Suchergebnisse

[full article, abstract in German; abstract in English] Im Kapitel 8 desGemeinsamen europäischen Referenzrahmens für Sprachen (GER) wird die sogenannte mehrsprachige und plurikulturelle Kompetenz als weiteres Ziel des Sprachenlernens erläutert. Dementsprechend wird die allgemeine Sprachkompetenz "nicht als Schichtung oder als ein Nebeneinander von getrennten Kompetenzen verstanden, sondern vielmehr als eine komplexe oder sogar gemischte Kompetenz" (Trim et al. 2001, p. 163) betrachtet. Insgesamt werden 140 Auslandsschulen mit Ressourcen des deutschen Auswärtigen Amtes in 71 Ländern gefördert. Von 80.000 Schülern besitzen ca. 73% weder die deutsche Staatsbürgerschaft noch sprechen sie Deutsch als Erstsprache. Meistens handelt es sich um private Bildungsanstalten, welche als bikulturelle Begegnungsschulen bezeichnet und von Kindern und Jugendlichen aus ökonomisch privilegierten Elternhäusern besucht werden. In diesem Zusammenhang stellt sich die Kernfrage: Inwiefern entspricht der dabei erwartete interkulturelle Dialog den Austauschdynamiken und Identitätsprozessen, wie sie im Schulalltag festgestellt werden können, und auch den Prämissen des GER in Bezug auf interkulturelle und mehrsprachige Kompetenz? An welcher sprachlichen Ideologie orientiert sich der Diskurs und die pädagogische Praxis in solchen binationalen Schuleinrichtungen? Die Analyse des institutionellen Diskurses der untersuchten Einrichtung zeigt ihren ideologischen Unterbau und die soziopolitische Zielgruppe auf, die sie in den Blick nimmt, sowie ihre Einstellung zu Interkulturalität und Mehrsprachigkeit. Die überwiegende Spracheinstellung verweist noch auf den "Nativitätsmythos" (Rajagopalan 1997, p. 226 f.), indem die Sprachkompetenz des zweisprachigen Individuums hinsichtlich eines anachronistischen, imaginären 'Muttersprachlers' bewertet wird. Encounter Schools and Foreign Language: The Pedagogical-Institutional Discourse about Multilingual and Pluricultural Competence Promotion in a German School Abroad Among the 80,000 students attending the 140 German schools abroad, about 73% are not German or 'native' German speakers. These are usually private schools, called "bicultural schools of encounter" frequented by children and young people from the economically privileged classes. The purpose of this study is to analyze the permeability of the space of this encounter and between the internal structures of the same. We seek to elucidate the extent to which the model of intercultural dialogue envisaged by this political project corresponds to the dynamics of exchanges and identity re-elaborations that occur organically and to the assumptions of the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR) in relation to the development of intercultural and plurilingual competences. Analyzing the presentation of the institutional profile and pedagogical plan in the homepage of one of these schools, we hope to counter the vestiges of this proposal of literacy in the school environment to the social and linguistic representations shared by these institutions and their target audience. In this context, the key question arises: To what extent does the expected intercultural dialogue correspond to the exchange dynamics and identity processes that can be identified in everyday school life, and to the premises of the CEFR in relation to intercultural and multilingual competence? At which linguistic ideology is the discourse and pedagogical practice in such binational institutions oriented? The analysis of the institutional discourse of a bilingual German school located in Brazil aims to reveal its ideological substructure and the socio-political target group that it looks at, as well as its attitude to interculturality and multilingualism. According to the results, the predominant language attitude still refers to the "myth of nativity" (Rajagopalan 1997: 226 f.), in which the linguistic competence of the bilingual individual is evaluated in terms of an anachronistic, imaginary 'native speaker'. The theoretical basis for this study is presented in the first two chapters, followed by a brief discussion of the methodology applied on this research. Afterwards, chapter 5 deals in depth with the institutional discourse on the examined school concept. Chapter 6 deals with language attitudes and transcultural processes in reports on multidisciplinary activities and the following concluding chapter tries to reconstruct the challenges of a partly organic, partly planned development towards a multilingual (school) identity.

Die Energiewende ist zu einer globalen Herausforderung geworden. Deutschland kann mit seinen Erfahrungen mithelfen, diese zu bewältigen. Doch gegenwärtig herrscht in der Energiewende-Außenpolitik teilweise ziemliches Durcheinander. Zwar wird immer wieder Kohärenz gefordert, doch wie soll das gehen? Ein paar Vorschläge. (IP)

Seit 60 Jahren wird im Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) Europa gedacht – dies ist die Bilanz internationaler Forschung und Kommunikation für Politik und Zivilgesellschaft, mit Beiträgen aus allen Epochen und Arbeitsbereichen, von 23 Autoren und Autorinnen, die das IEP mitgestaltet und begleitet haben. Hervorgegangen aus den euro-föderalistischen Bewegungen der Nachkriegszeit hat sich das IEP als Thinktank in Deutschland durch interdisziplinäre Wissenschaft und Forschung, durch Publikationen und Veranstaltungen, durch Schulungs- und Lehrprogramme in der deutschen Europapolitik einen Namen gemacht als Vordenker, Ratgeber und Agenda-Setter.Die in diesem Band präsentierten Entwicklungen und Forschungsfelder reichen von den Optionen, die sich zu Zeiten der Römischen Verträge boten, bis zur Zentralasienpolitik der Europäischen Union heute, über die Einbindung Mitteleuropas in die europäische Integration nach der Wende von 1989 bis zu Fragen der Demokratisierung des EU-Systems.Mit Beiträgen vonDr. Katrin Böttger, Dr. Gianni Bonvicini, Dr. Wolf-Ruthart Born, Elmar Brok, Dr. Vladimír Handl, Dr. Gunilla Herolf, Dr. Werner Hoyer, Prof. Dr. Rudolf Hrbek, Prof. Dr. Mathias Jopp, Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Beate Kohler, Prof. Dr. Michael Kreile, Dr. Barbara Lippert, Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Wilfried Loth, Prof. Dr. Hartmut Marhold, Prof. Dr. Jürgen Mittag, Prof. Dr. Dr. iur. habil. Dr. h.c. mult. Peter-Christian Müller-Graff, Ph.D. h.c., MAE, Dr. Elfriede Regelsberger, Axel Schäfer, Dr. Otto Schmuck, Dr. Franz Schoser, Dr. Funda Tekin, Dr. Jürgen Trumpf, Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Wessels

The main reason for blaming the EU for not watching the regional reforms more often is based on the idea that the EU has a chance to stimulate and positively influence developments in Central Asia and Kazakhstan and to provide a democratic social model. Many analysts think the EU could use economic relations and business ties in the region for the sake of social development and vice versa arguing that social instability affects the EU business relations forcing Kazakhstani government to finally solve problems and execute necessary democratic reforms. For instance, Sebastien Peyrouse sees the following behavior: "In theory, Europe could make use of its business potential to help spread the social model it incarnates. The EU could thus choose to privilege business relations that commit the participants to ensuring certain legal standards in economic activity and to strengthening the rule of law. This could be done, for instance, by giving preference to Central Asian companies that are committed to respecting the rights of local workers, to fighting corruption, promoting fair competition and good corporate governance, and recognizing the importance of contracts. The long-term objective would be to increase the social responsibility of Central Asian companies – something that has indirect repercussions on the societies" (PEYROUSE 2009, P. 11). Nevertheless, he also doubts that it can be easily done because of possible accusations by using "its own doorstep to tax heavens – particularly in Luxembourg - where Central Asian heads of state, their families and the oligarchs close to them deposit money siphoned off from national wealth" (PEYROUSE 2009, P. 11). However, the history of the EU as a welfare union of states is more powerful than the use of accusations. Therefore, European politicians may successfully use economic ties, contacts, and obligations in long-term trade relations to influence the government to provide better social reforms to secure stability, as well as strengthen the power of the EU as an external player in the region. In this case, the economic topic should serve as a basis for the European strategy in the region. "The EU therefore has every reason to implement forms of development assistance which, by helping European companies to establish themselves in the market, will play a key role in reducing Central Asia's social vulnerability and will contribute to the fight against poverty, which is currently the main issue that needs to be addressed by the international community and by regional governments" (PEYROUSE 2009, P. 11). Continuation of this strategy that will enforce Kazakhstani government to provide the society with necessary reforms will gain a positive image for the union both within the region and globally. This also may help the EU, as an external player, to further obtain influence on governmental decision-making processes. It is obvious that social stability is the key to decrease economical risk factors and to improve the investment climate to benefit the whole development of a country or union. In this case, the EU strategy will profit the EU itself. Chances for a successful realization of such a plan are relatively high. Kazakhstan has been conduction fruitful business with EU Member States. According to the statistics, provided by the German Auswaertiges Amt, Germany takes place number eight in the list of Kazakhstan trading partners with a commodity turnover of EUR 5.7 billion in 2008, and it continues to grow (AUSWAERTIGES AMT 2009). "In this area, Kazakhstan does not hide its ambitions; its "Path to Europe" program clearly states its intention to become one of the main communications hubs between Asia and Europe" (PEYROUSE 2009, P. 9), according to Sebastien Peyrouse, who specialized on Central Asian trade and economic relations. The program called "Path to Europe" was signed by the President in August 2008 and supposed to be implemented during 2009-2011. According to evaluations made by the EU and Kazakhstani political analysts, the program will help to intensify and deepen the political collaboration between Kazakhstan and the EU. The introduction of the program has 3 stages and the basis for implementation of the program was prepared carefully. First of all, the president addressed his hopes for future profitable relations with the EU beforehand, in his annual message to the people of Kazakhstan. This message was used by Kazakhstani officials during political meetings to announce the future document. Finally, the document was signed and came into force in August 2008. The program seemed to be very promising. For instance, in March 2008, during the conference in the Netherlands, organized with the help of the Kazakhstan embassy, the ambassador of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Mainura Murzamadiyeva, familiarized more than 70 representatives of political, informational, and business layers of the Netherlands with the President´s message to the people of Kazakhstan, where he had announced the future program. Many of Dutch political scientists stated that the proposals the president made in his message will definitely intensify political cooperation between Kazakhstan and the EU, attract foreign investments, bring new technologies, and help to bring people of different regions close to each other. Analyzing the program "Path to Europe" that is celebrating its first anniversary this August, since it was signed in 2008, the following objectives are performed by the government of the Republic of Kazakhstan: - Cooperation with the EU countries; - Creation of required conditions for technological cooperation; - Energy cooperation development; - Transport cooperation development; - Technical regulation and metrology cooperation; - Trade-economic relation strengthening and broadening; - Small and medium-sized enterprises development; - Living conditions improvement cooperation; - Humanitarian cooperation; - Kazakhstani legal base improvement and European experience application. Kazakhstan clearly stated that it expects the level of a strategic partnership with leading European countries in political, economic, and humanitarian spheres and a trade commodity turnover increase by 10% per year as well as a high level of exchange visits. The country also expects the EU to help to promote Kazakhstan internationally which will improve the investment climate and, therefore, the economic situation. However, priorities of the country remain unclear showing the country's reluctance to answer the questions on how to establish democracy and solve the following problems "continuation of efforts on creation of conditions for democracy institutions development on the OSCE territory; transport and transit potential development; Eurasian transcontinental transport corridors development; ecological problems solutions; trust measures and regional security strengthening; non-military aspects of safety development under the OSCE activities including terror, extremism, drug trafficking, organized crime, weapons' and people's sale fighting and Afghanistan reconstruction". To reach the declared goals and priorities, Kazakhstan needs the support of the EU and cooperation. Many political and business analysts provide recommendations suggesting to establish trade chambers and delegation sections related to trade and business that will monitor the activities, provide more legal support and consultations for small and medium-sized business in the region. Further, they suggest establishing more exchange programs for Kazakhstani businessmen to bring more business culture and experience. To monitor and evaluate the progress, the EU can establish clear and visible rating systems with distinct conditions and deadlines. In this case, evaluation committees and reports with full transparency are crucial. However, the first step, the EU should fulfill, is to admit that the time of 'soft power' has ended and finally declare a clear political dimension. Without a distinctive view and goal, the EU will not succeed in representing a strong power and will not improve the policy that has been executing in Kazakhstan since signing the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 1992.