Using a new set of micro evidence from an original survey of 28 transition countries, we show that democracy increases citizens' support for the market by guaranteeing income redistribution to inequality-averse agents. Our identification strategy relies on the restriction of the sample to inhabitants of open borders between formerly integrated countries, where people face the same level of market development and economic inequality, as well as the same historically inherited politico-economic culture. Democratic rights increase popular support for the market. This is true, in particular, of inequality-averse agents, provided that they trust political institutions. Our findings suggest that one solution to the recent electoral backlash of reformist parties in the former socialist block lies in a deepening of democracy. ; A l'aide d'une enquête récente couvrant 28 pays anciennement socialistes, nous mettons en évidence une relation de causalité entre démocratie et adhésion au marché. Notre stratégie d'identification repose sur la restriction de l'échantillon aux habitants des zones-frontières intégrées. Ces derniers partagent en effet le même héritage historique en termes de valeurs et d'attitudes vis-à-vis du marché et de la démocratie, ainsi que la même expérience concrète du marché. Le mécanisme proposé repose sur le fait que les agents, hostiles à l'inégalité engendrée par la transition vers le marché, acceptent l'approfondissement des réformes à condition de pouvoir compter sur le gouvernement pour corriger en partie les inégalités de revenus. La démocratie joue ici le rô le d'un mécanisme d'engagement de l'Etat en faveur d'une intervention sur la répartition des revenus. Cependant, la démocratie formelle n'est pas suffisante pour garantir la crédibilité du gouvernement aux yeux de ces agents. La qualité des institutions, mesurée par la confiance des agents dans le gouvernement, est une condition nécessaire à leur adhésion au marché.
Using a new set of micro evidence from an original survey of 28 transition countries, we show that democracy increases citizens' support for the market by guaranteeing income redistribution to inequality-averse agents. Our identification strategy relies on the restriction of the sample to inhabitants of open borders between formerly integrated countries, where people face the same level of market development and economic inequality, as well as the same historically inherited politico-economic culture. Democratic rights increase popular support for the market. This is true, in particular, of inequality-averse agents, provided that they trust political institutions. Our findings suggest that one solution to the recent electoral backlash of reformist parties in the former socialist block lies in a deepening of democracy. ; A l'aide d'une enquête récente couvrant 28 pays anciennement socialistes, nous mettons en évidence une relation de causalité entre démocratie et adhésion au marché. Notre stratégie d'identification repose sur la restriction de l'échantillon aux habitants des zones-frontières intégrées. Ces derniers partagent en effet le même héritage historique en termes de valeurs et d'attitudes vis-à-vis du marché et de la démocratie, ainsi que la même expérience concrète du marché. Le mécanisme proposé repose sur le fait que les agents, hostiles à l'inégalité engendrée par la transition vers le marché, acceptent l'approfondissement des réformes à condition de pouvoir compter sur le gouvernement pour corriger en partie les inégalités de revenus. La démocratie joue ici le rô le d'un mécanisme d'engagement de l'Etat en faveur d'une intervention sur la répartition des revenus. Cependant, la démocratie formelle n'est pas suffisante pour garantir la crédibilité du gouvernement aux yeux de ces agents. La qualité des institutions, mesurée par la confiance des agents dans le gouvernement, est une condition nécessaire à leur adhésion au marché.
Using a new set of micro evidence from an original survey of 28 transition countries, we show that democracy increases citizens' support for the market by guaranteeing income redistribution to inequality-averse agents. Our identification strategy relies on the restriction of the sample to inhabitants of open borders between formerly integrated countries, where people face the same level of market development and economic inequality, as well as the same historically inherited politico-economic culture. Democratic rights increase popular support for the market. This is true, in particular, of inequality-averse agents, provided that they trust political institutions. Our findings suggest that one solution to the recent electoral backlash of reformist parties in the former socialist block lies in a deepening of democracy. ; A l'aide d'une enquête récente couvrant 28 pays anciennement socialistes, nous mettons en évidence une relation de causalité entre démocratie et adhésion au marché. Notre stratégie d'identification repose sur la restriction de l'échantillon aux habitants des zones-frontières intégrées. Ces derniers partagent en effet le même héritage historique en termes de valeurs et d'attitudes vis-à-vis du marché et de la démocratie, ainsi que la même expérience concrète du marché. Le mécanisme proposé repose sur le fait que les agents, hostiles à l'inégalité engendrée par la transition vers le marché, acceptent l'approfondissement des réformes à condition de pouvoir compter sur le gouvernement pour corriger en partie les inégalités de revenus. La démocratie joue ici le rô le d'un mécanisme d'engagement de l'Etat en faveur d'une intervention sur la répartition des revenus. Cependant, la démocratie formelle n'est pas suffisante pour garantir la crédibilité du gouvernement aux yeux de ces agents. La qualité des institutions, mesurée par la confiance des agents dans le gouvernement, est une condition nécessaire à leur adhésion au marché.
Using a new set of micro evidence from an original survey of 28 transition countries, we show that democracy increases citizens' support for the market by guaranteeing income redistribution to inequality-averse agents. Our identification strategy relies on the restriction of the sample to inhabitants of open borders between formerly integrated countries, where people face the same level of market development and economic inequality, as well as the same historically inherited politico-economic culture. Democratic rights increase popular support for the market. This is true, in particular, of inequality-averse agents, provided that they trust political institutions. Our findings suggest that one solution to the recent electoral backlash of reformist parties in the former socialist block lies in a deepening of democracy. ; A l'aide d'une enquête récente couvrant 28 pays anciennement socialistes, nous mettons en évidence une relation de causalité entre démocratie et adhésion au marché. Notre stratégie d'identification repose sur la restriction de l'échantillon aux habitants des zones-frontières intégrées. Ces derniers partagent en effet le même héritage historique en termes de valeurs et d'attitudes vis-à-vis du marché et de la démocratie, ainsi que la même expérience concrète du marché. Le mécanisme proposé repose sur le fait que les agents, hostiles à l'inégalité engendrée par la transition vers le marché, acceptent l'approfondissement des réformes à condition de pouvoir compter sur le gouvernement pour corriger en partie les inégalités de revenus. La démocratie joue ici le rô le d'un mécanisme d'engagement de l'Etat en faveur d'une intervention sur la répartition des revenus. Cependant, la démocratie formelle n'est pas suffisante pour garantir la crédibilité du gouvernement aux yeux de ces agents. La qualité des institutions, mesurée par la confiance des agents dans le gouvernement, est une condition nécessaire à leur adhésion au marché.
Using a new set of micro evidence from an original survey of 28 transition countries, we show that democracy increases citizens' support for the market by guaranteeing income redistribution to inequality-averse agents. Our identification strategy relies on the restriction of the sample to inhabitants of open borders between formerly integrated countries, where people face the same level of market development and economic inequality, as well as the same historically inherited politico-economic culture. Democratic rights increase popular support for the market. This is true, in particular, of inequality-averse agents, provided that they trust political institutions. Our findings suggest that one solution to the recent electoral backlash of reformist parties in the former socialist block lies in a deepening of democracy. ; A l'aide d'une enquête récente couvrant 28 pays anciennement socialistes, nous mettons en évidence une relation de causalité entre démocratie et adhésion au marché. Notre stratégie d'identification repose sur la restriction de l'échantillon aux habitants des zones-frontières intégrées. Ces derniers partagent en effet le même héritage historique en termes de valeurs et d'attitudes vis-à-vis du marché et de la démocratie, ainsi que la même expérience concrète du marché. Le mécanisme proposé repose sur le fait que les agents, hostiles à l'inégalité engendrée par la transition vers le marché, acceptent l'approfondissement des réformes à condition de pouvoir compter sur le gouvernement pour corriger en partie les inégalités de revenus. La démocratie joue ici le rô le d'un mécanisme d'engagement de l'Etat en faveur d'une intervention sur la répartition des revenus. Cependant, la démocratie formelle n'est pas suffisante pour garantir la crédibilité du gouvernement aux yeux de ces agents. La qualité des institutions, mesurée par la confiance des agents dans le gouvernement, est une condition nécessaire à leur adhésion au marché.
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The U.N. Security Council authorized a multinational mission to Haiti on Monday in an attempt to combat the disorder and violence that have flourished since the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse more than two years ago. The proposed Kenyan-led mission is expected to focus on safeguarding key infrastructure and supporting Haitian police, but there are grave doubts among human rights activists and Haitian civil society leaders about launching yet another outside intervention to address Haiti's problems. There has been no compelling case made in favor of a new intervention in Haiti, but the Security Council has nonetheless chosen to bless this half-baked plan.The Biden administration has been searching for a government willing to take the lead in Haiti, and earlier this year it found one in Kenya. The U.S. has ignored the objections of Haitian civil society leaders that the de facto Haitian government under Ariel Henry is unelected and illegitimate and that an outside intervention will just prop up Henry's rule without significantly improving security. As Alexandra Fillipova, an attorney for the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, told The New York Times, "This will prop up a corrupt, illegitimate repressive government, which is responsible for creating and perpetuating the crisis."The de facto government has no mandate from, and does not speak for, the people of Haiti. That should have made the Security Council even warier of approving Henry's request for international intervention, but instead it overwhelmingly voted for the mission with only Russia and China abstaining. Working with the de facto government under Henry may seem like a practical necessity, but in practice it damages America's reputation and contributes to Haiti's instability. Siding with Henry may seem like the safer option right now but relying on the staying power of an illegitimate ruler is usually a bad bet. Being publicly aligned with Henry not only continues to bring discredit on the U.S., but it will also affect how people in Haiti perceive the international mission. If an outside intervention is going to have a chance of succeeding, it has to be accepted and welcomed as legitimate. What are the chances this will happen if it is seen as a means for Henry to keep himself in power?It might be possible to set aside these serious concerns if the proposed intervention seemed likely to improve security at an acceptable cost, but there is little reason to think this will happen. The New York Times previously reported on the many reasons why the Kenyan-led mission seems ill-suited to Haiti's crisis and unlikely to succeed. In addition to the language barrier (Kenyan forces don't speak French or Kreyol), Kenyan police have their own troubling record of human rights abuses at home, including allegations of torture. A police force that doesn't know the terrain will be ill-equipped to take on well-armed gangs in any case. It is also doubtful that the governments contributing to the mission are prepared to shoulder the burden of a long-term commitment.While the U.S. will not be participating directly in the mission with its own forces, it has pledged to provide logistical and financial support for the mission. If the Kenyan-led mission fails or runs into significant opposition, there will be a temptation for the U.S. to move from a supporting role to direct involvement, and that would be an even bigger mistake. If the forthcoming intervention in Haiti goes badly, the U.S. must resist the inevitable demands to step in.It is telling that no other governments wanted the responsibility for leading a mission in Haiti because previous U.S. and U.N. interventions have had such a poor track record. The U.N. mission in Haiti from 2004 to 2017 was marred by serious abuses, including sexual assault, and the accidental introduction and spread of cholera. To the extent that U.N. forces took the fight to the gangs, they were also responsible for causing many civilian casualties. The domineering U.S. role in Haitian affairs dates back centuries, and Washington's backing for authoritarian Haitian leaders has been one of the recurring mistakes in U.S. policy. The U.S. backed Moïse before his assassination, and even now the U.S. supports Henry despite his deep unpopularity and lack of legitimacy. One of the principal demands from Haitian civil society groups and institutions is that the U.S. cease supporting Henry, but Washington remains on the side of the political status quo. The U.S. push for a multinational force repeats past errors and threatens to reinforce the very structures that have brought Haiti to its current state. The Biden administration will own the consequences of its decision to support this mission.According to the Times report, two Haitian-American groups wrote to oppose the Kenyan-led mission, saying that the intervention will "exacerbate [Haiti's] current political crisis to a catastrophic one." The National Haitian-American Elected Officials Network (NHAEON) and Family Action Network Movement (FANM) wrote to the president and Secretary of State Antony Blinken last week urging the administration to end its support for the Kenyan-led mission, saying that "It will further entrench the regime, deepening Haiti's political crisis while generating significant civilian casualties and migration pressure." It is possible that these predictions could be wrong, but it seems reckless to discount the warnings of organizations that likely understand the conditions in the country better than U.S. policymakers.Haiti has been treated as a ward of major powers and international institutions for decades, and outsiders have utterly failed the Haitian people. It is foolish to think that another international mission with even less support and fewer resources than previous efforts will lead to better outcomes. The burden is on advocates of intervention to make the case for their preferred policy, and for the last two years no one has been able to explain how another international force in Haiti would be anything more than a temporary remedy. The U.S. and the U.N. should be prepared to assist Haiti with humanitarian and economic aid to help the country recover, but they also need to support the creation of a transitional government that is not tainted by the corruption and abuses of the current leadership. There needs to be a Haitian-led solution that respects Haiti's sovereignty and independence, and that cannot happen if outside governments are sending police and troops into their country every few years. No matter how well-intentioned the Kenyan-led mission may be, it is a mistake.
The Silk Route Between Past and Present. A Paradigm Beyond Space and Time. On the threshold of the third millennium, in an atmosphere of anachronisms and contradictions, dominated and conditioned by scientific and technological discoveries, new ideas seem to take flight whilst regional barriers and territorial boundaries are collapsing to give way to a new form of comprehensiveness. Sharing ideas and intellectual stimuli, amalgamating cultural elements circulating along its intertwining branches, the Silk Route has more than once given life to new scientific forms, cultural and intellectual systems and, amongst these, artistic shapes and religious syncretism. The "Silk Route", which, with its articulated network of twisting routes and sub-routes, even now well represents the challenging paradigm of a new age yet standing at its threshold.
A paradigm beyond time and space. The following paper aims at focusing on the Silk Route's Religious-Cultural dimension in the middle-inner Asia of the 13th-15th Centuries, when, whatever may have happened regarding local realms and rulers, it played the role of junction and meeting point of different worlds and their civilisations. Even now we are confronted with a political trend that is at once and the same time a cultural current; emanating from the past, it is re-linking Europe and Asia and, re-uniting territories with their individual and traditional cultural forms, is shaping a renewed kaleidoscopic framework. We are confronted with new forces deeply rooted in the past, which, emanating from the far eastern fringes of Asia, by the second decade of the 21st century have reached the far western fringes of Europe, dynamics that are not only 'economics' and 'scientific technologies' but also thought, religion, and other intellectual values. These forces are heir of past times, nevertheless they endure in the present and are the active lively projection of a future time…though still largely to be understood and matured. A vision of life and universe where speculative and religious values coexist with astounding technological and scientific discoveries in a global dimension without space and time.
At the verge of this millennium, the Information and Communication Revolution has given life with its advanced technologies to a new space conditioned and dominated by no-distances. And this space with its always-evolving scientific discoveries today involves the society in its entirety (what is commonly named as "global space" actually symbolised by the Silk Route), endeavours to amalgamate it creating new links between civil and political society and positioning them in a new military dimension. New forms and structures that are rapidly evolving in search of some balance between technological development and preservation of ancient traditions, which might make possible social and economic justice, yet an utopia more than a reality. However, both (social and economic justice) form the ideological basis of order and stability, anxiously pursued by the young generation in search of an economic and speculative order where stability, security (hard and soft security) and religious structures should in their turn become the platform of new political-institutional structures.
Be that as it may, this is not a new phenomenon. Technological advancements are astoundingly new, but not the process and its aims. We are confronted with a phenomenon that has already occurred in more than one historic phase. Epochal phases. That is the human search for economic and social justice, and their framing into new conceptual schemes. And within this ratio, it would be unrealistic to ignore an additional key-factor. It would be unrealistic to deny that Religion has always been a major player. It has been at the basis of more than one revolution, it has represented the culturalpolitical response to foreign challenges, it has legitimised military action, it has given life to new spaces and political systems, it has filled with its pathos cultural and political voids. It has given to Mankind and Universe a new centrality, creating a new space within which Man and Mankind, History and Philosophy, Cosmos and Universe with their laws meet and merge in new systems and structural orders. The World and its Destiny, core of lively debates, conditioned by the eternal dialectic between economics and society, between society and religion, between science and technology on the one hand, and religion on the other, between formal ratio and ideologies or myths, which underline with their voice the eternal antithesis between cultures and civilisations.
At the verge of the third millennium, the intellectual world is facing a new historiographical debate, into which the Religious Factor has also entered. Knowledge and the vision of the world and its new order/disorder are translated into a new philosophy of culture and history, of society and religion. Rationality, historicity of scientific knowledge, nature and experience, nature and human 'ratio', science and ethics, science and its language, science and its new aims and objectives are amongst some of the major themes of this debate. But not only this: which aims, which objectives? And within which new order that might ensure security and stability, social and economic justice? Thence, revolution and power are coming to the fore with another factor: Force and its use…a stage that, however, does not disregard dialogue and tolerance, or, as recently stated by Francesco Bergoglio, more than tolerance, "reciprocal respect". These are only 'some' amongst the main issues discussed and heard of also in the traditional culture of ordinary people.
Undoubtedly, the end of the Cold War and the well-known "global village" dealt with by Samuel Huntington, the global village with its technological revolutions, have induced to re-think our own speculative parameters, traditional paradigms and models of society and power, mankind and statehood. And once again we have been confronted with elements that might bring to new forms of sharp opposition and a global disorder. However, beyond and behind the Huntingtonian cliché of the "clash of civilizations", a new cultural current seems to take flight spurring from the roots of a traditional past, which however has not yet disappeared. The Silk Route stems out emanating from the far-eastern lands of Asia as the conceptual image, the paradigm of a conceivable new order. By merging the material, scientific-technological and economic dimension of life with a new cultural (or neo-cultural) vocation it seeks (and seems to be able) to give life to a new social body and new systemic-structural answers, a comprehensive order capable of tackling the challenges opened by the collapse of the traditional cultural parameters and the dramatic backdrop of a mere clash of civilisations.
Middle-Inner Asia of the 13th -15th Centuries: the Silk Route and its Reflection on Painting and Architectonic Forms. As just pointed out, nothing is new in the course of History. Professor Axel Berkowsky has authoritatively lingered on the Silk Route – or better "the New Silk Route" – with specific regard on practical aspects of these last decades. In the following text, I wish to linger on a past historic period, particularly fertile when confronted with the collapse of traditional values and the challenges posed by new fearful forces and their dynamics: the Mongols with their hordes (ulus) and, some later, Tamerlane with his terrible Army. Sons of the steppe and its culture, these people suddenly appeared on the stage, raced it from Mesopotamia to the north-eastern corner of Asia with their hordes and their allied tribal groups, shattered previous civilisations and imposed a new dominion, a new political-military order and new models of life. But, with their Military superiority, they also brought the codes and the ancient traditional knowledge of the nomadic world. It is misleading to watch to this epochal phase only as a phase of devastation and horrors. With their codes, Mongols and Timurids brought with them the Chinese algebraic, mathematical and scientific knowledge, and fused it with Mesopotamian mathematical and medical sciences reaching peaks of astronomical, arithmetical, numerical, geometric, algebraic theoretical and practical knowledge. They also brought with them from vital centres of religious scholarship and life a large number of theologians, pirs, traditionists and legal religious scholars with their individual religious features and systems. Shamanism, Buddhism, Muslim forms, Nestorianism and other cults vigorously practised in the mobile world of the steppe gave life to an important phase of religious culture and multifarious practices largely imbued with mystic feelings and traditional emotional states.
Then, and once again, within the global space created by the military conquests of the new-comers, the Silk Route – or more precisely, the Silk and its Routes – reorganised and revitalised trades and business, gave life to close diplomatic connections and matrimonial allegiances reinforced by a vigorous traditional chancery and official correspondence, that tightly linked Asia with Europe. Within this new global order, the Silk and its routes played the crucial role, shaped new political, institutional, scientific and intellectual formulae, gave life to new conceptual forms that – at their core – had Man and Mankind as centre of the entire Universe. We are confronted with a cultural development begun at a time when the sons of the steppe were taking over lands of the classical Arabic civilisation (like Syria, Iraq and al-Jazīra), at a time when the Iranian world was still centre of intellectual life and its social norms were still spreading over large spaces of Inner Asian territories. Visual Arts wonderfully mirror this phenomenon.
We witness a process that renovated itself 'from within' in the course of three centuries and did not stop even when the arrival of the European Powers on the Asian markets seemed to sign, with the decay and end of the traditional market economy, also the closing of the cultural interactions created by the Silk Routes of the time. Once again, Visual Arts wonderfully mirror this phenomenon: a dramatic transitional, fluid period, marked by a distinctive timeless reality, which had no longer territories well delimited by frontiers to conquer or defend.
Herewith I have dealt, as an example, with the reflection of the new conceptions of Life and Universe on visual Fine Arts in the 13th-15th centuries, specifically painting and architectonic forms. Ideological values that aimed to forge new relationships among different peoples and their individual human values, religious thinking, moral codes…and economic, scientific, technological achievements.
'Fine Arts'. Visual fine arts, in my case painting and architecture, are the mirror of feelings shared by the Lords of the time, registered by painters and architects in plastic forms, the signal of these stances to an often confused Humanity. Here, I linger on two pictorial themes: Nature and Landscape on the one hand, and Religion with its very images on the other. With regard to architectonic forms, these reflect the same conceptual paradigm shaped through technical features. By those ages, Nature and Landscape were perceived by contemporary painters and architects with formal, stylistic and technical characteristics which strongly reflected the impact with a world which lived its life in close, intimate contact with nature, a world and a culture which observed Nature and the Cosmos, and perceived them in every detail over the slow rhythmical march of days and nights, of seasons and the lunar cycles. These artistic features depict a precise image, that of a world which lives its life often at odds with nature for its very survival, a world which conditions nature or is conditioned in its turn. At that time, it was a world and a cosmic order which were often perceived by the artist in their tension with uncertainty and the blind recklessness of modern-contemporary times. However, to a closer analysis, these same artistic forms shape a celestial order which was at one and the same time a culture and a religion.
In the vast borderless space of the Euro-Asiatic steppes, cut by great rivers, broken by steep rocky mountainous chains and inhospitable desert fig.aux, the Silk succeeded in building and organising its own network of twisting routes and sub-routes, along which transited (albeit, yet still transit) caravans with their goods…but also cultural elements and their conceptual-philosophical forms. Of these latter and their syncretic imageries and dreams, the fine arts have left evocative pictures and architectonic images, which depicted a world that is the projection of a precise social and political reality and its underlying factors, such as the restlessness of a nomadic pattern of life and the culture of the Town and its urban life. Little is changed today despite the collapse of the Soviet empire and its order. Features and forms change, but in both cases they announce a different world with its order built on a robust syncretism, which is at the same time science, knowledge, harmony and religion (divine or human, or both). A world that is the projection of a precise political, social and economic reality. A reality that, at one and the same time, is the silent voice of a humanity often disregarded by contemporary writers, an 'underground world' that echoes traditional forms and their dynamics, and a no less authoritative de facto power that politically, economically and militarily conditions and dominates its times. A reality that finds an authoritative voice through the Silk Route.
Penelitian ini dilakukan untuk menguji dan menganalisis implikasi dari praktek sumber daya manusia yang terdiri dari perencanaan karir, pelatihan dan penilaian kinerja terhadap kepuasan kerja dan kinerja karyawan pada Kantor Distrik Navigasi Kelas III Pontianak. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kuantitatif dengan pendekatan korelasi, atau juga penelitian yang dirancang untuk menentukan tingkat hubungan variabel-variabel yang berbeda dalam suatu populasi. Sampel dari penelitian ini berjumlah 130 responden dari karyawan pada Kantor Distrik Navigasi Kelas III Pontianak. Metode pengambilan sampel dalam penelitian ini dilakukan dengan sampel jenuh. Data diperoleh melalui kuesioner, kemudian dianalisis dengan menggunakan model jalur (path) dengan menggunakan software SPSS versi 20.0 untuk windows. Berdasarkan temuan ini, disarankan kepada pimpinan untuk meningkatkan kepuasan kerja atau secara langsung dapat meningkatkan kinerja karyawan. 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Bandung: Remaja Rosadakarya.Sununta Siengthai, Patarakhuan Pila-Ngram, (2016) "The interaction effect of job redesign and job satisfaction on employee performance", Evidence-based HRM: a Global Forum for Empirical Scholarship, Vol. 4 Issue: 2, pp. 162-180. Sugiyono, 2017. Metode Penelitian Kuantitatif Kualitatif dan R&D. Bandung: Alfabeta. Tanoli, Mubashar Farooq, (2016) "Understanding Caree Planning: A Literature Review", MPRA Paper No. 74730. Very Mahmudhitya Rudhaliawan, Hamidah Nayati Utami, Mehammad Soe'oed Hakam. 2012. Pengaruh Pelatihan Terhadap Kemampuan Kerja dan Kinerja Karyawan. Univ. Brawijaya Malang Zhang, B. and J.L. Morris (2013) "High-performance work systems and organizational performance:testing the mediating role of employee outcomes using evidence from PR china", The International Journal of Human Resources Management, (ahead-of-print):pp:1-23.
This dissertation takes a step towards providing a better understanding of post-socialist welfare state development from a theoretical as well as an empirical perspective. The overall analytical goal of this thesis has been to critically assess the development of social policies in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania using them as illustrative examples of post-socialist welfare state development in the light of the theories, approaches and typologies that have been developed to study affluent capitalist democracies. The four studies included in this dissertation aspire to a common aim in a number of specific ways. The first study tries to place the ideal-typical welfare state models of the Baltic States within the well-known welfare state typologies. At the same time, it provides a rich overview of the main social security institutions in the three countries by comparing them with each other and with the previous structures of the Soviet period. It examines the social insurance institutions of the Baltic States (old-age pensions, unemployment insurance, short-term benefits, sickness, maternity and parental insurance and family benefits) with respect to conditions of eligibility, replacement rates, financing and contributions. The findings of this study indicate that the Latvian social security system can generally be labelled as a mix of the basic security and corporatist models. The Estonian social security system can generally also be characterised as a mix of the basic security and corporatist models, even if there are some weak elements of the targeted model in it. It appears that the institutional changes developing in the social security system of Lithuania have led to a combination of the basic security and targeted models of the welfare state. Nevertheless, as the example of the three Baltic States shows, there is diversity in how these countries solve problems within the field of social policy. In studying the social security schemes in detail, some common features were found that could be attributed to all three countries. Therefore, the critical analysis of the main social security institutions of the Baltic States in this study gave strong supporting evidence in favour of identifying the post-socialist regime type that is already gaining acceptance within comparative welfare state research. Study Two compares the system of social maintenance and insurance in the Soviet Union, which was in force in the three Baltic countries before their independence, with the currently existing social security systems. The aim of the essay is to highlight the forces that have influenced the transformation of the social policy from its former highly universal, albeit authoritarian, form, to the less universal, social insurance-based systems of present-day Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. This study demonstrates that the welfare–economy nexus is not the only important factor in the development of social programs. The results of this analysis revealed that people's attitudes towards distributive justice and the developmental level of civil society also play an important part in shaping social policies. The shift to individualism in people's mentality and the decline of the labour movement, or, to be more precise, the decline in trade union membership and influence, does nothing to promote the development of social rights in the Baltic countries and hinders the expansion of social policies. The legacy of the past has been another important factor in shaping social programs. It can be concluded that social policy should be studied as if embedded not only in the welfare-economy nexus, but also in the societal, historical and cultural nexus of a given society. Study Three discusses the views of the state elites on family policy within a wider theoretical setting covering family policy and social policy in a broader sense and attempts to expand this analytical framework to include other post-socialist countries. The aim of this essay is to explore the various views of the state elites in the Baltics concerning family policy and, in particular, family benefits as one of the possible explanations for the observed policy differences. The qualitative analyses indicate that the Baltic States differ significantly with regard to the motives behind their family policies. Lithuanian decision-makers seek to reduce poverty among families with children and enhance the parents' responsibility for bringing up their children. Latvian policy-makers act so as to increase the birth rate and create equal opportunities for children from all families. Estonian policy-makers seek to create equal opportunities for all children and the desire to enhance gender equality is more visible in the case of Estonia in comparison with the other two countries. It is strongly arguable that there is a link between the underlying motives and the kinds of family benefits in a given country. This study, thus, indicates how intimately the attitudes of the state bureaucrats, policy-makers, political elite and researchers shape social policy. It confirms that family policy is a product of the prevailing ideology within a country, while the potential influence of globalisation and Europeanisation is detectable too. The final essay takes into account the opinions of welfare users and examines the performances of the institutionalised family benefits by relying on the recipients' opinions regarding these benefits. The opinions of the populations as a whole regarding government efforts to help families are compared with those of the welfare users. Various family benefits are evaluated according to the recipients' satisfaction with those benefits as well as the contemporaneous levels of subjective satisfaction with the welfare programs related to the absolute level of expenditure on each program. The findings of this paper indicate that, in Latvia, people experience a lower level of success regarding state-run family insurance institutions, as compared to those in Lithuania and Estonia. This is deemed to be because the cash benefits for families and children in Latvia are, on average, seen as marginally influencing the overall financial situation of the families concerned. In Lithuania and Estonia, the overwhelming majority think that the family benefit systems improve the financial situation of families. It appears that recipients evaluated universal family benefits as less positive than targeted benefits. Some universal benefits negatively influenced the level of general satisfaction with the family benefits system provided in the countries being researched. This study puts forward a discussion about whether universalism is always more legitimate than targeting. In transitional economies, in which resources are highly constrained, some forms of universal benefits could turn out to be very expensive in relative terms, without being seen as useful or legitimate forms of help to families. In sum, by closely examining the different aspects of social policy, this dissertation goes beyond the over-generalisation of Eastern European welfare state development and, instead, takes a more detailed look at what is really going on in these countries through the examples of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. In addition, another important contribution made by this study is that it revives 'western' theoretical knowledge through 'eastern' empirical evidence and provides the opportunity to expand the theoretical framework for post-socialist societies.
This dissertation takes a step towards providing a better understanding of post-socialist welfare state development from a theoretical as well as an empirical perspective. The overall analytical goal of this thesis has been to critically assess the development of social policies in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania using them as illustrative examples of post-socialist welfare state development in the light of the theories, approaches and typologies that have been developed to study affluent capitalist democracies. The four studies included in this dissertation aspire to a common aim in a number of specific ways. The first study tries to place the ideal-typical welfare state models of the Baltic States within the well-known welfare state typologies. At the same time, it provides a rich overview of the main social security institutions in the three countries by comparing them with each other and with the previous structures of the Soviet period. It examines the social insurance institutions of the Baltic States (old-age pensions, unemployment insurance, short-term benefits, sickness, maternity and parental insurance and family benefits) with respect to conditions of eligibility, replacement rates, financing and contributions. The findings of this study indicate that the Latvian social security system can generally be labelled as a mix of the basic security and corporatist models. The Estonian social security system can generally also be characterised as a mix of the basic security and corporatist models, even if there are some weak elements of the targeted model in it. It appears that the institutional changes developing in the social security system of Lithuania have led to a combination of the basic security and targeted models of the welfare state. Nevertheless, as the example of the three Baltic States shows, there is diversity in how these countries solve problems within the field of social policy. In studying the social security schemes in detail, some common features were found that could be attributed to all three countries. Therefore, the critical analysis of the main social security institutions of the Baltic States in this study gave strong supporting evidence in favour of identifying the post-socialist regime type that is already gaining acceptance within comparative welfare state research. Study Two compares the system of social maintenance and insurance in the Soviet Union, which was in force in the three Baltic countries before their independence, with the currently existing social security systems. The aim of the essay is to highlight the forces that have influenced the transformation of the social policy from its former highly universal, albeit authoritarian, form, to the less universal, social insurance-based systems of present-day Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. This study demonstrates that the welfare–economy nexus is not the only important factor in the development of social programs. The results of this analysis revealed that people's attitudes towards distributive justice and the developmental level of civil society also play an important part in shaping social policies. The shift to individualism in people's mentality and the decline of the labour movement, or, to be more precise, the decline in trade union membership and influence, does nothing to promote the development of social rights in the Baltic countries and hinders the expansion of social policies. The legacy of the past has been another important factor in shaping social programs. It can be concluded that social policy should be studied as if embedded not only in the welfare-economy nexus, but also in the societal, historical and cultural nexus of a given society. Study Three discusses the views of the state elites on family policy within a wider theoretical setting covering family policy and social policy in a broader sense and attempts to expand this analytical framework to include other post-socialist countries. The aim of this essay is to explore the various views of the state elites in the Baltics concerning family policy and, in particular, family benefits as one of the possible explanations for the observed policy differences. The qualitative analyses indicate that the Baltic States differ significantly with regard to the motives behind their family policies. Lithuanian decision-makers seek to reduce poverty among families with children and enhance the parents' responsibility for bringing up their children. Latvian policy-makers act so as to increase the birth rate and create equal opportunities for children from all families. Estonian policy-makers seek to create equal opportunities for all children and the desire to enhance gender equality is more visible in the case of Estonia in comparison with the other two countries. It is strongly arguable that there is a link between the underlying motives and the kinds of family benefits in a given country. This study, thus, indicates how intimately the attitudes of the state bureaucrats, policy-makers, political elite and researchers shape social policy. It confirms that family policy is a product of the prevailing ideology within a country, while the potential influence of globalisation and Europeanisation is detectable too. The final essay takes into account the opinions of welfare users and examines the performances of the institutionalised family benefits by relying on the recipients' opinions regarding these benefits. The opinions of the populations as a whole regarding government efforts to help families are compared with those of the welfare users. Various family benefits are evaluated according to the recipients' satisfaction with those benefits as well as the contemporaneous levels of subjective satisfaction with the welfare programs related to the absolute level of expenditure on each program. The findings of this paper indicate that, in Latvia, people experience a lower level of success regarding state-run family insurance institutions, as compared to those in Lithuania and Estonia. This is deemed to be because the cash benefits for families and children in Latvia are, on average, seen as marginally influencing the overall financial situation of the families concerned. In Lithuania and Estonia, the overwhelming majority think that the family benefit systems improve the financial situation of families. It appears that recipients evaluated universal family benefits as less positive than targeted benefits. Some universal benefits negatively influenced the level of general satisfaction with the family benefits system provided in the countries being researched. This study puts forward a discussion about whether universalism is always more legitimate than targeting. In transitional economies, in which resources are highly constrained, some forms of universal benefits could turn out to be very expensive in relative terms, without being seen as useful or legitimate forms of help to families. In sum, by closely examining the different aspects of social policy, this dissertation goes beyond the over-generalisation of Eastern European welfare state development and, instead, takes a more detailed look at what is really going on in these countries through the examples of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. In addition, another important contribution made by this study is that it revives 'western' theoretical knowledge through 'eastern' empirical evidence and provides the opportunity to expand the theoretical framework for post-socialist societies.
This guide accompanies the following article: Doreen Anderson‐Facile and Shyanne Ledford, 'Basic Challenges to Prisoner Reentry', Sociology Compass 3/2 (2009): 183–195, 10.1111/j.1751‐9020.2009.00198.xAuthor's IntroductionCrime, incarceration and prisoner reintegration are pressing issues facing the United States today. As the prison population grows at record rates so, in turn, does the reentry of prisoners into society. The transition from prison to the outside world is often difficult for post‐release prisoners, their families, their communities and the larger society. Many formally incarcerated individuals do not have the skills or support to succeed outside prison walls. Unfortunately, when post‐release prisoners are not successfully reintegrated, they are often returned to prison and begin the cycle of incarceration.The following is a course designed around the basic challenges prisoners face upon reentry. The literature suggests that success depends in part on support and overcoming several barriers, such as homelessness and under/unemployment. This course begins with an examination of reentry barriers facing post‐release prisoners followed by an exploration of the relationship between prisoner reentry, race, gender, family, and employment and concludes with an assessment of ongoing research and public policy.Author RecommendsAnderson‐Facile, Doreen. (2009). 'Basic Challenges to Prisoner Reentry'. Sociology Compass, 3(2): 183–95.Anderson‐Facile's review of current research on prisoner reentry yields interesting results. Her article examines prisoner reentry as it relates to the barriers preventing successful reintegration. Anderson‐Facile begins with a look at incarceration and recidivism statistics leading readers through the barriers preventing reentry success. Barriers such as housing, family and community support, employment, and the stigma of a prison record make successful reentry difficult. Anderson‐Facile concludes with a look at current reentry programs. Anderson‐Facile highlights literature suggesting post‐release success begins with rehabilitation and ends with community support. The author notes that many successful programs are faith or character‐based. These programs focus on the individual and assist in substance abuse issues, vocational training, and transitional living arrangements. Finally, Anderson‐Facile notes that programs that work in one community may not show success in other communities, therefore concluding that matching programs with communities is a critical component for assuring post‐release success.Dhami, Mandeep K., David R. Mandel, George Loewesnstein, and Peter Ayton. (2006). 'Prisoners' Positive Illusions of Their Post‐Release Success'. Law and Human Behavior30: 631–47.Dhami et al. examine prisoners' forecasts of reentry success as this may have implications for how prisoners respond to imprisonment, release, and parole decisions. The authors examine sentenced US and UK prisoners' predictions for personal recidivism. The authors also asked UK prisoners how successful they will be compared to the average prisoner. Overall, both samples yielded overly optimistic, unrealistic beliefs about personal reentry success when compared to official data. The UK participants demonstrated a self‐enhancement bias by expressing that they would fair far better than the average prisoner. The authors conclude their article by discussing the implications of their findings and suggest future research possibilities.Holzer, Harry J., Steven Raphael, and Michael A. Stoll. (2002). 'Can Employers Play a More Positive Role in Prisoner Reentry? Urban Institute's Reentry Roundtable'.The authors report that in the early 21st century over 600 000 prisoners were released each year from prison and three million or more ex‐prisoners were in the general population. Holzer et al. indicate that one of the greatest hurdles for a newly released prisoner is finding employment because, as applicants, they are faced with an aversion on the employers part to hiring ex‐offenders. Holzer et al. explore the extent and nature of this aversion. Holzer et al. maintain that interventions by other agencies can help mediate employer aversions to hiring post‐release prisoners.La Vigne, Nancy G., Diana Brazzell, and Kevonne M. Small. (2007). 'Evaluation of Florida's Faith‐ and Character‐Based Institutions'. The Urban Institute.La Vigne et al. produced a summary of the findings from a 'process and impact' evaluation of two of Florida's faith and character‐based programs, also known as FCBIs. The authors' note that FCBIs are founded on principles of self‐betterment and faith development and are often ran by volunteers. The authors gathered data in the following ways: one on one interviews, semi structured interviews with staff members at all levels, focus groups with inmates, administrative data/official documents, and telephone and email communications with state corrections personnel. The authors noted that at six months, male FCBI housed participants were more successful than post‐released prisoners housed in Federal Department of Corrections (FDOC) facilities.La Vigne, Nancy G., Rebecca L. Naser, Lisa E. Brooks, and Jennifer L. Castro. (2005). 'Examining the Effect of Incarceration and In‐Prison Family Contact on Prisoners' Family Relationships'. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice21(4): 314–35.In this article, La Vigne, Naser, Brooks and Castro look at the role of the family in recidivism rates. Specifically, they examine the role of in‐prison contact with family members on released prisoner success. This article first defines family and then looks at the quality of familial bonds at imprisonment and during incarceration. Next, they examine the inter‐personal bonds in relationships, i.e., parent–child vs. husband‐wife of these post‐released prisoners. The authors' findings were inconsistent. For example, in some situations in‐prison contact was detrimental on family relationships and ties, wherein other cases the same contact served to strengthen the family and create a tighter network of family support for the newly released prisoner. These findings suggest further research is necessary.Pager, D. (2003). 'The Mark of a Criminal Record'. The American Journal of Sociology108(5): 937–75.Pager examined the relationship between prior incarceration and race on employment on two teams of subjects. One team consisted of two 23‐year‐old, white men and the other team was two 23‐year‐old, African‐American men. The two teams were nearly identical in personality, appearance, skills and employment history. The variables were race and criminal record. The findings suggest that race and employment history are important factors on post‐released employment. Thirty‐four percent of white applicants without criminal backgrounds received a call back while only 14 percent of black applicants without criminal backgrounds got called back. Seventeen percent of white applicants with criminal records received call backs while only 5 percent of black applicants with criminal records received call backs. These findings indicate that race and not prison record is a greater determinant of employment.Parsons, Mickey L. and Carmen Warner‐Robbins. (2002). 'Factors That Support Women's Successful Transition to the Community Following Jail/ Prison'. Health Care for Women International23: 6–18.Parson and Warner‐Robbins simply state the purpose of their article is to describe the factors that support the successful reentry of post‐release women into the community. The authors look at a specific program called Welcome Home Ministries (WHM), a community‐based program. The authors examine the demographics of the population, the rising incarceration rates, issues that lead to incarceration, and support for post‐release mothers. Through qualitative interviews with women who were participating in WHM programs upon release many themes emerged. The authors argue that these themes lead to implications about what future programs need to support women who are transitioning from prisoner to general public.Seiter, Richard P. and Karen R. Kadela. (2003) 'Prisoner Reentry: What Works, What Does Not, and What is Promising'. Crime and Delinquency49(3): 360–88.Seiter and Kadela examine the nature of the reentry issue and explore which reentry programs show success in reducing recidivism. The authors note a swing from modified sentencing to determinate sentencing which increases length of incarceration as an additional factor in successful reentry. Seiter and Kadela define reentry, categorize programs for prisoner reentry, and use the Maryland Scale of Scientific Method to determine program effectiveness. The authors find that programs that emphasized vocational training and employment development yield the most success.Travis, Jeremy and Joan Petersilia. (2001). 'Reentry Reconsidered: A New Look at an Old Question'. Crime and Delinquency47(3): 291–313.Travis and Petersilia drive prison reform by providing research‐based implications for revamping the current system of prisoner management. While prisoners have always been arrested and released, the authors point out that the numbers of both are increasing. They believe this is a call to action. Travis and Petersilia look at changing sentencing policies, changes in parole supervision, and how the removal and return of prisoners influence communities. The authors highlight the astronomical increase of prisoners at a time when sentencing policies are changing and are often inconsistent. They examine parole, the demographics of transitioning inmates, and the links between reentry and five social policies. The findings provide guidance for development of reentry policies.Wacquant, Loic. (2002). 'Deadly Symbiosis: Rethinking Race and Imprisonment in Twenty‐ First‐Century America'. Boston Review27(2): 22–31.Waquant begins his article with three abrupt facts about racial inequality and imprisonment in the United States all of which point to a 'blackening' of the nations prisons. The author points out that the high percentage of black people incarcerated in the United States is a direct result of four institutions; slavery, the Jim Crow System, the organizational structure of urban ghettos and the growing prison system. One of the main findings, according to Waquant, is that when laws and social reform restricted segregation (technically ended), the prisons picked up where society left off. Essentially he argues that, as evidenced by the ghettos and increasing numbers of African‐Americans behind bars, the prison serves to reaffirm racial inequality.Online MaterialsDepartment of Justice http://www.usdoj.gov/Urban Institute http://www.urban.org/California Departmen of Corrections and Rehabilitation http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Bureau of Justice Statistics http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjsLloyd Sealy Library at John Jay College http://www.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/Pew Center http://www.pewresearch.org/Sample Syllabus Week 1: Introduction to Prisoner Reentry Anderson‐Facile, Doreen. (2009). 'Basic Challenges to Prisoner Reentry'. Sociology Compass 3/2: 183–95.Visher, Christy A. and Jeremy Travis. (2003). 'Transitions from Prison to Community: Understanding Individual Pathways'. Annual Review of Sociology29: 89–113. Week 2: Introduction to Prisoner Reentry Continued Travis, Jeremy and Joan Petersilia. (2001). 'Reentry Reconsidered: A New Look at an Old Question.'Crime and Delinquency 47/3: 291–313.The Urban Institute. 'Beyond the Prison Gates: The State of Parole in America. A First Tuesday Forum.'http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=900567, November 5, 2002. Week 3: Incarceration, Reentry, and Race Pettit, Becky, and Bruce Western. (2004). 'Mass Imprisonment and the Life Course: Race and Class Inequality in US Incarceration.'American Sociological Review69: 151–169.Wacquant, Loic. (2002). 'Deadly Symbiosis: Rethinking race and Imprisonment in twenty‐first‐century America'. Boston Review 27/2 (April/May): 22–31.Marbley, Aretha Faye and Ralph Ferguson. (2005). 'Responding to Prisoner Reentry, Recidivism, and Incarceration of Inmates of Color: A Call to the Communities'. Journal of Black Studies 35/5(May): 633–49. Week 4: Incarceration, Reentry, and Gender O'Brien, Patricia. (2007). 'Maximizing Success for Drug‐Affected Women after Release from Prison: Examining Access to and Use of Social Services During Reentry'. Women & Criminal Justice 17/2&3: 95–113.Severance, Theresa A. (2004). 'Concerns and Coping Strategies of Women Inmates Concerning Release: 'It's Going to Take Somebody in My Corner"'. Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 38/4: 73–97.Parsons, Mickey L. and Carmen Warner‐Robbins. (2002). 'Factors that Support Women's Successful Transition to the Community Following Jail/ Prison.'Health Care for Women International23: 6–18. Week 5: Incarceration, Reentry, and Family/ Home La Vigne, Nancy G., Rebecca L. Naser, Lisa E. Brooks, and Jennifer L. Castro. (2005). 'Examining the Effect of Incarceration and In‐Prison Family Contact on Prisoners' Family Relationships'. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 21/4 (November): 314–35.Pearson, Jessica and Lanae Davis. (2003). 'Serving Fathers Who Leave Prison'. Family Court Review 41/3(July): 307–20.Roman, Caterina Gouvis and Jeremy Travis. (2004). 'Taking Stock: Housing, Homelessness, and Prisoner Reentry,'The Urban Institute.http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=411096, March 8, 2004. Week 6: Incarceration, Reentry, and Employment Pager, Devah. (2003). 'The Mark of a Criminal Record,'American Journal of Sociology 108/5 (March): 937–75.Solomon, Amy L., Kelly Dedel Johnson, Jeremy Travis, and Elizabeth C. McBride. (2004). 'From Prison to Work: The Employment Dimensions of Prisoner Reentry'. Urban Institute Justice Policy Center. October 2004, pp. 1–32. Week 7: Incarceration, Reentry, and Employment Continued Holzer, Harry J., Steven Raphael, and Michael A. Stoll. (2002). 'Can Employers Play a More Positive Role in Prisoner Reentry? A Roundtable Paper'. The Urban Institute, March 20–21, 2002, pp. 1–16.Harrison, Byron, and Robert Carl Schehr. (2004). 'Offenders and Post‐Release Jobs: Variables Influencing Success and Failure'. Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 39/3: 35–68. Week 8: Prisoner Reentry: What Works? MacKenzie, Doris Layton. (2000). 'Evidence‐Based Corrections: Identifying What Works'. Crime and Delinquency46: 457–71.Petersilia, Joan. (2004). 'What Works in Prisoner Reentry? Reviewing and Questioning Evidence'. Federal Probation 68/2 (September): 4–8.Seiter, Richard P. and Karen R. Kadela. (2003). 'Prisoner Reentry: What Works, What Does Not, and What is Promising,'Crime and Delinquency 49/3 (July): 360–88. Week 9: Incarceration, Reentry, Research and Public Policy Lynch, James P. (2006). 'Prisoner Reentry: Beyond Program Evaluations.'Criminology and Public Policy 5/2: 401–12.Pager, Devah. (2006). 'Evidence‐Based Policy for Successful Prisoner Reentry'. Criminology and Public Policy 5/3: 505–14.La Vigne, Nancy G. Diana Brazzell, and Kevonne M. Small. (2007). 'Evaluation of Florida's Faith‐ and Character‐Based Institutions'. The Urban Institute http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=411561, October 1, 2007.Jacobson, Michael. (2006). 'Reversing the Punitive Turn: The Limits and Promise of Current Research'. Criminology and Public Policy 5/2: 277–84. Week 10: Incarceration, Reentry, and Outcomes Dhami, Mandeep K., David R. Mandel, George Loewenstein, and Peter Ayton. (2006). 'Prisoners Positive Illusions of Their Post‐Release Success'. Law and Human Behavior30: 631–47.Richards, Stephen C., James Austin, and Richard S. Jones. (2004). 'Kentucky's Perpetual Prisoner Machine: It's About Money'. The Review of Policy Research 21/1: 93–106.Suggested ReadingsEvans, Donald G. (2005). 'The Case for Inmate Reentry'. Corrections Today pp. 28–9.Lynch, James P. and William J. Sabol. (2001). 'Prisoner Reentry in Perspective'. Crime Policy Report3: 1–25.'One in 100: Behind Bars in America 2008'. The Pew: Center on the States 2008, pp. 1–35.Petersilia, Joan. (1999). Parole and Prisoner Reentry in the United States, The University of Chicago.Petersilia, Joan (2003). When Prisoners Come Home: Parole and Prisoner Reentry. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0‐19‐516086‐x.Travis, Jeremy, Amy L. Solomon, and Michelle Waul. (2001). 'From Prison to Home: The Dimensions and Consequences of Prisoner Reentry'. The Urban Institute.Young, D. Vernetta and Rebecca Reviere (2006). Women Behind Bars. London: Lynn Rienner Publishers. ISBN 1‐58826‐371‐1.Focus Questions
Think about the kind of crimes for which people are imprisoned. What types of crimes do you think the majority of the prisoners commit? What precursors would lead to someone being arrested and eventually imprisoned for these types of crimes? What is the likelihood that these factors remain upon release? Do you think prison should be rehabilitative or punitive? Do you think prison is always the best option for criminal behavior (in other words, is the old adage 'if you do the crime you need to do the time' valid?). Why are incarceration and recidivism rates different across race and class? How do you explain the disparities in incarceration rates for people of color? What kind of programs, if any, do you feel should be incorporated into a prison sentence (i.e. job training, counseling, AA, NA, religious opportunities, etc.). Suggested Culminating Activity: Students are to design a pilot program to assist prisoners successfully reenter into the community. Students must have the following parts in their report/ presentation: Prison/Community Summary (what population and community do you want to serve), Program Summary and Justification (what is the program – how does it work and why do you think it is a valuable program), Requirements for Participation in Program, Barriers to Success, Assessment/ Measurement of Success/ Failure, and Conclusion. Students must briefly site articles from this course to support their methodologies and indicate the problems they suspect they will face as they try to determine the success or failure of their program. Budgets and money are a non‐issue. In the 'real' world budgets are always an issue but for the purpose of this assignment they are not. However, when designing your program you should consider whether your design is financially feasible.. The goal of such an assignment is for students to recognize the barriers prisoners face to successful reentry, the evidence and research that goes into creating prisoner policies, and that a program must be multi‐faceted and comprehensive in order to provide a platform for former inmate success.
This sample syllabus above is modeled after a 10 week term. It is recommended for longer terms, that the following book be utilized:Irwin, John. (2005). The Warehouse Prison. California: Roxbury Publishing Company.ISBN: 1‐931719‐35‐7.John Irwin derived his data from a prison in Solano County, California. Irwin watched as incarceration rates doubled between 1980 and 2000 despite crime levels staying relatively stable. Irwin notes that most of the prisoners in his study were incarcerated for 'unserious' crimes and were often treated in unethical ways. Irwin begins by examining incarceration rates, the demographics of the prison population, problems prisoners faced while incarcerated, post‐release difficulties and hurdles, and the societal costs of the prison super‐structure. Irwin offers a thorough examination of why prisoners are incarcerated, what they face while inside prison walls, what challenges they face once released, and the financial implications of imprisoning people.
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Das Konzept des demokratischen Rechtsstaates, bisher einigendes Fundament und Leitprinzip der europäischen Einigung, steht heute im Zentrum einer kritischen Debatte, die die Grundlagen des europäischen Friedensprojektes zu gefährden droht. Weltweit und insbesondere in Europa wächst die Sorge um den Erhalt der freiheitlich-demokratischen Werte. Populistische Bewegungen gewinnen an Einfluss, indem sie einfache Antworten auf die komplexen Herausforderungen unserer Zeit anbieten. Diese Bewegungen finden vor allem bei denjenigen Anklang, die sich inmitten des raschen gesellschaftlichen und wirtschaftlichen Wandels nach Sicherheit und Beständigkeit sehnen. Sie neigen dazu, sich Lösungen wie nationaler Abschottung und der Etablierung autoritärer Regime zuzuwenden, um ein Gefühl der Sicherheit zu vermitteln (vgl. Möllers 2018, S. 7).Seit der Flüchtlingskrise 2015 haben populistische Strömungen in verschiedenen europäischen Ländern an Zulauf gewonnen. Ungarn und Polen sind prominente Beispiele, in denen rechtsnationale bis rechtsradikale Parteien an die Macht gekommen sind. Diese Regierungen stehen im Widerspruch zu den Grundprinzipien der Europäischen Union, einschließlich der Achtung der Menschenwürde, der Demokratie, der Freiheit, der Gleichheit und der Rechtsstaatlichkeit. Der Umbau des Staatswesens in diesen Ländern zeigt sich insbesondere in der Einschränkung der Unabhängigkeit der Justiz, der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und der Medien (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2022).Besonders in Ungarn, wo seit Viktor Orbáns zweiter Amtszeit im Jahr 2010 ein schleichender Prozess des Demokratieabbaus zu beobachten ist, wird die Bedeutung der Medienregulierung für die demokratischen Strukturen und die politische Landschaft offensichtlich. Die vorliegende Arbeit widmet sich dieser Problematik und beleuchtet, wie die Regulierung der Medien in Ungarn demokratische Prozesse und die politische Szenerie des Landes beeinflusst.Die Arbeit beginnt mit einer grundlegenden Definition des Begriffs "Medien" und einer Erörterung ihrer primären, sekundären und tertiären Funktionen im politischen Raum. Anschließend wird die Nutzung der Medien als Instrument der Regierungskommunikation und als Mittel der Machtsicherung untersucht. Eine Analyse der aktuellen Medienlandschaft in Ungarn, einschließlich der Einschränkungen der Pressefreiheit, der Meinungsvielfalt sowie der Kontrolle und Einflussnahme der Regierung auf die Medienorgane, bildet den Kern der Arbeit.Besonderes Augenmerk wird dabei auf die Medienregulierung in Ungarn gelegt. Die Auswirkungen dieser Medienregulierung auf die Demokratie in Ungarn werden untersucht, um zu verstehen, wie Veränderungen in der Medienlandschaft die Grundpfeiler der Demokratie beeinflussen - die Bedeutung der Medien für eine demokratische Gesellschaft, die Einschränkungen der Demokratie durch Regulierungen in der Medienlandschaft und die politischen Auswirkungen auf das demokratische System. Abschließend wird in einem Fazit reflektiert, inwiefern die Medienregulierung in Ungarn als symptomatisch für eine Verschiebung weg von demokratischen Idealen gesehen werden kann.Ziel der Arbeit ist es, ein Verständnis der komplexen Wechselwirkungen zwischen Medienregulierung und demokratischen Prozessen in Ungarn zu erlangen und damit einen Beitrag zur aktuellen Debatte über die Bedeutung liberaler demokratischer Werte in Europa zu leisten.Die Rolle der Medien in der PolitikDer folgende Abschnitt befasst sich mit der Rolle der Medien in der Politik. Im Mittelpunkt steht dabei die differenzierte Betrachtung der primären, sekundären und tertiären Funktionen der Medien. Mit Hilfe dieser Unterscheidung ist es möglich, ein tieferes Verständnis dafür zu entwickeln, wie Medien die politische Landschaft gestalten und beeinflussen. Durch die Analyse dieser Funktionen wird untersucht, wie Medien Öffentlichkeit herstellen, Informationen verbreiten, politische Akteure kontrollieren und zur politischen Sozialisation und Bildung beitragen. Dies ist von entscheidender Bedeutung, um die komplexen Wechselwirkungen zwischen Medien und Politik vollständig zu erfassen. Primär-, Tertiär- und SekundärfunktionDie Macht der Massenmedien, bestehende Machtstrukturen herauszufordern, darf nicht unterschätzt werden. Durch die Sammlung, Aufbereitung und Verbreitung von Informationen, Wissen und politischen Ansichten wird die öffentliche Meinung wesentlich beeinflusst (Wittkämper, S. 37). Bereits in der Frühen Neuzeit erkannten der Adel und die Kirche als damalige Machthaber die potenzielle Bedrohung, die von den Medien ausging. Sie reagierten schnell und führten nach der Entdeckung des Buchdrucks Zensurmaßnahmen ein, um die zu druckenden Inhalte vorzuprüfen und ihre Herrschaft zu sichern (Strohmeier 2004, S. 69).In der heutigen Zeit spielen die Medien eine zentrale Rolle bei der Gestaltung der politischen Realitäten, da sie in der Lage sind, die politische Macht entweder zu stärken oder zu untergraben (Strohmeier 2004, S. 69). Ziel der folgenden Ausführungen ist die Veranschaulichung des Einflusspotenzials der Massenmedien durch die Darstellung ihrer grundlegenden Funktionen.Gerd Strohmeier weist auf die Bedeutung der primären, der sekundären und der tertiären Funktion der Massenmedien hin. Die Primärfunktion besteht darin, Öffentlichkeit herzustellen, die entsteht, wenn direkte Kommunikationsformen bevölkerungsbedingt nicht ausreichen. Massenmedien ermöglichen eine schnelle und einfache Verbreitung von Nachrichten und füllen so diese kommunikative Lücke (Strohmeier 2004, S. 72).Die Kontrolle der politischen Akteure und die Verbreitung von Informationen gehören zu der Sekundärfunktion. Ziel ist die umfassende und verständliche Vermittlung von Inhalten und damit die Beeinflussung der Meinungsbildung. Zugleich haben Massenmedien die Aufgabe, das Verhalten der politischen Institutionen zu überwachen, Missstände aufzudecken und Kritik zu üben (Strohmeier 2004, S. 72f.).Die Tertiärfunktion der Medien umfasst drei wesentliche Aspekte. Erstens die Förderung der politischen Meinungs- und Willensbildung, zweitens die Integration und politische Sozialisation und drittens die Vermittlung politischer Bildung. Diese Aspekte unterstützen die Entwicklung der Persönlichkeit des Einzelnen und seine Integration in die Gesellschaft, fördern das Verständnis für das politische System und regen zur aktiven Teilnahme am politischen Leben an. Darüber hinaus haben die Massenmedien einen entscheidenden Einfluss auf die Art und Weise, wie über bestimmte Themen nachgedacht und gesprochen wird, oft ohne dass sich die Menschen der Beeinflussung ihrer Meinungen durch die Medien bewusst sind (Strohmeier 2004, S. 73f.).Medien als InstrumentIm nächsten Schritt unserer Analyse konzentrieren wir uns auf die Rolle der Medien als politisches Werkzeug. Dabei unterteilt sich unsere Betrachtung in zwei Schlüsselaspekte. Einerseits die Nutzung der Medien für Regierungskommunikation, durch die Regierungen ihre Botschaften vermitteln, und andererseits die Anwendung der Medien als Mittel zur Machtsicherung, wodurch Einfluss auf die öffentliche Meinung genommen und politische Macht gefestigt wird.Medien als Instrument für RegierungskommunikationDie strategische Nutzung der Medien durch die Regierung wird vor allem in Bezug auf den Einfluss der Mediengesetzgebung auf die Demokratisierungsprozesse und die Politikgestaltung in Ungarn untersucht. Durch die gezielte Verbreitung politischer Botschaften und Entscheidungen interagieren Regierungen direkt mit der Bevölkerung, was nicht nur die Verbreitung von Informationen fördert, sondern auch die öffentliche Meinung prägt und politische Unterstützung generiert.Um den Rechtspopulismus zu verstehen, ist es notwendig, sich mit Cas Muddes Definition des Populismus auseinanderzusetzen, der Populismus als eine Ideologie betrachtet, die die Gesellschaft in zwei homogene und antagonistische Gruppen teilt: "das reine Volk" gegenüber "der korrupten Elite", wobei Politik als Ausdruck des allgemeinen Volkswillens verstanden wird (Mudde 2004, S. 543). Die Tendenz, dass rechtspopulistische Parteien seit den 1980er Jahren Wahlerfolge erzielen und sich etablieren, zeigt sich nicht nur in westeuropäischen, sondern auch in jungen Demokratien Osteuropas, einschließlich Ungarns (Geden 2006, S. 17f.).Rechtspopulisten positionieren sich als Vertreter der "schweigenden Mehrheit" in direktem Gegensatz zu den politischen und kulturellen Eliten und privilegierten Minderheiten, denen sie die Verfolgung partikularer Interessen vorwerfen (Geden 2006, S. 20f.). Ihre politische Rhetorik ist durch Vereinfachung und Komplexitätsreduktion gekennzeichnet, wobei sie sich organisatorisch von den etablierten Parteien abgrenzen, etwa durch die Zusammenarbeit mit außerparlamentarischen Gruppen, die Initiierung von Volksentscheiden oder die Präsenz charismatischer Führungspersönlichkeiten (Geden 2006, S. 22).Ein zentrales Element rechtspopulistischen Denkens ist der "Ethnopluralismus", der besagt, dass sich ethnisch und kulturell homogene Völker nicht vermischen sollten, was eine inhärente Ungleichheit der Völker suggeriert und kulturelle Begegnungen als konfliktträchtig ansieht (Bruns et al. 2015, S. 12f.).Im spezifischen Kontext Ungarns unter der Führung von Viktor Orbán zeigt sich die kritische Rolle dieser Medienstrategien. Die Regierung Orbán hat Medienregulierung bewusst eingesetzt, um ein medienfreundliches Umfeld für regierungsnahe Nachrichtenquellen zu schaffen und gleichzeitig den Raum für kritische Stimmen einzuschränken (Mudde 2004, S. 543). Dies schränkt nicht nur die Vielfalt und Freiheit der Medien ein, sondern hat auch tiefgreifende Auswirkungen auf demokratische Prozesse, indem es die Möglichkeiten für eine offene politische Debatte einschränkt.Diese strategische Nutzung der Medien für die Regierungskommunikation verdeutlicht die Doppelnatur der Medien in der Politik. Einerseits als Kanäle für die transparente Kommunikation politischer Inhalte und andererseits als Instrumente der Machtkonsolidierung, die die demokratischen Grundlagen untergraben können. Diese Dynamik ist entscheidend für das Verständnis der politischen Situation in Ungarn und der Rolle, die die Medienregulierung dabei spielt (Geden 2006, S. 17f.).Detlef Grieswelle betont in "Politische Rhetorik: Macht der Rede, öffentliche Legitimation, Stiftung von Konsens" die bedeutende Rolle der Rhetorik in der Politik. Rhetorik dient nicht nur der Durchsetzung und Legitimation von Macht, sondern auch der Kontrolle und Repräsentation von Interessen, was ihre Bedeutung als Instrument politischer Führung und Einflussnahme unterstreicht (Grieswelle 2000, S. 33). In diesem Zusammenhang ist die rhetorische Strategie des ungarischen Ministerpräsidenten von besonderer Relevanz, da mit ihr versucht wird, politische Legitimität für diese Vision zu schaffen und die Unterstützung der Bevölkerung zu gewinnen (Bruns et al. 2015, S. 12f.).Medien als Werkzeug zur Sicherung von MachtUm zu verstehen, wie die Medien zum Machterhalt beitragen, ist die Rhetorik von rechtspopulistischen Figuren wie Viktor Orbán besonders aufschlussreich. Orbán nutzt plakative und skandalträchtige Kommunikationswege, um mediale Aufmerksamkeit zu generieren die nicht nur seine Präsenz in der Öffentlichkeit stärkt, sondern auch eine Mobilisierung seiner Anhängerschaft bewirkt (Schnepf 2020, S. 5). In seinen politischen Reden kehren bestimmte rhetorische Muster immer wieder, darunter die Verwendung von Antagonismen, die eine Konfliktsituation erzeugen, insbesondere durch die Gegenüberstellung von "Elite" und "Volk". Dabei wird das "Volk" als unterdrückt dargestellt, während die rechtspopulistische Partei als volksnah inszeniert wird (Mudde 2004, S. 543). Eine charakteristische Einfachheit in den Botschaften rechter Parteien wird von Bischof und Senninger hervorgehoben. Je weiter rechts eine Partei steht, desto einfacher ist ihr Programm (Bischof/Senninger 2018, S. 484). Solche Diskurse verwenden prägnante und leicht verständliche Formulierungen für ansonsten komplexe politische Sachverhalte, suggerieren einfache Lösungen und nutzen Dramatisierungen und Metaphern. Insbesondere werden Migrant*innen durch metaphorische Vergleiche abgewertet (Hogan/Haltinner 2015, S. 533) und es wird auf die Bedrohung der nationalen Identität durch ethnische Minderheiten und Migrant*innen angespielt, ein Vorgehen, das Ruth Wodak als "politics of fear" beschreibt (Wodak 2015, S. 2).Diese Elemente rechtspopulistischer Rhetorik finden sich in Orbáns Äußerungen deutlich wieder, wie einige seiner Reden und Interviews exemplarisch zeigen. Besonders deutlich wird dies in seiner Darstellung von Migration als Bedrohung für das ungarische Volk, wobei er einen alarmistischen Ton anschlägt, um die migrationskritische Haltung der Regierung zu untermauern und ein Klima der Angst zu erzeugen: "Europa wird von einer beispiellosen Masseneinwanderung bedroht. (...) Wir sprechen heute von Hunderttausenden, nächstes Jahr werden es Millionen sein, ein Ende ist nicht in Sicht" (Orbán, zitiert nach Mendelski 2019, S. 8). Orbáns Wortwahl, in der er von der "Wahrheit" spricht, verdeutlicht seine Überzeugung von der Legitimität seiner Politik, wobei er durch Übertreibungen wie "Millionen", "massive Integration" oder "unerwartetes Ausmaß" eine Atmosphäre der Panik schafft.In einer Rede anlässlich seiner Vereidigung als Ministerpräsident präsentierte Orbán seine Vision einer Demokratie, die er als "christdemokratisch im 21. Jahrhundert" bezeichnete und damit ein stark von christlichen Werten geprägtes Bild nationaler Identität entwarf, das traditionelle Familienbilder bevorzugt und Homosexualität ausgrenzt. Diese Ausführungen zeigen, wie Orbán die Medien nutzt, um seine politische Botschaft zu verstärken und wie er die Medien als Instrument zur Sicherung seiner Macht einsetzt, indem er sich einer Rhetorik bedient, die sowohl mobilisiert als auch polarisiert, um seine Position zu festigen und Herausforderungen zu kontrollieren.Analyse der aktuellen Medienlandschaft in UngarnDer folgende Teil der Arbeit befasst sich mit der aktuellen Medienlandschaft in Ungarn. In der ersten Amtszeit Orbáns zwischen 1998 und 2002 gab es kaum Eingriffe in die Pressefreiheit, was auf mehrere Faktoren zurückzuführen ist. Da Ungarn in dieser Zeit noch auf den EU-Beitritt hinarbeitete, vermied Orbán bewusst Auseinandersetzungen mit der Europäischen Union über Fragen der Pressefreiheit. Dies änderte sich jedoch in der darauffolgenden Amtszeit ab 2010 drastisch: Ein neues Gesetz wurde eingeführt, das staatlichen Stellen die Einflussnahme auf die Medien ermöglichte und deren Regulierung legitimierte. Fortan nutzte die Regierung Orbán die Medien gezielt für ihre politischen Ziele.Einschränkungen der Pressefreiheit und Meinungsvielfalt in UngarnDas Beispiel Ungarns zeigt den Übergang von einem Demokratisierungsprozess zu einem schleichenden Verlust demokratischer Strukturen. Ursprünglich galt Ungarn aufgrund seiner politischen Fortschritte und wirtschaftlichen Stabilität in den späten 1990er und frühen 2000er Jahren als Vorbild unter den EU-Beitrittskandidaten. Nach dem Fall der kommunistischen Einparteienherrschaft (1949-1989) und der Etablierung einer parlamentarischen Demokratie (ab 1990) unternahm das Land erhebliche Anstrengungen, um eine demokratische Staatsform zu etablieren. Wichtige Reformen dieser Zeit schufen unter anderem eine klare Trennung der Staatsgewalten (Legislative, Exekutive, Judikative) und die neue Verfassung verankerte Prinzipien wie Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Unabhängigkeit der Justiz (Ismayr 2002, S. 310ff.).Seit 2010 hat Viktor Orbán mit seiner Fidesz-Partei jedoch einen politischen Kurs eingeschlagen der den zuvor eingeleiteten Demokratisierungsprozess nicht nur gestoppt, sondern in einigen Bereichen sogar rückgängig gemacht hat. Ein 2010 verabschiedetes Mediengesetz, das es staatlichen Stellen erlaubt, die Medien zu überwachen und bei Verstößen zu sanktionieren, markiert einen Wendepunkt in der Einschränkung der Pressefreiheit und ist ein zentraler Faktor im Demokratieabbau des Landes (Bajomi-Lazar 2018, S. 273ff.). Freedom House hebt hervor, dass von allen Kriterien zur Bewertung des Zustands von Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit gerade die Pressefreiheit in Ungarn die dramatischsten Einbußen zu verzeichnen hat (Bajomi-Lazar 2018, S. 273).Die ungarische Medienlandschaft hat sich seit der Regierungsübernahme durch Orbán und Fidesz sukzessive verändert. Die Regierung kontrolliert den öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunk, die staatliche Nachrichtenagentur Magyar Tavirati Iroda sowie einen erheblichen Teil der privaten Medien, die sich im Besitz von Orbán nahestehenden Personen befinden. Im Rahmen einer umfassenden Umstrukturierung wurden 570 leitende Angestellte der Rundfunkanstalten durch der Fidesz-Partei loyale Mitarbeiter ersetzt (Bajomi-Lazar 2018, S. 275f.).Für die regionale Berichterstattung sind seit Sommer 2017 ausschließlich unternehmerfreundliche Medien zuständig. Mit der Schließung einiger kritischer Zeitungen, darunter die überregionalen Blätter Nepszabadsag und Magyar Nemzet, ist die kritische Berichterstattung landesweit nahezu zum Erliegen gekommen. Zudem werden Journalisten, die sich kritisch über Orbán und seine Regierung äußern, nicht selten auf "schwarze Listen" gesetzt, eine Praxis, die offensichtlich darauf abzielt, Kritiker einzuschüchtern (Bajomi-Lazar 2018, S. 280).Kontrolle und Einflussnahme der Regierung auf MedienorganeEin neues Medienpaket mit Änderungen des Medien- und Pressegesetzes trat am 01.01.2011 durch die Regierung Orban in Kraft. Dieses sorgte damals europaweit für Schlagzeilen. Die Rechtsstaatlichkeit des Gesetzes wurde von der EU-Kommission angezweifelt. Auf einige Aspekte soll im Folgenden kurz eingegangen werden.Die Unabhängigkeit der Medien wurde durch das Mediengesetz erheblich geschwächt. Das Mediengesetz sah unter anderem ein Verbot bestimmter Äußerungen vor und legte eine Registrierungspflicht für alle Medien fest. Es drohte die Löschung und der Entzug der rechtlichen Möglichkeit, in Ungarn zu publizieren, wenn der Registrierungspflicht nicht nachgekommen wurde. Dies galt auch für Medienunternehmen, die außerhalb Ungarns in anderen Staaten der Europäischen Union (EU) tätig waren.Die Aufsicht über die Medien wurde nicht mehr von verschiedenen Behörden, sondern von einem einzigen Medienkontrollgremium ausgeübt. Das Medienkontrollgremium war für die Verhängung von Geldstrafen bei "politisch unausgewogener Berichterstattung" (Möllers 2018, S. 47) zuständig. Hinzu kam, dass viele Journalistinnen und Journalisten, die für den staatlichen Rundfunk arbeiteten, entlassen wurden und beispielsweise privaten, regierungskritischen Medien erschwert wurde, eine Rundfunklizenz zu erhalten. Die EU konnte durch die Androhung eines Vertragsverletzungsverfahrens zumindest eine Änderung der "EU-Ausländer betreffenden Aspekte" (Möllers 2018, S. 47) erreichen.MediengesetzgebungNoch bevor Ungarn seine neue Verfassung verankerte, stand die Regierung aufgrund der Verabschiedung eines restriktiven Mediengesetzes unter Beschuss. Das Gesetz, welches im Januar 2011 in Kraft trat, beschränkt deutlich die Freiheit der Medien und Presse (Salzborn 2015, S. 76). Das Hauptziel dieser Maßnahme ist die Dominanz der Regierung Orbáns über das Mediengefüge. Zu diesem Zweck wurde die Nationale Kommunikations- und Medienbehörde ("KESMA") ins Leben gerufen. Diese Behörde und der Medienrat erhielten erweiterte Befugnisse zur Überwachung und Lizenzierung von Medienangeboten. Unter anderem ist die Nationale Kommunikations- und Medienbehörde verantwortlich für die Vergabe von Sendelizenzen und übernimmt Aufgaben im Bereich des Verbraucher- und Wettbewerbsschutzes. Eine der Hauptaufgaben des Medienrates ist die Gewährleistung einer Berichterstattung (Bos 2021, S. 38). Neben der Neustrukturierung des Medienwesens führte die Regierung ein Fördermodell ein, das regierungsnahe Medien durch staatliche Werbeverträge finanziell unterstützt.Nach den Wahlen im Jahr 2014 erwarben Unternehmer, die der Regierung nahestehen, zunehmend Medien der Opposition, die anschließend in die neu geschaffene "Mitteleuropäische Presse- und Medienstiftung" eingebracht wurden (Bos 2021, S. 38). So schaffte es die Regierung Orbán, einflussreiche Medien der Opposition zu marginalisieren oder vollständig vom Markt zu nehmen. Ebenso wurden Online-Nachrichtenplattformen in das System eingegliedert (Bos 2021, S. 39).Samuel Salzborn kritisiert insbesondere den rechtlichen Charakter des neuen Mediengesetzes, das vage Generalklauseln beinhaltet, welche sich auf unbestimmte Konzepte wie "gute Sitten" berufen. Diese Klauseln sind offen für Interpretationen und ermöglichen damit eine gewisse Willkür. Die Definition dessen was als "gute Sitte" gilt kann staatlich bestimmt und gegen kritische Berichterstattung eingesetzt werden, was deren Sanktionierung zur Folge haben kann (Salzborn 2015, S. 77).Auswirkungen der Medienregulierung auf die Demokratie in UngarnNachdem im vorangegangenen Kapitel die aktuelle Medienlandschaft in Ungarn dargestellt wurde, widmet sich der folgende Abschnitt den Auswirkungen der Medienregulierung auf die demokratische Verfasstheit Ungarns. Anhand konkreter politischer Maßnahmen der ungarischen Regierung wird untersucht, wie die Visionen Orbáns umgesetzt wurden. Darüber hinaus wird analysiert, inwiefern die rechtspopulistische Politik die Qualität der ungarischen Demokratie beeinflusst und verändert hat.Bedeutung der Medien für die demokratische GesellschaftIm Zentrum der Debatte um die Rolle der Medien in der demokratischen Gesellschaft Ungarns steht die Transformationspolitik Viktor Orbáns und seiner Fidesz-Partei, die seit ihrem Regierungsantritt eine umfassende Kontrolle über die Medienlandschaft ausüben. Die Regierung nutzt diese Kontrolle strategisch als Instrument der Regierungskommunikation, um eine fast ausschließlich positive Berichterstattung über ihre Handlungen und Entscheidungen sicherzustellen. Regierungskritische Stimmen finden kaum Gehör, stattdessen wird Kritik systematisch unterdrückt und negative Nachrichten werden in einem für die Regierung vorteilhaften Licht dargestellt. Die gezielte Durchführung von Desinformationskampagnen, die Bajomi-Lazar als "Propaganda" bezeichnet, ist ein weiterer Baustein dieser Medienpolitik (Bajomi-Lazar 2018, S. 280f.).Die Verpflichtung von Arthur J. Finkelstein, einem erfahrenen Kampagnenstrategen aus den USA, durch Viktor Orbán unterstreicht den gezielten Einsatz der Medien zur Meinungsbildung. Das Phänomen der Verbreitung von teilweise oder vollständig gefälschten Nachrichten ist zwar kein Alleinstellungsmerkmal der ungarischen Medienlandschaft, die offene Zurschaustellung dieser Praktiken durch die ungarische Regierung ohne den Versuch, ihre Aktivitäten zu verschleiern, stellt jedoch einen klaren Bruch mit demokratischen Normen dar (Bajomi-Lazar 2018, S. 281).Diese Entwicklung wirft grundsätzliche Fragen nach den Auswirkungen der Medienregulierung auf die Demokratie in Ungarn auf. Die Einflussnahme auf die Medien und die damit einhergehende Unterdrückung pluralistischer Diskurse hat unmittelbare Folgen für die demokratische Gesellschaft. Indem die Medien als verlängerter Arm der Regierungskommunikation fungieren und kritische Berichterstattung marginalisiert wird, werden demokratische Grundwerte wie Meinungsvielfalt und Pressefreiheit massiv untergraben. Die strategische Manipulation der Medienlandschaft durch die Regierung Orbán verdeutlicht die Herausforderungen vor denen die Demokratie in Ungarn steht und unterstreicht die zentrale Rolle der Medienfreiheit als Grundpfeiler einer lebendigen und funktionierenden demokratischen Gesellschaft. Einschränkung der Demokratie durch Regulierungen in der MedienlandschaftDie Regulierung der Medienlandschaft in Ungarn durch Viktor Orbán und seine Fidesz-Partei hat weitreichende Folgen für die Demokratie im Land. Durch die systematische Übernahme und Anpassung der Medien an ihre Vorstellungen, insbesondere durch die Besetzung der Führungspositionen in den wichtigsten Medienorganisationen mit Verbündeten der Regierung, haben sie die Medien zu einem Instrument der Machtsicherung gemacht. Die Aufhebung der Unabhängigkeit der Medien ermöglicht es der Orbán-Regierung, die Berichterstattung vollständig für ihre politischen Ziele zu instrumentalisieren. Es dominiert eine einseitige Berichterstattung, die den Bürgern vor allem in den ländlichen Regionen wenig Spielraum lässt die Authentizität und Richtigkeit der präsentierten Nachrichten zu überprüfen. Die Bürger Ungarns stehen vor der Herausforderung, dass sie kaum Zugang zu alternativen Perspektiven oder kritischen Stimmen haben, was sie quasi dazu zwingt, den regierungsgesteuerten Nachrichten Glauben zu schenken (Bajomi-Lazar 2018, S. 281/282).Diese Einschränkung der Medienfreiheit und die Manipulation der Informationslandschaft durch die Regierung Orbán untergraben grundlegende demokratische Prinzipien, indem sie den freien Zugang zu Informationen einschränken und eine fundierte öffentliche Meinungsbildung verhindern. Durch die gezielte Meinungsmache und die Abschottung gegenüber kritischen Debatten werden die natürlichen demokratischen Kontrollmechanismen geschwächt und die Bevölkerung als Kontrollinstanz der Regierung faktisch entmachtet. Die Strategie, die Macht über die Medien zu festigen und dafür zu sorgen, dass keine Gegenmeinungen an die Öffentlichkeit gelangen oder Widerstand gegen politische Entscheidungen leisten können, ist ein deutliches Zeichen für den Missbrauch von Medienmacht zur Festigung autoritärer Strukturen.Diese Entwicklungen in Ungarn verdeutlichen die zentrale Bedeutung einer unabhängigen und pluralistischen Medienlandschaft für den Erhalt einer gesunden Demokratie. Die Einschränkung der Pressefreiheit und die gezielte Manipulation der Medien durch die Regierung stellen eine ernsthafte Bedrohung für die demokratischen Prozesse und die politische Freiheit im Land dar. Politische Auswirkungen auf das demokratische System UngarnsDie politischen Auswirkungen der Regulierung der Medien auf das demokratische System in Ungarn sind tiefgreifend und haben zu einer Verschlechterung der Qualität der Demokratie im Land geführt. Diese Veränderungen spiegeln sich in verschiedenen internationalen Indizes wider, die die demokratische Stabilität Ungarns bewerten. Der "Freedom in the World Index" von Freedom House stuft Ungarn als "teilweise frei" ein, da die Fidesz-Partei die Kontrolle über unabhängige Institutionen erlangt hat, was zu einer Schwächung der Aktivitäten von Oppositionellen, Journalisten, Universitäten und NGOs geführt hat (Freedom House 2021). Der "Nations in Transit Index" bezeichnet Ungarn sogar als "Transitional or Hybrid Regime" mit einem Wert von 49 von 100 Punkten, wobei 100 Punkte für eine funktionierende Demokratie stehen (Freedom House 2021b). Der Bertelsmann Transformationsindex beschreibt Ungarn als "defekte Demokratie", in den demokratischen Institutionen zwar existieren, aber eingeschränkt und ineffektiv sind (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020, S. 13).Deutlich verschlechtert hat sich zudem die Platzierung Ungarns in der Rangliste der Pressefreiheit von "Reporter ohne Grenzen", wo das Land nur noch auf Platz 92 von 180 Ländern rangiert und die Situation der Pressefreiheit als problematisch eingestuft wird (Reporter ohne Grenzen 2021). Der "Rule of Law Index" des World Justice Project weist Ungarn den niedrigsten Wert in Osteuropa zu, weltweit liegt es auf Platz 60 von 128 (World Justice Project 2020).Diese Indizes und Bewertungen zeigen, dass die von Viktor Orbán vorangetriebene politische Transformation direkte negative Auswirkungen auf die Qualität der Demokratie in Ungarn haben. Einige Autoren wie Attila Ágh sprechen von der "ungarischen Krankheit" als antidemokratischer Herausforderung für die EU und beschreiben das Land als "worst case scenario" einer "elected autocracy" (Ágh 2015, S. 4, S. 16). János Kornai sieht in der Entwicklung seit Orbáns Amtsantritt eine Abkehr von Demokratie und Errungenschaften des Systemwechsels Ende der 1980er, einen "U-Turn" (Kornai 2015, S. 1). Samuel Salzborn identifiziert eine transformatorische Entwicklung hin zu einer Diktatur, bedingt durch rechtliche Veränderungen und eine zunehmende Ethnisierung der Innenpolitik (Salzborn 2015, S. 81).Andere Forscher sprechen von einem "hybriden Regime" und positionieren Ungarn in einer Grauzone zwischen Demokratie und Autokratie. András Bozóki und Dániel Hegedüs betonen, dass hybride Regime eine eigenständige Kategorie darstellen, die weder als Unterform der Demokratie noch der Diktatur zu verstehen ist (Bozóki/Hegedüs 2018, S. 1183). Attila Antal betont, dass das Orbán-Regime seine politische Anhängerschaft gezielt repolitisiert und den Rest der politischen Gemeinschaft depolitisiert hat (Antal 2017, S. 18).SchlussfolgerungDas Phänomen des Demokratieabbaus, beobachtet nicht nur in Ungarn, sondern weltweit und innerhalb Europas, unterstreicht eine kritische Herausforderung für die demokratische Ordnung vieler Staaten. Die systematische Einschränkung der Presse- und Meinungsfreiheit in Ungarn seit Viktor Orbáns zweiter Amtszeit im Jahr 2010 zeichnet ein beunruhigendes Bild der Degradierung demokratischer Werte, das weit über die Grenzen Ungarns hinausreicht und die europäische Gemeinschaft insgesamt betrifft (Möllers 2018, S. 7; Ismayr 2002, S. 309ff.).Die zentrale Rolle der Medien in einer Demokratie, hervorgehoben durch ihre vielfältigen Funktionen wie die Schaffung von Öffentlichkeit, Informationsvermittlung, Kontrolle der Macht, soziale Integration und Bildung, unterstreicht die Bedeutung der Medienfreiheit für das Funktionieren einer demokratischen Gesellschaft (Strohmeier 2004, S. 69ff.). Die Kontrolle über die Massenmedien zu haben bedeutet, einen entscheidenden Einfluss darauf zu besitzen, welche Informationen die Bevölkerung erhält und wie sie die politische Realität wahrnimmt.Ungarns Entwicklung seit 2010 unter der Fidesz-Regierung ist besonders alarmierend, da sie zeigt, wie gezielt Propaganda eingesetzt wird, um die Regierungsperspektive zu stärken und oppositionelle Stimmen effektiv zum Schweigen zu bringen. Die offene Ausführung dieser Maßnahmen und das scheinbare Desinteresse der Regierung, ihre Aktionen zu verbergen, verdeutlichen eine besorgniserregende Gleichgültigkeit gegenüber demokratischen Standards (Bajomi-Lazar 2018, S. 281f.). Trotz der Transparenz dieser Aktivitäten hat die Europäische Union bisher wenig Einfluss auf eine positive Veränderung nehmen können, was den Demokratieabbau in Ungarn weiter vorantreibt.Die Situation in Ungarn ist nicht isoliert zu betrachten, sondern stellt ein ernstes Problem für die EU dar, da es die konstitutionellen und demokratischen Grundlagen der Gemeinschaft untergräbt. Die aktuellen Entwicklungen in Ungarn sind ein Warnsignal und erfordern eine dringende und koordinierte Reaktion auf europäischer Ebene, um die Demokratie zu schützen und zu fördern. Die Frage, wie die Medienregulierung in Ungarn die demokratischen Prozesse und die politische Landschaft des Landes beeinflusst, lässt sich klar beantworten: Sie führt zu einer erheblichen Einschränkung der Demokratiequalität, indem sie die freie Meinungsäußerung untergräbt, die politische Pluralität einschränkt und die Kontrollfunktion der Medien schwächt.Die Hoffnung liegt nun darauf, dass die internationale Gemeinschaft und europäische Institutionen wirksame Maßnahmen ergreifen, um die demokratischen Prinzipien in Ungarn zu stärken und einen weiteren Demokratieabbau zu verhindern. Die Bewahrung der Medienfreiheit und die Sicherstellung einer pluralistischen und unabhängigen Medienlandschaft sind essenziell für die Aufrechterhaltung einer lebendigen und gesunden Demokratie, nicht nur in Ungarn, sondern in allen demokratischen Staaten. LiteraturverzeichnisÁgh, Attila. 2015. 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'It is a lesson which all history teaches wise men, to put trust in ideas, and not in circumstances'.Ralph Waldo Emerson'It is precisely in times of national emergencies that civil liberties must be defended and protected most forcefully. If not, then governments will be given incentives to constantly create crises, or perceptions of crises, and declaring "official states of emergency" in order to grab more and more power and money and destroy more and more liberty and prosperity'.United States Supreme Court (Ex Parte Milligan. 1866)IntroductionSince the September 11 attacks, the notion of state of exception has been used in order to coin the legal and political repercussions of the 'War on Terror'. These, by being labeled within the state of emergency's legal -or extralegal- framework, have been able to be constitutionally justified and, also, ethically criticized. Proponents of draconian measures consider that, in certain circumstances, necessity dictates policies aimed at protecting the State from terrorist attacks. They deem terrorism an imminent and serious threat capable of destroying the institutions that give political cohesion to society. Denying, suspending and limiting certain individual rights amount to a lesser evil; compared to the, apparently, almost certain greater evil that terrorists embody. On the other hand, advocates of the inviolability of the rule of law believe that under any situation a democratic government should allow urgency and peril prevail over the constitutionally recognized political and human rights. For them, counterterrorism should not rely on extralegal actions 'legitimized' by the state of exception. The State already has the legal and adequate tools, provided by the police and criminal justice, to persecute terrorists. Democracies that recur to lesser evil arguments to fight terrorism always end up committing more damage that the one they were trying to prevent.This essay will analyze the state of exception by studying the legal and the political-social natures of it. Various arguments, in favor and against the exception, will be showcased by continuously referring to the War on Terror and its effects on the legal system and democracy. Lastly, a conclusion will address the importance of this debate in current politics and society. The State of ExceptionThe state of exception or emergency can be studied under two different kinds of views: the legal and the political-social ones. The former defines the state of emergency, within the various constitutional frameworks of current modern democracies, as a temporary measure that limits or suspends certain individual freedoms within the territory of the State . It is prompted by a critical and imminent, domestic or foreign, threat to the State's existence. Under this scenario, necessity overcomes the 'normal' rule of law. Consequentially, individual freedoms are limited while police, security and military agencies' powers are enhanced. The debate regarding the state of exception's legal aspect circles around the constitutionality of its enactment, the variety of faculties attributed to the State's security forces and, more importantly, the personal rights suspension's lawfulness. Politically and socially, the state of emergency is conceived either as the pivotal attribute that defines the sovereign body as such; or, either as the transitional step required for -'legitimately'- transforming a democracy into a dictatorship. The former perception links the state of exception with the concept of sovereigntyunderstood as the State's existence as an organized polity . The latter one considers any type of restriction to individual freedoms as a permanent damage to the fabrics of democracy . The Legal Nature of the State of Exception The legal, and political, origin of the state of emergency is to be found in ancient Roman law. According to the lex de dictatore creando, whenever the Roman Republic was in grave danger, the Senate designated an extraordinary magistrate that was invested with absolute and total authority over the Republic . Subsequently, a provisional dictatorship was instituted that lasted for six months or until the threat passed. The republican and the dictatorship authorities, to the Romans, were complementary; quite the opposite of how democracies and authoritarian regimes are understood today. However, Roman dictators quickly learned how to indefinitely prolong their authority by perpetuating foreign wars through the creation of an Empire.The institution of the Roman provisional dictatorship is the historical legal inception of the various types of state of emergency that are currently present within modern constitutions. Broadly speaking, in every constitution the state of exception is declared by the head of the executive power whenever the normal functions of the State's institutions are no longer guaranteed because of foreign attack or domestic unrest. Fundamental liberties and rights -such as habeas corpus, freedom of movement and public gathering among others- are suspended or severely restricted. In most cases, the executive is entitled to order the arrest of individuals and to set military commissions for their trials. The security forces' faculties are enhanced and the military is allowed to take on police activities. Depending on the country, the state of emergency could be declared to last for days, months or years and it can even be extended indefinitely number of times . The debate concerning the state of exception's legal aspect comprises three main issues: its constitutionality; the amount of power given to the security forces; and, the limits set on fundamental freedoms, individual rights and constitutional guarantees. The state of emergency's constitutional validity considers under which cases it can be declared. As stated before, it is necessity that calls for the establishment of exception. It is necessary to give to the executive branch of government extraordinary powers and authority in order to prevent the State's breakdown from an imminent and grave danger. This peril can be prompted by a domestic or foreign threat. The latter are not sufficiently, and narrowly, defined by modern constitutions. Normally, they invoke a military invasion by a foreign country or an internal insurrection; but both of them are broad cases and can be loosely interpreted. Taking the U.S. Constitution, for example, the state of emergency is only referred to in Article I, Section 9 where it states: 'The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.'Therefore, only in the cases of rebellion –domestic threat- and invasion –foreign threat- the state of exception can be enacted. Regrettably, the Constitution does not define what constitutes a rebellion or an invasion. The task was left for legal experts and the Judiciary to tackle; but, it has not been easy or even coherent.The Supreme Court had the opportunity to take on the constitutionality of the state of emergency after President Lincoln had declared it in 1861 . In Ex Parte Milligan, it was decided that the suspension of the habeas corpus and the setting of military tribunals for citizens was unconstitutional because, even if a rebellion was in course, civilian courts were still operating. Additionally, the Supreme Court went even further by declaring that the theory of necessity, which justifies the state of exception, was false. It was argued that under the rule of law, guaranteed by the Constitution, the powers needed to protect the State's institutions are already set in place. Lastly, the Justices regarded the state of exception as a dangerous instrument that could only lead to despotism . Nevertheless, the Court did not pronounce itself about the issue of defining what constitutes a rebellion or invasion. Interestingly, even if it was deemed –correctly- that necessity never justifies the suspension of the rule of law, by not defining what constitutes an emergency, the Court considered the issue a political, and not a legal, matter . Rebellion and invasion remain broad, undefined, cases open to interpretation and to malleability by politics. In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court refrained itself from approaching the issue .The question of the security forces' enhanced powers, during the state of emergency, is a thornier one when compared to the former. Moreover, it is also deeply intertwined with the problem regarding limitations to fundamental liberties. During the state of exception the police and other security agencies are given extraordinary faculties aimed at facilitating the expedient resolution of the crisis. Therefore, they are allowed to search within premises without warrants, to arrest suspects without a court order, to hold individuals for a long period of time with no access to a lawyer or judge, to carry out aggressive interrogations, to set up wiretapping and close surveillance with no Judiciary control. Furthermore, it could also be the case that intelligence agencies and the military would be empowered to perform police and judicial activities. Since the declaration of the state of emergency by President George W. Bush, following 9/11, numerous enhanced and new attributes have been granted to the United States' security forces and agencies. Their faculties were augmented by several executive decrees and the three Patriot Acts. These pieces of legislation were said to be justified by the imminent and severe danger that terrorism embodied. But, are these prerogatives really needed to prevent future terrorist attacks? This is, of course, an endless debate; and one that again points out to the relationship between law and politics. As implied by the Supreme Court in Ex Parte Milligan, terrorists can be persecuted without declaring the state of emergency, by applying 'plain' criminal law and by letting the F.B.I -not the military- take the lead. To sum up, the 'normal' rule of law is perfectly suited for the task. However, depending on how terrorism is considered, as a war act or as a criminal one, is still a political issue.Just like in both the question of the constitutionality of the state of exception and the empowerment of security agencies, the concern regarding the suspension or restriction of fundamental liberties is one that is ascribed within the lesser evil debate. Legally, the selection between continuing the 'normal' rule of law or enacting the state of exception weights the possible damage that not acting would cause against the harm that limiting individual freedoms would produce . It is here where the legal concept of necessity comes into play. It is necessary to inflict or withstand a lesser evil in order to prevent a greater evil. This is the pragmatic view of constitutional freedoms: the risk of harming individual freedoms is a lesser one when compared to the possibility of not having any State that protects those liberties . The moral point of view argues that, by restricting constitutional freedoms, the State is causing an irreversible damage that may, quite possibly, be greater than the one that necessity is trying to avoid . When a state of exception is enacted the fundamental liberties that are suspended are, normally, the right to habeas corpus; freedom of movement; the right to public and private gathering; and the right to due process among others. The United States Government, during both the Bush and the Obama Administrations, restricted and suspended several individual freedoms and constitutionally guaranteed rights in order to effectively and speedily fight terrorism and avert further attacks. The rights to habeas corpus, to due process, to unnecessary cruel punishment and to trial by jury have been gravely and irreversibly hampered by the legalization of indefinite detention, targeted killing, aggressive interrogation and military tribunals respectively. In nearly all these cases, there is no chance of contradictory or revisionary procedures that would allow the dismissal of their establishment by proving their unfairness or unconstitutionality . The issue, maybe, is that they are not only unfair, but that they are unnecessary and cause permanent damage. Targeted killing and aggressive interrogation, which would be better labeled as targeted assassination and torture, are completely detrimental to the rule of law and set up dangerous precedents for the future. Since both measures have to be sanctioned, in each case, by the President and there is no possibility of revision, it could be argued that the executive is taking on the exclusive attributes of the other two branches of government. The check and balances system, designed to avoid despotic power, is totally disregarded in these cases . Here, the effects of necessity are clearly the greater evil.Depending on the country, the state of emergency or exception is labeled as martial law or state of siege (état de siège or estado de sitio). Both, however, share the same objectives and are justified by necessity. See Ignatieff, Michael; The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror; Princeton University Press; New York; 2004; pp. 25-28. Schmitt, Carl; Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty; Chicago University Press; Chicago; 2005; pp. 5-6. See, Arendt, Hannah; 'Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship'; in Responsibility and Judgment; Kohn, Jerome (Ed.); Schocken Books; New York; 2003.Lintott, Andrew; The Constitution of the Roman Republic; Oxford University Press; Oxford; 1999; pp. 110.For example, in France l' état de siège can only last for 12 days, although the President is allowed to extend it for more time with the Parliament's confirmation. In the United States, the National Emergency Acts can only last for no more than two years, but the President is entitled to extend it for one more years indefinitely number of times by only notifying Congress of his decision. For the French case see Article 16 of the Constitution, available at http://www.vie-publique.fr/decouverte-institutions/institutions/approfondissements/pouvoirs-exceptionnels-du-president.html ; for the American case see the U.S. Code, Title 50, Chapter 34, available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode50/usc_sup_01_50_10_34.html .See the United States Constitution, available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=001/llsl001.db&recNum=138See Neely, Mark; The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties; Oxford University Press; New York; 1991; pp. 179-184. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866); available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/71/2/case.htmlSee, Roche, John; Executive Power and Domestic Emergency: The Quest for Prerogative'; Western Political Quarterly; Vol. 5; N. 4; December 1952. See Ex Parte Quirin , 317 U.S. 1 (1942), which declared constitutional the military trials of German saboteurs during the Second World War in U.S. soil, available at http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=317&invol=1 ; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), which determined constitutional the Japanese Americans internment camps, available athttp://supreme.justia.com/us/323/214/case.html ; and, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), where it was decided that all Guantanamo detainees had the right of habeas corpus, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/07pdf/06-1195.pdf The national emergency was declared through Proclamation 7463 available athttp://ra.defense.gov/documents/mobil/pdf/proclamation.pdfSee Ignatieff, Michael; The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror; Princeton University Press; New York; 2004; pp. 40-44.See, Posner, Richard; Law, Pragmatism and Democracy; Harvard University Press; Cambridge; 2003. It is also interesting to consider here Margaret Somers' Arendtian view of political rights versus human rights because the former are recognized and protected by the State. See Somers, Margaret; Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness, and the Right to Have Rights; Cambridge University Press; Cambridge; 2008.See Dworkin, Ronald; Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the Constitution; Harvard University Press; Cambridge; 1996.Only regarding the cases of the restriction of habeas corpus and the setting up of military tribunals has the Supreme Court been able to declare their unconstitutionality and illegality. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); both available athttp://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=000&invol=03-6696&friend andhttp://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/05pdf/05-184.pdf respectively.For a better and more detailed analysis of the legality or illegality of targeted killings and torture see Banks, William; 'Targeted Killing and Assassination: the U.S. Legal Framework'; University of Richmond Law Review; Vol. 37; N. 667; 2002-2003; Dershowitz, Alan; 'When All Else Fails, Why not Torture?'; American Legion Magazine; July 2002; Blum, Gabriella, and Heymann, Philip; 'Law and Policy of Targeted Killing'; The Harvard National Security Journal; Vol. 2, Issue 2; 2010; and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). *Estudiante de Doctorado, New School for Social Research, New YorkMaestría en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos AiresÁrea de Especialización: Procesos de formación del Estado moderno, sociología de la guerra, terrorismo, genocidio, conflictos étnicos, nacionalismos y minorías.
In: Spajić-Vrkaš, Vedrana and Ilišin, Vlasta (2005) Youth in Croatia. Faculty of Humanites and Social Sciences University of Zagreb, Research and Training Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Citizenship, Zagreb. ISBN 953-175-242-7
The results of the research described above were obtained on a representative sample of Croatian youth from 15-24 years of age in the second half of 2002. The research was carried on in the context of a regional research project on youth under the auspices of the PRONI institute from Sweden. The main objective of the project was to provide empirical data on life, needs, attitudes and aspirations of young people as a means of assisting the process of youth policy review. The process was initiated by the Council of Europe with a view to strengthen youth participation in democratic changes of the countries in the region. This report is the most recent one in a long and well-established tradition of studying youth issues in Croatia. Therefore, it often includes comments and references to earlier research findings for the purpose of determining the changes in youth trends, as well as for the purpose of validity testing of our data. On the other side, the data presented in this report may, together with earlier studies, be used as a reference point in the process of reviewing the National Programme of Action for Youth, as well as in developing a comprehensive, efficient and youth-centred national youth policy. The core of the findings is probably that the criteria for determining the upper age-level of youth period should be reviewed and extended to include those who are 30 years of age. The fact that more and more young people remain longer in education, that they decide to marry and have children later in their life, that they consider changing their job and probably, if possible, enroll in re-training programmes for that purpose, as well as that they desire to reach full independence by relying on their own abilities and endeavour, speaks in favour of the need to redesign our traditional approaches to youth upper age-limits. Other findings that help us understand some important dimensions and trends of contemporary life of Croatian youth are summarised below. The most basic socio-demographic data demonstrate that very few young people from our research who are 24 and below are married and few think of having children before the age of 25. About half of them live in a two-child nuclear family in a house/apartment of their own that, averagely, comprises more than two rooms. Very few have an opportunity to live in an apartment of their own, although four fifths express desire to live separately. The aspiration towards such independence is mainly motivated by socio-economic and maturity factors: it is a prominent feature of young people who are university students, whose fathers have more education, and who are over 20. Since the chances of having their own apartment in a reasonable period of time are rather minimal, not only due to the difficulties in finding a job but due to extremely high prices in the housing sector, such prolonged co-habitation and dependency on parents and/or relatives is a frequent cause of young people' s frustrations and is probably related to, together with other factors such as poverty and limited capacity of pre-school child-care institutions, a constant decrease in the average number of children per family. On average, young people are satisfied with their present life and expect no change in the future. Despite a high unemployment rate especially among them, approximately three quarters assess their own present and future life, the life of their closest friends and their peers in Western Europe as good or excellent. Their optimism is somewhat even higher than it was found in the end of 1990s. When asked to imagine their life in 10 years ahead majority see it as a success, either in general terms or in specific terms of their professional advancement or family happiness. Dissatisfaction with present life grows with age and with opportunities to enter the world of work and become fully independent, since the young between 20-24 years of age, both employed and unemployed are more inclined to perceive their present life as unsatisfactory. Interestingly enough, the age does not have influence on the assessment of future, which means, in the context of this research, that young people in general, irrespective of age, equally believe that future brings better opportunities. In reference to their professional and educational aspirations, almost two thirds of the young want to continue education, while one fourth of them think of finding a job. The differences are mainly determined by residential, social, and age factors. Thus, a primary aspiration of pupils and university students, as well as of those who live in Zagreb or in families of higher socio-economic status, is to continue their education. Contrary to them, rural young people, those who live in low-income families, as well as those who are over 20 are more inclined to seek for a job or to continuing the job they currently hold. Over two fifths of young people plan to leave their present place of residence so as to be able to meet their professional and educational aspirations. Almost half of this group prefer to move somewhere inside the country, most often to a bigger city which is perceived as the place that offers better opportunities for career and social positioning, while other half think of going abroad. The percentage of the young planning to leave the country for good rose from 11% in 1986 and 18% in 1999 to 19% in 2002. Their migratory plans are connected to their residential status, i.e. to the conditions in the place or region where the young actually live. Young people from Zagreb are less willing to go somewhere else; rural youth and youth from Eastern Croatia wish to migrate to another place inside Croatia more than any other group, while all groups (except youth from Middle and Northern Croatia who want that somewhat more than others) equally (do not) want to settle abroad. Data on a desired place for living are quite similar to those on migratory plans. The number of youth preferring to remain in their present place of residence and the number of those having no migratory plans are almost identical. When compared to earlier studies, we see an increase in the number of young people preferring to live in large cities. In addition, almost one quarter express their preference for living abroad, majority of which opt for a Western European country. The fact that almost one fifth of all has plans and almost one fourth prefer to live abroad indicate the existence of two closely related but, nevertheless, separate dimensions of youth migratory thinking. While the preference for other counties may mean only an inclination, having plans on migrating abroad most certainly includes active search for such a possibility. In light of our findings it means that at least one fifth of Croatian youth not only dream of leaving the country but actually make plans how to make it a reality. Employed youth is far from being satisfied with their jobs. Every second confirms his or her disappointment. Approximately one fifth of both them and those that are still in the process of education desire jobs in the service or business sector; little less in number think of entering more creative and/or dynamic professions or professions related to education, health care and social services. This means that their professional aspirations are somehow higher that those of their parents, majority of whom have secondary school completed and are mainly employed as industrial, service and shop workers or clerks. Nevertheless, if their choices are compared to the structure of the employed force in Croatia and if we add to it a rapidly changing labour market in all transitional countries, their professional preferences seem rather realistic. This is probably why almost half of the young hold that their chances for getting a preferred job are high or very high. The data also confirm that their estimations are related to age and socio-professional status since pessimism increases with age (except for the university students) and is tightly linked to unemployment status. In any case, optimism prevails among the young and it, as well, may be linked to their strong motivation to succeed in life by relying on their own abilities despite unfavourable social and economic context in which they live. It is also possible, at least partly, that self-assurance of young people comes from positive educational experience. Over half of the young state they feel happy and satisfied when thinking of their schools or universities. However, it is not clear whether their satisfaction should be understood in terms of acquiring subject-matter knowledge and skills or in terms of developing certain personal qualities through participating in school life. Earlier studies on youth have proven that the young have complex relations towards education which are the outcomes of both institutional tasks and personal expectations. Moreover, our results document that feelings about school are correlated with sex and socio-professional status.Girls and university students, in general, are more satisfied with their education, while the unemployed are among the least satisfied. It is also possible that positive feelings about education also relate to school grades. Earlier studies have shown that female pupils receive somewhat better average scores than their male schoolmates, which may explain why girls have more positive feelings about school than boys. • On the other hand, it is clear that school is by no means a source of information about the events in the country and the world for young people since a great majority of them actually receive news through ordinary media (TV, radio, newspapers and magazines). Moreover, Internet has become an important source of information about the country and the world for approximately one fifth and over one fourth of them, respectively. This shift has to do with the fact that over two thirds of the young from our study are computer users and that more than half of them already have computer at home. It is, therefore, obvious that new information and communication technologies are becoming part and parcel of young people' s daily life what needs to be taken into account when policies and programmes of action for promoting their wellbeing are designed, especially in reference to underprivileged youth. Namely, our research confirms that the use of computer correlates with residence (urban environment), family background (parents with higher education and higher socio-economic status), age, and education factors (younger population and students). Nevertheless, young people are not enslaved by new information communication technologies. Most of them spend their free time associating with friends, engaging in sport activities, going to disco-clubs, watching TV or performing outdoor activities, while far less enjoy music, reading books or art exhibitions. In addition, many young people have no daily obligations, except in relation to school and spend their free time idling or sleeping. This means that the majority of youth either do nothing or engage almost solely in the so called passive and/or receptive activities for self-entertainment. Despite that fact, almost three fourths of them claim they are more or less satisfied with how they spend their free time what brings us to the conclusion that the main problem is not the quality of their free time activities but their lack of awareness that the quality itself is being at stake. However, it should be pointed out that their opinions are related to age and socio-professional status. Young people who belong to an upper age-cohort and who are unemployed exhibit far more dissatisfaction with their free time than the youngest. Overpronounced dissatisfaction among the unemployed seems to be an indicator of an overall discontent with one' s own life. For the unemployed, free time becomes a burden not only because they cannot perceive it in terms of an offduty activity but because they can not afford it financially. In reference to the use of psychoactive substances, it seems that tobacco smoking and alcohol consumption are the most widespread types of risk behaviour among the youth. Approximately one third of them smoke cigarettes or drink alcohol daily or weekly ; three fifths are non-smokers and one fifth never drink alcohol. Smoking increases with age and employment. Alcohol, on the other hand, is solely related to gender in a way that young women drink less than their male peers. Such trend may be the sign of a subtle male initiation rite de passage that has outlived its traditional context. Since the data on smoking are more favourable than those from earlier research it may be presumed that an anti-smoking media campaign, which has been going on rather aggressively throughout the country, has brought positive effect, whereas non-existence of similar anti-alcohol campaign may be the sign of a relatively high level of a social tolerance for alcohol consumption. As far as drug are concerned, Croatian youth is more inclined to the so-called 'soft' drugs. Over one third of the young have tried or used twice or more only marijuana ; hashish and ecstasy is mentioned by less than one tenth of them, whereas other 'hard' drugs have been only tried or are consumed by 1-3% of them. The consumption of marijuana is associated with a recognizable youth group, what confirms earlier studies. A group of highest risk is made of young people between 20 and 24, male, university students, the residents of Zagreb, Istria, Croatian Littoral and Dalmatia, and whose fathers have higher education level. A great majority of young people tend to see themselves in rather positive terms: they are self-assured, think they have a good number of personal qualities; believe in their capabilities when compared to other people and have no doubts that most people they know like them. This may be related to feeling of security they experience in the context of their immediate environment since a great majority of the young claim that they can almost always get warmth, care and support from their parents and support from their friends. On the other hand, only every second of them feel the same about their teachers. It seems that most Croatian families are characterised by an exercise of indirect and flexible control over their children in the course of their growing up. In over half of the cases parents or relatives hardly ever determine rules for their children' s behaviour although they do control the choice of their friends, as well as their evening outdoor activities. Moreover, young people claim that their parents are especially keen of their school progress since they almost regularly keep records on their children school situation. • When asked about the most serious problems of their generation, the majority of young people in Croatia mention socially unacceptable behaviour, such as drug abuse, alcohol consumption and violence, unemployment, low standard of living, the lack of life chances and mass migration of young experts abroad. Since unemployment was repeatedly displayed as the major problem of young generation in earlier studies, their present preoccupation with socially unacceptable behaviour may be related either to the sample structure (majority of them are students) or to a general social climate which is, due to predominance of media campaigns mainly geared against smoking and drug abuse (but not against alcohol consumption, except for safe driving), inducing an over-sensitisation to behavioural issues causing, on the other side, the lack of awareness of existentially important issues of young people that are of an utmost importance for their independence and self-satisfaction. Young people are inclined to attribute responsibility for solving these problems primarily to themselves, their parents and public authorities, i.e. firstly to those actors that function at the private level (personal and parents' responsibility), than to public sector (government, education system) and, finally, to the civil society (nongovernmental organizations, youth associations and religious institutions). This means that youth principally count on their personal strength and family support, as well as that they have explicit expectations of state institutions, whereas they think of receiving the assistance from the civil sector only exceptionally. Notwithstanding, since half of the young studied have failed to mention personal responsibility, it clearly demonstrates that both strong sense of self-responsibility and its avoidance stand side by side as two features of Croatian youth. Among the measures that Croatian youth see as the most efficient for solving their problems two are underlined: equal education and career opportunities, on the one hand, and strict punishment of drug dealers and restrictions on alcohol selling, on the other hand. Since the majority of youth consider socially unacceptable behaviour, including drug-addiction, to be the gravest problem of their generation, it is understandable that they see the way out in strict punishing of drug dealers, (rather than consumers), what is still inadequately determined by Croatian law. Other most frequently mentioned measure has to do with the youth quest for developing society of equal chances which is in line with their perception of unemployment as the second most frequently mentioned youth problem in Croatia. Although lesser in number, the young refer to their under-representation and require their participation in decision-making to be ensured at all levels. They also require better adapting of secondary and higher education to the needs of contemporary life, as well as better quality of education, in general; some speak in favour of establishing a ministry for youth affairs, developing national strategy for promoting youth well-being, setting up of funds for youth initiatives, better legal regulations of the places of youth entertainment, i.e., the issues majority of which have already been integrated into the recently adopted National Programme of Action for Youth that is seen as an initial step in developing a national youth policy. The values that the majority of young people hold personally important or very important are healthy environment, peace in the world, gender equality, and rights and freedoms of the individual. Second group of the most personally preferable values encompasses solidarity among people, social justice, economic security, respect for differences, rule of law, inalienability of property, civil society, free market, freedom of the media, protection of minorities, religion and democratic system. The bottom of the scale is occupied by social power, national sentiment, European integration, and high economic standard. The review of their preferences demonstrates a relatively respectable level of democratic potential of young people in Croatia. They are more oriented towards comfortable life based on key principles of democracy and civil society, which is in correspondence with earlier research that have documented the shift to a more individualistic value system, including youth' s preference for independence and their focus on self-realisation and material security. However, their relative devaluation of the importance of European integration may be, on the one hand, the sign of either their dissatisfaction with, or their criticism of the way new European order has been established, partly due to the fact that Croatia has been somehow unjustly left behind. On the other hand it may be the consequence of their perceiving the integration merely in terms of a political objective of which very little they experience in everyday life. This is not to say that they devaluate the importance of European integration for Croatia as such. It would be more accurate to say that Croatian young people are becoming more and more pragmatic in their social positioning of which many think not only in the context of Croatia but in the context of Europe and the world. Having in mind a long tradition of Croatian youth emigration to Europe and the fact that almost 20% of contemporary youth plan to leave the country for good (mostly for a European country), their relation toward European integration may mean that they see it only as an added value to an already established youth migratory pattern in Croatia. of young people about the determinants of upward social mobility in Croatia reflect their accurate perception of social anomalies that, if left unquestioned, threaten to deepen social inequalities and diminish democratic potential of the society. Namely, a great majority of the young see as important or highly important for social promotion in Croatia a combination of the following variables: adaptive behaviour, personal endeavour, knowledge and skills, and connections and acquaintances. University degree, money and wealth, and the obedience and submissiveness to the 'boss', are identified less but, nevertheless, reflect a combination of appropriate and inappropriate means of social promotion. Somehow more troublesome is the finding that one third to one half of the young consider belonging to certain nation or political party, as well as bribing and corruption as important determinants of one' s success in Croatia. These data present an index of youth's perception of Croatian society as the society of unequal chances since it, by allowing nondemocratic practice to play an important role in social promotion, actually discriminates against those who in this matter believe in, and rely on their own abilities and efforts. When compared to earlier studies, it is highly troublesome that almost the same factors of social promotion are estimated as important by both socialist and ' transitional' young people in Croatia. Overall examination of the above results may be seen as an indicator of a process of relative homogenisation of young people in today' s Croatia – certainly, within the issues here examined and at the present level of analysis. There is no doubt that young people here described have many characteristic in common, especially in reference to their marital status, family pattern, housing conditions, parent' s educational background, attitudes towards present and future life, professional and educational aspirations, desired accommodation, sources of information, satisfaction with free time, positive feelings about themselves, feeling of security in relation to their parents and friends, as well as in reference to their abuse of psychoactive substances. They also share their desire for autonomy and independence, and for the recognition by the society at large, as well as their dreams of a more just society in which life opportunities would match individual abilities and endeavour. When they differ, it is mostly due to their varied socio-professional status and age. Residential status, father' s educational background, gender, and regional background are less important. The tendencies that have been documented suggest that youth are divided primarily by their actual social status and stage of attained maturity, and only secondarily by socialization factors, such as social origin in a narrow and broad sense of the term, and a gender socialization patterns. However, further analysis of data should disclose youth dominating trends with more accuracy.