Suchergebnisse

Dschihadistische Gruppen wählen für ihre Anschläge oft Ziele wie Bordelle und Kasinos, die in der salafistischen Ideologie als Orte der Sünde gelten. Sie passen sich dabei jedoch an die Erwartungen der lokalen Bevölkerung an. Auf diese Weise wollen sie ihr Ansehen steigern und sich die Solidarität anderer Salafisten sichern. Wo sie nicht davon ausgehen können, dass tödliche Anschläge auf "sündige" (haram) Ziele gutgeheißen werden, setzen sie eher auf "Umerziehung" statt auf Strafe. Gerade schwächere Terrorzellen vermeiden zudem Anschläge, bei denen sie eine massive Vergeltung der Sicherheitsbehörden zu erwarten haben. Im Kern verhalten sich, wie am Beispiel Dagestans zu zeigen ist, dschihadistische Gruppierungen daher rational. (Osteuropa (Berlin) / SWP)

How should we understand religion in Saudi Arabia? To what extent does religion control the various aspects of Saudi life? Why are more and more Saudis and generally Muslims leaning toward heresy? Why are many others exhibiting an indifference toward religion? And how does our understanding of the state of religion in Saudi Arabia inform us about the state of religion in other Islamic communities? This text explores the emergence of nonbelief and the response to it from the Salafi-Wahhabi religious institutions of Saudi Arabia.

The contemporary threat of terrorism has changed the ways in which government and the public view the world. Unlike the existential threat from nation states in previous centuries, today, government and the public spend much of their effort looking for the inward threat. Brought about by high profile events such as 9/11, 7/7, and 3/11, and exacerbated by globalisation, hyper-connected social spheres, and the media, the threats from within are reinforced daily. In the UK, government has taken bold steps to foment public safety and public security but has also been criticised by some who argue that government actions have labelled Muslims as the 'suspect other'. This thesis explores the counter-terrorism environment in London at the community/government interface, how the Metropolitan Police Service and London Fire Brigade deliver counter-terrorism policy, and how individuals and groups are reacting. It specifically explores the realities of the lived experience of those who make up London's 'suspect community' and whether or not counter-terrorism policy can be linked to further marginalisation, radicalism, and extremism. By engaging with those that range from London's Metropolitan Police Service's Counterterrorism Command (SO15) to those that make up the radical fringe, an ethnographic portrait is developed. Through that ethnographic portrait the 'ground truth' and complexities of the lived experience are made clear and add significant contrast to the aseptic policy environment.

The Yemeni Salaolic Movance appears to be composed of dábord dúne salafiya literalist, linked to the\ "legacy of Muqbil al Wadi'". In particular, in the early 1980s, this first line of power was affirmed against the developments advocated by the Muslim Brotherhood. Instrumentalised by the harsher regime, it is more and more visibly competing with a reformative or 'politicised' Salafiya through a dynamic similar to that which led the Muslim Brotherhood to sórise on the demands of political and social modernisation. On the other hand, it is more difficult to draw the battle between the battle of Salafiya muqatila or 'jihadist', with the ideological borders of the military crossing being very close to the fortnightly battlefield. ; http://cy.revues.org/document137.html ; The Yemeni Salaolic Movance appears to be composed of dábord dúne salafiya literalist, linked to the\ "legacy of Muqbil al Wadi'". In particular, in the early 1980s, this first line of power was affirmed against the developments advocated by the Muslim Brotherhood. Instrumentalised by the harsher regime, it is more and more visibly competing with a reformative or 'politicised' Salafiya through a dynamic similar to that which led the Muslim Brotherhood to sórise on the demands of political and social modernisation. On the other hand, it is more difficult to draw the battle between the battle of Salafiya muqatila or 'jihadist', with the ideological borders of the military crossing being very close to the fortnightly battlefield. ; International audience ; The Yemeni Salaolic Movance appears to be composed of dábord dúne salafiya literalist, linked to the\ "legacy of Muqbil al Wadi'". In particular, in the early 1980s, this first line of power was affirmed against the developments advocated by the Muslim Brotherhood. Instrumentalised by the harsher regime, it is more and more visibly competing with a reformative or 'politicised' Salafiya through a dynamic similar to that which led the Muslim Brotherhood to sórise on the demands of political and social ...