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International audience ; The Nazi Temptation of the Unemployed in Weimar Germany: a False Historical Hypothesis orObviousness ?Emmanuel PierruThis article reviews the main historical researches which emphazise on the issue of the political effectsof mass unemployment in Weimar Germany. The complexity and the tangle of those effects (direct,indirect, contextual) lead to question the common representation of the supposed decisive impact ofunemployment in the Nazi dynamics. Electorally speaking, and considering that sociologicalinvestigation is confronted to severe statistical difficulties and to the risk of ecological fallacy, thehypothesis of a direct effect of unemployment on the Nazi Party electoral scores has to be refuted,meanwhile a "transfer effect" seems plausible. In this period, the forms of radicalization were closelyconnected with the structuration of political supply. The paramilitarization of the Weimar society and ofthe main political parties (Nazi Party and, above all, Communist Party) accounts for the enlistment ofsome unemployed in their ranks. ; Cet article propose un bilan critique des travaux historiographiques sur la question des effets politiquesdu chômage dans l'Allemagne de Weimar. Il montre que la complexité et l'enchevêtrement de ceseffets (directs, indirects, contextuels) appellent à nuancer très sérieusement la représentationcommune qui voit dans le chômage et les chômeurs un puissant levier de la dynamique nazie. D'unpoint de vue électoral, et par-delà les redoutables difficultés de méthodologie statistique ainsi que lesrisques d'erreurs écologiques liées à l'interprétation de données agrégées, les recherches ont montréqu'il faut réfuter l'hypothèse d'un effet direct du chômage sur les résultats électoraux du NSDAP (àl'inverse de ce qu'on constate pour le Parti communiste allemand - KPD). Cependant, un possible effetde transfert n'est pas à exclure. Les formes de « radicalisation » observables sur cette périodeapparaissent davantage liées à la structuration de l'offre politique et à ...

An evaluation of British foreign policy towards Nazi Germany is still overlaid in England by political controversy. The two main political parties cannot deny their descent from the parties that confronted each other in the 1930's. The question of responsibility for that tragically unsuccessful foreign policy and for the ensuing war still produces heated reproaches in the political arena and equally heated debates among historians. The belief that, had Britain taken the "right line," the war could have been prevented is still very strong. In the words of the Oxford historian, A. L. Rowse: "There was a hope then, and it did matter what line we took; during that last decade this country exercised a leading influence in Europe and still held a position of leadership in the English-speaking world. All that has changed: the real decisions are made elsewhere" (p. 4). Had Hitler been checked and the exhaustive blood-letting avoided, would the "real decisions" still be made in England? These nagging questions arise again and again on the rostrum, in the newspapers, in Senior Common Rooms. They have produced two sets of legends, of which various versions circulate. The Right asserts in Quintin Hogg's words that "the Left was never right," and that by demagogically exploiting the public's pacifist temper it kept Britain from rearming so that the Conservative governments had no alternative to appeasement. The Left, on the other hand, developed the legend that Tories feared Soviet Russian communism more than Nazism and saw in Hitler the man who stemmed the Red tide from spreading westward. The Communist version of this goes further; it asserts that Neville Chamberlain, in true Machiavellian fashion, encouraged Hitler to expand towards the East in order to involve him in a serious conflict with Stalin.

Aus israelischer Sicht

AbstractWith the rise and influence of populist radical right (PRR) parties in Western European democracies, research has focused on explaining the PRR vote. We know less about the reasons why many people would never vote for these parties. Recent research has pointed out that negative partisanship may be particularly prominent in the case of PRR parties. This study contributes to that line of research. It demonstrates that the PRR Progress Party in Norway has the highest share of negative partisanship of all parties in the system. Novel analysis of open‐ended responses reveal that negative partisans react against both the party's policies and rhetorical style. The analysis reveals that negative partisans mirror voters of the PRR only to some extent. Notably, they emphasize disagreements with the party's views on humanity, and with environmental and economic policies. Political style is also a considerable source of negative PRR partisanship and is more important to account for never voting than to account for the support for these parties. The findings underscore that the study of negative partisanship contributes to a fuller account of patterns of PRR electoral performance and particularly its limitations.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EVALUATIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL PERFORMANCE AND VOTER DECISIONS AT DIFFERENT ELECTORAL LEVELS IS EXAMINED. DATA FROM THE 1970 MIDTERM ELECTIONS SHOW THAT EVALUATIONS OF MR. NIXON HAD LITTLE IMPACT UPON THE VOTING DECISIONS OF THOSE WHO IDENTIFIED WITH ONE OF THE MAJOR PARTIES.

The Soviet ruling elite, the nomenklatura, used both cooption & political repression to encourage loyalty to the communist regime. Loyalty was critical both in defusing internal opposition to the rule of the nomenklatura & in either deterring or defeating foreign enemies of the Soviet Union. The cost of coopting people into the Communist Party was a decrease in the standard of living of members of the nomenklatura, whereas the cost of political repression was the danger that members of the nomenklatura would themselves be victimized. We assume that the nomenklatura determined the extent of cooption & the intensity of political repression by equating perceived marginal benefits & marginal costs. We use this assumption to construct an account of the historical evolution of policies of cooption & political repression in the Soviet Union. 1 Figure, 27 References. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThis paper presents an explanation for the breakdown of dominant party systems. In contrast to previous works that examine how ruling parties lose their dominant position as a result of interparty competition, this paper focuses on how they are undermined from within by factional conflict. Through an overview of dominant party systems in the postwar world, we show that most of the ruling parties suffered from major splits that significantly reduced their electoral strengths before their final electoral defeat. In order to explain why large groups of politicians decide to leave dominant parties that are likely to remain in power, we develop simple game-theoretic models of intraparty bargaining between party factions over the distribution of benefits from office. Our results suggest two mechanisms through which dominant parties break up. First, factional defections from dominant parties are likely to occur when they are experiencing a significant decline in public support. Second, factional defections are likely to occur when a non-mainstream faction is rapidly losing its bargaining power against the party leadership. Importantly, our results show that under certain conditions, dominant parties will break up even when their electoral prospects are much better than the opposition. We briefly discuss how these mechanisms can be applied to actual cases of dominant party systems.