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Henry Adams (1918:7) once described nineteenth-century Massachusetts party politics as the "systematic organization of hatreds." At first glance, his observation appears to be true for the early twentieth century as well, especially for Boston, where Brahmin reformers battled Irish bosses in an apparent reprise of a half-century-old conflict. But a closer examination reveals that while ethnic hatreds grew stronger in the city's twentieth-century public life, Progressive reform weakened partisan organization. In fact, political modernization produced tribal politics; such was Progressivism's ironic legacy in Boston. When the city's politics shifted from contests between grassroots parties to battles over shaping public opinion, ethnicity replaced partisanship as the primary source of local political identification. Conflict between Yankee and Irish now defined the city's public life as never before.

This study examines political, institutional and economic influences on monetary policy in the long run. A monetary policy reaction function is estimated, which focuses principally on the influence of the administration, Congress and the Federal Reserve on outcomes; these influences are estimated together with a variety of economic and political controls. The findings show that partisan control of the White House is particularly important in explaining variations in the growth of the quantity of money over time. Republican control of the White House is associated with tighter money, and Democratic control with looser money, but there are exceptions. Finally, the indirect influence of partisanship on the economic variables in the reaction function suggest that the total effects are stronger than the direct effects alone.

THIS STUDY EXAMINES POLITICAL, INSTITUTIONAL AND ECONOMIC INFLUENCES ON MONETARY POLICY IN THE LONG RUN. A MONETARY POLICY REACTION FUNCTION IS ESTIMATED, WHICH FOCUSES PRINCIPALLY ON THE INFLUENCE OF THE ADMINISTRATION, CONGRESS AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE ON OUTCOMES; THESE INFLUENCES ARE ESTIMATED TOGETHER WITH A VARIETY OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONTROLS. THE FINDINGS SHOW THAT PARTISAN CONTROL OF THE WHITE HOUSE IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN EXPLAINING VARIATIONS IN THE GROWTH OF THE QUANTITY OF MONEY OVER TIME. REPUBLICAN CONTROL OF THE WHITE HOUSE IS ASSOCIATED WITH TIGHTER MONEY, AND DEMOCRATIC CONTROL WITH LOOSER MONEY, BUT THERE ARE EXCEPTIONS. FINALLY, THE INDIRECT INFLUENCE OF PARTISANSHIP ON THE E ECONOMIC VARIABLES IN THE REACTION FUNCTION SUGGEST THAT THE TOTAL EFECTS ARE STRONGER THAN THE DIRECT EFFECTS ALONE.

Interest-group interactions may be examined in ways comparable to the analysis of conflict and coalition in other areas of political science. We seek to measure and compare the structure of interest-group participation and conflict in four domains of U.S. domestic policy: agriculture, energy, health, and labor. Data are drawn from a survey of 806 representatives of organizations with interests in federal policy, supplemented by interviews with 301 government officials in the same four domains. Several types of data are adduced regarding the intensity and partisanship of group conflict in each domain and the range and variety of group participation. Coalitional patterns are described and the mutual positioning of different kinds of organization—peak-association groups versus more specialized trade, professional, or commodity groups, for example—are examined.

This analysis explores the impact of war, unemployment and partisanship on trends in Democratic and Republican preferences. It furthers the discussion of the influence of economic conditions on party choice by exploring the hypothesized relationship in a different context-the influence of economic conditions on party preferences between elections. At election times, party choice is reflected in the two-party vote. In the absence of an election, a surrogate for party choice can be obtained from the distribution of responses to the frequent opinion survey query as to which political party could do the "best job" in running government and solving societal problems ("party preferences"). Trends in these questions reveal that unemployment diminishes Republican preferences (and increases Democratic preferences) while the existence of war exercises no significant influence on party preference.

Before World War I religion was a major determinant of voting in Britain. Butler and Stokes have used recent interview surveys, divided into cohorts, to trace the declining effect of religion on British partisanship or at least the present day results of that historic decline. This paper compares their findings with census based analyses of religion and voting at each election from 1918 to 1970 and for each major party. The results confirm and extend the Butler/Stokes conclusions. The Conservatives consistently benefited from the Anglican tradition, Labour consistently did badly in areas of high religiosity. But the Liberals connection with both class and religion varied. Religious effects were large between the wars. They dropped to a low level in 1950–1 and then increased again though not to the interwar level.

While the voting turnout among whites has long been lower than elsewhere, in recent years the gap has diminished. Regression equations based on education, occupation, urbanism, political efficacy, & strength of partisanship are used to estimate voting rates for the South if it had the same population structure as the North, for comparison with actual Northern rates. Predicted voting rates remain lower than those for the North, suggesting that changes in SE composition do not explain the increase. Rather, review of survey data from 1956 through 1968 show greatest changes among southerners who see the major parties as taking different stands on racial issues. Thus, the change in Southern turnout can be attributed to the increased salience of racial issues, & can be expected to continue. 6 Tables. Modified HA.

Many local pol'al units in America are dominated by the electoral strength of a single party; evenly balanced competition between the 2 parties is frequently the exception. One-party dominance of politics militates against the effectiveness of minor party motivations in producing minor party votes & increases the effectiveness of major party motivations in producing voting support for the major party. One-party dominance of politics is associated with divisiveness, lack of unity & a signif'ly high degree of heterogeneity among rank & file minor party voters with respect to felt partisanship for candidates & issues. The same is not true of Party Identification; it appears to be the one factor of those examined which sustains the minor party vote, independent of the partisan complexion of the local pol'al environment. (AA-IPSA).

Vieth v. Jubelirer is a significant setback to efforts to challenge partisan gerrymandering in court. Four members of the Supreme Court repudiated Davis v. Bandemer and concluded that partisan gerrymanders present a nonjusticiable question, while the fifth, Justice Kennedy, determined that the Court ought to "refrain from intervention" at this time, although he left open the hope that gerrymandering might become justiciable if the right standard of proving a gerrymander is ever found. Yet, strikingly, all nine members of the Supreme Court agreed that, justiciable or not, partisan gerrymanders do raise a constitutional question and some partisan gerrymanders are unconstitutional. Indeed, Justice Scalia's plurality opinion noted that "severe partisan gerrymanders" are incompatible with "democratic principles" and are presumptively unconstitutional. Justice Scalia analogized "severe partisan gerrymanders" to a decision by the Senate to "employ, in impeachment proceedings, procedures that are incompatible with its obligation to 'try' impeachments." Such an action would "violate the Constitution" even though it might not be "for the courts to say when a violation has occurred, and to design a remedy." Justice Kennedy apparently agreed with the unconstitutionality of gerrymandering as, of course, did the four dissenters. Presumably because the plurality concluded that gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable, Justice Scalia said very little about why partisan gerrymandering is unconstitutional. The concurring and dissenting justices also focused on the linked questions of justiciability and standard of proof of gerrymandering, and said relatively little about what makes gerrymandering unconstitutional. Professor Daniel Lowenstein, in his article, Vieth's Gap: Has the Supreme Court Gone from Bad to Worse on Partisan Gerrymandering?, differs with the plurality on the question of justiciability and with the Court as a whole on the question of constitutionality In his view, partisan gerrymandering does present a justiciable question, but, on the merits, he finds that gerrymandering is almost never unconstitutional. Only when gerrymandering is aimed at a "pariah" group subject to the "pervasive kind of discrimination" comparable to that inflicted on African- Americans in the Jim Crow South or when it is used to "permanently" exclude a majority group from control of a state legislature would Professor Lowenstein find that gerrymandering violates the Constitution. Professor Lowenstein rightly concludes that the likelihood of the first type of claim arising is "small" and of the second "even smaller." He emphatically rejects the "excessive partisanship" theory of the unconstitutionality of gerrymandering. He asserts as a matter of principle – and not just out of a pragmatic concern about "manageability" – that excessive partisanship in legislative apportionment is not only constitutional but is also consistent with both the letter and spirit of the Constitution. The heart of his argument on the constitutionality of gerrymandering is that "the Constitution does not try to prevent political competition from going 'too far.' It depends on competition to preserve the balanced structure of the government." I agree with Professor Lowenstein on two key points – that the substantive merits of the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering must be given much greater attention than they have so far received, and that excessive partisanship is the most important constitutional argument against partisan gerrymandering.

"Why does the American political system work the way it does? After observing the strains of intense partisanship and divided government, many Americans are wondering what logic, if any, can be found in politics. With both sides of the political spectrum being so different from one another and the scales often tipping in the favor of the opposing party by a fraction of a percentage point, how can anyone work the system to their advantage? With fresh analysis of the 2022 midterm election results, the bestselling textbook The Logic of American Politics provides students the tools they need to make sense of the government they have. Weaving together historical context, contemporary politics, and a "toolkit" of institutional design concepts, the authors build students' understanding of political institutions and practices as imperfect solutions to collective action problems"--

It is no secret that the US variously pulls away from the United Nations and embraces it as a significant venue for policy initiatives. But what explains this dramatic inconsistency? What is the logic of US multilateralism? Alynna Lyon explores the puzzling waxing and waning of US support for the UN, tracing events, actions, and decisions from the end of World War I to the present. Lyon weaves together a consideration of international context, UN institutional dynamics, and US domestic politics to conceptualize and explain the trials and tribulations of the US-UN relationship. In the process, she tells the story of the progression of the US from a country committed to internationalism to one full of dysfunctional partisanship, ideological underpinnings, and domestic power struggles that undermine its capacities to cooperate on a global scale

Public opinion polls have become increasingly prominent during elections, but how they affect voting behaviour remains uncertain. In this work, we estimate the effects of poll exposure using an experimental design in which we randomly assign the availability of polls to participants in simulated election campaigns. We draw upon results from ten independent experiments conducted across six countries on four continents (Argentina, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States) to examine how polls affect the amount of information individuals seek and the votes that they cast. We further assess how poll effects differ according to individual-level factors, such as partisanship and political sophistication, and the content included in polls and how it is presented. Our work provides a comprehensive assessment of the power of polls and the implications for poll reporting in contemporary elections.

Cover -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction: Jimmy Carter, the "Year of the Evangelicals," and the Religious Right -- Seeing Red: Evangelical and Fundamentalist Anticommunism and Political Engagement -- Full Circle: The Religious Right from Bob Jones to Donald Trump -- An Evangelical Black Panther: The Politics of Race and the Conversion of Eldridge Cleaver -- Building Bridges and a Broad-Based Movement Outreach to Evangelicals and Right-to-Life Strategy, 1972-1980 -- Evangelicals and Abortion: The 1976 Presidential Election and Evangelical Pro-Life Partisanship -- Dwelling in the Shelter of the Most High Ronald Reagan and the Religious Right -- End of a Life Cycle: The Decline and Fall of Southern Evangelical Political Authenticity -- A Question of Emphasis?: Evangelicals, Trump, and the Election of 2016 -- Framing Faith during the 2016 Election: Journalistic Coverage of the Trump Campaign and the Myth of Evangelical Schism -- Contributors -- Index.

US federalism grants state legislators the authority to design many aspects of election administration, including ballot features that mediate how citizens understand and engage with the choices available to them when casting their votes. Seemingly innocuous features in the physical design of ballots, such as the option to cast a straight ticket with a single checkmark, can have significant aggregate effects. Drawing on theoretical insights from behavioral economics and extensive data on state ballot laws from 1888 to the present, as well as in-depth case studies, this book shows how strategic politicians use ballot design to influence voting and elections, drawing comparisons across different periods in American history with varying levels of partisanship and contention. Engstrom and Roberts demonstrate the sweeping impact of ballot design on voting, elections, and democratic representation.