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"This book embarks on a comprehensive exploration of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and elucidates the three foundational aspects of its jurisdiction as laid out in the Rome Statute: the preconditions for exercising jurisdiction (Article 12 ICCRSt), its substantive competence regarding core crimes (Articles 5-8bis ICCRSt), and the principle of complementarity (Article 17§1(a) ICCRSt). This principle, crucial to understanding the ICC's 'ultimate jurisdiction', is invoked only when a State Party demonstrates an inability or unwillingness to genuinely undertake investigation or prosecution. The book further probes the 'negative preconditions' of the Court's jurisdiction, in particular, immunities (Article 27 ICCRSt) and exceptions through Security Council referrals (Articles 13(b) and 15 ICCRSt). Intended for students, scholars, and practitioners alike, this second edition offers invaluable insights into the ICC's jurisdiction, making a notable contribution to the existing literature. Importantly, it also navigates emerging fields of international criminal law, addressing topical and thought-provoking subjects such as ecocide, cyber warfare, automated lethal weapons, artificial intelligence, and the legal complexities arising from the Russian invasion of Ukraine." --

The literature on diversionary war has long argued that a leader's tenure considerations play an important role in international conflict behavior. However, for the diversionary use of force to be rational, international conflict must in turn affect the leader's tenure. A two-stage probit model on a new data set of all leaders between 1919 and 1992 is used to examine this reciprocal relationship between the probability of losing office and the probability of crisis initiation. Contrary to theories of the diversionary use of force, results show that an increase in the risk of losing office makes leaders less likely to initiate a crisis, and an increase in the risk of an international crisis makes leaders more likely to lose office. Results also suggest that democracies are overall less likely to initiate a crisis because of the domestic political insecurity of democratic leaders.

Recent conflict studies that combine the behavioral decision-making approach with quantitative systems theory are yielding new insights and new verification methods in policy analysis. They can be characterized as "decision system" studies. The present study proposes and quantitatively verifies several hypotheses about how the British Navy budget was decided over a seventy-year period before World Wars I and II. It concludes that actual decisions can be very precisely modeled in terms of an arms budget race with goals that shifted intermittently due to (a) changes in the countries identified as antagonists, and (b) changes in relative aspiration levels. The levels and changes of goals are validated by reference to known historical incidents. Although technological and strategic military factors were prominently discussed in public debates, they had little direct influence on budget levels. Similarly, domestic economic and political party factors were often mentioned in connection with the naval budget, but the model shows that they were only occasionally influential.