Zerstort der Logische Empirismus die Praktische Rationalität?: Eine Erwiderung auf Beckermanns "Logischer Positivismus und radikale Gesellschaftsreform" und Hegselmanns ,Grenzen der wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung des Wiener Kreises"
In: Analyse & Kritik: journal of philosophy and social theory, Band 1, Heft 1, S. 51-59
ISSN: 2365-9858
Abstract
It will be argued that the basic theoretical assumptions of logical empiricism do not destroy the possibility of practical reasoning, because the noncognitivity of normative or evaluative statements still guarantees rational argument over practical questions and problems. Therefore, no logical inconsistency exists between logical empiricism, its noncognitivist meta-ethics and socialist politics. In particular, logical empiricism is not committed to indifference concerning reactionary political programmes, although it itself entails no individual political programme.