Suchergebnisse

This Note contains the recommendation for a mathematical basis for the apportionment of the seats in the European Parliament between the Member States of the European Union. This is the unanimous recommendation of the Participants in the Cambridge Apportionment Meeting, held at the instigation of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs at the Centre for Mathematical Sciences, University of Cambridge, on 28-29 January 2011.

This Note contains the recommendation for a mathematical basis for the apportionment of the seats in the European Parliament between the Member States of the European Union. This is the unanimous recommendation of the Participants in the Cambridge Apportionment Meeting, held at the instigation of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs at the Centre for Mathematical Sciences, University of Cambridge, on 28-29 January 2011.

Статья посвящена феномену периодических или постоянных общественных форумов, которые призваны представлять определенные этнические группы и которые формируются путем массовых выборов с открытым доступом. «Съезды народов» (далее СН) связаны с темами нетерриториальной автономии, «участия» и представительства. В статье делается попытка объяснить разрыв между формальным значением и формальной легитимностью СН, с одной стороны, и ограниченной ролью, которую они играют на практике, с другой. За последние 20 лет в России можно назвать как минимум 13 стабильных и регулярно работающих СН. Съезды в основном представляют «титульные» национальности в республиках РФ. Чаще всего СН формируются в результате двухступенчатых выборов, на которых могут голосовать лица, относящие себя к группе и прочие заинтересованные люди. Съезд в значении массового мероприятия обеспечивает дискуссию по ключевым общественным вопросам, формирует постоянные органы и массовое движение. Постоянно работающие центральные органы СН действуют в основном как лоббисты, побуждающие власти к определенным акциям (если они сами не управляются властями) или играют роль групп поддержки, или пропагандистского инструмента для официальных властей. Руководящие органы СН и местные отделения реализуют культурные и образовательные проекты и часто получают государственное финансирование. СН показали себя в качестве жизнеспособных и устойчивых организаций; продемонстрировали гибкость в учреждении и работе; обеспечили возможность массового участия в дискуссиях и голосовании; смогли избежать основных трудностей, связанных с установлением цензов и критериев допуска для участников; стали мостом между властями и этническим активистами. В то же время, реальные съезды не стали заметными на общенациональном уровне и остаются известными только региональным властям, горстке исследователей и своим непосредственным участникам. Также существует разрыв между формальной успешностью массового участия и представительства и практической эффективностью: расхождение может быть объяснено различием между символической и инструментальной политикой. СН могут быть легитимными в глазах их участников и официальных властей независимо от того, как они реально формируются и функционируют, поскольку они соответствуют определенным идеологическим представлениям и ожиданиям. ; This paper addresses the phenomenon of permanent or regularly convened public fora (or 'people's congresses', PCs hereafter) which are designed to represent certain ethnic groups and are formed through open-accessed popular vote. PCs can be associated with the issues of non-territorial autonomy, 'participation' and representation. The paper seeks to explain the gap between the formal significance and legitimacy of the 'congresses', on the one hand, and the negligible role they play in practice, on the other. In retrospect, over the last 20 years one can list 13 stable and regularly functioning PCs in Russia. The 'congresses' are mainly represented by titular ethnicities of the republics within the Russian Federation. Most often, congresses are at least nominally formed through two-staged elections in which people belonging to a particular ethnicity and at times others who are sympathetic to the movement vote. A congress as a public meeting provides for mass discussion on strategic issues, forms a permanent coordinating structure such as an executive committee and establishes a kind of mass 'nationwide' public movement. The standing central organs of the congresses and the regional branches have acted mainly as lobbyists, prompting authorities to specific actions (if they were not controlled directly by the authorities), or have acted as support groups or as additional propaganda tools of the official authorities. Permanent executive organs of the movements and the regional branches often run cultural and educational projects and are often granted public funding. The PCs have proven to be viable and durable organizations; secured flexibility in their establishment and functioning; provided for mass participation in public discussions and voting; avoided most complexities related to setting qualifications and the selection of eligibility criteria for the participants; became a bridge between ethnic activists and public authorities. In the meantime, the real 'congresses' have not gained a significant public visibility at the national level and remain known only to regional authorities, a handful of academics and to the direct participants. There is also a gap between the formal success in creating mechanisms of representation and participation and the questionable substantive effectiveness. This disjuncture can be explained through the difference between symbolic and instrumental politics. The PCs must be legitimate in the eyes of their constituencies and the official authorities regardless of the real way there convene and function, because they fully met certain ideological expectations

The term res publica (literally "thing of the people") was coined by the Romans to translate the Greek word politeia, which, as we know, referred to a political community organised in accordance with certain principles, amongst which the notion of the "good life" (as against exclusively private interests) was paramount. This ideal also came to be known as political virtue. To achieve it, it was necessary to combine the best of each "constitutional" type and avoid their worst aspects (tyranny, oligarchy and ochlocracy). Hence, the term acquired from the Greeks a sense of being a "mixed" and "balanced" system. Anyone that was entitled to citizenship could participate in the governance of the "public thing". This implied the institutionalization of open debate and confrontation between interested parties as a way of achieving the consensus necessary to ensure that man the political animal, who fought with words and reason, prevailed over his "natural" counterpart. These premises lie at the heart of the project which is now being presented under the title of Res Publica: Citizenship and Political Representation in Portugal, 1820-1926. The fact that it is integrated into the centenary commemorations of the establishment of the Republic in Portugal is significant, as it was the idea of revolution – with its promise of rupture and change – that inspired it. However, it has also sought to explore events that could be considered the precursor of democratization in the history of Portugal, namely the vintista, setembrista and patuleia revolutions. It is true that the republican regime was opposed to the monarchic. However, although the thesis that monarchy would inevitably lead to tyranny had held sway for centuries, it had also been long believed that the monarchic system could be as "politically virtuous" as a republic (in the strict sense of the word) provided that power was not concentrated in the hands of a single individual. Moreover, various historical experiments had shown that republics could also degenerate into Caesarism and different kinds of despotism. Thus, when absolutism began to be overturned in continental Europe in the name of the natural rights of man and the new social pact theories, initiating the difficult process of (written) constitutionalization, the monarchic principle began to be qualified as a "monarchy hedged by republican institutions", a situation in which not even the king was exempt from isonomy. This context justifies the time frame chosen here, as it captures the various changes and continuities that run through it. Having rejected the imperative mandate and the reinstatement of the model of corporative representation (which did not mean that, in new contexts, this might not be revived, or that the second chamber established by the Constitutional Charter of 1826 might not be given another lease of life), a new power base was convened: national sovereignty, a precept that would be shared by the monarchic constitutions of 1822 and 1838, and by the republican one of 1911. This followed the French example (manifested in the monarchic constitution of 1791 and in the Spanish constitution of 1812), as not even republicans entertained a tradition of republicanism based upon popular sovereignty. This enables us to better understand the rejection of direct democracy and universal suffrage, and also the long incapacitation (concerning voting and standing for office) of the vast body of "passive" citizens, justified by "enlightened", property- and gender-based criteria. Although the republicans had promised in the propaganda phase to alter this situation, they ultimately failed to do so. Indeed, throughout the whole period under analysis, the realisation of the potential of national sovereignty was mediated above all by the individual citizen through his choice of representatives. However, this representation was indirect and took place at national level, in the hope that action would be motivated not by particular local interests but by the common good, as dictated by reason. This was considered the only way for the law to be virtuous, a requirement that was also manifested in the separation and balance of powers. As sovereignty was postulated as single and indivisible, so would be the nation that gave it soul and the State that embodied it. Although these characteristics were common to foreign paradigms of reference, in Portugal, the constitutionalization process also sought to nationalise the idea of Empire. Indeed, this had been the overriding purpose of the 1822 Constitution, and it persisted, even after the loss of Brazil, until decolonization. Then, the dream of a single nation stretching from the Minho to Timor finally came to an end.

"There is hardly a political question in the United States which does not sooner or later turn into a judicial one." - Alexis De Tocqueville Over the Memorial Day long weekend, the White House announced President Obama's nominee to replace retiring Judge David Souter in the Supreme Court. Barring any unforeseen circumstances, Circuit Court of Appeals judge Sonia Sotomayor will be confirmed by next September, in time for the new Supreme Court term starting in October of this year. Obama has pressed the Senate Judiciary Committee to start hearings and be ready to vote before the August Congress recess, but Republicans would like more time to scrutinize her sizable record and score some political points in the process.Because the nomination was announced during the Senate's Memorial weekend recess, the first reaction on the Conservative side came from anonymous blogs, from radio talk host Rush Limbaugh and from former speaker of the House Newt Gingrich. Needless to say, the attacks were fierce. Sotomayor was alternatively portrayed as an "activist judge" intent on making policy from the bench, a "reverse racist" and a candidate with "insufficient credentials" (the latter being the most laughable of all and the one that gives you the measure of the lack of seriousness of the rest: a Princeton summa cum laude graduate, and Yale Law Review editor, with over 17 years of experience as a federal judge, and over 3,000 decisions made, Sotomayor's credentials are anything but impeccable). This week the Republican Senators, who will actually be in charge of the process, tried to regain the initiative and significantly moderated the tone of the discourse. Indeed, the vetting process to the highest tribunal of the land should focus on Sotomayor's earlier decisions from the bench (she has been both a US district and a circuit court judge), her views on the Constitution and the law, on the rights of states and on the importance of precedent, and not , as her anonymous detractors would like us to think, on empty slogans, her taste for Puerto Rican food or the way she pronounces her name (accentuating the last syllable, which is seen by these ignorant critics as lack of assimilation to the Anglo culture). But having been born in the Bronx from poor immigrants, and risen in class and status to where she is today, Judge Sotomayor is more than ready for the fight. Her life experiences have taught her to see the world through different perspectives. She is not in the least intimidated by other groups' prejudices presented as righteousness, and by those who are targeting her, as Mary Sanchez from the Florida Sentinel so aptly puts it, "as if a weaker species had wandered into their den".The Republican Party is in such disarray that different elements within it are constantly and recklessly trying to score points with the electorate, using any tactic at hand without much consideration of its consequences. Given the solid majority of Democrats in the Senate, and the fact that several Republicans are likely to vote in favor of Sotomayor (she was, after all, nominated by George H.W Bush for the federal bench the first time (1992) and approved unanimously by the whole Senate), the question for Republican elected officials is how far to go in their attacks without producing an irreversible backlash at the polls from women and Hispanics for years to come. At the same time, they will be pressed by the extreme right to do some damage to the nominee and through her, to the President. Judicial fights are part and parcel of the political struggle over the court's direction, and even if the replacement of Souter with Sotomayor is not likely to change the balance of the court, the hearings should be used as a stage to present the philosophical differences between the two parties, rather than as a nasty squabble over personal characteristics, anonymous character attacks and meaningless slogans. The ideological mix in the Court (5 conservatives-4 liberals, with Justice Kennedy as the swing vote, sometimes voting with the liberals) will remain the same; the Democrats right now have a filibuster-proof majority, and there will be other Supreme Court nominations by this President to come, so the Republicans should recognize that the only battle worth fighting in this case is a clean one, free from vitriol and toxicity. Scholars have identified four primary selection criteria used by presidents in their appointments of Supreme Court justices: merit, ideology, friendship and representation. Obama's choice of Sotomayor was based on her impressive credentials, her experience of seventeen years in the federal judiciary, which offers some insight into her judicial philosophy (similar to Obama's), and her charisma and compelling biography as a Latina born in the Bronx. She therefore clearly meets three of those four criteria. Obama's short list included three other women with similar credentials, all close friends of his, but none of them Latinas.Sotomayor's ideology appears to match Obama's, himself a constitutional scholar, in that both share a penchant for pragmatism and a conscientious quest for justice and fairness under the law. For example, although she has a thin record on abortion cases and therefore her position is not clear, in one case concerning the right of the federal government to attach conditions to the use of its foreign aid money, she ruled against the pro-abortion group. In several cases of gender or racial discrimination she decided against the minority or female plaintiff. This makes some groups on the Left somewhat apprehensive. It would not be the first time that a President nominates a judge based on compatible ideology and is later disappointed when his appointee votes with the "other" block. But her vote affirming the decision by the city of New Haven to scrap a promotion test which only white firefighters had succeeded in (Ricci v. De Steffano) is what is making the headlines: the Right's intention is to portray her as a "reverse racist" and an unequivocal defender of affirmative action. Ironically, this case will come before the Supreme Court this summer, and many think her decision (unanimously made by a panel of three judges) could be overturned just before her hearings get under way, thus providing more ammunition to the opposition. Also making the headlines is her 2001 statement, during a La Raza Law Symposium, that "a wise Latina woman, with the richness of her experience, would reach "better"conclusions than a white male"who hasn't lived that life." This week Obama regained control of the debate that Republicans had been craftily shaping, by excusing her for the wrong choice of the word "better" and by explaining that what she meant was that "her life experience will give her more information about the… hardships people are going through." This was an allusion to the fourth criteria listed above, that is, the one of representation, in this case, of Hispanics/Latinos. Since the Supreme Court is not an elected body, it follows that its representativeness is not a must. Credentials, wisdom and judicial temperament should suffice for judges to fulfill their role as interpreters of the Constitution and neutral arbiters of the law.However, the history of the Supreme Court suggests that Presidents do make efforts at representativeness when choosing their nominees, certainly to gain the political sympathies of new groups, but also to give legitimacy to the body and its main function of judicial review. (Indeed, such legitimacy has been disputed on and off since the Marbury v. Madison decision of 1803 gave its judges, appointed for life, unelected and unaccountable to nobody, the exclusive authority to decide on the constitutionality of laws for all spheres, including those of the other branches of government. This was a power that Thomas Jefferson vehemently opposed because it was nowhere to be found in the Constitution and it undermined the principle of checks and balances.)In the early part of the twentieth century, religious affiliation became a major focus, and by 1916 both a Catholic and a Jewish judge had been appointed. As different religious groups became more assimilated and religion became a non-issue to the appointment process, the imbalance of race and gender became the major considerations. But a quick review of the "representatives" of those categories shows that their representation can at times be symbolic or passive. While Sandra Day O'Connor, a conservative appointed by Reagan to close the "gender gap", actively represented women's interests in her jurisprudence and many times voted with the liberal block, Clarence Thomas, the second black judge to accede to the Supreme Court, has actively opposed affirmative action, which he regards as a noxious policy that undermines personal merit and creates resentment in the majority group. In contrast, the justice he replaced, Thurgood Marshall, the first African American in the court, was a leader of the civil rights movement who had made his reputation as a young lawyer, successfully arguing before the court the unconstitutionality of segregation in public education inBrown v Board of Education. Finally, both Justice Brennan and Justice Scalia are Catholic but find themselves at opposite sides of the ideological spectrum.In sum, to paraphrase Justice Day O'Connor, if human beings are the sum total and the product of their experiences, they cannot be defined by their gender, ethnicity, race or religion alone. Sonia Sotomayor is a very experienced federal judge with remarkable credentials who will, according to her own statements, attempt to decide every case based on its merits as it relates to the law, using objective legal standards. She also happens to be a woman of Puerto Rican origin, proud of her humble origins and of her cultural roots. And she meets all of the criteria Obama was looking for in a Supreme Court judge. Given the predominance of Democrats in the Senate, her confirmation is almost certain. Let us hope that the confirmation process itself is guided by honest inquiries and arguments on the merits of her appointment, on her judicial temperament and philosophy, and not turned into a media circus of innuendo, slurs and empty slogans that can scar a nominee for life, and in the process, devalue our democracy.Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia

Republican Gov. Jeff Landry's first
big move as Louisiana's chief executive is more likely to blow up than pay
off.

An imperative to provide some rational alternative
to the state's present congressional map provided the main impetus for the
Legislature's special session currently in session. A federal district judge
declared that the district plan which contains only one of six majority-minority
districts unconstitutional, and jurisprudence for the moment dictates that the
state must come up with a plan that at the very least creates an additional opportunity
district – one that has a plurality of residents who identify racially as least
partially as black – or an additional M/M district. If that doesn't happen by
Jan. 30, by default in February the court will draw its own map, with the court's
ideological leanings likely making it a two M/M outcome.

The state has two options here: either capitulate to
draw the two M/M districts or to produce a map with fewer constructed in a way to
probe outstanding constitutional questions on the matter. Two
of those loom large: a partial
dissent to the U.S. Supreme Court decision opening the door to elevate race
above other reapportionment criteria such as maintaining continuity of
representation and keeping community of interests together that if directly
challenging that use as timebound would negate it, and conflicting rulings by
circuit courts of appeals whether non-government groups can challenge government
reapportionment choices that eventually the Court will have to sort out.

Landry has backed surrender by signaling support
for SB 8
by Republican state Sen. Glen
Womack. The bill would convert the existing Sixth District into M/M status
mainly by shifting the westerly northwestern Fourth eastward and south to
connect parts of Shreveport with Alexandria and to the doorstep of Lake Charles,
attenuating the reach of the central to northeastern Fifth from the south and
west but connecting Monroe to Baton Rouge, and lopping off the southern end of
the Baton Rouge-south-to-the-coast Sixth in favor of extending it from
inner-city Shreveport down the Red River to gulp in parts of Alexandria then
splaying southward to pick off parts of Lafayette and Baton Rouge while
removing Baton Rouge precincts from the Second.

Like a plan favored by special interests and
Democrats that makes likely Democrats can win the two M/M seats, it grants
narrow black majorities in each. The difference is the Democrat-favored plan,
which the district court probably would try to impose in absence of legislative
action, would rejigger lines to make the Fifth M/M.

Landry appears to prefer SB 8 because in part it
protects the electability of GOP Rep. Julia
Letlow, the state's only female member and of one of just nine GOP
congresswomen in the deep south, but mainly as it threatens GOP Rep. Garret Graves, who has stirred
resentment not only of Landry but by other members of the Republican congressional
delegation. Graves indirectly supported an opponent of Landry's and worked
against the leadership aspirations of the top two leaders of the House of Representatives,
Louisianans Republicans Speaker Mike
Johnson and Majority Leader Steve
Scalise.

If choosing SB 8 as the option, essentially the
state forfeits any chance of retaining its current single M/M lineup, not only
by its discarding but also in that it forgoes the chance at the constitutional challenges.
By no means is it a sure thing that a single M/M plan, even with another
opportunity district, would prevail, so Landry's strategy could be seen as
setting aside the chance to reflect better the will of the voters and Legislature
in favor of a sure thing that also achieves other purposes, although it would
rankle some members of his party that has a supermajority in each chamber.

Not entirely willing to go along apparently is
Republican state Rep. Mike Echols,
whose HB 14
would make both the Second and Sixth opportunity districts with black voting-age
residents at about 48 percent. The Sixth would stop its northern reach into part
of Alexandria and still gulp in part of Lafayette, but it keeps Baton Rouge almost
entirely together and does less splitting of metropolitan areas than does either
Landry's or Democrats' preferred alternatives. Best of all, it keeps alive the possibility
of resolving the constitutional question of whether opportunity districts would
stand.

Keep in mind that a separate challenge concerning
Louisiana's legislative maps already has brought forth the constitutional question
about whether using race so aggressively in reapportionment, despite wording in
the Voting Rights Act that declares proportionality in population is not
mandated to translate into proportionate seating, can continue to be applied. Resolution
of that case could kick out the rationale behind both a two M/M congressional
map and one with two opportunity districts.

But the problem in going with SB 8 over HB 14 is
the district court could invalidate the SB 8 two M/M map and then impose the
Democrats' preference. The Sixth District in SB 8 in characteristics is too
much like the "slash" Fourth District in Louisiana's second attempt to
reapportion after the 1990 census, which was declared unconstitutional
in placing too much emphasis of race at the expense of other reapportionment
principles.

If this happens, Landry and the GOP majorities
lose both their second-choice map and preference in protected Republican
congressional incumbents, immediately. The state could challenge in that circumstance,
but that past jurisprudence suggests it would lose and makes less certain that
the judiciary wouldn't impose the Democrat-preferred map in time for 2024 elections
and beyond. Depending upon the constitutional questions it doesn't ask finding their
resolution by other means and how quickly that happens, Louisiana could be
stuck with its third-choice map – but Democrats' first choice – up until 2032
reapportionment after the 2030 census.

By contrast, backing HB 14 produces more desirable
outcomes. At worst, the district court and special interest plaintiffs accept
it, giving Landry's party a shot at winning both opportunity districts, but if
not likely ousting their preferred GOP sacrificial lamb, until such time the
Supreme Court could axe race's preferred position in reapportionment before
2032 reapportionment generated from the 2030 census that if happening before then the
state could go back and perform a mid-decade reapportionment back returning to the
first-choice plan.

If either the district court or plaintiffs disagree,
then the state could initiate legal action that pushes the desired
constitutional questions towards quicker resolution, all the while much likelier
preserving their first-choice map for 2024 and perhaps permanently with favorable
Court resolution by 2026. Indeed, because not only is the HB 14 plan better on
all reapportionment principles than SB 8 it's also better on these than any
Democrats' preferred plans, excepting potentially on racial distribution, it
stands a good chance of Supreme Court validation should the timebound question either
not have been addressed by then or decided that it didn't apply, or can ask
that itself.

By tying themselves to SB 8, Landry and the
Republican majority unnecessarily gamble, where while this may increase the
chances of Graves not returning to Congress compared to HB 14 it also increases
the chances of having a map imposed that loses Letlow instead while decreasing
the chances of achieving sooner their first-choice map. Odds are greater if
they pursue that course that they will be saddled with their least-preferred
choice.

Mención Internacional en el título de doctor ; This dissertation, which is structured as a four-paper thesis, aims to analyze the potential existence of an asset bubble in the market for offices (i.e., licenses to be a public officer) in 17th century Castile. In order to examine whether this idea holds true, I have constructed a unique database which contains 1,813 sales, 2,794 resignations, and 370 leases of four different types of offices (regidores-veinticuatros, procuradores del número, escribanos del número, and other escribanos) in 8 major Castilian cities (Burgos, Córdoba, Granada, Madrid, Málaga, Seville, Valladolid, and Zamora) from 1543 to 1710. Chapter I focuses on collection process, main characteristics and limitations of the database. This is mainly based on original manuscripts from the Council of Finance and the Chamber of Castile. Besides sales and resignations, the dataset includes other relevant variables, such as perpetuaciones, leases, wages, and arrangements with creditors, that allows an extensive study of the evolution of the market for offices in Castile. The main limitation of this database is that secondary sales are underreported before the 1580s. However, this problem may be overcome due to the fact that this period is rich in primary sales, and both primary and secondary sales are statistically equivalent. Chapter II studies the institutional evolution and size of market for offices, while analyzing office profitability. I differentiate between the "patrimonialization" process (i.e., conversion of offices into a part of family patrimony) and institutionalization (i.e., the process through a formal market for offices was created). The latter played a key role in the development of property rights, reduction of transaction costs, and expansion of the market for offices. Also, the value at market prices of the most relevant offices in the eighteen cities with voting rights at the Cortes is estimated. The estimates result in 2,807,012 ducats in 1581, 5,358,871 ducats in 1599, and 10,919,189 ducats in 1640. These number are equivalent to 6.2, 7.1, and 8.8 percent of overall consolidated public debt of the whole kingdom in 1581, 1599, and 1640 respectively. Finally, it is shown in this chapter that offices were economically profitable. Offices with fixed earnings display wage-to-price ratios between 2.6 and 5.7 percent, while variable-pay offices had ratios between 6 and 12 percent on average. Additionally, offices could be leased, and the standard return to capital of leases was close to 5 percent. Chapter III analyzes how offices became financial assets during the 16th century. In particular, it is studied how the combination of offices, censos (long-term loans), and pactos de retroventa (repurchasing agreements) allowed office-holders to lease out offices, and create sophisticated financial vehicles, such as Office-Backed-Censos and repo transactions. This chapter also shows that offices fulfilled all conditions to be regarded as safe assets. This means that offices did not suffer from adverse selection, were very liquid, and increased their value during worsening economic times (the latter is analyzed through several dynamic panel models, such as DOLS, PDOLS and AMG, that are suitable for the characteristics of the dataset). To conclude, chapter IV studies the evolution of office prices during the 16th and 17th centuries. First, it is demonstrated that markets for offices were integrated along Castile. The analysis of prices also shows that the boom-bust cycle took place between 1595 and 1630-40. Most plausible fundamental variables that could provoke this cycle (expansive monetary policies, Dutch Disease, perpetuaciones, and servicio de millones) are ruled out. Hence an explanation is provided based on the Aoki et al.'s (2014) model that fits with the timing of the boom-bust and the aforementioned evidence. This model proves the tendency of economies to overvalue safe assets, and concludes that bubbles can arise due to a safe asset shortage. This indeed happened in Castile from the late 1590s onwards. The kingdom suffered from a shortfall of haven assets since 1593-1596 due to juros' loss of safety caused by the Crown's debt-management. Castilian investors then substituted juros for silver and offices, and provoked the office bubble. The bust, which took place in the late 1630s and 1640s, could be explained because of the reduction in office profitability, and a harsh economic and political crisis that probably restricted access to credit and deteriorated political fundamentals of offices. Finally, it is shown that the so-called Office Mania coincided with some traditional patterns of bubbles (low interest rates, growing credit, speculation, and arrangements with creditors). Also, this mania fulfilled all criteria to be considered a bubble by Quinn and Turner (2020). It is to say that satisfied the "bubble triangle" (marketability, increasing credit and money, and speculation), and it was triggered by a government policy (i.e., the bad practices in debt management). ; Programa de Doctorado en Historia Económica por la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; la Universidad de Barcelona y la Universitat de València (Estudi General) ; Presidente: Francisco Andújar Castillo.- Secretaria: Pilar Nogués-Marco.- Vocal: Rui Pedro Ferreira Da Costa Esteve

The specific diseconomy of our broken food systems has perpetuated a state of suppressed agency wherein citizens are purposefully turned into mere passive consumers, while in parallel spreading the idea that, in democracy, consumer sovereignty and dollar voting are people's best voice. This logic has led to a situation of structural violence: privileged populations have profited from increased information access, expanded choices, and better quality and healthier foods, while disenfranchised communities subjugated to enduring gender, race, and class disparities remain imprisoned in a reality of poor information access, limited choices, and lower quality, frequently unhealthy foods. In recent years, socially innovative initiatives including farmers' markets, public-access community gardens, or food-buying groups, have begun to expand traditional understandings of democracy, democracy in these cases being non-traditionally understood as the exercise of collective rights to self-determination. Empowering communities at the local level has been identified as the first step towards establishing sustainable food systems (UN Human Rights Council, 2014), and governments and authorities are becoming increasingly aware of the need to support and promote local social innovations to achieve that objective. If social innovations are key in achieving sustainability, critically examining them becomes a crucial democratic exercise, lest they remain ephemeral lifestyle choices of a privileged subset of society. Some of these initiatives, while well-intentioned, have been uncritical of power relations and existing disparities, unreachable to the broader population due to their insensitivity to recognition and redistribution struggles. Others, not so well-intentioned, have hoarded sustainability discourses and, with the connivance of governments and authorities, often misled well-intended eaters into supporting seemingly sustainable but inherently problematic practices. A third, important but under- recognized set of initiatives, have come from within communities themselves, designed to serve those very communities, often including core values like participation parity, endogenous leadership, and self-empowerment. In the last decade, food democracy has been defined in multiple ways. First, as opposed to "food control", in the form of an inclusive approach to food policy and in terms of its bottom-up approach and of diversity of views and interests (Lang, 1999). Shiva (2003) also uses it in opposition to food dictatorship understood as the control by foreign transnational corporations through GM crops. Then, as an ideal method for ensuring participation in the food system (Hassanein, 2003), and in opposition to the corporatization of the organics' movement (Johnston & Baumann, 2009). Some authors have continued to frame the debate of food democracy in terms of localism (Brecher, Costello, & Smith, 2000; F. M. Lappé & Lappé, 2002; Thompson & Coskuner-Balli, 2007); while others touch much closer on core issues central to food democracy as understood in the present analysis, such as power relations: "A central concern is the problem of commodity fetishism or, put differently, a lack of transparency in the food system that obscures how relations of production are socially produced rather than naturally given." (Johnston & Baumann, 2009, p. 110) Democracy has also been identified as one of the main features of food sovereignty (Jacobs, 2013; McMichael, 2013; Patel, 2009a; 2009b; Windfuhr & Jonsén, 2005), with research having looked into democratic attributes within food sovereignty practices at the local level (Wald, 2015). However, as a concept, democracy in the food system remains credulously presumed and generic at best, and problematically manipulable at worst. Despite the work of these authors, there is a lack of systematic analyses looking beyond simple definitions by opposition, mere calls for engagement/participation, or non-quantitative mileage definitions. While concepts like "localization", "transparency", or "alternativeness" have helped deepen the analysis of the agri-food system and its actors, isolated notions no longer serve scrutinize recent complex social dynamics, as they do not constitute a comprehensive framework through which to analyze the status of these niches of innovation in democratic terms. As a result of this conceptual gap, governance organizations involved in the agri-food system have been unable to identify key democratizing traits in these initiatives, inadequately addressing the divide between privileged and disenfranchised communities. The hypothesis of this paper is that food democracy is necessary because achieving sustainability involves conflicts over values. The first section of this paper proposes a characterization of food democracy, aiming to identify potential democracy principles for food initiatives, both in their internal and external dimensions. Going beyond conventional criteria of generic participation or transparency, our framework will also consider community-building, horizontal integration of the various actors in a territory, community leadership, ability to generate public debate, economic accessibility, outreach capacity, and empowerment through social action. The second section evaluates the contribution of these principles toward improving social learning processes regarding socio-ecological sustainability controversies in the field of sustainable food transitions. The third section applies this framework to 64 food-related initiatives interviewed in the EU (Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Spain.) As social demands for new forms of democracy increasingly regard socio-environmental governance processes, this research provides a framework to identify democratic attributes in food- related initiatives. These attributes can be key in the support, promotion, and facilitation of social innovations in the agri-food system. Social innovations, particularly in the food system, are transforming and creating new social relations, addressing unsatisfied human needs in the transition towards more sustainable and resilient systems, but to truly transform society and effect lasting change, they must be critical of power structures and radically democratic in essence. The hope of this research is to provide useful principles for the kind of necessary democratic conditions a food initiative must fulfill to be truly socially transformative.

The specific diseconomy of our broken food systems has perpetuated a state of suppressed agency wherein citizens are purposefully turned into mere passive consumers, while in parallel spreading the idea that, in democracy, consumer sovereignty and dollar voting are people's best voice. This logic has led to a situation of structural violence: privileged populations have profited from increased information access, expanded choices, and better quality and healthier foods, while disenfranchised communities subjugated to enduring gender, race, and class disparities remain imprisoned in a reality of poor information access, limited choices, and lower quality, frequently unhealthy foods. In recent years, socially innovative initiatives including farmers' markets, public-access community gardens, or food-buying groups, have begun to expand traditional understandings of democracy, democracy in these cases being non-traditionally understood as the exercise of collective rights to self-determination. Empowering communities at the local level has been identified as the first step towards establishing sustainable food systems (UN Human Rights Council, 2014), and governments and authorities are becoming increasingly aware of the need to support and promote local social innovations to achieve that objective. If social innovations are key in achieving sustainability, critically examining them becomes a crucial democratic exercise, lest they remain ephemeral lifestyle choices of a privileged subset of society. Some of these initiatives, while well-intentioned, have been uncritical of power relations and existing disparities, unreachable to the broader population due to their insensitivity to recognition and redistribution struggles. Others, not so well-intentioned, have hoarded sustainability discourses and, with the connivance of governments and authorities, often misled well-intended eaters into supporting seemingly sustainable but inherently problematic practices. A third, important but under- recognized set of initiatives, have come from within communities themselves, designed to serve those very communities, often including core values like participation parity, endogenous leadership, and self-empowerment. In the last decade, food democracy has been defined in multiple ways. First, as opposed to "food control", in the form of an inclusive approach to food policy and in terms of its bottom-up approach and of diversity of views and interests (Lang, 1999). Shiva (2003) also uses it in opposition to food dictatorship understood as the control by foreign transnational corporations through GM crops. Then, as an ideal method for ensuring participation in the food system (Hassanein, 2003), and in opposition to the corporatization of the organics' movement (Johnston & Baumann, 2009). Some authors have continued to frame the debate of food democracy in terms of localism (Brecher, Costello, & Smith, 2000; F. M. Lappé & Lappé, 2002; Thompson & Coskuner-Balli, 2007); while others touch much closer on core issues central to food democracy as understood in the present analysis, such as power relations: "A central concern is the problem of commodity fetishism or, put differently, a lack of transparency in the food system that obscures how relations of production are socially produced rather than naturally given." (Johnston & Baumann, 2009, p. 110) Democracy has also been identified as one of the main features of food sovereignty (Jacobs, 2013; McMichael, 2013; Patel, 2009a; 2009b; Windfuhr & Jonsén, 2005), with research having looked into democratic attributes within food sovereignty practices at the local level (Wald, 2015). However, as a concept, democracy in the food system remains credulously presumed and generic at best, and problematically manipulable at worst. Despite the work of these authors, there is a lack of systematic analyses looking beyond simple definitions by opposition, mere calls for engagement/participation, or non-quantitative mileage definitions. While concepts like "localization", "transparency", or "alternativeness" have helped deepen the analysis of the agri-food system and its actors, isolated notions no longer serve scrutinize recent complex social dynamics, as they do not constitute a comprehensive framework through which to analyze the status of these niches of innovation in democratic terms. As a result of this conceptual gap, governance organizations involved in the agri-food system have been unable to identify key democratizing traits in these initiatives, inadequately addressing the divide between privileged and disenfranchised communities. The hypothesis of this paper is that food democracy is necessary because achieving sustainability involves conflicts over values. The first section of this paper proposes a characterization of food democracy, aiming to identify potential democracy principles for food initiatives, both in their internal and external dimensions. Going beyond conventional criteria of generic participation or transparency, our framework will also consider community-building, horizontal integration of the various actors in a territory, community leadership, ability to generate public debate, economic accessibility, outreach capacity, and empowerment through social action. The second section evaluates the contribution of these principles toward improving social learning processes regarding socio-ecological sustainability controversies in the field of sustainable food transitions. The third section applies this framework to 64 food-related initiatives interviewed in the EU (Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Spain.) As social demands for new forms of democracy increasingly regard socio-environmental governance processes, this research provides a framework to identify democratic attributes in food- related initiatives. These attributes can be key in the support, promotion, and facilitation of social innovations in the agri-food system. Social innovations, particularly in the food system, are transforming and creating new social relations, addressing unsatisfied human needs in the transition towards more sustainable and resilient systems, but to truly transform society and effect lasting change, they must be critical of power structures and radically democratic in essence. The hope of this research is to provide useful principles for the kind of necessary democratic conditions a food initiative must fulfill to be truly socially transformative.

That didn't take long. In fact, what took so long
for a challenge to come to Louisiana's recent reapportionment attempt that probably
won't do much in the short term but could have an enormous impact long term?

Wednesday,
a suit
was filed against the state for its new congressional map carved into existence
at the legislative special session in January. That plan deliberately created
two majority-minority districts, with residents who identify at least partially
as black holding narrow majorities, out of the six. It replaced a map with a
single M/M district in a state where just about a third of residents identified
as at least partially black that was under litigation with Middle District of
Louisiana judge Shelly Dick, a Democrat former Pres. Barack
Obama appointee who showed little patience for the existing map with her threatening
to impose her own two M/M map as a result of a rushed ruling in 2022.

That decision became bolstered by the U.S. Supreme
Court's Allen v.
Milligan ruling last year, which consented to a special three-judge
panel in Alabama, which had a black population of about a quarter, that determined
a one-of-seven M/M plan by the state violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act. That ruling gave preference to race as a means of reapportionment over
other principles such as compactness, contiguity, and community of interests
preserved, by injecting race as something defining a community's interest.

The problem for Louisiana was the solution stumped
for by Republican Gov. Jeff
Landry and GOP legislative majorities looked awfully similar to the map invalidated
in Hays v.
Louisiana three decades ago, except drawn with six districts instead of
seven. The compliant draws attention to that, perhaps not surprisingly as the
same lead lawyer in that case headlines the just-filed Callais
v. Landry.

No surprise as well that the filing savages the
current map, drawing attention to characteristics that make it no more
constitutional, if not even less so, than the rejected map back then. It piles
on that the 2022 map so criticized by Dick even fares better than the 2024 map
on certain quantifiable criteria of quality. In passing, it makes clear leftist
critics of the 2022 map who hypocritically swooned over the 2024 map by that
reaction ratify the fact that race had a predominant role in the latter's construction,
which clearly violated Hays' admonition that race cannot play such a role
absent compelling circumstances obviously missing in this case.

Nor does the outcome
of Allen look promising to salvage the new map. While the Supreme
Court accepted the special panel's (these are required when an
action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of
congressional districts or the apportionment of any statewide legislative body)
reasoning to invalidate the previous one-of-seven M/M plan, it thereupon produced
a new map that explicitly rejected a two M/M plan in favor of one also a single
M/M plan except a second district was created as a generous "opportunity" district
or one with a black plurality (which had a 47 percent black proportion; a
previous state attempt to create one at 40 percent the panel turned away). This
map's districts score well on compactness and contiguity, plus separate more
communities of interest than both of Alabama's rejected plans but not to absurd
lengths.

By contrast, Louisiana skipped that possibility of
having an additional opportunity district (one special session bill would have
created two). Instead, it produced the two M/M map which, the text of the
complaint illustrates extensively, has severe contiguity problems (multiple districts
kept together at some points by borders only 1,500-2,000 yards wide), registers
terrible quantified compactness scores, and does substantial violence to communities
of interest, slicing up every single one of the state's major cities between
two districts except Bossier City.

Note as well that it was a district court in
Alabama, just as happened in Louisiana, that invalidated the former map, because
the challenge presented was both one under law (the VRA) and the Constitution
(14th Amendment) and the district court, and thus succeeding courts,
addressed only the claim under law. The special panel provided the
constitutional parameters for a new map once under law the old map was cast
aside. The constitutional question of the entire approach wasn't directly
adjudicated and, as Assoc. Justice Brett Kavanaugh noted
in a concurrence, ripe for visiting that could tank the Section 2 jurisprudence
that declared the old Alabama map infirm and by extension threatened Louisiana's
previous one.

However, the Callais challenge is strictly
on constitutional grounds, treading the well-worn path of Hays. This
invites not only the virtually-certain binning of the new Louisiana map, but also
it opens up the possibility that the Kavanaugh concurrence will be explored in
the process that could put Section 2 into forced retirement and actually permit
the state to reinstate something like the old map.

Yet that won't be likely for 2024. As it is a constitutional
challenge where the district court – the Western where it is assigned to David
Joseph, the district's former attorney and a Republican former Pres. Donald
Trump appointee – plays a lesser role of coordination and handling preliminary
matters, giving a bit of a head start, little time remains in a practical sense.

That's because of the Purcell
Principle the Court has enunciated where it won't change electoral boundaries
too close to an election. The forthcoming
election calendar suggests that everything involved in invalidating the map
will have to be wrapped up by the end of May, in order for the state administratively
to revert back to the map just set aside and be ready for the gathering of
petitions by candidates to qualify. Four months would be tough.

By 2026, the present map will be history and districts
at that time will look more like the map recently shunted aside. It's far less
certain that will be the case for elections conducted this year.

TANİN'DEKİ YAZILARI ÇERÇEVESİNDE BABANZÂDE İSMAİL HAKKI'NIN MEŞRUTİYET DÜŞÜNCESİÖZETBabanzâde İsmail Hakkı Bey; etkili bir aydın, politikacı, gazeteci ve yazar olarak II. Meşrutiyet döneminin önemli isimlerinden biri olmuştur. Kökü 16. yüzyıla uzanan, Süleymaniye şehrinin kurucusu ünlü Kürt aşireti Baban ailesine mensuptur. İslamcılık düşüncesinin güçlü temsilcilerinden Babanzâde Ahmed Naim'in kardeşidir. Hukuk Mektebi'ni bitirdikten sonra Mülkiye ve Mühendis Mektepleri'nde hocalık; İkdam, Tanin, Şura-yı Ümmet gibi gazetelerde köşe yazarlığı yapmıştır. Hukukla ilgili eserlerinin yanı sıra Bismarc biyografisi ve Dreyfus Meselesini anlattığı kitapları da bulunmaktadır.Meclis-i Mebusan'da Bağdat (1908) ve Divaniye (1912) mebusu olarak yer almış, İbrahim Hakkı Paşa Kabinesi'nde Maarif Vekilliği (1911) siyasi kariyerinin en üst noktası olmuştur. 26 Aralık 1913'te, henüz 37 yaşında iken ders verdiği sırada vefat etmiştir.Meşrutiyet düşüncesini resmetmeye çalıştığım bu tezde onu tanımlayabilecek temel kavramlar; itidal, tedrici tekâmül, meşruiyet,parlamenter sisteme bağlılık, teamül , uzlaşma kültürüdür.Babanzâde, Meşrutiyet'i demokrasi ile eşanlamlı bir yönetim olarak gördüğü için yazılarını, demokrasiyi oluşturan temel unsurları (çoğunluk, çoğulculuk, yasama, yürütme, yargı, güçler ayrılığı, basın özgürlüğü, hukukun üstünlüğü vb.) esas alarak sınıflandırdım.Nitekim 1909 Ağustos'unda yayınlanan Şeyhülislamlık Beyannamesi'ni değerlendirdiği yazılarında; hâkimiyet-i milliye, iktidarın denetlenmesi, güçler ayrılığı, müsavat kavramlarını vurguladığı görülmektedir.Yaşanan olaylara sosyolojik izahlar getirmesi, akademik kimliğinin yazılarına akseden önemli bir parçasıdır. Etki-tepki kanunu, değişimin kaçınılmazlığı, parça-bütün ilişkisi, evrimci yaklaşım, bazı sorunların ancak toplumsal olgunlaşma ile çözülebileceği, yeniliklerin somut ihtiyaçlardan başlaması gerektiği bunlardan birkaçıdır. İttihad ve Terakki Partisi'nin güçlü olduğu dönemde, siyasi rakiplerinin kürsü dokunulmazlığı ve emeklilik haklarını savunması demokrasiye olan bağlılığındaki samimiyeti gösterir.Sultan Reşad'ın cülus yıldönümlerinde kaleme aldığı yazılar, Meclis'te hanedanın damatlarının -onurlarının korunabilmesi için- ödeneklerinin artırılması teklifini desteklemesi onun saltanata karşı olduğu iddiasını çürütmektedir. Ancak sistem içerisinde padişaha biçtiği rol de oldukça sınırlıdır: Milletin birliğini ve ülkenin bütünlüğünü temsil eden, siyasi yetkileri azaltılmış sembolik bir makam.Ona göre; halk Meşrutiyet yönetimiyle beraber iktidara ortak olmuştur. Ancak sınırsız bir özgürlük elde etmemiştir. Hakkını kurallar içerisinde aramalıdır. Rüşvet, tembellik, düzensizlik gibi toplumsal hastalıkların tedavisi için siyasi ve medeni terbiyenin yükselmesi gereklidir.Çoğulculuk kavramına çok erken sayılabilecek bir dönemde vurgu yapması onun demokrasi çıtasının yüksekliğini göstermektedir. Ona göre azınlıkta kalan siyasi hareketler ancak sağlam ve tutarlı fikirlerle hayatta kalabilirler.Karmaşık seçim sisteminde en iyi sonucu alabilmek için İttihad ve Terakki'nin hem seçmenlerine hem adaylarına hem de parti yöneticilerine tavsiyelerde bulunur. Bu tavsiyeler günümüzde dahi yerleşmemiş olan parti içi demokrasi anlayışı açısından oldukça önemlidir.Dini inançların seçim malzemesi yapılmasına karşı çıkar. Siyasi cinayetlere şiddetle karşıdır. Partisinin seçim başarısını açıklarken güçlü bir analizci olduğu görülmektedir.Basının halkın sesi olduğuna dair iyimserliği siyasi rekabetin labirentlerinde kaybolur. Bu alandaki düzensizliğin önlenmesi için bir Matbuat Cemiyeti kurulmasını ve bir Matbuat Nizamnamesi hazırlanmasını önemsemiştir. Yabancı basının iç politikada taraf olmasına karşı çıkar.Osmanlı Devleti'nin azınlıkları Türkleştirmeye çalıştığı ithamını bir iftira olarak görür. Ancak herkesi ortak vatan ve ortak vatandaşlık çatısı altında bir araya getirecek Osmanlıcılık politikasının da gerekli olduğunu savunur. Eşitlik talep eden azınlıkların eski ayrıcalıklarının devam etmesini istemelerini ise bir çelişki olarak görür. Kültürel amaçla kurulan Kürt Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti'ne (1908) üye olması ve bu Cemiyet'in gazetesinde yazı yazması, azınlıkları Türkleştirmenin yanlış olacağını savunması kendisinin Türkleşmiş Kürt olduğu iddiasını çürütür; Osmanlıcılık idealine samimiyetle bağlı Kürt kökenli bir aydın olduğunu gösterir.Arnavutluk'un Osmanlı Devleti'nden ayrılış süreci tam bir travma etkisi doğurur. Çünkü bu ayrılış "ümmet" anlayışına vurulan ilk darbedir. Arap siyasi hareketlerine, bu süreçte yaşananları bir ibret olarak hatırlatır.Devleti oluşturan unsurlardan başta yasamayı (Meclis) öne çıkarırken daha sonra yürütmeyi ilk sıraya geçirmiştir. Bir hükümet kurulurken padişah-sadrazam-Meclis arasında güvenoyu alınmasını sağlayacak bir işbirliğini gerekli görür. Bugünkü tabirle teknokrat bir koalisyon hükümeti kurulmasına, yürütmeyi zayıflatacağı için karşı çıkar.Örfi İdarenin hatalarının üstünü örtme çabası ve muhalefetin sesini daha gür duyurabileceği açık alan mitinglerine karşı çıkması onun demokrasi anlayışında tespit edebildiğimiz nadir kırılmalardır. Halaskarân Zabitan tehdidi karşısındaki dik duruşu ise takdire şayandır.Ona göre, yasama organının diğer parçası olan Ayan Meclisi'nin varlığı -aristokratik bir geçmişe dayanmadığı için- sadece bir sebeple anlamlıdır: Kanunların hazırlanması sürecinde ihtiyaç duyulan teenniyi sağlaması. Buna rağmen zaten Meclis'in feshinde onay hakkına sahip olan Ayan Meclisi'nin bir de hükümeti düşürebilecek istizah (gensoru), kendi üyelerini seçme gibi haklara sahip olursa sistemdeki tek güç olacağı uyarısını yapar. Meclis müzakerelerinin uzamaması için yaptığı teklifler tam bir uzman görüşüdür. Muhalefet milletvekillerinin iktidarın istediği kanunları engellemek için başvurduğu obstrüksiyon (engelleme) yöntemlerini demokrasi dışı uygulamalar olarak tanımlar.Ocak 1912'de Meclis'in ilk feshinin ardından aynı yıl Ahmet Muhtar Paşa Kabinesi döneminde yeniden feshedilmesi çabasına şiddetle karşı çıkar. Bu amaçla dile getirilen Meclis'in ömrüne dair fikirleri ustaca çürütür.Güçler dengesi bağlamında Meclis'in istizah hakkına karşılık hükümetin cevabın ertelenmesi hakkının hangi dengede olması gerektiğini izah eder. İstizah, güven oylaması ile sonuçlanan bir yöntem olarak kullanıldığı için iktidarın denetlenmesinde daha hafif bir yöntem olarak sual yöntemini teklif eder. Meclis'in adem-i itimad oyuna karşılık Hükümet'in Meclis'i feshetme hakkını düzenleyen 35. maddenin değiştirilmesi meselesi, güçler dengesi başlığının en önemli konusudur. Anayasa'da yapılan 1909 tadilatıyla bu denge İttihad ve Terakki tarafından Meclis lehine bozulmuştur. 1912'de dengenin yeniden kurulması için yapılan teklifin de İttihadçılardan gelmesi muhalifler tarafından şiddetle eleştirilmiştir.Babanzâde, yargı alanında reform ihtiyacını kabul etmektedir. Ancak bunun da tedrici bir şekilde olması gerektiğini savunur. Mahkemelerin tekliği esas olmasına rağmen bir süre daha memurların yargılanması için idari mahkemelerin varlığını sürdürmesi gereklidir. Gezici sulh mahkemelerinin kurulması adi suçların çözümünü hızlandıracaktır. Hâkimlerin ilmi yeterliliklerini artırmak için hukuk mekteplerinin sayısı artırılmalı, gayret eksikliğini gidermek için görevde yükselme şartlarını belirleyen objektif kriterler getirilmelidir.Ordu ve adliye mensubu memurların politikadan uzak durması şarttır. Ancak bu sayede saygınlıklarını koruyabilirler. Küçük düzeydeki memurların halkı bilgilendirmek amacıyla politikayla ilgilenmesi yanlış olmaz, aksi takdirde siyasi güç kısa zamanda yerel zorbaların eline geçer. Memurların sendikal haklara sahip olmaması fikri ise bugün geçerliliğini yitirmiştir.BABANZÂDE İSMAİL HAKKI'S CONSTİTUTİONALİZM İDEA İN THE VİEW OF HİS WRİTİNGS İN TANİNBabanzâde İsmail Hakkı Bey: He is one of the important names of II. Constitutionalizm as an effective intellectual, politician, journalist and an auther.He is a member of Baban Family which is a famous Kurdish tribe in 16. Cc. The founder of Suleymaniye city. He is the brother of Babanzâde Ahmet Naim who is the most powerful represantative of Pan-İslam. After graduation from law school,he worked at Mülkiye and Engineering Schools and wrote articles to İkdam, Tanin, Şura-yı Ümmet newspapers. In addition to his Works about law, he wrote Bismarc biography and the book which he told about Dreyfus matter.He worked as a representative of Bağdat and Divaniye in Grand National Assembly (Mebusan Meclisi). He worked as an Education Minister with İbrahim Hakkı's Goverment. This position was his top career. While he was teaching ,26 th December 1913 at 37 years old he died.When I want to describe his constitutionalism with this thesis, I can say these terms: moderate, improving step by step, legitimacy, devotion on the system of parliament, customs, culture of reconcile.As Babanzâde has seen constitutinalism and democracy the same, I classified his writings as the basic items: majority, pluralism, legislation, propulsion, judgement the diversity of powers, the freedom of press and dominiant of law.In his writings which criticized Şeyhülislam Declaration in 1909 August, it is seen that he focused on soverignity, inspecting the power goverment, the diversity of power and equality.His sociological way of describing the events is important part of his career. Effect and cause, inevitable change, the relation of part and whole, evolutionist approach, the thing that some problems can only be solved by the maturity of the society and the necessity that the innovation must started by the concrete need are some of them.When İttihad and Terakki Party was powerful, his defensing the rivals seat untouchable position of its and the rights of being retired shows his dependancy on democracy.In Sultan Reşat's ascending the throne anniversary writings his supporting increasing the subsidy of sons in law on the behalf of protecting their honour in the assembly refutes the idea of opposition against the throne. But the role of the Sultan is very limited in his system it is a symbolic stage which represents the unity of the nation and the unity of whole country.According to him the people participated in the political power with constitutinaolism. However,they couldn't get endless freedom. They have to look for their right according to the rules and law. The social disorders like bribery, laziness, untidiness can be solved by increasing the level of political and civilized understanding of society.His focusing the concept of pluralism at early period shows his improving the idea of democracy for him weak political movements can only stay alive by strong and coherent ideas.He has some suggestions both to the candidates and voters of İttihad and Terakki in order to be succesful on the complicated voting system. These suggestions are very important for the today's changeable party and democracy understanding.He is opposed to misusing of religious beliefs. He is strongly object to political murders. While he is describing his party's voting success, he is seen to be a strong analisist.The optimism of the press about being the voice of the nation disappears in the labyrinth of political competition. He gave importance to the foundation of press and to the event of preparing a press declaration in order to prevent the disorders in this field. He opposes to foreign press's side in inside policy.The minorities of Ottoman Empire sees the accusation of making them Turkish as a slander. On the other hand,he thinks that the Ottoman policy which will make all the natives and non-natives United is a most that the minorities who demands equality and also demanding their old privilages is seen as a contradiction by him. The event of being a member of the Kurdish Teavün and Terakki Association founded with the aim of culture (1908) and writing many articles in this association's newspaper and defending that it would be wrong to make Kurdish people Turkish refutes that he is a Kurdish. It shows that he is a Kurdish-rooted, intellectual person who is strongly devoted himself to Ottoman idealism.The period in which Albania seperated from Ottoman Empaire reveals a real travma. Because this parting is a real blow for the Muslim Community. He sees it as a sample for the Arabic political movements.He gives importance to legislation but then he finds carrying a law more important than legislation. He thinks a cooperation providing with winning a vote of confidence among Sultan-Grand Vizier and Assembly is necessary. He objects to today's technocrat coalition goverment, because of its dangerous effects on carrying out the law.His effors to conceal the faults of cencorship and his objections to opposition party's demonstrations are his defects of his democracy understanding. However,his standing upwright against the threat of Halaskarân is worth to appreciating.In his opinion, existing Ayan Assembly another part of legislation is only meaningful -because of not depending on the aristocratic past- while laws being pirepared the needed calmness is because provided. Neverthless he warns that if Ayan Assembly has the right to select its own members and to give interpellation in Parliment, it will be the unique power.His suggestions not to last the parliment discussions are totally expert ideas. He identifies the methods which the opposition party's members applied for preventing the power's laws are out of democracy.He is strongly against to the efforts of repealing during Ahmet Muhtar Paşa Kabinet period again after the first repealing of parliment in January 1912. He eliminates the ideas of the life-span of the Assembly.He explains the necessary balance between assembly's interpellation right and goverments delaying right to answer. As interpellation is a method used for voting for trust he proposes as a light method "questioning method" to inspect the goverment.The problem which is about the changing of the 35. Matter the right of repealing the goverment is the most important subject of the power balance. The change in 1909 constitution ,this balance was ruined against the Parliment by İttihad and Terakki. In 1912 the proposal by İttihad and Terakki to rebuild this balance was strongly criticized by the opponents.Babanzâde accepts the need for a change in judgement. But he defends that is should be step by step. Although the courts are the only way to judge, managerial courts must exist to judge the officers for a while. Founding portable peace courts will make the solution the vulgar crimes faster. The number of law schools should be more in order to develop the judge's careers and there should be some objective criteria to improve on their careers and to prevent the effort deficiency.It is a condition for army and judge staff to be away from the policy. Providing that they can protect their esteem. Low-level officers' dealing with the policy is not wrong, otherwise political-power can be subsituted with local tyrants. The officer's union rights have disappeared today.

On 29th - 30th March 2007, SUERF and the Central Bank of Cyprus jointly organized a Seminar: Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions. The papers in the present publication are based on a sample of the presentations at the Seminar. Together, the papers illuminate a number of key issues in corporate governance in a variety of financial firms. In the first paper based on a keynote address, Spyros G. Stavrinakis, Central Bank of Cyprus gives an overview of the legal framework for corporate governance in financial institutions in Cyprus. According to a Central BankDirective issued in 2006, implementation of corporate governance principles is mandatory for all banks incorporated in Cyprus and their overseas branches and for some Cyprus branches of foreign banks domiciled outside the European Economic Area. Banks are obliged to have a robust internal governance framework, consistent lines of reporting and effective risk identification, management, monitoring and reporting procedures for all the risks to which credit institutions are actually or potentially exposed. The board of directors should take the lead in establishing and approving ethical standards and corporate values for itself and for the bank's senior executive management. Potential conflicts of interest should be identified, prevented or appropriately managed. Each bank should maintain a compliance function that monitors compliance with rules, regulations and policies. Clear lines of responsibility and accountability should be set and enforced. New members of the board of directors as well as the senior executive managers of banks have to be vetted and approved by the Central Bank of Cyprus for their " fitness and properness." In order to ensure transparency concerning the implementation of the principles, each bank's corporate governance framework should be disclosed in the bank's annual report and on its public website. In the second paper by Christian Harm, University of Muenster, "The Governance of the Banking Firm" the author builds on the literatures on corporate governance and financial regulation. In relation to governance of financial institutions, agency theory has both merits and shortcomings. It provides good explanations in many delegation situations but it has severe difficulties in dealing with institutions with several stakeholders and complex objective functions for the management. Firms guided by shareholder value may work more effectively than firms guided by stakeholder cacophony. Depositors are important stakeholders in banks. Since they are typically incapable of managing the supervision of their claims on the bank, they rely on regulators to do it for them. Remuneration systems for bank managers should provide proper incentives. According to the author, incentives should be structured such as to reward particular strategic achievements. Banks can apply executive stock option plans, but should confine options to a secondary place behind other long-term incentives based on success criteria that further shareholder interests without compromising the regulatory mission. Such an incentive framework tends, however, to be very complex so that the general ambiguities associated with the concept of governance could imply that in the banking firm, selecting managers with a proper intrinsic motivation may be superior to defining complex remuneration programs. In the third paper "Corporate Governance Issues in Non-Shareholder Value Financial Institutions: ACase Study of Mutual Building Societies in the UK", David T. Llewellyn, Loughborough University, focuses on corporate governance in non-incorporated financial firms. The author describes the relevant stakeholders and the nature of agency problems in different types of financial firms. He compares monitoring mechanisms, incentives, abilities and feasibilities of managers and members of mutuals. Mutuality raises specific corporate governance issues: Corporate governance is less clearly defined because the firm's objectives are less clearly defined. Conflicts of interest between managers and owners are less easily identified and it is more difficult to create management incentives. The almost exclusive source of capital is retained profits and each member has a non-exclusive and non-marketable claim to residual net worth. Voting rights are typically not proportional to the size of the ownership stake. There is no market in ownership claims and therefore no effective market in corporate control. Consequently, there is ample scope for mutuals to be inefficient. There is, however, no evidence that the efficiency and performance of mutuals are poorer that that of incorporated financial firms. In the fourth paper "Corporate Governance in Emerging Market Banks", Bridget Gandy, Fitch Ratings Ltd., and her co-authors from the rating agency look at the framework for corporate governance of banks in a sample of emerging market countries. Since the crisis in the late 1990s in Latin America and Asia, there has been a marked improvement in corporate governance of financial institutions in the regions under observation. Many countries have taken legal steps to develop functioning market economies with a view to the need to satisfy the demands of international capital markets. Several banks have listed their shares on stock exchanges in developed markets and foreign bank ownership and involvement in local banking systems have increased. In Central and Eastern Europe, countries' desire for EU-accession has impacted on the development of their corporate governance systems. At the individual bank level, Fitch Ratings looks at bank board independence and quality, oversight and the importance of related party transactions, the integrity of the audit process, acceptability of executive and director remuneration, ownership structures and transparency. In evaluating the quality of governance at the country level, the authors apply a three-pillar approach in line with Montesquieu: Powers and responsibilities need to be separated between a representative legislature, a competent and accountable executive branch and a fair and independent judiciary. The paper contains an interesting table in which a number of key regulatory initiatives in a sample of emerging market countries are compared. The authors point out that large scale privatizations have reduced the importance of state-owned banks in many countries. There are, however, still several examples with complex holding structures involving banks with potential negative implications for corporate governance quality and problems with related party transactions. Acquisitions by foreign banks with developed corporate governance standards have generally had a positive impact and also listing of bank shares on foreign stock exchanges with tough disclosure and transparency requirements have contributed positively to the quality of corporate governance in emerging market banks. Read together, the four papers give a good overview of the development of corporate governance practices and remaining problems in financial institutions of different types and with domicile in different countries.