Suchergebnisse

Abstract: This paper concentrates on the regulation of charitable organisations in the state of Victoria, where governments have sought to determine the bona fides of these organisations by obtaining their financial reports. A survey of the financial reports of registered Victorian charities indicates, however, that a significant proportion of charities do not supply this information. This deficiency indicates that government judgements about the bona fides of organisations cannot always be made, and the efficiency of regulation is therefore questioned. Other shortcomings in the regulation of charities are also identified. These include the problems incurred in seeking to implement these regulations and those which arise through the enforcement of the regulations themselves.

Individuals generate accounts to deflect threats to identity posed by undesired events or outcomes. The triangle model of accountability proposes that an actor's accountability is a function of the combined strength of three linkages: a prescription-event link (the clarity of the rules of conduct for the event), a prescription-identity link (the applicability of the rules to the actor), and an identity-event link (the perceived control the actor has over the event). Subjects were asked to choose among various accounts related to each of the three linkages. We predicted that when only one link was weak or ambiguous, preferred accounts would focus on the ambiguous link. Results were consistent with our hypotheses. The strengths of individual linkages of the accountability triangle are an important determinant of strategic accounting.

This report discusses the contents of the PAR's and their availability. It also presents information on a FY2007 PAR pilot program, recommendations for PAR improvement by the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) work group, and the FY2008 continuation of the PAR pilot program.

A Public Expenditure and Financial accountability (PEFA) repeat assessment was conducted in the Republic of Serbia (RoS) between November 2014 and May 2015 by an independent team of experts, led by the World Bank (WB). The assessment was financed jointly by the Strengthening of Accountability and the Fiduciary Environment (SAFE) Trust Fund of the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), the European Union Delegation to Serbia (EU Delegation) and WB. The period covered by this Assessment (2011-2013) was dominated by the challenges posed by the aftermath of the global economic recession which affected macro-fiscal performances. Notwithstanding these challenges PFM improvements can be observed in strengthening legislative framework, and Budget classification, multi-year fiscal planning, procurement and external audit. In other areas such as the composition of expenditure out-turn compared with originally approved budget, expenditures arrears, oversight of fiscal risk, and effectiveness of tax collection, predictability in the availability of funds, application of public sector accounting standards application and legislative scrutiny of annual budget law and final accounts, further work is needed to improve PFM performance.

Judicial independence and accountability are central legal and political values. Chapter III of the Australian Constitution entrenches the minimum standard for judicial independence. The High Court is the guardian against that standard being encroached. A mechanism for judicial accountability in the federal jurisdiction must be consistent with Chapter III. In recognition that the High Court will strictly enforce the primacy of Chapter III, the Parliamentary Judicial Misbehaviour or Incapacity Commission Bill is "a conservative constitutional approach to ensure validity".2 Section 72 of the Constitution provides a notional standard for the removal of federal judges; "proved misbehaviour or incapacity". However, the section does not clarify the appropriate procedure which the Parliament can adopt as they contemplate removal. T11e PJMIC would facilitate the credibility and transparency of parliamentary deliberations under s72 by providing an investigative service. Since the PJMIC does not adjudicate, or even directly receive, complaints, its scope of operation will be unlikely to infringe the exclusive vesting in s72. The PJMIC Bill is paralleled by a proposed amendment to the Senate and House of Representative Standing Orders. This amendment would impose important safeguards against the use of parliamentary privilege on hi vial or reckless grounds. 3 The misuse of parliamentary privilege in this regard would have serious consequences for public confidence in a Justice. Significant difficultly is presented by the situation of judicial misbehaviour or incapacity which, although constitutive of undesirable conduct, would not satisfy the threshold for removal. Where judicial misbehaviour or incapacity has directly impacted the outcome of a case, the appeals process may provide an immediate remedy. However, it should not remain the obligation of a party to detect and enforce proper judicial conduct. Where less serious judicial misconduct or incapacity has occurred, it is apt to question what the practical protection ensured by the concept of judicial independence is. If judges do not have margin to make some errors of judgement without a looming accountability mechanism, substantive make some errors of judgement without a looming accountability mechanism, substantive judicial independence is defeated. Under the current federal arrangement the treatment of complaints is effectively selfregulated by the judiciary. That is, complaints are resolved by an informal and collegial approach. This arrangement has recently been criticised as unacceptably secretive and lacking in transparency. 4 Given the growing public imperative for the transparent treatment of complaints, it is undesirable that judicial accountability in the federal jurisdiction remain an informal, differentiated and ad hoc procedure. In Australia, the use of judicial commissions has been controversial and inconsistent. The Judicial Commission of New South Wales, made constitutionally viable by the Kable doctrine, is increasingly presented as an ideal judicial commission. Although Victoria and Western Australia are currently contemplating the replication of the JCNSW, it is unlikely that a reform would be consistent with Chapter III in the federal context. The PJMIC is not structured to address less serious complaints, and neither it feasible to independence is defeated. Under the current federal arrangement the treatment of complaints is effectively selfregulated by the judiciary. That is, complaints are resolved by an informal and collegial approach. This arrangement has recently been criticised as unacceptably secretive and lacking in transparency.4 Given the growing public imperative for the transparent treatment of complaints, it is undesirable that judicial accountability in the federal jurisdiction remain an informal, differentiated and ad hoc procedure. In Australia, the use of judicial commissions has been controversial and inconsistent. The Judicial Commission of New South Wales, made constitutionally viable by the Kable doctrine, is increasingly presented as an ideal judicial commission. Although Victoria and Western Australia are currently contemplating the replication of the JCNSW, it is unlikely that a reform would be consistent with Chapter III in the federal context. The PJMIC is not structured to address less serious complaints, and neither it feasible to replicate the JCNSW. Accordingly, this paper recommends a replication of s21 B(IA)(b) of the Family Law Act 1975 in each federal court statute. It also adopts the recommendation of the Access to Justice Advisory Committee (1994) ('AJAC') proposal for the introduction of court charters. If each federal court would codify their expectations for performance standards in a charter, this would allow for judges, court staff, parliamentarians considering a s72 motion, and the general public to have the same expectations and information. A charter could also outline a comprehensive process for the treatment of complaints within each court; it could express precisely the responsibilities of the chief justices in complaint handling; and could implement the Constitutional Committee (2009) recommendation that the federal courts should publish quarterly complaint handling summaries.