Suchergebnisse

The question of how the domestic political context of democratic countries affects their foreign policies has received increasing interest in political science research during the last few years. In this article, the interrelationships between public opinion and public statements by presidential candidates are studied for the US presidential elections from 1968 through to 1988. The issues covered are the explanations of Soviet foreign policy and the prescriptions for US policy responses, here collectively called the image of the Soviet Union, which are offered by the two (in two cases three) main contenders for the presidency. It is found that there is a tendency for the main thrust of the debate on relations with the Soviet Union to shift from one election to the next, no matter what the Soviet Union has done between the elections. This shift can be summarized as a movement from a `hawkish' approach to a `dove-like' one. In particular, presidential candidates who ran for re-election changed their message from the first election to the next. The hypothesis that presidential candidates adjusted their images of the Soviet Union directly to the views of the public as expressed in opinion surveys did not receive confirmation, however.

The Swedish and Finnish value priorities and modes of adaptation in the current process of European integration are analysed — Denmark being a comparative background cloth. The Danish Maastricht referendum and its European aftermath leading to the Edinburgh agreement in late 1992 are used as the focal points that can elucidate not only Denmark's general postures, but also those of the other two countries. The referendum outcome forced the Danish decision-makers to make issue-neutral autonomy Denmark's no. 1 priority (at the cost of a certain status marginalization in the EC, presumably). Sweden and Finland, by contrast, cannot afford such a provocative posture (from the standpoint of EC integration); given their narrow action spaces as would-be members, some more modest, issue-specific values are given highest priority. Inspired by these cases and certain more general reasonings, a model of national adaptation to unipolar (regional) integration is formulated. It emphasizes the causal power of the polarity structure and its constellations for the explanation of non-essential powers' modes of adaptation. Not only should it put the cases at stake into a broader perspective, but it should also be useful for the future study of some fresh cases of national adaptation during the present European polarity structure.

This article takes the view that mercantilism can be understood as a pursuit of stateness, an articulation of the nation-state logic vis-à-vis the free play of market forces. The contemporary context of the mercantilist logic is the international political economy, in which `the political' refers to a transnational framework of economic transactions, in brief, a world order. Hence the concept `neomercantilism', to which this discussion is primarily addressed. This conceptualization is somewhat troublesome because of the historical association of mercantilism with the nation-state. The solution to this paradox is to see regionalism as a return of `the political', the need for control, in a transnational context. The argument is pursued in three steps: first the concept is located in the historical political economy discourse, focusing on mercantilism proper; second, a definition of neo-mercantilism is suggested which associates it with `the new regionalism' in a global context, more precisely the pursuit of `regionness'; third, contemporary manifestations of `the new regionalism' are presented as a preliminary attempt to test the hypothesis. In the concluding discussion the significance of these regional manifestations in an international political economy perspective is assessed.

Among the Nordic countries Denmark has been a member of the European Community (EC) since 1973. The other Nordic countries, for various reasons, did not feel they could join the EC until now. Recently they negotiated the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement with the EC, but, partly because of its limits, Sweden, Finland and Norway have now applied for EC membership. If the Maastricht Treaty on European Union enters into force they will be seeking to join a Union which will further deepen the European integration process. This, however, depends on a second Danish referendum, probably in May 1993. Since Denmark has been a `minimalist' member of the EC and now has been given some opt-outs from the Maastricht Treaty at the Edinburgh meeting of the European Council in December 1992, it is to be expected that the Nordic participants in the European integration process will remain `difficult' partners for those who have more ambitious plans for the future.

This article draws on an empirical study of EC energy policy between 1985 and 1992 in a theoretical discussion of the requirements for a comprehensive theory of integration for the post-1985 period. An analytical framework that improves on intergovernmentalist approaches is proposed. The author argues that a `domestic politics' approach presupposes a delineation of state strategies and state actor capability in a given issue area prior to the analysis of interstate bargaining at the EC level. Further, this approach is argued to be inadequate as a basis for a theory of integration as such, where the ability on the part of the Commission for designing policy that satisfies states' interests is argued to be a necessary condition for the achievement of integrative outcomes. Integration is defined as the intended yet often informal effect of such policy designs, and informal integration is assumed to generate political pressures towards formal integration.

From its inception the European Political Cooperation (EPC) has gradually developed a network of dialogue partners, and dialogue with third countries and groups of third countries is now extensive. This article presents an overview of the most important formal consultations taking place. It examines the various forms, levels and frequency of relations, and the criteria for choosing the concrete format of political consultations. The article also explains why dialogue has been established and developed, and four factors are put forward. First, the integration process of the European Community itself is a necessary precondition for dialogue, and also explains why the Twelve are now more willing to enter into dialogue, and why the Twelve themselves have become more desirable partners for consultation. The second factor is the response from the third countries: from the outset the EPC has excited keen interest — and in some cases felt pressure — from third countries wanting to establish formal contact. Third, dialogue has benefited the Twelve, enabling them to assert themselves on a global scale. Finally, local or regional crises and conflicts outside Europe have served as a catalyst for the establishment of interregional cooperation.

The analysis presented here departs from the conventional conceptualization of foreign policy change in terms of input-output modes of analysis, here represented by two of its most recent and acknowledged practitioners. It is argued that approaches of this kind tend to fail on at least three counts: their account of the function of human agency in such change, which is not given the central role which this factor arguably deserves; their negligence of the agency-structure issue and its implications for analysing the dynamic interaction between decision-makers and social structures; and their inability to incorporate `learning' as an endogenous characteristic of foreign policy systems. An alternative mode of analysis is then presented which rejects the input-output imagery while specifically addressing the problems highlighted above. Although it defines the explanandum of foreign policy wholly in terms of agential behaviour, it includes structural factors as a crucial explanans and outlines a conceptualization of the dynamic nature of foreign policy which explicitly incorporates the reciprocal causal links between agents and structures, particularly in the form of the interplay — both adaptive and innovative — between institutions and discursive practices in foreign policy behaviour.

The article surveys and analyzes the foreign policies and relevant domestic political conditions of the Baltic states since 1918, emphasizing the period after 11 March 1990. The general argument is that small states located near a great power can choose between alliance with their more powerful neighbor, alliance with his chief rival, or some kind of neutrality. Above all, rim states must pay attention to great-power diplomacy. In the interwar years none of the Baltic states seemed to appreciate that their situation necessitated such thinking and such choices. None used the Western powers to counter-balance the Soviet Union or Germany. Only Lithuania drew on the Soviet Union as a partner. A policy of neutrality remained untried. Between the wars, what governed their foreign policies, besides their lack of appreciation of great power politics, was a concentration on their own local affairs. After March 1990, an `interregnum period' followed, with internal strife about the proper direction of foreign policy. Four phases of alternating confrontation and negotiation characterized Moscow-Baltic relations in the period up to the aborted coup. The achievement of independence in September 1991 brought a concentration on domestic concerns. Today the unintegrated Russian-speaking and Polish minorities contribute to domestic instability, which easily spills over into foreign affairs. The last section discusses the Baltic states' security policies and possible future security arrangements, accentuating the need for a subregional solution including all coastal states on the Baltic Sea.

The Finnish integration policy has been conditioned by the elite bargain struck in the European Community on the Single European Act which crystallized a compromise between market-oriented reforms and intergovernmental institutionalism. A similar political development has occurred in Finland where the elite bargain has included the application for EC membership. The move towards the EC has been facilitated by the changes in the Soviet and Russian policies, which have become less of a constraint on Finland's choices. The elite bargain in Finland has been rather loose and informal, partly because in the late 1980s the industry used the exit option by investing heavily in Western Europe. That is why it has needed little voice to convince the political leadership which has shifted to support the EC membership under internal and external influences.