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The purpose of this article is to test if institutional approaches and legitimation-oriented explanations in comparative authoritarianism research can account for the differences in redistribution of income in autocracies. In order to address this question, the study analyses data on income redistribution for 122 autocracies worldwide between 1960 and 2010. The existing literature suggests that authoritarian institutions and strategies of regime legitimation affect policy outputs in autocracies. This article develops an informal model that explains income redistribution as the outcome of bargaining between the dictator, political elites and the masses over the level of income taxation and social welfare expenditures. The findings of our statistical analysis suggest that there are substantial differences between income redistribution between different types of authoritarian regimes and their strategies of regime legitimation: Communist regimes exhibit the highest average income redistribution while monarchies have the lowest redistribution rate. However, legitimation strategies of different types of autocracy cannot account for the differences in social welfare expenditures in authoritarian regimes. In contrast, authoritarian political institutions explain different levels of social welfare expenditure in autocracies, but cannot account for the differences in income redistribution. Overall, institutional and legitimation-centred approaches contribute to a better understanding of differences in income redistribution between autocracies, but their explanatory power is limited. Therefore, the article concludes with some considerations concerning avenues for future research.

This book investigates the close connections between engineering and war, broadly understood, and the conceptual and structural barriers that face those who would seek to loosen those connections. It shows how military institutions and interests have long influenced engineering education, research, and practice and how they continue to shape the field in the present. The book also provides a generalized framework for responding to these influences useful to students and scholars of engineering, as well as reflective practitioners. The analysis draws on philosophy, history, critical theory, and technology studies to understand the connections between engineering and war and how they shape our very understandings of what engineering is and what it might be. After providing a review of diverse dimensions of engineering itself, the analysis shifts to different dimensions of the connections between engineering and war. First, it considers the ethics of war generally and then explores questions of integrity for engineering practitioners facing career decisions relating to war. Next, it considers the historical rise of the military-industrial-academic complex, especially from World War II to the present. Finally, it considers a range of responses to the militarization of engineering from those who seek to unsettle the status quo. Only by confronting the ethical, historical, and political consequences of engineering for warfare, this book argues, can engineering be sensibly reimagined

AbstractGrievances that derive from the unequal treatment of ethnic groups are a key motivation for civil war. Ethnic power sharing should therefore reduce the risk of internal conflict. Yet conflict researchers disagree on whether formal power‐sharing institutions effectively prevent large‐scale violence. We can improve our understanding of the effect of power‐sharing institutions by analyzing the mechanisms under which they operate. To this effect, we compare the direct effect of formal power‐sharing institutions on peace with their indirect effect through power‐sharing behavior. Combining data on inclusive and territorially dispersive institutions with information on power‐sharing behavior, we empirically assess this relationship on a global scale. Our causal mediation analysis reveals that formal power‐sharing institutions affect the probability of ethnic conflict onset mostly through power‐sharing behavior that these institutions induce.

The paper explores the linkages among political risk, institutions, and foreign direct investment inflows. For a data sample of 83 developing countries covering 1984 to 2003, we identify indicators that matter most for the activities of multinational corporations. The results show that government stability, internal and external conflict, corruption and ethnic tensions, law and order, democratic accountability of government, and quality of bureaucracy are highly significant determinants of foreign investment inflows. [Copyright 2006 Elsevier B.V.]

Religious institutions are kind integral areas, in which spatial complex is subordinated to social complexes. Intellectuals as order of society owns big influence as idea on forming integral area relatively and as realities. Total institutions are invariable kind of integral area from many year. Sacral area is not enclave from social conditionality excluded entirely, can be treated independently on social context. Modern sacral buildings refer to trends of modern architecture frequently more, separateness of sacral area in smallest degree underlining, on symbolic pronunciation more putting.

Cyber security is considered as business issue more than a technical issue. The term widely used in Bangladesh since last decade. Dealing with information made our life resourceful, and risky at the same time. Cyber security and private institutions keep a silent but significant relation around Bangladesh. Corporate offices, public and private organizations have dealing with private cyber institutions to develop, design and monitor the respective websites. This paper has conducted study on those private institutions of Dhanmondi and Banani Thana administrative areas. The study found the diversity of working area of private institutions and limited resources to continue the activity. International collaboration and support from government can increase the strength of private cyber institutions and consider their performance as the potential resource for the cyber world.

A surprisingly large proportion of the world's dictators today hold elections, so much so that scholars have coined the term ``electoral authoritarianism" to identify this oxymoronic phenomenon. Yet, the role these elections play in shaping authoritarian politics for the regime and its citizenry alike is undertheorized. Do the specific types of institutions that govern elections under authoritarianism matter? In democracies we see sustained relationships between voters and their elected representatives. Do elections shape enduring citizen-state linkages under authoritarianism or are they simply isolated events of state-society interaction? Moreover, how do electoral institutions under authoritarianism interact with salient ethnic cleavages and local political landscapes? I argue that the way in which electoral institutions are structured have meaningful consequences for citizens living under authoritarianism much as they do for those living in democracies – a fact that is almost completely overlooked in the literature. Taking electoral institutions under authoritarianism seriously, this research analyzes the effects of variations in electoral rules on voter behavior, parliamentarian clientelistic service provision, and ethnically-based citizen-state linkages. Drawing upon data I collected from over two years of fieldwork in Jordan, I investigate how the Jordanian regime overcomes a classic conundrum for dictators who hold elections: how to cultivate widespread loyalty to the regime while maintaining deep-seated divisions among the elite and the masses alike to avoid threats to their power from unmitigated collective action. I claim that elections help the ruler solve both sides of this quandary. I leverage shifts in the electoral institutional design throughout history to investigate how different types of electoral institutions are structured to ensure that parliamentarians win their seats with narrow voter coalitions rather than broad-based ones, encouraging parliamentarians to win their seats based on clientelistic rather than programmatic appeals. I explain how the use of a single, non-transferable vote system favors political mobilization on ethnic lines when compared to the use of a single-member plurality system in Jordan. The dataset I draw from comprises of the full election results from 1989 to 2013, parliamentarian constituent casework logs, tribal indices I constructed for each electoral district, more than a hundred qualitative interviews with stakeholders in the elections, as well as a national poll of eligible voters in Jordan.My empirical evidence demonstrates how elections serve as a reliable mechanism of rent distribution in authoritarian settings, facilitating the purchase of loyalty from tribal sectors of the population who have historically been open to trading support for privileged access to state benefits. Under these conditions, parliamentarians spend all of their time catering to the personal concerns of their constituents rather than pursuing national legislation and they become beholden to the regime for fulfilling their requests. In the final chapter, I show how the rules governing the elections can either enhance or diminish ethnic identity as the basis for political mobilization and distribution of government goods and services long after the elections. These findings are evidence that for citizens living in a dictatorship electoral institutional design plays an important role in their ability to access state goods and services through their member of parliament.

Thema der Publikation, die überarbeitete Fassung einer 1994 an der Verwaltungshochschule von Rabat verteidigten Dissertation, ist eine Analyse der Zusammenhänge zwischen den politischen Institutionen und dem Zerfall der Komoren, der "Parodie eines Staates", der bereits "tot geboren" gewesen sei, als er 1975 seine Unabhängigkeit von Frankreich erlangte. Ein anachronistischer Zentralismus, Korruption, Nepotismus und Inkompetenz von Behörden und visionslosen Politikern machen nach Meinung des Autors die Hoffnung auf rationale Staatsführung zum Wohle der Bürger in näherer Zukunft zunichte. (DÜI-Cls)

This article presents three approaches to estimate the size of the publicly funded institutional marketplace to determine what opportunities exist for local farmers and fishers. First, we found that estimates from national foodservice sales statistics over-estimate local capacity opportunities. Second, analyzing budgets of publicly funded institutions for foodservice expenditures proved more difficult than anticipated. Third, a consumption production model from data provided by the institutions and comparing it to production statistics enabled us to estimate local capacity in publicly funded institutions for specific commodities. The consumption production model provided the most useful estimates for Extension and government decision makers.