Search results

Voters have been coordinating their choices for president and House of Representatives in recent presidential election years, with each voter using a strategy that features policy moderation. Coordination is defined as a noncooperative rational expectations equilibrium among voters, in which each voter has both common knowledge and private information about the election outcome. Stochastic choice models estimated using individual-level NES data from 1976–96 support coordination versus a model in which voters act nonstrategically to moderate policy. The empirical coordinating model satisfies the fixed-point condition that defines the common knowledge expectation voters have about the outcome in the theoretical equilibrium. The proportion of voters who split their ticket in order to balance the House with the president has been small but large enough to affect election outcomes. Moderation has usually been based on voters' expectations that the president will be at least an equal of the House in determining postelection policy.

In recent years, issues of aid effectiveness have come centre stage, motivated amongst other factors by the increased emphasis on impact evidenced in particular by the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Improved aid alignment and harmonization (A&H) is seen as vital for enhanced aid effectiveness, as reflected most prominently in the 2005 Paris Declaration. In this context, this Joint Evaluation Paper (JEP) addresses key aspects of donor coordination and harmonization in Bangladesh. The subject of the JEP is the Joint Strategic Framework (JSF) of the four largest aid donors in Bangladesh the World Bank (WB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), Department for International Development (DFID), and Japan. At the time it was started around 2005, the JSF was considered a major step forward in aid A&H, and as such merits serious joint evaluation.

The need for economic policy coordination is particularly great in Europe given both the strong interdependence between European countries and the multiplicity of policymakers. With a two-country model, in which the countries can differ in their propensity to inflate or in their economic policy objectives we show that if each country chooses autonomously its economic policy, the world economic situation is non- optimal. Each country tries to export its inflation or its deficit on current account, which globally is impossible. Economic policy coordination improves the situation of both countries. This coordination is more fruitful when the countries have the same economic policy objectives, on account of the costly competitive exchange rate policies that they would otherwise pursue. But negociating for coordination is not easy, so rules such as those of the EMS are more desirable. We show, in our model, that the EMS leads to an improvement in comparison with the non-cooperative equilibrium, without being a perfect substitute for cooperation. ; Le problème de la coordination se pose avec une acuité particulière en Europe du fait de la forte interdépendance des nations européennes et de la multiplicité des centres de décision. Grâce à une maquette à deux pays, pouvant se différencier par leurs propensions à l'inflation ou par leurs préférences en matière d'objectifs de politique économique, nous montrons que si chaque pays définit de façon autonome sa politique économique, il en résulte une situation inefficace au niveau mondial, les pays ayant tendance à essayer d'exporter leur inflation ou leur déficit commercial ce qui est globalement impossible. Bien que difficile à mettre en œuvre, la coordination des politiques économiques permet d'améliorer la situation des deux pays. Cette coordination apparaît d'autant plus souhaitable que les préférences des deux pays sont proches, du fait des politiques de taux de change concurrentielles qu'ils mèneraient sinon. Mais les négociations menant à la coordination des ...

This article examines the extent to which local governments in North Carolina embrace innovation in their economic development activities. The study makes a distinctive theoretical contribution by examining the relationship between innovation in how economic development policies are administered and implemented (using concepts associated with governance and NPM), and innovation in what is substantively done (policy innovation). An analysis of the results from a statewide survey of local governments in North Carolina finds that certain governance/management variables are significant determinants of economic development policy innovation. An implication of this finding is that new ways of doing economic development may go hand‐in‐hand with new ways of governing and managing. Many of the governance/management variables are also positively associated with the use of a greater number of traditional economic development strategies and tools. This suggests that local governments may find it helpful to be innovative in how they implement economic development irrespective of the substantive policy orientation of particular strategies and tools.