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The socio-educative background of the incumbent leader of « Tanzim al Jihad », the most revolutionary of Islamist trends to have branched out on the banks of the Nile, does better than reams of discourse in illustrating the danger of an indefatigably "economicist" reading of the phenomenon. A trained surgeon himself and husband to a philosopher, Ayman al Zawahiri is the son of a University Dean and a don. But recapping the family tree of the leader of the organisation which succeeded in assassinating president Anwar Sadate (already then, under seal of approval by a certain 'alim from Al-Azhar University named Omar Abdurrahman) only goes to emphasize still further how great, in political analysis, is the risk of hair-splitting – however useful this may be at other times – when discussing the different expressions of Islamic religion: Sufi, Azhari or Islamist. On the paternal side, Ayman al-Zawahiri is the grandson of. an Al-Azhar Sheikh (Rabi' Al-Zawahiri) and through his mother (daughter of Abdelwahab 'Azzam), a Rector of Cairo's University, a late ambassador, but above all. the Sheikh of a Sufi brotherhood! In Egypt, as elsewhere, the use of the "Islamist" label in depicting the relations between society, politics and religion comes up against the eternal problem of definition. In the western view – and not only on the media – it remains wholly negative in connotation, which is far from being the case in the thick of Arab societies. It then tends to reinforce the thesis of a political instrumentalisation of religion to be placed statically and "a-historically" at the Islamists' door, identifying them in dichotomy with other forms of belief. Within the rigid framework of their current definition, the Islamists are indeed "those people who – because development policies have left them by the wayside – instrumentalise Islam as a form of opposition to established political power". They reputedly do so by basing themselves on an erroneous interpretation of the religious message, at eternal loggerheads with the very ...

The socio-educative background of the incumbent leader of « Tanzim al Jihad », the most revolutionary of Islamist trends to have branched out on the banks of the Nile, does better than reams of discourse in illustrating the danger of an indefatigably "economicist" reading of the phenomenon. A trained surgeon himself and husband to a philosopher, Ayman al Zawahiri is the son of a University Dean and a don. But recapping the family tree of the leader of the organisation which succeeded in assassinating president Anwar Sadate (already then, under seal of approval by a certain 'alim from Al-Azhar University named Omar Abdurrahman) only goes to emphasize still further how great, in political analysis, is the risk of hair-splitting – however useful this may be at other times – when discussing the different expressions of Islamic religion: Sufi, Azhari or Islamist. On the paternal side, Ayman al-Zawahiri is the grandson of. an Al-Azhar Sheikh (Rabi' Al-Zawahiri) and through his mother (daughter of Abdelwahab 'Azzam), a Rector of Cairo's University, a late ambassador, but above all. the Sheikh of a Sufi brotherhood! In Egypt, as elsewhere, the use of the "Islamist" label in depicting the relations between society, politics and religion comes up against the eternal problem of definition. In the western view – and not only on the media – it remains wholly negative in connotation, which is far from being the case in the thick of Arab societies. It then tends to reinforce the thesis of a political instrumentalisation of religion to be placed statically and "a-historically" at the Islamists' door, identifying them in dichotomy with other forms of belief. Within the rigid framework of their current definition, the Islamists are indeed "those people who – because development policies have left them by the wayside – instrumentalise Islam as a form of opposition to established political power". They reputedly do so by basing themselves on an erroneous interpretation of the religious message, at eternal loggerheads with the very ...

The socio-educative background of the incumbent leader of « Tanzim al Jihad », the most revolutionary of Islamist trends to have branched out on the banks of the Nile, does better than reams of discourse in illustrating the danger of an indefatigably "economicist" reading of the phenomenon. A trained surgeon himself and husband to a philosopher, Ayman al Zawahiri is the son of a University Dean and a don. But recapping the family tree of the leader of the organisation which succeeded in assassinating president Anwar Sadate (already then, under seal of approval by a certain 'alim from Al-Azhar University named Omar Abdurrahman) only goes to emphasize still further how great, in political analysis, is the risk of hair-splitting – however useful this may be at other times – when discussing the different expressions of Islamic religion: Sufi, Azhari or Islamist. On the paternal side, Ayman al-Zawahiri is the grandson of. an Al-Azhar Sheikh (Rabi' Al-Zawahiri) and through his mother (daughter of Abdelwahab 'Azzam), a Rector of Cairo's University, a late ambassador, but above all. the Sheikh of a Sufi brotherhood! In Egypt, as elsewhere, the use of the "Islamist" label in depicting the relations between society, politics and religion comes up against the eternal problem of definition. In the western view – and not only on the media – it remains wholly negative in connotation, which is far from being the case in the thick of Arab societies. It then tends to reinforce the thesis of a political instrumentalisation of religion to be placed statically and "a-historically" at the Islamists' door, identifying them in dichotomy with other forms of belief. Within the rigid framework of their current definition, the Islamists are indeed "those people who – because development policies have left them by the wayside – instrumentalise Islam as a form of opposition to established political power". They reputedly do so by basing themselves on an erroneous interpretation of the religious message, at eternal loggerheads with the very ...

This research focuses on how the public policy against domestic violence has been set up, how it has evolved, and how it is currently implemented. Using a sociohistorical approach, I did an ethnography of some of the feminist non-profit organizations which provide victims of domestic violence and their children with counseling and accommodation, and I did interviews with professionals of government institutions in order to understand how public action has been dealing with the issue of domestic violence. Framed as intolerable at the end of the second wave feminist movement, domestic violence became a feminist cause which is now supported by professional and institutional associations. Thanks to the production of a body of scientific knowledge and its practical translation by state feminism, this cause has become legitimate and was put on the political agenda. Analyzing the activist careers of the organizations' founders helps to understand the organizational decisions they made, as well as the reasons why they moved into the social work sector. A new group of professionals came into being, and it was made of three types of activist workers. Their professional training and socialization participate in shaping a feminist professional group, differing from social workers in their practice as well as in their framing of domestic violence. The way laws and judicial practice has evolved, professional controversies and the new public management of public policies are all elements which shed light on the dynamics of change in the public policy. As well as a contribution to the analysis of public policies, this research seeks to make feminist professional practice visible. ; La politique publique de lutte contre les violences conjugales constitue l'objet de cette thèse, qui en retrace les fondements, la mise en œuvre actuelle et les éléments au principe des processus de changement. A partir d'une approche sociohistorique et d'une enquête ethnographique dans les associations féministes accueillant et hébergeant des femmes victimes et leurs enfants, et par entretiens auprès des professionnels des institutions étatiques, cette recherche se propose d'étudier les ressorts de l'action publique luttant contre les violences conjugales. Constituées en intolérable à la fin du mouvement féministe de la seconde vague, les violences conjugales sont devenues une cause féministe, défendue par des associations aujourd'hui professionnalisées et institutionnalisées. Légitimée par la production de savoirs scientifiques, cette cause a également été l'objet d'un travail de retraduction par le féminisme d'Etat, pour être ensuite mise à l'agenda politique. Les carrières militantes des fondatrices des structures d'accueil permettent de comprendre le projet associatif qu'elles ont soutenu, et les raisons de leur choix d'investir le secteur du travail social. Un nouveau groupe professionnel émerge, auquel participent trois figures de travailleuses militantes. La spécificité de leurs pratiques, et du cadre d'interprétation des violences conjugales les distinguent dans l'espace du travail social : les formations et socialisations professionnelles contribuent au devenir d'un groupe professionnel féministe. L'analyse de la mise en œuvre de la politique publique conduit ensuite à rendre compte des dynamiques de changement. Les évolutions de la législation et des pratiques judiciaires, les controverses professionnelles ainsi que la nouvelle gestion publique comme mode d'administration des politiques publiques, constituent les principaux ressorts du changement de la politique publique. Contribuant à l'analyse des politiques publiques, cette thèse entend aussi rendre visibles des pratiques professionnelles féministes, trop rarement étudiées.

Since the 2000s and especially with the contested military dispatch in the war in Iraq, new modes of expression of civil society have been developed in Spain alongside the traditional institutional tools. As of 2008, the economic crisis seems to consolidate these new protesters practices. Ocupation of empty buildings, workshops in self-managed spaces, transformation of wasteland left by demolished buildings into vegetable gardens, or even Indignados and Democracia Real Ya collective's demonstrations, which have helped bringing these different initiatives in a more unified movement, could reflect a weariness of Spanish citizens against traditional forms of commitment.Could the graphical occupation of public space and the increased presence of anti-establishment and protest street art work prove to form another method of activism ? This work wishes to question the validity of engaged public art as an alternative to exercising one's civil rights. Why are these artists illegally occupying public space ? How are these interventions being seen by passersby ? To what extent do these images affect both space and public consciousness ? The first part attempts to define the outline of this hybrid custom based on different forms of graphical occupation on the walls. In the second part, an overview of public art interventions is proposed and is classified into three main categories : cultural activism, social demands and political protest. The last part of this work presents the results of various surveys conducted in Madrid between 2009 and 2014 to measure the intentions and the scope of these public art interventions. ; Depuis les années 2000 et particulièrement avec l'engagement contesté des troupes militaires dans la guerre en Irak et en Afghanistan, de nouvelles modalités d'expression de la société civile se sont développées en Espagne, en marge des outils institutionnels classiques. À partir de 2008, la crise économique semble consolider ces nouvelles pratiques contestataires. L'occupation d'immeubles vides, ...

Since the 2000s and especially with the contested military dispatch in the war in Iraq, new modes of expression of civil society have been developed in Spain alongside the traditional institutional tools. As of 2008, the economic crisis seems to consolidate these new protesters practices. Ocupation of empty buildings, workshops in self-managed spaces, transformation of wasteland left by demolished buildings into vegetable gardens, or even Indignados and Democracia Real Ya collective's demonstrations, which have helped bringing these different initiatives in a more unified movement, could reflect a weariness of Spanish citizens against traditional forms of commitment.Could the graphical occupation of public space and the increased presence of anti-establishment and protest street art work prove to form another method of activism ? This work wishes to question the validity of engaged public art as an alternative to exercising one's civil rights. Why are these artists illegally occupying public space ? How are these interventions being seen by passersby ? To what extent do these images affect both space and public consciousness ? The first part attempts to define the outline of this hybrid custom based on different forms of graphical occupation on the walls. In the second part, an overview of public art interventions is proposed and is classified into three main categories : cultural activism, social demands and political protest. The last part of this work presents the results of various surveys conducted in Madrid between 2009 and 2014 to measure the intentions and the scope of these public art interventions. ; Depuis les années 2000 et particulièrement avec l'engagement contesté des troupes militaires dans la guerre en Irak et en Afghanistan, de nouvelles modalités d'expression de la société civile se sont développées en Espagne, en marge des outils institutionnels classiques. À partir de 2008, la crise économique semble consolider ces nouvelles pratiques contestataires. L'occupation d'immeubles vides, ...

Since the 2000s and especially with the contested military dispatch in the war in Iraq, new modes of expression of civil society have been developed in Spain alongside the traditional institutional tools. As of 2008, the economic crisis seems to consolidate these new protesters practices. Ocupation of empty buildings, workshops in self-managed spaces, transformation of wasteland left by demolished buildings into vegetable gardens, or even Indignados and Democracia Real Ya collective's demonstrations, which have helped bringing these different initiatives in a more unified movement, could reflect a weariness of Spanish citizens against traditional forms of commitment.Could the graphical occupation of public space and the increased presence of anti-establishment and protest street art work prove to form another method of activism ? This work wishes to question the validity of engaged public art as an alternative to exercising one's civil rights. Why are these artists illegally occupying public space ? How are these interventions being seen by passersby ? To what extent do these images affect both space and public consciousness ? The first part attempts to define the outline of this hybrid custom based on different forms of graphical occupation on the walls. In the second part, an overview of public art interventions is proposed and is classified into three main categories : cultural activism, social demands and political protest. The last part of this work presents the results of various surveys conducted in Madrid between 2009 and 2014 to measure the intentions and the scope of these public art interventions. ; Depuis les années 2000 et particulièrement avec l'engagement contesté des troupes militaires dans la guerre en Irak et en Afghanistan, de nouvelles modalités d'expression de la société civile se sont développées en Espagne, en marge des outils institutionnels classiques. À partir de 2008, la crise économique semble consolider ces nouvelles pratiques contestataires. L'occupation d'immeubles vides, ...

War, Reconstruction of the State and Invention of Tradition in Afghanistan War since 1979 and the reconstruction of the state under Western tutelage since 2001 have led to a simplification of the identity of Afghan society, through an invention of ethnicity and tradition – a process behind which the control or the ownership of the political and economic resources of the country are at stake. Hazarajat is a remarkable observation site of this process. Its forced integration into the nascent Afghan state during the late nineteenth century has left a mark on its history. The people of Hazara, mainly Shi'ite, has been relegated to a subordinate position from which it got out of progressively, only by means of jihad against the Soviet occupation in the 1980s and the US intervention in 2001, at the ost of an ethnicization of its social and political consciousness. Ethnicity, however, is based on a less communitarian than unequal moral and political economy. Post-war aid to state-building has polarized social relations, while strengthening their ethnicization: donors and NGOs remain prisoners of a cultural, if not orientalist approach to the country that they thereby contribute to "traditionalize", while development aid destabilizes the "traditional" society by accelerating its monetization and commodification. ; La guerre depuis 1979 et la reconstruction de l'Etat sous la tutelle occidentale depuis 2001 ont conduit à une simplification identitaire de la société afghane, sous la double forme d'une invention de l'ethnicité et de la tradition – un processus dont l'enjeu véritable est le contrôle ou l'appropriation des ressources politiques et économiques du pays. Le Hazarajat est un remarquable site d'observation de cette évolution. Son histoire a été marquée par son intégration coercitive, à la fin du xixe siècle, à l'Etat afghan en formation. Sa population, de confession chiite, s'est vue reléguée à une condition de subalternité dont elle n'est progressivement sortie qu'à la faveur du djihad contre l'occupation ...

War, Reconstruction of the State and Invention of Tradition in Afghanistan War since 1979 and the reconstruction of the state under Western tutelage since 2001 have led to a simplification of the identity of Afghan society, through an invention of ethnicity and tradition – a process behind which the control or the ownership of the political and economic resources of the country are at stake. Hazarajat is a remarkable observation site of this process. Its forced integration into the nascent Afghan state during the late nineteenth century has left a mark on its history. The people of Hazara, mainly Shi'ite, has been relegated to a subordinate position from which it got out of progressively, only by means of jihad against the Soviet occupation in the 1980s and the US intervention in 2001, at the ost of an ethnicization of its social and political consciousness. Ethnicity, however, is based on a less communitarian than unequal moral and political economy. Post-war aid to state-building has polarized social relations, while strengthening their ethnicization: donors and NGOs remain prisoners of a cultural, if not orientalist approach to the country that they thereby contribute to "traditionalize", while development aid destabilizes the "traditional" society by accelerating its monetization and commodification. ; La guerre depuis 1979 et la reconstruction de l'Etat sous la tutelle occidentale depuis 2001 ont conduit à une simplification identitaire de la société afghane, sous la double forme d'une invention de l'ethnicité et de la tradition – un processus dont l'enjeu véritable est le contrôle ou l'appropriation des ressources politiques et économiques du pays. Le Hazarajat est un remarquable site d'observation de cette évolution. Son histoire a été marquée par son intégration coercitive, à la fin du xixe siècle, à l'Etat afghan en formation. Sa population, de confession chiite, s'est vue reléguée à une condition de subalternité dont elle n'est progressivement sortie qu'à la faveur du djihad contre l'occupation ...

War, Reconstruction of the State and Invention of Tradition in Afghanistan War since 1979 and the reconstruction of the state under Western tutelage since 2001 have led to a simplification of the identity of Afghan society, through an invention of ethnicity and tradition – a process behind which the control or the ownership of the political and economic resources of the country are at stake. Hazarajat is a remarkable observation site of this process. Its forced integration into the nascent Afghan state during the late nineteenth century has left a mark on its history. The people of Hazara, mainly Shi'ite, has been relegated to a subordinate position from which it got out of progressively, only by means of jihad against the Soviet occupation in the 1980s and the US intervention in 2001, at the ost of an ethnicization of its social and political consciousness. Ethnicity, however, is based on a less communitarian than unequal moral and political economy. Post-war aid to state-building has polarized social relations, while strengthening their ethnicization: donors and NGOs remain prisoners of a cultural, if not orientalist approach to the country that they thereby contribute to "traditionalize", while development aid destabilizes the "traditional" society by accelerating its monetization and commodification. ; La guerre depuis 1979 et la reconstruction de l'Etat sous la tutelle occidentale depuis 2001 ont conduit à une simplification identitaire de la société afghane, sous la double forme d'une invention de l'ethnicité et de la tradition – un processus dont l'enjeu véritable est le contrôle ou l'appropriation des ressources politiques et économiques du pays. Le Hazarajat est un remarquable site d'observation de cette évolution. Son histoire a été marquée par son intégration coercitive, à la fin du xixe siècle, à l'Etat afghan en formation. Sa population, de confession chiite, s'est vue reléguée à une condition de subalternité dont elle n'est progressivement sortie qu'à la faveur du djihad contre l'occupation ...

Résumé. — Développement des remarques exposées par les auteurs dans le Bulletin de juillet 1966. Éléments d'information réunis plus spécialement à l'intention des géologues et tenant compte du haut degré de précision atteint par les mesures de temps.

Verdienste, toeval, en rechtvaardigheid Pleidooi voor de herwaardering van verdienste Gebaseerd op: http://www.theyoungphilosophers.org/interview/huub-brouwer-1989/. Met de publicatie van Een theorie van rechtvaardigheid (1971) van John Rawls verdween het begrip 'verdienste' naar de marges van de filosofie. Daarmee ging een belangrijk instrument verloren om de sociale waarde van onder andere – onbetaalde – zorg voor ouderen, schilderkunst of muziek te beoordelen en daar de juiste beloning tegenover te zetten. In mijn proefschrift pleit ik daarom voor een herwaardering van verdienste. In filosofische discussies over een rechtvaardige verdeling van inkomen en vermogen speelt verdienste nauwelijks een rol. Dat vind ik intrigerend. Uit onderzoek blijkt dat dit wel het geval is als 'gewone' mensen daarover nadenken. Ook in het huidige filosofische debat over straf speelt verdienste een centrale rol. Waarom dan niet in de discussie over verdeling van goederen? Eeuwenlang speelde verdienste overigens wél een cruciale rol in het filosofische denken over een rechtvaardige verdeling. Dat was bijvoorbeeld zo bij Plato, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz en John Stuart Mill. Sinds de jaren zeventig is het concept echter in diskrediet geraakt. Dat is mijns inziens in grote mate het gevolg van de kritiek van John Rawls op het begrip verdienste in zijn beroemde en invloedrijke boek Een theorie van rechtvaardigheid (1971). Door de alomtegenwoordigheid van toeval kun je volgens hem niet verdedigen dat mensen inkomen en vermogen kunnen verdienen. Hoe intelligent je bent of hoe hard je werkt, is in grote mate afhankelijk van genen en opvoeding. Dat zijn factoren waar je geen controle over hebt. Misschien kun je leren om harder te werken, maar ook het vermogen om te leren is volgens Rawls van diezelfde factoren afhankelijk. Rawls probeert in zijn rechtsvaardigheidstheorie dat toeval zo veel mogelijk uit te sluiten. Hij formuleert onder meer het zogeheten 'difference principle', het verschilprincipe: sociale en economische ongelijkheid tussen mensen is alleen te verdedigen als die betrekking heeft op posities die voor iedereen openstaan, of waar de minstbedeelden op z'n minst beter van worden. Op die manier kun je bijvoorbeeld het verschil in inkomen tussen een vakkenvuller en een CEO legitimeren. Volgens mij denken veel politici zoals toevalsegalitaristen. Neem iemand als de Franse president Macron. Hij noemt zich schatplichtig aan de sociaaldemocratie, maar in een profiel in The New Yorker (juli 2019) worden zijn denkbeelden over rechtvaardigheid geheel in lijn met het toevalsegalitarisme omschreven: verschillen in inkomen zijn gerechtvaardigd wanneer ze terug te voeren zijn op vrije keuzes. Op die manier zijn enorme inkomensverschillen goed te praten. Door verdienste in je theorie te introduceren, kun je grote inkomensverschillen niet makkelijk wegwuiven. Aan verdienste koppel ik behalve keuzevrijheid, ook de sociale waarde die een bepaalde keuze oplevert. De filosofische discussie gaat dan niet alleen over de verantwoordelijkheid voor een bepaalde keuze, zoals bij het toevalsegalitarisme. Het debat gaat ook over de vraag: wat is sociaal waardevol en wat is dat niet? Bijna iedereen vindt dat sommige mensen meer verdienen dan anderen en dat het goed is als zij krijgen wat ze verdienen. Suzanne verdient een mooi salaris omdat ze hard werkt. Rozemarijn verdient op z'n minst erkenning, omdat ze de buurvrouw uit haar brandend huis heeft gered. En Mark verdient straf omdat hij een winkeldiefstal heeft gepleegd. Wat hebben al die claims met elkaar gemeen? Ze komen er allemaal op neer dat een morele balans verstoord zou zijn als iemand niet krijgt wat hij of zij verdient. Verdienste vereist dat een handeling of eigenschap van iemand – hoe hard Suzanne werkt, hoe heldhaftig Rozemarijn is, wat voor strafbare feiten Mark pleegt – in proportie staat tot hoeveel die persoon krijgt. Met het begrip 'verdienste' kun je een nieuwe wending geven aan de maatschappelijke discussie over topsalarissen. Vaak worden die salarissen gerechtvaardigd met het argument dat die verdiend zijn, omdat iemand een uitzonderlijke prestatie heeft geleverd. Kijk naar de voormalige topman van Unilever, wiens inkomen in het jaar voor zijn aftreden 283 keer zoveel bedroeg als een doorsnee werknemer – om maar te zwijgen over de baas van de Weight Watchers bij wie die verhouding 1 op 5900 was. Volgens het principe van proportionaliteit betekent dit dat de topman van Unilever gemiddeld 283 keer harder werkt, meer talent of verantwoordelijkheid heeft. Maar die vlieger gaat niet op: als je een gemiddelde werknemer van Unilever op zijn positie zou zetten, is het onwaarschijnlijk dat die het 283 keer slechter zou doen dan de CEO!

RÉSUMÉ La théorie de la décision a inspiré des modèles du risque qui formalisent des choix de comportement dont la diversité tient à des facteurs individuels, sociaux et environnementaux. Comme le droit routier cherche à modifier les comportements, ces modèles ont inspiré des politiques publiques et des réformes juridiques ou judiciaires. Leurs effets sont limités par la diversité des déterminants des comportements et l'éclatement des groupes qui prennent des risques. Ces modèles n'en restent pas moins un guide pertinent pour l'action générale de l'État, surtout si des actions spéciales la complètent. Celles-ci pourraient porter sur des cibles spécifiques avec des démarches appropriées, appuyées par l'éducation et la prévention.

La situation de la classe ouvrière en Argentine a profondément changé depuis les années 1970. On peut distinguer trois périodes. La première, de 1976 à 1991, a été caractérisée par différentes formes de résistance ouvrière aux changements impulsés dans le monde du travail par le régime militaire et la classe dominante. La seconde, celle des années 1990, à été celle de la défaite des travailleurs argentins et de la destruction des formes d'organisation ouvrière déjà existantes. À partir de 1999, avec l'apparition de nouvelles formes de lutte et d'organisation, a débuté une troisième période, dont il est encore difficile de définir les caractéristiques, les tendances et les possibles conséquences.