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AbstractIn the 1990s, the integrity and performance of nonprofit organizations in the United States have come increasingly under attack, and there are new calls to hold nonprofit organizations more accountable for their behavior and performance. This article reports on a study of the organizational structures of national nonprofit associations and asks how these umbrella organizations can help to self‐regulate the sector through appropriate checks and balances between the national organization and local affiliates. The authors identify a number of differences in how associations with alternative structures hold local affiliates and national organizations responsible for their performances, and they conclude that structure is an avenue of self‐regulation for nonprofit organizations deserving further attention.

Most political support models imply that in evaluating economic performance, voters use a standard that would provide poor predictions of the future and leave the economy vulnerable to manipulation by vote-hungry politicians. Drawing on macroeconomic theory, we develop a simple standard of evaluation which encompasses a concern not only for current economic outcomes, but also for accurately assessed future consequences of current policies. We find that political support for the president can be explained as well by models that assume that voters use this sophisticated standard as by models that assume voter naivete.Our analysis questions the wisdom of measures typically used to assess voter evaluation of economic performance in a variety of theoretical contexts. The results also help to explain the absence of convincing evidence that governments exploit voter ignorance in manipulating the economy.

Correspondence issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Interior and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, and the Ranking Minority Member, House Subcommittee on Legislative, Committee on Appropriations, requested that we review the Library's Special Events Gift Fund. As agreed, we focused on the Library's analysis supporting its June 2000 decision to increase suggested room contributions associated with the Great Hall effective January 2001, and key policies, procedures, and controls associated with holding the approximately 120 fiscal year 2001 special events that were accounted for in the Gift Fund. Specifically, we agreed to (1) review and comment on the analysis behind the Library's January 2001 increase in the suggested room contributions from outside sponsors of events held in the Great Hall of the Jefferson Building; (2) identify key policies and procedures applicable to requesting, approving, and planning those special events accounted for through the Gift Fund and determine whether the Library is following those policies and procedures; and (3) identify key accounting and control policies and procedures over receipts, expenditures, and the fund balance of the Gift Fund and determine whether the Library is following those policies and procedures."

Using this Guide will facilitate the practical implementation of theOECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprisesin the areas of transparency and accountability. It provides viable policy options and a step-by-step road map on how to address typical difficulties, risks and hurdles that may be encountered. It also provides concrete examples of good practices that can serve as a reference and inspiration. The Guidewill help governments, their ownership entities and other stakeholders to evaluate existing practices and support reforms. In most countries, improving transparency and accountability in state-owned enterprises entails a number of complex challenges. Addressing these, with the help of this Guide, is an important step in the process of establishing well-governed and economically sound state-owned enterprises

Accountability of assets is an unfinished problem in almost all local governments in Indonesia. It is proved by the high number of audit findings from the State Audit Agency regarding asset management issues. The aim of this study is to analyze the implementation of the accountability of fixed assets of local government. The method used is qualitative method. Questionnaires and interviews were done for data collection. The respondents of the research are government officials and apparatus who are actively involved in managing regional assets. The result shows that the implementation of the legal and process accountability for fixed asset management in Jambi City is categorized as good.

Various schools of research in public policy (the literature on 'governance' and its continental counterparts) are converging to focus on the growth of policy styles based on cooperation and partnership in networks, instead of on vertical control by the state. This article focuses on issues of democratic accountability and responsiveness with these governance arrangements. It argues that until recently the legitimacy of governance networks was not at the forefront of theoretical developments, even though the 'democratic deficit' of governance is problematic both for normative and for pragmatic reasons. There is now increased sensitivity to this problem, but the remedies presented in the literature are unsatisfactory, and critiques of governance presuppose a somewhat idealised image of representative democracy in terms of accountability or responsiveness of decision-makers. They also fail to offer adequate solutions to some of the central legitimacy problems of policy-making in complex societies. (European Journal of Political Research / FUB)

Why would government officials in authoritarian and transitional systems where formal democratic and bureaucratic institutions of accountability are often weak ever provide more than the minimum level of public goods needed to maintain social stability? Findings from a unique combination of in-depth case study research and an original survey of 316 villages in rural China indicate that even when formal accountability is weak, local officials can be subject to unofficial rules and norms that establish and enforce their public obligations. These informal institutions of accountability can be provided by encompassing and embedding solidary groups. Villages where these types of groups exist are more likely to have better local governmental public goods provision than villages without these solidary groups, all other things being equal.

AbstractThis article critically examines the concept of 'accountability' as it is understood in two‐party systems and majoritarian democracy – namely the ability of voters to remove governments that violate their mandates or otherwise perform poorly. Voters' capacity to 'throw the rascals out' is one of the main normative appeals of two‐partism and the single‐member plurality (SMP) electoral system. However, this article uses a spatial model to show that in at least two types of situation voters are left in a bind when confronted with a mandate‐breaking governing party: (1) when both major parties undertake unexpected non‐centrist shifts in opposing directions after an election, leaving centrist voters with an unappealing choice; and (2) when a governing party that had won an election on a non‐centrist platform undertakes a post‐election shift to the centre, leaving its more radical supporters dissatisfied. In each case, voters have four imperfect options: punish the governing party by throwing the rascals out, but in doing so vote for a party that is ideologically more distant; abstain, and withdraw from the democratic process; vote for a minor party that has no hope of influencing government formation, but which might detach enough votes to allow the ideologically more distant major opposition party to win; and forgive the governing party its mandate‐breaking. All of these options represent accountability failures. The problems are illustrated with two case studies from two‐party systems: the United Kingdom in the mid‐1980s and New Zealand in the period 1984–1993. In both instances, many voters found it difficult to 'throw the rascals out' without harming their own interests in the process. The article concludes that accountability may sometimes be better achieved if voters can force a party to share power in coalition with another party in order to 'keep it honest' instead of removing it from government completely, as can happen in multi‐party systems based on proportional representation. Thus, although two‐partism based on plurality voting is normally regarded as superior to multi‐partism and proportional representation on the criterion of accountability, in some instances, the reverse can be true. The article therefore undermines a core normative argument advanced by supporters of majoritarian democracy and SMP.

AbstractDoes increasing executive power necessarily decrease accountability? To answer this question, I develop a two-period signaling model comparing voter welfare in two separation-of-powers settings. In one, the executive works with a median legislator to change policy; in the other, the executive chooses between legislation or unilateral action. Both politicians may have preferences that diverge from the voter's, yet I find that increasing executive power may increase accountability and welfare, even in some cases when the legislator is more likely to share the voter's preferences than the executive. Unilateral power allows a congruent executive to overcome gridlock, implement the voter's preferred policy, and reveal information about the politicians' types—which can outweigh the risks of a divergent executive wielding power for partisan ends.