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Writing about the French Revolution, Edmund Burke suggested that the state that cannot change will not survive. As I write this, at the end of 1989, it is evident that for many people the world is changing at a great pace, and that some states may not survive. There can be no doubt that 1989 will appear in history books as a year to be remembered, a year to be weighed alongside 1789, 1914, 1939 and so on. There is a sense that we are living through a momentous time in history. For those of us too young to remember 1939 or 1945, let alone 1914, this is the first experience of enormous upheaval. The map of Europe, East and West, appears to be changing every day.With the established order, in Eastern Europe at least, disintegrating so rapidly, writing anything is a risky business, particularly for a journal such as Australian Child and Family Welfare where lead times are long and labour is voluntary. Much of what is written at the end of 1989 may appear irrelevant at best, in 1990.

In the aftermath of the attempted 1965 coup, many dissidents, leftists, and suspected Communists were either 'eradicated' or incarcerated in prisons all over Indonesia. Since their release, these political prisoners continue to face state-enforced discrimination and stigmatisation. The marginalization of ex-political prisoners by both the state and local communities has continued through Indonesia's democratic transition following President Suharto's downfall in 1998. This is compounded by the presence of right-wing groups who continue to harass them, labelling them as neo-Communists inimical to the Indonesian body politic. Through direct engagement with former political prisoners, I aim to understand rehabilitative efforts through support groups. In preliminary interviews, many eks-tapol refer to the need to 'straighten' history. This discourse highlights their need to be recognized as 'whole' citizens of Indonesia. I explore the state's struggle to address this dark chapter in Indonesian history, what it means to 'straighten' history and how eks-tapol engage with support groups to re-define their position within the community, denoting a strengthened sense of dignity and humanity. It is hoped that this research will contribute to efforts to understand and protect the rights of eks-tapol and other victims of political persecution in Southeast Asia.

From the book's Foreword: In the early 1970s, the U.S. Army Center of Military History contracted with BDM Corporation for a history of U.S. efforts to counter Soviet air and missile threats during the Cold War. The resulting two-volume History of Strategic Air and Ballistic Missile Defense covers the years 1945-1972 when the strategic arms competition between the United States and the Soviet Union was at its height. The study was first published for limited distribution in 1975 and recently declassified with minimal redaction. These volumes address the passive and active defense strategies, technologies, and techniques adopted by both U.S. and Soviet defense planners. Much of their actions centered around three common questions: How might we be attacked? How shall we defend our country? What can technology do to solve the basic problems of defending against this new intercontinental threat? ; Shipping list no.: 2009-0036-S ; Includes bibliographical references and index ; v. 1. 1945-1955 -- v. 2. 1956-1972 ; Volume 2: 1956-1972 -- Foreword -- Preface -- Executive Summary -- A: Introduction -- B: Setting -- 1: Influential factors -- 2: Context in 1955 -- 3: General overview -- C: Strategic actions -- 1: Parallel decisions during the period -- 2: Contrasts in choice -- 3: Tactics-US-Soviet air and missile defense strategy -- D: Conclusions -- 1: Summary judgments -- 2: Conclusion -- Chapter 1: US And Soviet Strategies For Strategic Air And Missile Defense, 1955-1972: A Comparison -- A: Introduction -- B: What was different from the first decade? -- 1: 1955 environment -- 2: 1955 problem-where to go next -- 3: Options-more defense or more offense -- C: Contrasting responses -- 1: Importance of air defense strategy -- 2: Impact of technology on strategic options -- 3: Summary-US-Soviet air and missile defense strategy -- 4: Judgments -- D: Reasons and influences -- 1: Parallel decisions during the period -- 2: Corollaries and consequences -- 3: Implications for US air/missile defense -- E: Conclusion -- Chapter 2: Blue Air Defense Strategy, 1955-1972 -- A: Administrative note -- B: Introduction and abstract -- C: Prelude to 1955 -- D: Blue strategy, 1955-1972 -- 1: 1955-4 October 1957: Emphasis on the air-breathing threat defense (the decision to build up the air defense system) -- 2: 4 October 1957-January 1961: Reevaluation of the strategic threat (the decision to deploy first generation IRBMs/ICBMs) -- 3: January 1961-January 1968: McNarma years -- 4: Decision not to deploy a ballistic missile defense system -- 5: Calendar years 1968-1972 plans for the future of air defense -- E: Summary -- 1: Politics of congress as it affected air defense -- 2: JCS/service participation in air defense strategy -- 3: Impact of detente on air defense -- 4: Decision 1: Build-up of the air defense system, January 1955 -- 5: Decision 2: Decision to deploy first generation IRBM/ICBMs of 1958 -- 6: Decision 3: Decisions not to deploy new air defense systems in the 1959-1962 period -- 7: Decision 4: Decision not to deploy a ballistic missile defense system through September 1967 -- 8: Decision 5: Decision for detente -- Annexes -- 1: CONUS air defense "master plan" -- 2: DERs and DEW line -- 3: Phasedown of C2 systems, 1958-1963 -- 4: Threat assessments in a secondary source -- 5: Changing threat estimates, 1954-1956 -- Chapter 3: Soviet Air And Defense Strategy -- A: Introduction -- B: Studies of behavior -- 1: Introduction -- 2: Great debate in military thought -- 3: Public statements on antiballistic missile defense capabilities -- C: Major decisions -- 1: Role of major decisions -- 2: Decision to deploy SAMs extensively -- 3: Decision to revamp the National Air Defense Forces -- 4: Decision to upgrade civil defense -- 5: Decision to continue a major role for fighter aviation -- 6: Decision to deploy ABMs -- 7: Decision to negotiate an ABM treaty -- D: Major factors shaping Soviet strategy -- 1: Factors -- 2: Threat perception -- 3: Reaction and interaction-the APVO case -- 4: Response to major events and crises -- 5: Relative importance of strategic defense -- 6: Budgetary constraints -- E: Soviet strategy-a synthesis -- 1: Basic thrust of Soviet strategy -- 2: Rationale of Soviet strategy -- 3: Weapons and resource strategy -- 4: Summary -- Chapter 4: American Systems -- Section 1: General -- A: Limitations -- B: Purpose -- C: Approach -- D: Chapter organization -- E: Analysis factors -- F: Status, end of 1955 -- 1: Approach -- 2: Organizational and command -- 3: Surveillance and early warning -- 4: Fighter interceptors -- 5: Ground-based antiaircraft defenses -- 6: Strategy -- Section 2: Air Defense, 1956-1972 -- A: Approach -- B: 1956-1960 -- 1: Organization, command, and control -- 2: Surveillance and early warning -- 3: Fighter interceptors -- 4: Antiaircraft gun and SAM defenses -- 5: Operational problems -- C: 1961-1964 -- 1: Organization, command, and control -- 2: Surveillance and early warning -- 3: Fighter interceptors -- 4: Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) defenses -- 5: Operational problems -- D: 1965-1968 -- 1: Status of the air defense system, January 1965 -- 2: Organization, command, and control -- 3: Surveillance and early warning -- 4: Fighter interceptors -- 5: Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) defenses -- 6: Modernized air defense concept -- E: 1969-1972 -- 1: Organization, command, and control -- 2: Surveillance and early warning -- 3: Fighter interceptors -- 4: Surface-to-Air Missile (Sam) Defenses -- 5: Air defense of the southern United States -- 6: Air defense with reduced forces -- 7: Planning directives -- 8: Air defense of ABM facilities -- F: 1972 view of future system requirements -- 1: Performance characteristics deficiencies in the 1972 air defense force system -- 2: New system development -- 3: Modernized air defense concept -- 4: Recommended force levels, modernized air defense force -- G: Characteristics and strategic implications deduced from the development, deployment, and modification of the air defense system, 1945-1972 -- 1: General -- 2: Significant events -- 3: Air defense in a continental perspective -- 4: System deployments -- 5: Significance of the threat -- Section 3: Ballistic Missile Defense -- A: Approach -- B: New dimension -- C: Nike Zeus development -- 1: Early years -- 2: Assignment of responsibilities -- 3: Early plans -- 4: Conflicting factors -- 5: Accelerated deployment -- D: Nike-X is born -- E: Assured destruction and damage limitation -- 1: McNamara's inconsistency -- 2: Back to the drawing board -- F: Limited Nike-X: the Chinese threat -- G: Sentinel decision -- H: Sentinel deployment -- I: Demise of sentinel -- J: Safeguard -- K: SALT -- Section 4: Space defense -- A: Approach -- B: Missile and space surveillance and warning systems -- 1: Authority -- 2: Composition -- 3: BMEWS -- 4: SLBM warning system -- 5: Over-the-horizon, forward scatter radar (440L) -- 6: Space detection and tracking system -- 7: Defense Support Program (DSP) -- C: Space defense system -- D: Status-1972 -- Section 5: Civil defense, 1955-1972 -- A: Introduction -- B: History -- C: Threat perceptions -- D: Congress, shelters, and the ABM -- E: Conclusions -- Chapter 5: Soviet Systems For Strategic Defense -- A: Introduction -- B: Systems of PVO strany -- 1: Systems of anti-aircraft defense aviation (APVO) -- 2: Systems of anti-aircraft defense missile troops (ZRV) -- 3: ABM systems -- 4: Systems of the radiotechnical troops (RTV) -- C: Soviet civil defense systems -- 1: Overview -- 2: Post-1955 developments (1955-1962) -- 3: 1962-1968 -- 4: Civil defense and the ABM -- 5: Civil defense and limited conflicts -- 6: Perceptions of the western threat -- 7: Psychological /ideological implications -- 8: 1968-1972 -- Appendixes -- A: Chronology of American air defense systems (1956-1972) -- B: Chronology of ballistic missile and space defense (1955-1972) -- C: Chronology of Soviet air defense systems (1956-1972) -- Glossary -- Bibliography -- Index ; Volume 1: 1945-1955 -- Foreword -- Preface -- Executive summary -- Chapter 1: American And Soviet Strategy: A Comparison -- A: Factors influencing air defense development and deployment, 1945-1950 -- 1: Perspectives of the threat and strategic realities -- 2: Impetus for decisions -- 3: Influence of intelligence and some economic limitations -- Increasing focus on Europe -- 5: Strategic concepts -- 6: Domestic political considerations -- 7: Decision style -- 8: Significant initial air defense decisions -- B: Systems developments -- 1: Unilateral efforts, service concepts, and continuing momentum in a context of challenge and change -- 2: Air defense systems components -- C: Factors influencing development and deployment, 1950-1955 -- 1: Air defense requirements and related actions -- 2: Summer study group-other air defense views -- 3: Soviet perspectives after Stalin -- 4: Evolution of the "new look"-NSC 162 -- 5: Growing differences -- D: Systems development -- 1: Overview -- 2: Air defense system components -- E: Summary judgments -- Chapter 2: American Strategy For Air And Ballistic Missile Defense -- A: 1945-1950: Entering the atomic era -- 1: World War II heritage -- 2: Immediate postwar developments -- 3: Planning and developing an air defense -- 4: Summary: 1943-1950 -- B: 1950-1955: Defense against the World War II threat -- 1: Strategic interaction: impact of the Korean War -- 2: Strategic interaction: the Soviet thermonuclear device I -- 3: Summary: 1950-1955 -- 4: Evaluation of US Strategic Air Defense 1945-1955 -- Chapter 3: Soviet Strategy For Air And Ballistic Missile Defense -- A: Historical backdrop -- 1: Long-term factors -- 2: Soviet air defense: the inter-war years -- 3: World War II experience -- B: Formative years, 1945-1950 -- 1: Strategic context -- 2: Organizational approach -- 3: Pursuit of systems development -- 4: Soviet strategy -- 5: Summary: 1945-1950 -- C: System established, 1950-1955 -- 1: Strategic context -- 2: Organizational integrity achieved -- 3: Systems mix in transition -- 4: Interim strategy -- 5: Korean proving ground -- 6: Summary: 1950-1955 -- D: Decision making in Soviet air and ballistic defense -- 1: Problem of data -- 2: Major actors -- 3: Influences on decision making -- 4: Consequences -- E: Appraisal for the first decade -- 1: Accomplishments of the period -- 2: Relative values -- 3: Absolute values -- 4: Strategic decisions: why and how -- Chapter 4: American Systems -- A: Introduction -- B: History of civil defense -- 1: World War II background -- 2: Initial civil defense planning -- 3: Civil defense operating agencies, 1951 -- 4: Period from 1952-1955 -- C: History of surface-to-air missiles -- 1: Background -- 2: AAF-ASF split -- 3: Work begins on Nike and GAPA -- 4: Race of the engineers -- 5: Bureaucratic struggle over missile programs -- D: History of antiballistic missiles -- 1: Technological problems -- 2: World War II experience -- 3: Post-war developments -- E: History of jet interceptors -- 1: Background -- 2: Shift to jet interceptors -- 3: Summary -- 4: Decisions for Supersonic Interceptors, 1948-1955 -- 5: Summary: 1950-1955 -- F: History of early warning systems, 1945-1955 -- 1: Introduction -- 2: DEW line -- 3: Track II-Lashup -- 4: Track III-Supremacy and the "permanent" system -- 5: Track IV-Mid-Canada line -- 6: Track V-Pinetree line -- G: History of command and control, 1945-1955 -- 1: Introduction -- 2: Pre-1945 decisions -- 3: Immediate post-war decisions -- 4: Korean War period -- 5: Post-Korean War developments -- 6: Summary -- Chapter 5: Soviet Systems -- A: Introduction -- B: History of fighter aircraft of PVO -- 1: Pre-war experience -- 2: Performance of Soviet aviation during WWII -- 3: Post-World War II developments -- 4: Observations based on the evolution of interceptor designs -- C: Antiaircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles -- 1: World War II experience -- 2: Post-War development (1945-1955) -- 3: Evaluation -- D: History of early warning systems -- 1: Pre-1945 developments -- 2: Assessment of post-war requirements -- 3: Developments after 1945 -- 4: Summary -- E: History of civil defense in the Soviet Union, 1945-1955 -- 1: Introduction -- 2: Post-war developments: general -- 3: Organization -- 4: Training -- 5: Shelters, evacuation, and dispersal -- 6: Summary -- Appendixes -- A: Concepts of air defense before 1945 -- B: Chronology of American air and ballistic missile defense systems -- C: Chronology of Soviet air and ballistic missile defense -- D: Figures -- Bibliography -- Index ; From the book's Foreword: In the early 1970s, the U.S. Army Center of Military History contracted with BDM Corporation for a history of U.S. efforts to counter Soviet air and missile threats during the Cold War. The resulting two-volume History of Strategic Air and Ballistic Missile Defense covers the years 1945-1972 when the strategic arms competition between the United States and the Soviet Union was at its height. The study was first published for limited distribution in 1975 and recently declassified with minimal redaction. These volumes address the passive and active defense strategies, technologies, and techniques adopted by both U.S. and Soviet defense planners. Much of their actions centered around three common questions: How might we be attacked? How shall we defend our country? What can technology do to solve the basic problems of defending against this new intercontinental threat? ; Mode of access: Internet.

AbstractOn May 27, 2021, the Tk'emlúps te Secwépemc First Nation reported the discovery of 215 unmarked graves on the site of the former Kamloops Indian Residential School in British Columbia. Their first response was mourning for the loss of young lives; their second response was melancholia for the loss of the children's names. David Eng and David Kazanjian advocate a "counterintuitive" interpretation of melancholia as "creative," redefining it as the work of mourning that sustains "a continued and open relation to the past." Jeff Barnaby's 2013 film about residential school resistance, Rhymes for Young Ghouls, affirms melancholia as a creative relation to the past for Indigenous people while drawing attention to another agency that allows settler society to actively lose the past. Freud remarks that the "most remarkable" quality of melancholia is the way it turns into mania, which ensues when "the ego coincides with the ego ideal." What if some losses do not make us melancholic but manic? Is it possible to make history by losing history? Settler mania incites Indigenous melancholia by displacing responsibility for children's deaths from church and state to parents who are themselves school survivors.

We live in an age of iconoclasm: we have felled Churchill, Kennedy, Lenin, Mao. Heroes come and go, history marches on, written and rewritten to fit the needs of the time and the exigencies of political propaganda

Vor einer Trivialisierung des Holocaust warnend, bezeichnete Claude Lanzmann vor acht Jahren den Regisseur Steven Spielberg als "eine Art big brother der Erinnerung". Damit gehörte Lanzmann zu einem Kreis von Historikern, Publizisten und Gedenkstättenmitarbeitern, die massive Kritik an Spielbergs ambitioniertem Vorhaben äußerten, weltweit möglichst viele Überlebende des Holocaust zu befragen. Die Gegenstimmen waren vielfältig und bezogen sich unter anderem auf die in den 1990er-Jahren noch gewöhnungsbedürftige Tatsache, dass Spielberg die digitalisierten Videointerviews in einem computergestützten, internetfähigen Riesenarchiv des Holocaust speichern wollte. Zudem bestand die Sorge, Spielbergs Medienpräsenz und erfolgreiche Sponsorenwerbung werde dazu führen, dass anderen, seit Jahrzehnten arbeitenden Oral-History-Projekten keinerlei Förderung mehr zukomme. Beanstandet wurde auch, dass nicht professionell ausgebildete Personen als Interviewer eingesetzt wurden. Wegen der hohen Zahl archivierter Aussagen von Überlebenden werde sich der inhaltliche Fokus von den Getöteten hin zu jenen verschieben, die der Ermordung entgangen waren. So werde die Geschichte des Holocaust als Geschichte eines Triumphs erzählt, die sie historisch nicht sei. Die Interviews seien darauf angelegt, genau jene Gefühle hervorzurufen, die Raul Hilberg für unlauter hielt: "There is nothing to be taken from the Holocaust that imbues anyone with hope or any thought of redemption." Tatsächlich kann die Interviewsammlung Spielbergs vielzitierten und wegen seiner Assoziation zu verbrannten Leichen etwas obszön wirkenden Anspruch, "jedes Körnchen Asche" aufzusammeln, nicht einlösen. Denn diejenigen, die sprechen können, haben, wie Primo Levi es nannte, "den tiefsten Punkt des Abgrunds" nicht berührt. Deutlich wird jedoch Spielbergs nachdrücklicher, fast obsessiv wirkender Versuch, vergehende Erinnerungen an den Holocaust vor dem Vergessen bannen zu wollen.

In "Aging in World History", David G. Troyansky presents the first global history of aging. At a time when demographic aging has become a source of worldwide concern, and more people are reaching an advanced age than ever before, the history of old age helps us understand how we arrived at the treatment of aging in the modern world. This concise volume expands that history beyond the West to show how attitudes toward aging, the experiences of the aged, and relevant demographic patterns have varied and coalesced over time and across the world. From the ancient world to the present, this book introduces students and general readers to the history of aging on two levels: the experience of individual men and women, and the transformation of populations. With its attention to cultural traditions, medicalization, decades of historical scholarship, and current gerontology, "Aging in World History" is the perfect starting point for an exploration of this increasingly universal aspect of human experience.

Economic History is not everyone's slave, but it can do much for a variety of sciences, given the proliferation of studies of the last century. It provides in full measure the "contextual approach" that can keep a narrow scientist from becoming a fool.