Suchergebnisse

What happened within and beyond Tunisia in 2010–11 has been told repeatedly from a number of perspectives, each putting a greater or a lesser emphasis on one or several variables ranging from society, politics, economics, to religion or the involvement of external dynamics. An exploration of the causes of the Arab Spring and the factors that shaped its outcome is critical when answering several frequently raised questions, some of which are highlighted here. This article provides a concise picture of the Arab Spring and its consequences for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). It defines the meaning of revolution by examining various explanations and interpretations provided by several theorists and shows which explanation(s) best fits the Tunisian case. Moreover, the study explains how multiple factors, such as social and economic injustice, authoritarian rule, the internet, and social media have played a role in enabling the Tunisian Revolution to happen.

The Mediterranean Sea has recently become the deadliest of borders for
illegalised travellers. The victims of the European Union's liquid border
are also found near North African shores. The question of how and where to bury
these unknown persons has recently come to the fore in Zarzis, a coastal town in
south-east Tunisia. Everyone involved in these burials – the coastguards,
doctors, Red Crescent volunteers, municipality employees – agree that
what they are doing is 'wrong'. It is neither dignified nor
respectful to the dead, as the land used as a cemetery is an old waste dump, and
customary attitudes towards the dead are difficult to realise. This article will
first trace how this situation developed, despite the psychological discomfort
of all those affected. It will then explore how the work of care and dignity
emerges within this institutional chain, and what this may tell us about what
constitutes the concept of the human.

ABSTRACT: In this paper, we have used the Gravity model to evaluate the factors or parameters, which eventually influence international trade activities of South Africa based on panel data. We have utilized data of nineteen countries and European Union (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lituania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden) accounting for the G20 nations and top ten African countries namely Nigeria, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Sudan, Kenya, Angola, Libya, Tunisia between the time period 2007 to 2016 and the data has majorly been collected from International Trade Centre (ITC), and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The estimated results affirm that there is a definite influence of economic size, market size and distance as they are important determining factors for trade flows in South Africa. KEYWORDS: G20 Countries, South Africa, Gravity model, trade potential

The fact that corruption has become one of the most notoriously persistent and progressively worsening social and welfare problems afflicting virtually all economic processes today is indisputable; while critics of corruption have long argued that corruption reflects government failure in providing health development infrastructures. This paper however provided the basis of theoretical interrelationships between corruption and health sector performances in West African countries. The paper also examines various policies measures as employed by other nations as lessons to improve the performances of health sector in these countries. One implication of these results as evidenced from Singapore, Hong Kong and Tunisia, is that attainment of stronger and effective institution and good governance will lower corruptive practices and improve health sector performances in West Africa nations. The paper therefore calls on governments of West African countries to concentrate on strengthening their institutions especially by reducing corruptive practices and promoting accountability, integrity and transparency in health sector.

The Qur'an is one of the main sources which scholar Ṭāhar Ḥaddād (1899-1935), a key to understanding modern-day Tunisia, used to reinforce his feminist theories. It comes as no surprise, considering that he received an Islamic upbringing, studying in the most important mosque-university of his country. Furthermore, he adheres to the Islamic reformism movement, founded by scholars such as Muhammad 'Abduh, whom Ḥaddād considered a true role model. Despite that, he had to face an accusation of heresy thrown against him by the religious leaders of his time, the šuyūj of al-Zaytuna, and most of his rivals, primarily from the political field. This paper will analyze Ḥaddād's use of the sacred text and its links to the feminist discourse, aiming to demonstrate that those clearly Islamic roots do not deter Ḥaddād from creating a feminist and straight discourse, even when compared to other Muslim feminists of his time.

The article analyzes the micro‐sociological dynamics of civil resistance in the uprisings in Bahrain and Tunisia (2010‐11). It argues that the Tunisian uprising succeeded because regime repression generated solidarity and unity among diverse groups in society, while the regime increasingly suffered from miscommunication, mistrust, and increasing disobedience. In Bahrain, the movement initially enjoyed a high degree of unity and solidarity mobilizing against regime atrocities, but as the regime allowed protesters to demonstrate with little interference for a month, internal divisions emerged. Whereas Tunisian protesters launched a united escalation at a time of opponent weakness, factions of Bahraini activists escalated at a time of increasing division in the movement and society as a whole which both provoked and enabled a crackdown by the regime. Conclusively, success or failure of an uprising depends on a movement and a regime's ability to maintain unity respectively, as well as the timing of escalatory actions.

State–society relations in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have been deeply impacted by the dynamics around collective identities in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings and of other domestic and regional far-reaching developments, such as the failed coup attempt in Turkey or the ramifications of the Syrian conflict. It is therefore of utmost importance to discuss the changes (or lack thereof) in the articulation of collective identities, what pressures shape them, and what impact this has on the societal actors and ultimately on their relations with the state institutions and policies. In this regard two trends can be identified whereby pluralization and hybridization in certain countries, for example Morocco and Tunisia, stand in opposition to entrenchment and polarization, as illustrated by the Israeli and the Turkish cases. The result is heightened conflictuality in state–society relations and within societies at large in the MENA with the risk of spillovers at the regional level.

Informal settlements have been positioned in Tunisia after many mechanisms of exclusion of the average and modest populations. This form of housing production relies on the skills of the inhabitants who orchestrate the development of a piece of the city. Although these urbanisations are informal, they are far from chaos, which shows real know-how and knowledge of the populations. Informal settlements are therefore a product of these skills and rehabilitation projects that concern these urban entities. ; L'habitat informel s'est positionné en Tunisie suite à des mécanismes d'exclusion des populations moyennes et modestes. Cette forme de production de logements repose sur des compétences des habitants qui orchestrent l'aménagement d'un morceau de la ville. Bien que ces urbanisations soient informelles, elles sont toutefois loin du chaos ce qui montre un véritable savoir-faire et une connaissance des populations. Les quartiers informels sont dès lors un produit de ces compétences et des projets de réhabilitation qui concernent ces entités urbaines.

Informal settlements have been positioned in Tunisia after many mechanisms of exclusion of the average and modest populations. This form of housing production relies on the skills of the inhabitants who orchestrate the development of a piece of the city. Although these urbanisations are informal, they are far from chaos, which shows real know-how and knowledge of the populations. Informal settlements are therefore a product of these skills and rehabilitation projects that concern these urban entities. ; L'habitat informel s'est positionné en Tunisie suite à des mécanismes d'exclusion des populations moyennes et modestes. Cette forme de production de logements repose sur des compétences des habitants qui orchestrent l'aménagement d'un morceau de la ville. Bien que ces urbanisations soient informelles, elles sont toutefois loin du chaos ce qui montre un véritable savoir-faire et une connaissance des populations. Les quartiers informels sont dès lors un produit de ces compétences et des projets de réhabilitation qui concernent ces entités urbaines.

Why, as a comparativist, did I find it compelling to carry out field research in over 20 countries on five different continents? Because comparative politics should be question-driven, not driven by methodology or existing data. Good questions led to new countries. My book on how Brazilian civilian elites were complicit in coups led to a comparative book on how to transform such civil–military relations in Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay. My colleague Juan J Linz and I broadened the scope of questions of democratic transition theory by adding post-communist countries to the transition set. New questions and relevant new countries continue to emerge. What to do if more than one nation exists in a polity pursuing 'nation-state' policies? I helped create the concept of 'state-nation' and documented how 'multiple but complementary identities' were fostered in India. How did polities that respected the 'twin tolerations' emerge in Muslim-majority Indonesia, Senegal, and Tunisia?

The aim of this study is to analyse the extent to which different productive factors, and the relationships that exist between them, affect the economic growth of productivity in ten Middle Eastern and North African (mena) countries during the period 1990-2010. A translog production function is estimated by using panel data and the contribution of the factors to growth is calculated. The results show a positive effect of the physical and human capital on productivity and high complementarity relationships between them, both factors being essential in determining economic growth. However, the magnitude of their contribution varies substantially between the ten countries considered. Thus, the capitalisation of the economies and the improvement of the human capital seem to be key policy elements of economic growth in these countries. Nevertheless, a considerable part of the economic growth cannot be explained by these factors, particularly in Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia.

Islamic State (IS), previously known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), has shown nothing but destruction, chaos and sectarianism. Through terror strategies, they rapidly spread over great parts of eastern Syria and north and central Iraq. Their new recruits came from all over the world, but mainly from Islamic countries. Arab countries had the biggest share of recruits. While IS was assembling supporters and sympathisers, Sunni Clergymen constantly called for 'material and moral' support to the Syrian rebels, and accordingly, thousands of foreign fighters flooded into Syria for Jihad. According to a Soufan Group research in 2014 on the foreign fighters in Syria, it is estimated that the highest number of foreign fighters came from Tunisia (about 3,000), Saudi Arabia (about 2,500), Morocco (about 1,500), Russia (about 800), France (700), Turkey and the United Kingdom (about 400 each). These numbers exclude the Syrians and Iraqis who are already in IS.

In precolonial Morocco, dominated by a sultanate of religious origin (the Alawite dynasty), political fault lines referred to clans and guilds, in a social and cultural context firmly based on Islam. To defend its borders against both Ottomans and Europeans, Morocco chose a more closed policy than that current in the Middle East, staying at the edge of the progressive and secularizing reforms which were affecting nineteenth century culture and institutions of other Muslim countries such as Turkey, Egypt and Tunisia (Burke 1972). The treaty of Fes of March 30, 1912, which placed the country under a protectorate (Rivet 1996), profoundly changed this situation, plunging Morocco into modern dynamics. Though the process was doubtless gradual, it's possible to establish the moment when pre-colonial political dialectics gave way to new forms which would lead the country towards new expressions and contents, in the events which followed the publication of the Berber dahir on May 16, 1930.

A chamada «Primavera Árabe» surgiu como uma enorme surpresa para a maioria dos observadores e académicos e, apesar dos seus resultados finais ainda serem desconhecidos, o «mundo árabe» não voltará a ser o mesmo. Estas revoltas populares árabes não foram previstas, mas eram realmente imprevisíveis? Seja qual for a resposta, as mudanças que ocorreram na Tunísia, Egito, Líbia, para não falar no Bahrein, Marrocos ou na Síria, mostram claramente que os regimes autoritários não eram - como as democracias ocidentais que os apoiaram fizeram crer - a melhor e única alternativa ao islamismo. Além disso estas revoltas enfatizaram as profundas mudanças sociais que resultaram no surgimento de novos atores, principalmente mulheres e jovens que estiveram na linha da frente. Embora o islamismo tenha dizimado a ideia de uma exceção democrática árabe, a regulação democrática do pluralismo cultural parece ser um dos desafios mais cruciais ao futuro do «mundo árabe».

This paper presents the results for testing for causal relationship between economic growth and goverment spending for OIC countries covering the time series data 1970~2006. There are usually two propositions regarding the relation between economic growth and government spending: Wagner's Law states that as GDP grows, the public sector tends to grow; and the Keynesian framework postulates that public expenditure causes GDP to grow. The primary strength and originality of this paper is that we used aggregate data as well as disaggregate data for Granger causality test. By testing for causality between economic growth and government spending, we find that government spending does cause economic growth in Iran, Nigeria and Tunisia, which are compatible with Keynesian's theory. However, the economic growth does cause the increase in goverment spending in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Benin, Indonesia, Libya Malaysia, Marocco, and Saudi, which are well-suited with Wagner's law.