра и правых партий, но эти избиратели были в достаточно большом абсолютном значении, чтобы отрицать их роль в результатах НСДАП на выборах 1928-1933 гг. Анализ этих избирательных кампаний подтверждает выводы о том, что НСДАП успешно «оседлала» протестные силы и молодых избирателей, однако только эти группы не способны были дать такой объем голосов партии, который сделал ее доминирующей в стране. Нацистам удалось создать «широкий народный фронт» в противовес «правым» и «рабочим партиям» и предоставить замену классовым идеям и лозунгам. Именно поэтому молодой электорат (до 30 лет) и самые голосующие возрастные группы социальные группы от 30 до 45 лет во всех социальных слоях отдали свои голоса большей частью НСДАП, что и обеспечило партии такой невероятный успех. ; The article focuses on four key questions that, in the author's opinion, help to explain the results of 1928-1933's elections in Germany, although there are no definite answers to these questions among scientists: 1) was the electoral growth of NSDAP exhausted in the Reichstag's elections in July 1932; 2) did the German working class vote for NSDAP; 3) what was the role of the protest electorate and its chances to mobilize supporters; 4) what was the role of young voters. The author concludes that the electoral potential of NSDAP had not been exhausted by the July elections of 1932, and the Nazis lost voices in November 1932 not just in several lands, but nationwide due to the drop of voters' turnout. Among NSDAP supporters, perhaps, the share of workers was less than among SPD or KPG voters, and the share of peasants less that among the Centre Party or the right-wing parties, but the number of these NSDAP voters in absolute terms was too big to deny their role in the results of 1928-1933's elections. The analysis of these election campaigns confirms that NSDAP successfully "saddled" protest and young voters, however, these groups alone were not enough to provide the party such an electoral support that made it dominant. Nazis managed to create "a huge national front" opposed to "right" and "labor" parties and to replace all class slogans. That is why young voters (under 30 years) and the most active voters (age groups from 30 to 45 years) in all social classes voted for NSDAP, thus ensuring the Nazi Party such an incredible success.
How can he Internet contribute to the development and establishment of a genuinely European public (e-public)? What are good practices for e-participation in Europe and how can public organisations profit from opening up their processes to a wider audience (e-participation)? Is e-voting a realistic means to increase electoral turnout and what are the conditions for the success of e-voting? These are the main questions being dealt with in this report, which is the final report of the STOA-project on e-democracy. The report includes the analysis and insights of a research and consultation project in which three scientific institutes, eleven external experts as participants of two workshops and several Members of the European Parliament were involved. The aim of the project, which went from January 2010 to September 2011, was to analyse current developments in the area of e-democracy and to relate the insights to the European policy context, especially to the needs of the European Parliament. Within the three areas of e-democracy covered in the study, e-voting is the area in which the recommendation to the European Parliament is the most explicit: Based on the analysis, the build-up of a comprehensive system for e-voting in Europe cannot be recommended for the time being. The reasons for this are primarily cost-benefit considerations, technological issues and reasons of political legitimacy. Underlying the analysis was the conviction that elections are at the heart of the democratic process and that existing and working election routines in the countries will not be changed without good reasons. Concerning e-public and e-participation the report argues that a European public sphere includes and requires an active citizenry endowed with political rights as well as with a sense of identity which motivates engagement and political concern. European citizenship cannot be based in common language and traditions but only in a sense of belonging to a political community with shared values and rights. E-participation as such, when related to relevant policy-making processes on the level of European institutions, would constitute a new element of European citizenship beyond the right to vote. It provides an additional democratic form of European citizenship which - if successfully established - could also help to foster European citizenship in its subjective or cultural meaning. However this would imply to organise e-participation in a way that is accessible, transparent and meaningful to the European citizenry. It must be clear where there are opportunities for citizens to raise their voice and at the same time it must be clear in which way and to what end e-participation spaces are related to the very core of policy-making. From what is known from e-participation exercises at all levels, participants do not expect to rule out or bypass the representative democratic structures. On the other hand it is also obvious that a lack of responsiveness of political institutions to formats of online participation leads to disappointment on the participants' side that in the long run would be detrimental to any process of developing feelings of citizenship.
Die Inhalte der verlinkten Blogs und Blog Beiträge unterliegen in vielen Fällen keiner redaktionellen Kontrolle.
Warnung zur Verfügbarkeit
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Blogbetreiber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie einen Blog Beitrag zitieren möchten.
Last week at the Bossier City Council meeting, the head of its and Republican Mayor Tommy Chandler's appointed Charter Review Commission Preston Friedley reported on his panel's activities and solicited input from councilors on changes. How – if – they respond to that will determine whether the constructed body actually carries out the task envisioned for it in the city charter or if it exists merely as a dog-and-pony show with ulterior political motives.
The Commission has met twice and addressed organizational considerations. It has set up an aggressive schedule of meetings throughout February and intends to toss in some public forums as well. That in and of itself indicates its use as a political tool to preserve the power of a small number of city insiders.
Its creation came in the context of a petition drive to put a three-term lifetime limit into the Charter. The drive succeeded, but has become hung up over legal minutiae initiated at the behest of the four graybeard councilors – Republicans David Montgomery and Jeff Free, Democrat Bubba Williams, and no party Jeff Darby – all of whom would be disbarred from running for reelection next year if the petitions (one covering councilor service, the other the mayor's) make it onto the Nov. 5 or Dec. 7 ballots and receive majority voter approval – plus GOP rookie Councilor Vince Maggio. On at least three out of four occasions each of the five has refused – illegally, according to the Charter which states they must approve for the ballot a petition certified by the registrar of voters as the pair were – to do that.
Out of this majority's political desires was born the idea of the Commission, as a tactic to accomplish a couple of goals. First, it wanted to take the steam out of the term limits movement. The lawfare gambit it has pursued most optimistically could declare the petitions invalid, but if that fails the fallback position is to drag proceedings out so long that the court doesn't rule the items onto the ballot by Oct. 14, the deadline for propositions to make the December ballot (the November ballot deadline is Jun. 19). Even if the judiciary (with the city likely trying to push it all the way to the Supreme Court, wasting huge chunks of taxpayer dollars along the way) does this that is a small victory, for the chances of the measures not passing in November are essentially zero while for December, likely without a federal election on the ballot with lower turnout, that expands to a small chance.
However, a parallel effort to put the same items (and more) onto the ballot in 2024 with a signature-gathering process is taking place, which could moot the court case. In this eventuality, the Council majority hopes the Commission would combat this by coming up with its own rival version of term limits, weaker such as grandfathering in current councilors, having it apply not until 2029 elections (by then the youngest of the graybeards and Maggio would be in their latter sixties in age), and/or lengthening the number of terms eligible to serve and/or not making it lifetime and/or retroactive. The intent is at the least to put a competing, comparatively limp version on the ballot.
Or, it may stand alone. The ongoing new petitioning effort has to wrap up within the month to make the November ballot, because there is a short interval where the registrar must vet signatures for certification, then afterwards the Council legally has 90 days before it must act to put something on the ballot (the graybeard plus Maggio coalition won't ever consider the other option of voting to insert the measures into the Charter within 30 days), and the majority will delay as long as it can. The second attempt has a much better chance of making the December ballot, so the graybeards+ desire is for the Commission to have its watered-down version on there first, hope to have that pass, then argue against a stronger version coming the next month saying term limits are done and dusted.
However, there's a second goal that graybeards+ might pursue. Commissioners could put a weak term limits measure in play surrounded by one or more poison pills, as the Charter defines amending the charter through the commission method as replacing the entire document. Therefore, ballot language would refer to a new document that could vary from almost no to extensive alterations. Further, amendments are not separated out but every change is in essence voted up or down.
So, for example, to weak term limits could be married something like changing the petitioning process to make it more difficult, as a third of the total votes cast in the last citywide office contested at the polls is not a demanding standard (the new petitioning also includes an amendment to make it easier still to have direct democracy). With this strategy, the graybeards+ would make a small, almost meaningless, concession to achieve a much larger goal of preventing encroachment on their power. This helps bring a win either way: obtaining a net victory or, if voters reject limits plus the poison pill (echoing in 2004 when massively defeated were some changes linked with a mandatory increased fee on water bills) that can delegitimize the idea and make it harder for future efforts to have limits, whether in discouraging petitioning or voting for a measure in progress on the way to the ballot.
The signaling for a quick resolution can achieve either. The Commission could slap on a diluted term limits proposal with a poison pill or send it out solo. In fact, if the solo version ends up on the same ballot as a stricter measure by petition, whether from court decision or new petitioning, as the two conflict and both pass the Charter instructs the one with the highest vote total becomes effective. This would leave term limits supporters with a difficult choice: vote for the diluted version which almost assuredly would put it into effect as the graybeards+ and their allies will do the same and try to influence the public to follow but with them vote against the stricter version, or if voting against both could lose any limitation, even a weak one. The degree of difficulty in choice becomes compounded if a poison pill were attached.
Thus, if the graybeards+ want to respond the Friedley's request – only Chandler's two appointment notifications were accompanied with the topic solicitation as suggested in the Charter – they would promote the weakest possible term limits and perhaps a poison pill. They may not make any public statement at all, having given the marching orders in private. That there seems to be a big hurry among some on the Commission lends to the latter possibility.
To make the November ballot, effectively the Commission has to wrap up by the end of May to give the Council time to put its product onto the ballot. A sprint there with a weak term limits item, regardless of a poison pill, would show the majority of the commission – with five of its nine members appointed by the graybeards+ and all but one of them political insiders or related to them – simply are there to carry out a sabotage mission on behalf of their appointers. Any serious attempt to iron out to any meaningful degree any inconsistencies, ambiguities, and anachronisms in the Charter, much less to consider seriously reforms to make city government more responsive and responsible, can't succeed in four months. The Commission should supplant this planned rush to judgment with a deliberative process that serves the interests of the people, not those of the masters of some of its appointees.
Die Inhalte der verlinkten Blogs und Blog Beiträge unterliegen in vielen Fällen keiner redaktionellen Kontrolle.
Warnung zur Verfügbarkeit
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Blogbetreiber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie einen Blog Beitrag zitieren möchten.
As the fig leaves fall away and the threats escalate, the battle about term limits on Bossier City elected officials has mutated from a veneer of concern over legal obligations to a process driven by reelection concerns on both sides, although opponents have captured a monopoly on hypocritical self-interest that continues to erode their political fortunes while giving Mayor Tommy Chandler a tremendous opportunity to boost his own.
This week a Council majority of graybeards – councilors Republicans David Montgomery and Jeff Free, Democrat Bubba Williams, and no party Jeff Darby who all will have served at least 12 years by 2025 – plus their pet rookie Republican Vince Maggio, in concert with their consigliere City Attorney Charles Jacobs hope to go all Cosa Nostra in their endeavor to defeat the effort to give voters a say on a three-term lifetime and retroactive limit in office. They combat a petition certified by Bossier Parish Registrar of Voters Stephanie Agee that the city charter forces the Council to approve placing such an item on the ballot by Nov. 7.
But this majority bloc resists, because such a vote of taken within the next 14 months almost certainly will pass the measure and end the political careers of the graybeards. And the excuse they try to use is the petition didn't directly have the birth years of signers listed as stated specifically in the relevant state statute, although it did list the voter identification numbers unique to signing individuals that includes the birth year of them, providing an indirect listing that complies with the spirit of the law if not its exact wording.
Until recently, the bloc went to great pains to frame their opposition in terms of legal niceties, principally that every letter needed correct crossing and dotting or else sometime in the indeterminate future some otherwise ineligible candidate (read: any of the graybeards) would sue to get on the ballot, citing defectiveness of the petition process. However, this fig leaf cannot overcome the fact that the charter says they must put the contents of a certified petition on the ballot by a certain date or they are in violation of the charter, and they have just such a petition at hand.
Further, Chandler won't leave them alone, pricking at them to do their duty to their public embarrassment. At the Council's last meeting, he introduced a resolution to fulfill the charter's imperative, which the bloc voted down but was supported by Republicans Chris Smith and Brian Hammons. So, he reintroduced it for the very next one, and he may keep doing it every single meeting as long as the Council doesn't comply. Every time he does this, he reminds voters he will fight for term limits and gives a chance for Hammons and Smith to do the same. And every time he does this, he reminds voters that not only do Darby, Free, Maggio, Montgomery, and Williams oppose term limits, but also that they repudiate their own oaths of office requiring them to uphold the charter.
Thus, to contain the damage Chandler keeps inflicting the bloc must dispense with the chimera of neutrality it has tried to sell and instead attack the petition itself. Adding a layer of hypocrisy to its quest, at the upcoming meeting it wants to pass a resolution – which failed to make the agenda as a late addition last meeting – to ask Agee to "decertify" the petition. The resolution's language doesn't hide that, despite no legal judgment to verify this, it declares its request valid "due to the petition failing to meet all the requirements of Louisiana Revised Statute 18:3."
Note that until now Jacobs and the bloc have claimed they oppose a move to put the petition language onto the ballot out of strict adherence to the law, but now they expose themselves as taking a side by asking Agee to do something for which registrars don't have the legal authority which appears nowhere in statute. It is an extralegal process invented out of thin air that does anything but adhere to the law, but which fulfills a purely political purpose.
However, this is only the veiled threat, akin to a mobster visiting Agee and telling her something like she has a nice registrar's office and it would be a shame if something happened to it, which she could avoid by following the bloc's wishes (assuming it passes that resolution, which given the numbers assuredly will happen). Because another resolution on the agenda carries the threat through by empowering Jacobs to litigate against the petition, which involves suing the registrar.
Of course, the resolution in many respects is both empty and meaningless. Under the charter, the city attorney doesn't have to have such a resolution in hand to pursue litigation, but rather it is a political gesture that carries both risk and reward. It attempts to avoid further damage to Jacobs, who has come under ethical fire for his manipulation of Council affairs at odds with the Charter and his publicly spreading false information in the course of his duties, by giving him the appearance of an imprimatur to procced, but it also puts the bloc again on record against term limits utilizing an unambiguous attempt to sabotage the democratic process.
And it would appear objectively as a futile gesture. How does the city have any standing to do this; who is harmed by having a certified petition? And because the law is silent about reversing petition certification, there's no valid mandamus claim that government fails to do its duty. The legal gymnastics involved even to present a plausible challenge will prove challenging.
Finally, and again involving a display of hypocrisy, last meeting the bloc muscled through a call for a charter review commission that would assess, among other things, term limits. Thus, why doesn't the majority let the vote take place, and during the campaign as a reason to vote down the measures (councilor and mayor terms) cite its allegation of invalidity and that the commission will come up with its own version of limits to correct that? And regardless of whether these pass, it can present its own version if different through the commission for voter approval (which it can guarantee through its selection of commissioners)? Why does it insist on bending and twisting the law instead?
Of course, the end goal in any legal machinations is not to defeat the petition's validity, which ultimately seems unlikely under the spirit of the law, but to delay having to put its language on the ballot until either it becomes subject to a low-stimulus special election that provides its lowest chances of success – which means a delay of at least six months but no more than nine because national elections will drive the election calendar next year and provoke high turnout – or it gets pushed past city elections in 2025. With Jacobs' past as a 26th Judicial District judge, he can hope his comradeship with that bench will pay off with a former colleague producing the ruling he wants that accomplishes the amount of delay desired.
Perhaps the bloc will succeed through all of this in buying its members the chance to win another term. Yet if this victory comes, it may be pyrrhic, for the resulting bad publicity and easy explanation to voters – X number of times voting against term limits, Y number of times voting to violate the city charter, all the while looking out for their own self-interests at the expense of the people's using taxpayer dollars – could cause the bloc members to lose the war of reelection. Aided by Chandler, who every time he twists the knife in by contrast further solidifies his chances of reelection.
The article considers electoral behaviour as one of the forms of participation of citizens in political life in connection with the need to choose specific authorities of different levels. The analysis of electoral behaviour was carried out within the framework of the system of determination of human activity. The author sees the determination system as a set of factors that constantly act on an individual or group and have the logic of their deployment in time and space. This approach to the study of electoral behaviour allows us to consider the relationship between external factors (economic, political, cultural, etcetera) and internal (goals, value orientations and attitudes implemented in electoral selection. The paper shows that the population behaviour during the election company is determined mainly by external factors since it is forced in nature and is formed mainly under the influence of manipulative technologies and is not the result of a motivated choice of applicants for legislative power. In addition, the executive power has significantly decreased interest in the active participation of citizens in elections at both local and federal levels in connection with the abolition of the turnout threshold, the "against all" column, as well as a combination of socio-economic factors. There is no need for voters to participate more actively in elections. What guides a significant part of voters is the necessity to come to the polling station and cast their vote for someone. At the same time, it is not necessary to have complete information about the programs of candidates, the experience of their work, the availability of knowledge necessary for qualified work on the adoption of laws that ensure an acceleration of the pace of resolving current problems of improving the material standard of living of the population, and the development of spiritual culture. ; В данной статье электоральное поведение анализируется как одна из форм участия граждан в политической жизни общества в связи с необходимостью выбора конкретных органов власти. Анализ электорального поведения проводился в рамках системы детерминации человеческой деятельности. Система детерминации понимается как совокупность факторов, постоянно действующих на индивида или группу и имеющих логику своего развертывания во времени и пространстве. Данный подход к изучению электорального поведения позволяет рассмотреть взаимосвязь между внешними (экономическими, политическими, культурными и т. д.) и внутренними (целями, ценностными ориентациями и установками, которые реализуются в процессе электорального выбора) факторами. Показано, что поведение населения во время избирательной кампании детерминировано преимущественно внешними факторами, так как носит вынужденный характер и формируется преимущественно под воздействием манипулятивных технологий, а не является следствием мотивированного выбора претендентов на законодательную власть. Тем более что у исполнительной власти существенно снизился интерес в активном участии граждан в выборах как местного, так и федерального уровня в связи с отменой порога явки, графы «против всех», а также совокупностью факторов социально-экономического характера. У избирателей не формируется потребность, побуждающая к более активному участию в выборах. Значительная часть избирателей руководствуется внешней необходимостью, заключающейся в том, что надо прийти на избирательный участок и за кого-то отдать свой голос. При этом не обязательно иметь полную информацию о программах кандидатов, опыте их работы, наличии знаний, нужных для квалифицированной работы по принятию законов, обеспечивающих ускорение темпов разрешения актуальных проблем повышения материального уровня жизни населения, развития духовной культуры.
One year after a national election in which the Democrats won not only the presidency but 18 congressional seats and 9 new senators, the party lost two major gubernatorial races in Virginia and New Jersey, but won an unexpected congressional seat in upstate New York. Clearly, Obama's coattails did not prove strong enough to bring out the two groups that helped him go over the top in last year's election, namely, the youth vote and the African American votes. There are many lessons to be learned by both parties from this past week' s elections, but there is also the risk of over interpreting results as a prequel of next year's mid-term elections. First, in an "off-off" year, most of the electorate was indifferent to the elections, worried as they are about more pressing issues such as higher taxes, the ever-expanding deficit and more than anything else, about unemployment, which has just surpassed the 10% mark in spite of reported GDP growth of 3.5% this quarter. Second, the state gubernatorial races were played out at the local level and had more to do with the candidates themselves than with the voters 'discontent with the President. Indeed, in a Virginia exit poll, 60% of the voters said that they had based their vote on state issues, while only 24% of those polled said they had used their vote to express their dissatisfaction with the President and 20% to express their support for him. On the other hand, Congressional elections reflect more of the national mood, and here the Democrats were winners: due to an inner brawl among Republicans, they unexpectedly won a seat the Republicans had held since the 1870s in the twenty-third district of New York. still, just as it would be a mistake to give national significance to the state races, it would also be silly to miss the obvious: the preponderant mood in the country is anti-incumbency, and this affects both parties. But clearly, independents who voted for Obama are re-directing their votes toward the Republicans and becoming savvier, more issue specific voters. In addition, both parties have base problems: the Democrats need to figure out how to get their base to the polls during off-year elections, and the Republicans must find ways to control their base so that it does not destroy the party. Turnout was the definitive factor in both gubernatorial races: it fell from 3.7 million to under 2 million in Virginia, and from almost 4 million to 2.3 million in New Jersey. The Republicans and Independents were more energized than the Democratic base, so they voted in larger numbers. Young voters between 18 and 29 years of age represented only 10% in Virginia and 9% in New Jersey. In contrast, in the 2008 presidential race they represented 21% and 17% respectively, and are credited for delivering the states to Obama in both cases. In New Jersey, an unpopular Democratic incumbent, albeit an Obama ally, lost to a new Republican face that ran on a fiscally conservative platform. Obama's appeal was apparently weaker than the voters' aversion for Jon Corzine, so U.S district attorney Chris Christie won, becoming the first Republican to win that position in 12 years. In Virginia, Bob McDonnell underplayed his extreme socially conservative views and his connection to Christian Right leader Pat Robertson. Instead, he ran a positive campaign based on job creation, quality of life for Virginians and fiscal responsibility. His opponent, Creigh Deeds, ran a negative TV ad campaign based on his opponent's social conservatism and his ideology as reflected in a misogynist twenty-year old thesis. In a calculation that backfired, Deeds distanced himself from President Obama for most of his campaign, only to turn to him towards the end. It proved to be too late. On that sunny autumnal day, Democratic voters, especially African Americans and young voters, the two groups than gave Obama his victory in Virginia, were absent from the polls. After eight years of two outstanding Democratic governors, the Executive Mansion in Richmond reverted to Republicans. Unlike Governor Warner who in 2005 prepared the way for his successor, Tim Kaine had spent most of 2009 out of the state, in his new national role as chairman the Democratic National Committee, and did very little to help Deeds. Kaine's national ambition seems to have gotten in the way of his local role as Deeds' promoter and cheerleader, and he became, in the words of Professor Larry Sabato, more of a "partisan rather than a unifying figure" at home. However, the apathy of Democratic voters has deeper roots than just civic irresponsibility or lack of engagement. It is also a reflection of disillusion and even rage with the failure of the Obama administration to create jobs and to deal with Wall Street in stricter terms, for example by breaking up the "too-big-to-fail" banks, introducing stricter regulation of derivatives trading and by reducing of CEO's compensation. Again, in spite of all the rhetoric, Obama seems to have bailed out Wall Street at the expense of middle-class tax payers and small businesses. In sum, Obama's young followers and liberals stayed home because Obama is moving too slowly in crucial issues; independents switched parties because of their own fears of losing their jobs and facing higher taxes, as well as to punish the Democrats for too much government spending with little results for higher employment; and McDonnell benefited as much from a weak, erratic opponent who ran a terrible campaign as he did from his own smart strategy and pragmatic style.While the main problem then for Democrats is how to energize the base so that they can fulfill their civic duty and vote, the Republicans have the opposite problem: how to control their base so that it does not get in the way of allowing the party to field moderate candidates that can get the Independent vote. In this sense, what happened in New York 23rd district may be a blessing in disguise for the Republicans, as it will teach them a lesson in time for next year mid-term election. In this previously little known congressional district near the Canadian border, the Republican Party nominated moderate Assemblywoman DeDe Scozzafava in a special election called to fill the seat of Representative JohnMcHugh (R-NY) who had been appointed Secretary of the Army by President Obama. This was regarded as a safe Republican seat given that the party had held it for over 100 years. However, in a twist of events that took both parties by surprise, Conservatives rebelled against the party nominee, whose social values were deemed too liberal, and fielded their own candidate, Doug Hoffman, with the support of talk show celebrities Rush Limbaugh, Glen Beck and Sarah Palin. The Club for Growth, main supporter of Tea Partiers and Birthers, poured a lot of money in support of Hoffman, and consequently Scozzafava, the official Republican Party nominee, started training in the polls. On the weekend before the election, Scozzafava abandoned the race and endorsed the Democratic candidate! The Right was jubilant, confident of a victory in this rural district, which has very few immigrants and is 93% white. Indeed, Fox news insisted on predicting a "tidal wave" in favor of the Conservative candidate all throughout Election Day, only to be forced to concede at past midnight that instead, the Democratic candidate, Bill Owens, had won. The election in the 23rd district, then, served as a warning to Republicans of whatnot to do in 2010. While the two Republicans that won the gubernatorial races did so by moving to center, thus appealing to Independents and moderates, the main losers in New York state were the Tea Partiers and Birthers who have taken advantage of the vacuum of leadership at the top, have hijacked the Republican Party and made the country at times seem ungovernable. Let it be noted here that both conservative candidates then- to- be governors elect, Chris Christie in New Jersey and Bob McDonnell in Virginia, had rejected Palin's offer to campaign for them. Recognizing the relevance of this kind of wisdom, as well as his good looks and ability to persuade, McDonnell is already being touted as a possible candidate for the 2012 national ticket.2009 will be remembered as the year of anti-incumbency, but this anti-incumbent mood is not so much about Obama, who still enjoys close to 60% of popularity, as it is about government in general. Indeed, every special Congressional election since Obama assumed the presidency has been won by Democrats even in seats previously held by Republicans. In politics, one year is an eternity, so it is difficult to extrapolate the November 3rd results to next year's mid-term election. It all depends on whether the economic stimulus starts to work more consistently and is translated into jobs. The passage of health care reform by the House is undoubtedly a victory for Democrats, but it was a narrow one, with 39 Democrats voting against it, in spite of serious compromises by House Speaker Pelosi, including one amendment that prohibits the use of federal money for abortion and that is already under fire by the party's liberals. If the so-called Stupak amendment is not taken out in House-Senate conference, then the Party may see a huge backlash by women and other groups. Still, health care reform will be a reality by year's end, and once it passes it will become sacred: voters will embrace it (as they did with Medicaid and Medicare, as well as Social Security) and, together with job recovery, it may become the basis of a better mid-term election for Democrats than most pundits are predicting now.Finally, while the two gubernatorial races were won by the Republicans, and can be read as a warning to incumbent governors everywhere in next year's elections, it is clear that the largest group that went to the polls were mainly McCain voters, as well as disgruntled independent voters who shifted to the right. And while this trend is good news for the Republicans, the inexorable weight of demographics is against them: these races were won by an overwhelmingly white and older, more male than female, electorate who constitute at the same time an increasingly smaller percentage of the population as a whole. The fastest-rising voting groups do not vote for the Republican Party, which they consider the party "without ideas". To win next year, the GOP needs to regroup fast, get rid of the Palin-Limbaugh baggage and find new leadership. A year has gone by since their huge electoral loss and they have yet to find it. Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia
Die Inhalte der verlinkten Blogs und Blog Beiträge unterliegen in vielen Fällen keiner redaktionellen Kontrolle.
Warnung zur Verfügbarkeit
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Blogbetreiber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie einen Blog Beitrag zitieren möchten.
It's not too early to declare some winners and losers in Louisiana's state elections this cycle, primarily because so many contests already have been decided or wrote on the wall what will come in next month's runoff elections.
WINNER: Jeff Landry. The Republican attorney general wiped out all opposition in the gubernatorial race, in the most impressive display of the 1974 Constitution era. He became the first first-time candidate ever to win without a runoff and joining only Democrat Edwin Edwards (1983), Republican Mike Foster (1999), and Republican Bobby Jindal (2007 and 2011) in pulling off the feat of a general election triumph. That he did so bodes well for his powers of persuasion in herding the Legislature, which almost certainly will deliver supermajorities for his party, towards delivering on an agenda that looks to be the most transformative in a century.
WINNER: Billy Nungesser. The chattering class (see Loser below) thought he could give Landry a run for his money and were somewhat surprised when the Republican passed on that race to win reelection as lieutenant governor. Perhaps he knew something that other like GOP Treas. John Schroder and GOP state Sen. Sharon Hewitt didn't, that Landry would win. His big win keeps him in office while others retire or hope to bag jobs in the Landry Administration.
WINNER: Jefferson Parish GOP legislators. Too often, a majority of this group abandoned a conservative agenda in favor of licking the boots of Democrat Gov. John Bel Edwards, which made a few of them targets in their reelection campaigns of conservative insurgents. Those challenged all survived, from narrowly to easily. Now they conveniently can flip-flop to back Landry's agenda (with one exception: closed primaries that threaten their continued service) since they know they can't stop it and thus try to keep their political careers alive.
LOSER: Louisiana Democrats. The party's ruling white powerbrokers ran a poor gubernatorial candidate in the form of former cabinet member Shawn Wilson, knowing they had to have some black face to head the ticket to stave off extremist left insurgent black competitors. The inevitability of Landry also discouraged turnout, dooming any chance to prevent Republicans from doing no worse in legislative contests that ensured retention of a supermajority. Landry's win and separate Board of Elementary and Secondary Education campaigns that also weren't close now gives the GOP a commanding 9-2 edge on that body. And Republicans after Nov. 18 will have swept all statewide offices, after all but one of these contests put them within a few points of winning outright in the general election, if not Landry and Nungesser winning then.
Two other indicators demonstrate the reality of this rout. A white Democrat minister named Danny Cole raised and spent no money in running for governor, conducting his campaign solely through free social media and personal appearances, yet grabbed 3 percent of the vote, such was the dissatisfaction with Wilson. And in Caddo Parish, for sheriff former Shreveport city councilor Republican John Nickelson racked up 45 percent of the vote against black Democrat former Shreveport chief administrative officer Henry Whitehorn's 35 percent, even though Nickelson has no law enforcement experience and Whitehorn has decades of it, in a parish with a solid Democrat plurality and bare white plurality. Statewide Democrats had zero coattails, and the results sends the strongest signal yet that unless it abandons its far-left agenda it will have no impact on policy-making on state issues.
LOSER: Legacy media. Whatever generally left-leaning newspaper and television outlets did, in terms of story selections trying to slow Landry or cajoling him to turn out for debates hoping to catch him off guard, failed. Landry as well as a number of conservative candidates simply ignored media requests and campaigned emphasizing cutting out intermediaries like the media – Landry showed up for exactly one of several media-sponsored candidate forums – by going directly to voters. As a result, the state's chattering class had almost no influence on election outcomes and face increasing irrelevancy in trying to shape policy outcomes going forward.
LOSER: Clay Schexnayder. After four years of serving as House of Representative speaker kissing up to Edwards on budget and several other major issues, although the dictates of the GOP supermajority more often pushed policy in a conservative direction, Schexnayder hoped that this triangulation legacy could retain enough conservatives and capture enough non-conservatives in the electorate to attain the secretary of state's office, aided by business-as-usual monied interests, to extend his political career and set himself up for future advancement. Instead, he finished a dismal fourth that extinguishes his hopes.
학위논문 (석사)-- 서울대학교 대학원 : 행정학과, 2012. 2. 이승종. ; 민선 5기 지방선거 이후 우리나라 지방자치는 새로운 양상으로 진행되고 있다. 지방자치의 정치화, 지방정치의 중앙화가 가속화되었으며 특히 무상급식이라는 정책이슈가 지방자치의 주류 현안으로 등장하게 되었다. 이 논문은 무상급식 이슈가 대표적인 양대 지방자치단체인 서울시와 경기도에서, 유사한 정책 환경에도 불구하고 전혀 다른 정책결과를 낳은 점에 주목하였다. 이를 위해 서울시와 경기도의 무상급식과 관련된 정책 환경의 공통점과 차이점을 알아보고 어떤 요소에 의해 상이한 정책결과가 나타났는지를 분석하고자 하였다. 급식정책 실시 결과라는 종속변수에 영향을 주는 독립변수로는 지방선거 결과, 지방의회 특성, 자치단체 재정규모, 마지막으로 단체장의 특성을 설정하였다. 연구 결과 두 지방자치단체는, 단체장의 정당배경 및 무상급식에 대한 소신, 지방의회의 정당간 분점정도, 의회규모, 의원 보수, 자치단체 재정규모 면에서 극히 유사하였으나 단체장 특성 가운데 정당배경 및 성장배경 보다는 갈등해결 전략에서 차이가 있음을 알 수 있었다. 그 결과 경기도에서는 김문수 지사가 명분을 지키면서도, 의회와 타협하여 상생의 길을 모색하였고 서울시에서는 오세훈 시장과 의회가 강경대응으로 일관하여 시장 사퇴라는 나쁜 선례를 남기고 말았다. 또한 당초 설정된 '단체장의 특성에 따라 급식정책은 영향을 받을 것이다' 라는 가설이 확인되었다. 정책적 함의로 첫째는 '지방선거의 지방화'를 위해 정치권이 노력해야한다는 점을 들 수 있다. 6.2 지방선거에서는, 행정학자들이 우리나라 지방정치의 문제점으로 거론해 온 지방정치의 중앙화 현상이 더욱 극심해진 결과를 보여주었다. 중앙당은 지방선거를 중앙선거의 대리전 또는 전초전으로 간주하는 태도를 버려야 할 것이다. 둘째는 정당들이 더욱 정책개발에 노력할 필요가 있다는 것이다. 민선 5기 선거는 무상급식 이슈가 전국을 휩쓴 선거로서, 여야 정당들은 지방차원의 정책 개발보다는 선거이슈 선점에 따른 공세 및 방어에 급급한 모습을 보여 주었다. 교육정책에는 무상급식 외에 절실한 문제들이 많이 있음에도 불구하고 마치 과거 민주화항쟁 당시의 대통령 직선제 요구를 방불케 하는 양자택일 양상으로 진행되었다. 또한 근거 없이 무상급식 요구를 포퓰리즘으로 매도한다거나, 선별적 급식지원 정책이 아이들에게 눈칫밥을 먹이는 것이라고 선동하는 것은 지방선거에서 우선 승리하고 보자는 식의 후진성을 보여주는 사례라고 할 수 있다. 정치권이 더욱 성숙해질 필요가 있다. 셋째 복지정책은 개별 지방자치단체의 재정상황 여건에 따라 추진할 필요가 있다. 연구결과 복지 선진국들도 국가별, 지역별로 다양한 급식 정책을 실시하고 있음을 알 수 있었다. 또한 지방자치단체와 의회는 일방적인 '힘'의 논리만 앞세우지 말고 서로 화합하여 선진 지방자치 문화 정착에 기여하여야 할 것이다. ; After the 5th local election by popular vote, Korea's local autonomy is taking on a new aspect. Party politics and centralization of local politics are accelerating. Especially free meals policy has become the mainstream issue of local autonomy. This paper paid attention to the fact that free meals issue brought about different outcome in two big typical local governments such as Seoul city and Gyeonggi province. For this research, first I tried to discern similarities and differences related to free meals policy environment and to analyze what factors brought about different outcome. I set up the local election result, financial ability of local government, and characteristic of local government head as independent variables which have influence on school meals policy. This reserch finds out that there was significant difference in characteristic of local government head, particularly conflict solving strategy rather than political backgrounds although there were many similarities in their parties, belief on free meals policy, inter-party domination structure, size of assembly, annual salary, local finance of the two local governments. In Gyeonggi province, Governor Kim negotiated with local assembly for peaceful coexistence, in Seoul city Mayor Oh and city assembly called for tighter controls. Finally Mayor Oh resigned because of the low turnout in inhabitant's poll on free meals policy. This is a bad precedent in local autonomy history. Also the hypothesis that free meals policy will be influenced according to the characteristic of local government head was confirmed. This study implies, first, all politicians should make a greater effort for localization of local election. In the 5th local election by popular vote, centralization of local politics which many scholars have mentioned so far was intensified. Central parties have to come off regarding local elections as proxy war and skirmish of the central general election. Second, parties should develop policies. The 5th local election was only for free meals policy issue all over Korea. Most of parties manage to cope with electoral situation related to free meals issue rather than policy development of local level. Free meals policy was considered as the only matter like direct presidential election system issue in 1987 although there are other urgent matters except free meals policy in education policy field. Also the ruling party politicians denounced free meals policy as populism, otherwise the opposition party politicians condemn selective welfare policy for vulnerable groups as discrimination of the poor. These cases are backward behaviors which aim at short-term election victory. All politicians must be more mature. Third, welfare policy need to be carried out depending on each local government's financial conditions. As mentioned earlier, even advanced countries implement various school meals policy on a case by case basis. Also local governments and local assemblies should cooperate each other for establishing desirable local autonomy culture not depending on the unilateral power. ; Master
The article analyzes the phenomenon of regional parties with all-Ukrainian status in the 2020 local elections. It is noted that the early and atypical for Ukraine parliamentary elections of 2014 were a direct consequence of the transformation of electoral consciousness during the Revolution of Dignity. It is noted that local elections have become decisive for the future political life in Ukraine due to several circumstances: these are the first local elections after the completion of the decentralization reform (on a new territorial basis); voters, according to the Electoral Code, could vote primarily for the party and choose its candidate; electoral technologies were transformed through the COVID-19 pandemic; low turnout for local elections has become a traditional fact, which encourages parties to maximize motivation and intensify their electoral field; some political parties, losing electoral support in most regions and turning into regional projects. It is stated that the local elections in 2020 changed the schedule of political players. Local elites in many regions relied on non-parliamentary parties, which marked the beginning of local political decentralization. Many voters opted for a particular political force, associating it with the hope of overcoming the crisis at both the national and local or even personal levels. The success of regional parties with all-Ukrainian status in the 2020 local elections in the regions is the result of growing confidence in regional elites, who often demonstrate their independence from parliamentary parties and pursue autonomous regional policies, which can have negative consequences if separatist sentiment and political activism intensify. national minorities. The Ukrainian state must understand these threats, and legal mechanisms must make it impossible to create regional political projects. Parliament needs to regulate the participation of political parties in local and parliamentary elections to avoid regionalism. ; У статті аналізується феномен регіональних партій із усеукраїнським статусом на місцевих виборах 2020 р. Зазначено, що позачергові та нетипові для України парламентські вибори у 2014 р. стали безпосереднім наслідком трансформації свідомості під час Революції гідності. Зауважено, що навіть з огляду на на пандемію коронавірусної хвороби, очікувану глобальну економічну кризу та інші суспільні проблеми в Україні відбулись місцеві вибори, і вони є визначальними для майбутнього політичного життя в Україні з огляду на кілька обставин: це перші місцеві вибори після завершення реформи децентралізації (на новій територіальній основі); виборці, за Виборчичм кодексом, могли проголосувати насамперед за партію і обирали її кандидата; відбулась трансформація виборчих технологій через пандемію коронавірусу; низька явка для місцевих виборів стала традиційним фактом, що спонукує партії до максимальної мотивації і активізації свого електорального поля; деякі політичні партії, втрачаючи електоральну підтримку в більшості регіонів, перетвоюються теж у регіональні проєкти.Вказано, що місцеві вибори 2020 р. змінили розклад політичних гравців. І хоча місцеві еліти у багатьох регіонах зробили ставку на непарламентські партії – це початок локальної політичної децентралізації. Більшість виборців зробили свій вибір на користь конкретної політичної сили, пов'язуючи з нею надію на вихід із кризи як на національному, так і на місцевому чи навіть особистому рівнях. Досліджено, що феномен успіху регіональних партій із усеукраїнським статусом на місцевих виборах 2020 р. у багатьох регіонах пов'язаний зі зростанням довіри до регіональних еліт, що часто демонструють свою незалежність від парламентських партій та здійснюють автономну регіональну політику, що може мати негативні наслідки за умови посилення сепаратистських відцентрових настроїв та політичної активізації національних меншин. Українська держава має розуміти ці загрози, а правові механізми мають унеможливлювати створення регіональних політичних проєктів. Парламенту необхідно унормувати участь політичних партій у місцевих та парламентських виборах для уникнення регіоналізму.Ключові слова: регіональна партія; сепаратизм; місцеві вибори; національні меншини; обласна рада; регіон; регіональний лідер; громада.
