Suchergebnisse

Belligerent Occupation — Judicial Powers of Occupant — Delegation of Powers of Occupant to Authorities of Occupied Country — Delegation of Power to Administer Booty — Determination of Issue whether Goods are Booty or Private Property — Whether Courts of Occupied Country Competent to Determine Issue.

The nature and dynamics of ownership are often neglected features of multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs). Seventeen cases in four countries illustrate characteristics of narrow government or broad societal ownership and forces for change over time. Refinements to the application of Gaventa's Power Cube are used to analyse such shifts from the perspective of invited and closed spaces for participation. Observations about ways in which stakeholder groups can create a more enabling environment for their collaboration are discussed. Sensitivity to sub-national conditions by weaving endogenous and exogenous forces appears to be crucial if MSIs are to be effective vehicles of choice for implementing the Sustainable Development Goals.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) form a significant part of the corporate sector in developed and developing economies. This paper shows the distortions in SOE investments due to political pressure by using the constitutionally mandated schedule of elections as a source of exogenous variation in politicians' incentive to cater to voters. We track investments by non-financial SOEs around election years using a unique project level database of new investments announced in India and find that SOEs announce a greater number of projects during election years. These patterns are especially pronounced in politically competitive districts and districts associated with high-ranking politicians. Specifically, the number of investments announced by SOEs in election years is on average 36% (66%) greater in politically competitive districts (districts of high-ranking politicians). These projects have negative announcement returns suggesting that political influence results in projects that are likely negative NPV. These patterns are in stark contrast to those observed in a placebo set of non-government firms. Our results inform the policy debate on the efficiency differences between government and private firms and support the political view of government ownership.

Ownership of publicly listed German companies has undergone significant changes in recent years. The aim of this report is to document these trends since 2007 and analyze the extent to which firms that compete in the same product market are owned by the same investors, which is known as common ownership. We show that some large foreign institutional investors have overtaken domestic investors and now occupy the top spots. This is true both in terms of value and the number of blockholdings, i.e. large blocks of shares.In addition, there has been an increase in ownership concentration overall. That said, private and governmental investors with few but large holdings, still own more than half of German equity. Using two leading industries, the chemical and car industries, we show that ownership trends and levels of common ownership can be very different across industries. While it is unclear a priori what common ownership implies for competition, innovation, and consumer welfare, markets that show more common ownership, such as the chemical sector, deserve more attention from policy makers, regulators, and academics alike.

This dissertation explores what it means for writers to maintain agency and ownership over their textual productions in big data age, where to write means to participate in a complex weave of software, code, and networked algorithms, and where writing produces both conventional text and data. Given how much everyday writing flows through proprietary digital platforms, my dissertation asks: how can we carve out a model of ownership that centers the agency of writers and users in the face of corporate web platforms that aggressively appropriate the value of our textual productions? Digital writing scholarship has responded by appealing to copyright law and proprietary authorship; however, calls to property or authorship no longer work towards the advantage of writers because they are rooted in an industrial capitalism framework where the propertization of writing was primarily expressed through copyright. Attending closely to Web 2.0's infrastructure, I show that property on the digital web has shifted from texts (copyright) to platforms (the means of producing texts), and that the function of property has shifted from rewarding authors to appropriating the value of their labor. Drawing on classical and contemporary political economic theory, I develop a framework for writer agency grounded in a critical theory of property, where agency is tied to the struggle against the propertization of writing and writing technologies and with writer control over the circulation infrastructures that make up the web. I test this theoretical model of agency against existing attempts to create alternative writing platforms that center writer agency, and by looking at the experiences of writers on those platforms. My findings show, first, that the most successful alternative platforms—free and open-source platforms like Mastodon—attempt to empower writers through decentralized server structures that make large-scale data appropriation and production impossible. Second, I show that solving the issue of data appropriation is not ...