Suchergebnisse

 Troll is a fairly entertaining movie (but that is not what this post is about)To repeat something I have said before, if,  as it has often been claimed, philosophy begins with Socrates then it also begins with its particular antagonism, its particular anti-philosophy in the sophist and sophistry. It seems to me that if one wanted to read the history of philosophy in this way, with a founding event and founding antagonism, then one might want to consider who is our anti-philosopher today, who is the contemporary equivalent of the sophist? The answer would seem to have to be the troll. This is my preamble to what is now becoming an ongoing discussion of Florida's vanguard fight against knowledge and reason; or more to the point, destruction of knowledge and truth in order to preserve whiteness.  As it was revealed recently, the new curriculum of black history in Florida teaches middle schoolers that "slaves developed skills which, in some instances, could be applied for their personal benefit." There is so much to unpack about this claim, as they say in grad school. First, there is the assumption that the people captured from Africa had no skills, no knowledge, no history, nothing but their bodies and skin. Such a claim not only follows from the mythology of a Dark Continent, outside of civilization and history, it confuses an effect from a cause. The people who became slaves were stripped of their knowledge, culture, and social relations. What Orlando Patterson calls a social death was also the reduction of a person to pure labor power, to a capacity to work and nothing else, an animate tool, as Aristotle put it. Second, as the architects of this change doubled down on this claim, since that is what trolls do, providing a list of individuals who gained "valuable job skills" during their "unpaid internship" on a plantation, they provided a list of mostly false claims, listing individuals who were never enslaved, or, in the case of Booker T. Washington, learned literacy and other skills after their emancipation. This "feel good" story about slavery is, like so many feel good stories about history, just not true. Of course there might be a case, or even a few, of people who learned a valuable skill during slavery--it could have happened. That does not defend the claim, or, more importantly does not defend its inclusion in a curriculum. It is, I would argue, an example of exception trolling, in which an isolated case or incident is used to obscure or confuse a general or structural tendency. Focusing on these isolated or unique cases, which often appeal to an anecdotal way of thinking that is predominant in our culture, is used to obscure what is generally the case. I would argue that part of gaining knowledge, part of thinking, is understanding the difference between an exception and a rule. Once, when I was in sixth grade, I think, I had the job of feeding the school's snake, a python or boa constrictor. I dropped the live rat in the tank with the snake, watched the snake coil and strike, and saw the rat bite the snake in the eye, blood spurting everywhere, eventually killing it. (This is probably why feeding live animals to snakes is no longer recommended. Not only is it cruel; It is also potential risky). This happened, I saw it with my own eyes, but I would still say that snakes kill and eat rats, and not the other way around. Exceptions exist as do rules, and the former does not negate the latter. Exception trolling is a persistent strategy of trolling, in which exceptions are made to obscure or conceal rules.I should say, as something of an aside, that this exception trolling has one of its conditions the transformation of all knowledge into discrete bits of information, facts, that can be found, cited and circulated independent of context, conditions, and larger implications. Joseph Vogl's book Capitalism and Ressentiment does an interesting job of charting the history of the current regime of contextless and thoughtless information, but that is for another time. (I just finished a review of that book.) In this reduction of all knowledge to isolated facts and bits of information any discussion of meaning or significance of this or that fact, its place within history or a system of values is impossible. As the clip below makes clear, anyone arguing against the claim that slaves learned skills is either an idiot or lying. Meaning, significance, and importance disappear in the absolute binary of facts. One exception is all that it takes to disprove any claim about systemic discrimination, exploitation, or marginalization. This is why the exception troll has a well stocked set of links and tabs of these exceptions, "reverse racism," false claims of sexual harassment,  happy slaves, etc., It is not facts and logic, as is often claimed, but the logic of the (singular and isolated) fact. This raises the question, what goal does this trolling serve? I think that trolling has to be understood as not just a failure to think, to distinguish exceptions from rules, but as itself the articulation of its own logic. In other words, trolling must be read symptomatically. It is necessary to see what is being said in what is not being said, or what is not being said by being said. In some sense these remarks about the virtues of slavery, and, if you watch the clip above, the holocaust could be understood as the culmination of "negative solidarity." Even the slave, the denizen of the concentration camp, cannot complain, they are gaining valuable job training, they just have to make themselves useful and everything will turn out fine. There is nothing to criticize, nothing to complain about. (I see culmination because I cannot imagine something worse than someone saying "slavery was not that bad, they were gaining job skills," but what I can imagine and what monstrosities history can produce are two different things). As such it also can be considered the culmination of "right workerism." Work is the ultimate meaning and justification of existence, those who do not work not only do not eat, but do not have a right to exist. The arguments about slavery and the holocaust are not just horrible distortions of a horrible past, they are alibis for a darker future. One in which the worst possible jobs, or unpaid internships, are seen as building valuable skills, or, if there are no skills involved, developing a solid work ethic. Anyone who praises slavery is preparing for you to become a slave. 

The instrumental use of Muslim women's experiences as a symbol and justification for Western countries interventions is not a new business and was not employed for the first time in the post September 11th "war on terror" campaigns. Indeed, the production of stereotypes of Muslim women in political platforms can be tracked back to different colonial enterprises. Clearly, as Lughod (2002) has highlighted, the consistent resort to a cultural framing through the equation women/religion/suffering has always been a tool to hide political and economic interests and consequently to bury more complex political and historical developments. In the academic sphere, debates on Muslim women also widened. However, as Lila Abu-Lughod (2002) contended, the efforts were almost put solely on denouncing the great violent and oppressive contexts where those women were living under the barbaric violations perpetrated to them by Islamist movements. Otherwise, if a scholar tried to problematize the cultural framing of Muslim women's questions, she (or he) would very likely be accused of cultural relativism (Lughod, 2002).
Therefore, a sole and unproblematic focus on the suffering of Muslim women is not only futile, but also contributes to reify the old Orientalist perceptions on Islam and Muslim women, and to provide intellectual foundations for Western imperialist wars. The objective of this article, on the contrary, is to raise another set of questions, which I believe to be more urgent. These questions aim at both unpacking Muslim women as a discursive category, and understanding the major challenges their experiences impose on secular feminist conceptions of agency. I contend that addressing these questions is more urgent for different reasons. Firstly, I argue vigorously that apart from the obsessive and somehow blind criticism that religion is inherently patriarchal and consequently oppressive to women, scholarship especially from within feminist theory remained oblivious to a more systematic and self-reflexive engagement with religion and Muslim women. In addition, I argue that surprisingly, even in a period of post-Orientalist deconstruction, which supposedly would have already dismissed those essentialist and repressive accounts of Muslim women and Islam, subtle but very important remnants can still be found on the so called "corrective" postcolonial feminist scholarship on Muslim women.
Indeed, there is a plurality of work on Muslim women in the social sciences. However, they are scattered and apparently separated by their own agendas and claims, with very few attempts at dialogue or debate. Hence, a systematic account of this diversity has been missing, one which could provide an up to date appraisal of the state of scholarship and activism on Muslim women, and build a firm foundation for advancing knowledge both of the subject itself and on interdisciplinary efforts like the one I advance here. Therefore, while doing a systematic and critical literature review, oriented specifically by an interdisciplinary approach, I expect this article to fill part of this gap and raise crucial questions in order to build knowledge of the intersection between Muslim women's studies and feminist theory. It is here where more research is certainly needed in order to reduce the gulf that exists between both areas.
The introduction of this article outlines briefly the ways through which Muslim women have been approached as a discursive category, constructing stereotypes of Muslim women in political platforms, as well as on the academic stage. Politically, the production of stereotypes can be tracked back to different colonial enterprises and more recently to the interventions by Western countries that comprised the "war on terror" campaign. On the academic stage, these stereotypes were reproduced in the sole efforts to denounce the great violent and oppressive contexts where those women are living, as previously mentioned.
The first section is concerned with the exclusion of religion and more specifically of Muslim women's experiences from history and feminist knowledge production, including IR feminist studies. I acknowledge that the ontological and epistemological openness in feminist and gender studies in international relations and other areas ensured the recognition of the existence of differences and of multiple "layers" of identities which affect sexed bodies in distinct ways. These were crucial to challenge Eurocentric narratives as the only legitimate source of knowledge production. However, I put forward in this section that despite a greater plurality in feminist studies, there is still a silence from feminist theorists regarding religious women's experiences, and hence, the importance of religion to women (Salem, 2013). Using the work of Phyllis Mack (2003) I argue that one of the reasons for this gap resides in the metanarrative of secularization, which is the basis of secular feminist scholarship. Within this analytical framework, I analyse how the conceptions of agency and emancipation underlying the different strands of secular feminism are limiting to the different voices and experiences of Muslim women.
The second section addresses the challenges Islamic feminism imposes to feminist notions of agency. As religion is seen as inherently patriarchal and oppressive to women, Islamic feminism or any other effort to pursue gender equality from within an Islamic framework would be taken as contradictory or incompatible. By locating the struggle within a religious framework, and at the same time claiming for the existence of what seems to be the untouchable foundations of Islam, Islamic feminists are cast away from secular feminisms. I argue that those experiences of activists and scholars make serious challenges to the notions of agency based on rationality and secularity as the only pillars whereby women can struggle for and reach gender equality. As a result, Islamic feminism(s)'s experiences also help to unsettle and complicate some binaries which feminist theory has been contributing to reify, such as secular/spiritual; reason/obscurantism; science/religion; freedom/oppression; modern/backward.
In the third section, the article discusses some of the piety women's movements anchored on Saba Mahmood's work on pietistic agency, firstly in order to highlight the inability of most feminist scholarship in capturing the diversity of Muslim women's voices; second to denounce the perilous nature of encapsulating women's agency solely within "the entelechy of liberatory politics". These movements advance very different agendas and orientations from the Islamic feminist ones. Those agendas are precisely what denounce the subtle but very important remnants of Orientalist assumptions, particularly its adherence to secular-liberal values, and the teleological conceptions of modernity (Lakhani, 2008).
I conclude the article arguing that rather than neglecting the important achievements feminism promoted in the lives of women in different parts of the world, the main intention of this work was to provincialize (to borrow the expression from Chakrabarty) the secular and liberal accounts of agency, feminism, empowerment, freedom and so on, locating them in the historical, political and cultural context that produced the desires that animate them.

Le mouvement de défense des droits qui a émergé en URSS dans les années 1960, a contribué à la mise en pratique des droits internationaux inscrits dans des traités. Il a légué une éthique de non-violence, de soutien aux victimes de l'arbitraire, d'action dans les cadres du droit, d'appels au respect de la Constitution russe et de recours aux traités internationaux relatifs aux droits de l'homme et aux institutions transnationales chargées de les garantir. Dans la Russie post-soviétique, cette mémoire de la défense des droits s'actualise et se régénère à travers l'engagement de jeunes défenseurs des droits dans un contexte de forte répression des voix dissidentes et critiques du pouvoir depuis le tournant autoritaire de 2012. Cette thèse aborde l'évolution du mouvement de défense des droits de l'homme et du milieu associatif dans la Russie des années 2010, et celle de la catégorisation des étrangers. Elle s'inscrit dans le questionnement anthropologique sur la concrétisation et la mise en pratique des droits de l'homme. Pour ce faire, elle arrime les combats des défenseurs des droits à l'ethnographie, effectuée entre 2012 et 2016, d'une association russe d'aide aux migrants et aux réfugiés située à Moscou : le Comité « Assistance civique » (CAC). Dans une perspective historique et anthropologique, l'aide octroyée par le CAC est étudiée en suivant, depuis l'éclatement de l'URSS, les vagues d'exilés qui arrivent à Moscou ou les personnes qui deviennent des étrangers, soit parce qu'elles n'arrivent pas à se légaliser, soit parce qu'elles ne peuvent pas accéder à la pleine citoyenneté en raison de la xénophobie, ou d'obstacles bureaucratiques et législatifs. L'objectif est d'analyser, d'un côté, qui est étranger en Russie et comment ces étrangers sont traités par les instances étatiques et, d'un autre côté, de mettre en relief les solidarités qui s'expriment au sein du CAC en lien avec l'accueil des étrangers et les limites de cette aide. Dans les années 1990, le CAC vient en aide essentiellement aux réfugiés de l'ex-URSS, puis aux déplacés intérieurs de la Tchétchénie. À partir de 1998, il devient le principal partenaire du Haut Commissariat aux réfugiés en Russie. Il s'inscrit alors dans un réseau d'aide humanitaire transnationale aux normes juridiques définies et accueille des réfugiés de pays plus éloignés. Outre les arrivées successives des citoyens ex-soviétiques, des Afghans, des Syriens et des Ukrainiens, cette thèse se penche plus spécifiquement sur la « vie sociale des droits » (Goodale 2009) des migrants et des réfugiés de différents pays d'Afrique qui se retrouvent à Moscou dans une situation particulièrement vulnérable et étudie la violence institutionnelle et populaire dont ils peuvent être victimes, ainsi que les violations de leurs droits La réalisation des droits des migrants et des réfugiés est entravée par le contexte de répression des associations et des défenseurs des droits, par un discours étatique qui fait primer la sécurité de l'État sur les droits individuels et en opposition aux valeurs occidentales (dont les droits de l'homme), par la primauté du critère ethnique sur la promotion d'une citoyenneté individuelle, par une approche policière des migrations et par la réduction des migrants et des réfugiés à des travailleurs temporaires. Les membres du CAC se battent pour l'application du droit d'asile et la réalisation des droits civiques et socioéconomiques. Pour ce faire, ils ont recours au discours des droits et aux instances internationales et transnationales qui les soutiennent. Toutefois, afin d'offrir une aide plus efficace et humaine, ils combinent à leur approche juridique dominante, des solidarités plus pragmatiques, un engagement personnel fort et une aide humanitaire et caritative. ; The human rights movement that emerged in the USSR in the 1960s has contributed to the implementation of international rights written in treaties. It has transmitted an ethic of non-violence, support for the victims of arbitrariness, action within the framework of law, calls for the respect of the Russian Constitution, and recourse to international treaties on human rights and transnational institutions responsible for guaranteeing them. In post-Soviet Russia, this memory of the defense of rights is being updated and regenerated through the engagement of young human rights defenders in a context of strong repression of dissenting voices and critics of power since the authoritarian turn of 2012. This thesis examines the development of the human rights movement and associations in Russia in the 2010s, and the evolution of foreigners' categorizations. It participates to the anthropological questioning of the realization of human rights. To do this, it links the struggles of human rights defenders to the ethnography, carried out between 2012 and 2016, of a Russian association helping migrants and refugees and located in Moscow: the "Civic Assistance" Committee (CAC). From a historical and anthropological perspective, the help given by the CAC is studied by following, since the breakup of the USSR, the waves of refugees who arrive in Moscow or the people becoming foreigners, either because they fail to legalize, either because they cannot have access to full citizenship due to xenophobia, or bureaucratic and legislative obstacles. The objective is to analyze, on the one hand, who is a foreigner in Russia and how these foreigners are treated by state authorities and, on the other hand, to highlight the solidarities that are expressed within the CAC in connection with the reception of foreigners and the limits of this assistance. In the 1990s, the CAC provided aid primarily to refugees from the former USSR, then to internally displaced persons from Chechnya. In 1998, it became the main partner of the High Commissioner for Refugees in Russia. Therefore, it was further involved in a transnational humanitarian aid network with defined legal standards, and welcomed refugees from more distant countries. In addition to the successive arrivals of ex-Soviet citizens, Afghans, Syrians and Ukrainians, this thesis examines more specifically the "social life of rights" (Goodale 2009) of migrants and refugees from different African countries, who are in a particularly vulnerable situation in Moscow, and studies the institutional and popular violence they may suffer, as well as the violations of their rights The realization of the rights of migrants and refugees is hampered by the context of repression of associations and activists, by a state discourse that prioritizes security over individual rights and in opposition to Western values (including human rights), by the primacy of the ethnic criterion over the promotion of individual citizenship, by a police approach to migration, and by the reduction of migrants and refugees to temporary workers. Activists at the CAC fight for the application of the right of asylum and the realization of civil and socioeconomic rights. To do this, they rely on the discourse of rights and the international and transnational bodies that support them. However, in order to offer an aid that is more effective and humane, they combine their dominant legal approach with more pragmatic solidarity, strong personal commitment and humanitarian and charitable aid.

In the course of the research carried out by the authors of the article, it was determined that Belarus has recently been intensively acquiring new stable signs of not only a totalitarian state, but also an authoritarian one. In a state with such a political regime, undesirable values and target orientations are suppressed by political methods by one person in power. The recent metamorphoses of the components of the political system in the Republic of Belarus and their possible consequences are explained by the authors as follows. From a formal point of view, Belarus is a presidential-parliamentary republic. However, an analysis of the degree of influence of different branches of power on political life in the Republic indicates a different situation. In particular, today an unlimited super-presidential system of government is actually operating in this country, which is the basis for the assertion of the sole power of President A. Lukashenko. So, having come to power as a classic, essentially populist politician, A. Lukashenko, at the present time, largely relying on the state-police apparatus, widely uses repressions against his political opponents. The authors of the article summarize that, taking into account the current political situation in Belarus, the modern political regime in this country can be confidently characterized as authoritarian-populist. This is confirmed by the latest events both on the territory of the Republic and abroad. At the same time, the nature of the events taking place indicates their direct connection with the activities of the Belarusian special services. Namely, the direct influence of the State Security Committee of the Republic of Belarus (KGB RB) on all spheres of activity in the country and the attempts of this special service to control the activities of the Belarusian opposition abroad are traced. The studies carried out by the authors showed that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in comparison with other special services of the post-Soviet space, the KGB of the Republic of Belarus avoided radical democratic changes and remained in the form of a small copy of the KGB of the USSR. A feature of this special service and other law enforcement agencies is that today their leaders are appointed directly by the President of the Republic. It is also necessary to take into account the fact that most of these leaders at one time received military education in the Russian Federation. At the same time, based on the assessment of domestic and Western political scientists of the current political situation in Russia, the authors of the article came to the conclusion that its state is also constantly undergoing destructive changes. Thus, the fact that the leadership of the Russian Federation has recently been sharply raising the question of the need to expand the spheres of influence of the Federal Security Service (FSS) outside the country is alarming. Consequently, the Kremlin's desire to control the political situation in its neighbors, including in Belarus, is constantly increasing. According to the authors of the article, at the moment, by all external signs, the integration of the armed forces of the Republic of Belarus into the so-called Belarusian-Russian grouping has already taken place. At the same time, cooperation between the KGB RB and the FSS received interstate legislative support and covered almost all spheres of political life in the Republic. Thus, representatives of the FSS of the Russian Federation are officially present in all state bodies of the Republic of Belarus. Thus, given the nature of cooperation between the law enforcement agencies of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation, as well as the hybrid war of Russia against Ukraine, the authors argue reasonably that Belarus poses a certain military threat to our country. An assessment of the current political situation in the Republic of Belarus and its similarity with the Russian Federation, as well as a deep analysis of the peculiarities of the activities of the special services of this country, made it possible for the authors of the article to develop some practical recommendations in the interests of subjects of competitive intelligence. According to the authors, the recommendations presented suggest that the subjects of competitive intelligence should adhere to certain security measures in the course of their professional activities in the territory of the Republic of Belarus in the context of an aggravated political situation in this country (subject to the influence of the FSB of the Russian Federation on the activities of the KGB of the Republic of Belarus). The authors assume that the proposed recommendations will increase the efficiency of the performance of important government tasks by the subjects of competitive intelligence. ; У ході проведеного дослідження авторами статті доведено, що сучасний політичний режим в Республіці Білорусь можна впевнено визначити як авторитарно-популістський. Це підтверджують останні події, які відбуваються як на території Республіки, так і за її межами. Характер цих подій опосередковано вказує на їх прямий зв'язок з діяльністю білоруських спецслужб. Зокрема простежується вплив Комітету державної безпеки Республіки Білорусь (КДБ РБ) на сфери політичного життя в країні. Зафіксовано неодноразові випадки, коли КДБ РБ намагається впливати на білоруську опозицію за кордоном. Дослідження показали, що КДБ РБ після розпаду Радянського Союзу на відміну від інших спецслужб на пострадянському просторі уникнув суттєвих демократичних змін, зокрема залишився, так би мовити, маленькою копією КДБ СРСР. Особливістю КДБ РБ та інших силових відомств є те, що їх керівники призначаються безпосередньо Президентом Білорусі, при цьому більшість з них отримали військову освіту в Російській федерації (РФ). За порівнянням політичного режиму в Білорусі із ситуацією в РФ авторами визначено, що Кремль в сучасних умовах поставив питання щодо необхідності розширити сфери впливу Федеральної служби безпеки (ФСБ) за межі країни. Про це свідчить постійно зростаюче з боку керівництва РФ бажання контролювати політичну ситуацію у «сусідів», зокрема в Білорусі. За основними зовнішніми ознаками на сьогоденні вже відбулася інтеграція збройних сил РБ в так зване білорусько-російське військове угруповання. Порядок співпраці КДБ РБ з ФСБ РФ закріплено чинним законодавством цих країн. Під контролем вказаних спецслужб опинилися всі державні структури, політичні та громадські організації в Республіці. Зокрема представники ФСБ РФ мають право у службових справах офіційно перебувати в усіх державних органах Білорусі. Отже, з огляду на продовження гібридної війни РФ проти України, а також враховуючи характер співпраці між силовими структурами цих країн, можна з впевненістю стверджувати, що сучасний політичний режим в Білорусі становить певну загрозу національній безпеці України та її складовим. Оцінка сучасної політичної обстановки в РБ у порівнянні з РФ, а також глибинний аналіз особливостей діяльності спеціальних служб цих країн, надали можливість авторам статті розробити рекомендації щодо забезпечення безпеки діяльності суб'єктів конкурентної розвідки з огляду на характер співробітництва між ФСБ РФ та КДБ РБ. Очікується, що ці рекомендації сприятимуть суб'єктам конкурентної розвідки якісно та ефективно виконувати важливі державні завдання.

In the course of the research carried out by the authors of the article, it was determined that Belarus has recently been intensively acquiring new stable signs of not only a totalitarian state, but also an authoritarian one. In a state with such a political regime, undesirable values and target orientations are suppressed by political methods by one person in power. The recent metamorphoses of the components of the political system in the Republic of Belarus and their possible consequences are explained by the authors as follows. From a formal point of view, Belarus is a presidential-parliamentary republic. However, an analysis of the degree of influence of different branches of power on political life in the Republic indicates a different situation. In particular, today an unlimited super-presidential system of government is actually operating in this country, which is the basis for the assertion of the sole power of President A. Lukashenko. So, having come to power as a classic, essentially populist politician, A. Lukashenko, at the present time, largely relying on the state-police apparatus, widely uses repressions against his political opponents. The authors of the article summarize that, taking into account the current political situation in Belarus, the modern political regime in this country can be confidently characterized as authoritarian-populist. This is confirmed by the latest events both on the territory of the Republic and abroad. At the same time, the nature of the events taking place indicates their direct connection with the activities of the Belarusian special services. Namely, the direct influence of the State Security Committee of the Republic of Belarus (KGB RB) on all spheres of activity in the country and the attempts of this special service to control the activities of the Belarusian opposition abroad are traced. The studies carried out by the authors showed that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in comparison with other special services of the post-Soviet space, the KGB of the Republic of Belarus avoided radical democratic changes and remained in the form of a small copy of the KGB of the USSR. A feature of this special service and other law enforcement agencies is that today their leaders are appointed directly by the President of the Republic. It is also necessary to take into account the fact that most of these leaders at one time received military education in the Russian Federation. At the same time, based on the assessment of domestic and Western political scientists of the current political situation in Russia, the authors of the article came to the conclusion that its state is also constantly undergoing destructive changes. Thus, the fact that the leadership of the Russian Federation has recently been sharply raising the question of the need to expand the spheres of influence of the Federal Security Service (FSS) outside the country is alarming. Consequently, the Kremlin's desire to control the political situation in its neighbors, including in Belarus, is constantly increasing. According to the authors of the article, at the moment, by all external signs, the integration of the armed forces of the Republic of Belarus into the so-called Belarusian-Russian grouping has already taken place. At the same time, cooperation between the KGB RB and the FSS received interstate legislative support and covered almost all spheres of political life in the Republic. Thus, representatives of the FSS of the Russian Federation are officially present in all state bodies of the Republic of Belarus. Thus, given the nature of cooperation between the law enforcement agencies of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation, as well as the hybrid war of Russia against Ukraine, the authors argue reasonably that Belarus poses a certain military threat to our country. An assessment of the current political situation in the Republic of Belarus and its similarity with the Russian Federation, as well as a deep analysis of the peculiarities of the activities of the special services of this country, made it possible for the authors of the article to develop some practical recommendations in the interests of subjects of competitive intelligence. According to the authors, the recommendations presented suggest that the subjects of competitive intelligence should adhere to certain security measures in the course of their professional activities in the territory of the Republic of Belarus in the context of an aggravated political situation in this country (subject to the influence of the FSB of the Russian Federation on the activities of the KGB of the Republic of Belarus). The authors assume that the proposed recommendations will increase the efficiency of the performance of important government tasks by the subjects of competitive intelligence. ; У ході проведеного дослідження авторами статті доведено, що сучасний політичний режим в Республіці Білорусь можна впевнено визначити як авторитарно-популістський. Це підтверджують останні події, які відбуваються як на території Республіки, так і за її межами. Характер цих подій опосередковано вказує на їх прямий зв'язок з діяльністю білоруських спецслужб. Зокрема простежується вплив Комітету державної безпеки Республіки Білорусь (КДБ РБ) на сфери політичного життя в країні. Зафіксовано неодноразові випадки, коли КДБ РБ намагається впливати на білоруську опозицію за кордоном. Дослідження показали, що КДБ РБ після розпаду Радянського Союзу на відміну від інших спецслужб на пострадянському просторі уникнув суттєвих демократичних змін, зокрема залишився, так би мовити, маленькою копією КДБ СРСР. Особливістю КДБ РБ та інших силових відомств є те, що їх керівники призначаються безпосередньо Президентом Білорусі, при цьому більшість з них отримали військову освіту в Російській федерації (РФ). За порівнянням політичного режиму в Білорусі із ситуацією в РФ авторами визначено, що Кремль в сучасних умовах поставив питання щодо необхідності розширити сфери впливу Федеральної служби безпеки (ФСБ) за межі країни. Про це свідчить постійно зростаюче з боку керівництва РФ бажання контролювати політичну ситуацію у «сусідів», зокрема в Білорусі. За основними зовнішніми ознаками на сьогоденні вже відбулася інтеграція збройних сил РБ в так зване білорусько-російське військове угруповання. Порядок співпраці КДБ РБ з ФСБ РФ закріплено чинним законодавством цих країн. Під контролем вказаних спецслужб опинилися всі державні структури, політичні та громадські організації в Республіці. Зокрема представники ФСБ РФ мають право у службових справах офіційно перебувати в усіх державних органах Білорусі. Отже, з огляду на продовження гібридної війни РФ проти України, а також враховуючи характер співпраці між силовими структурами цих країн, можна з впевненістю стверджувати, що сучасний політичний режим в Білорусі становить певну загрозу національній безпеці України та її складовим. Оцінка сучасної політичної обстановки в РБ у порівнянні з РФ, а також глибинний аналіз особливостей діяльності спеціальних служб цих країн, надали можливість авторам статті розробити рекомендації щодо забезпечення безпеки діяльності суб'єктів конкурентної розвідки з огляду на характер співробітництва між ФСБ РФ та КДБ РБ. Очікується, що ці рекомендації сприятимуть суб'єктам конкурентної розвідки якісно та ефективно виконувати важливі державні завдання.

Maritime shipping is considered as the most eco-friendly and fuel-efficient method of transport in ton-miles terms and moves about 90% of the worldwide trade (UNCTAD, 2020) [1]. The third GHG study (IMO, 2014) [2] estimates that shipping accounts for approximately 2.2% of the global anthropogenic CO2 emissions, addressing a 0.5% decrease from the second GHG study measures (IMO, 2009) [3]. However, the sector has seen increasing pressure, through new guidelines to improve its environmental performance, especially considering its commitment to harmful contamination emissions on human wellbeing. Sea transport represents 5–8% of the worldwide SOx emissions (Eyring et al., 2005) [4], and around 15% for NOx (Corbett et al., 2007) [5], while PM emissions from transportation close to coastlines and ports have been connected to fatalities attributed to respiratory health issues. The IMO is regulating the greatest sulfur limits in fuel through the changed MARPOL Annex VI, which additionally assigned sulfur emission control areas (SECA) where more tight limits apply. Current SECAs incorporate the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, the North American Emission control area (ECA) that broadens 200NM from the US and Canadian coasts, and the US Caribbean ECA. The last two ECAs have likewise set limitations on PM and NOx emissions. The first results of the SECAs on emissions limitation show critical enhancements. In relevant literature, there has been no recent update on the portion of sea transport in SOx emissions, and the most recent solid estimate is in the previously mentioned investigation of Eyring et al., back in 2005. On a later publication, Zis and Psaraftis (2018) [6] utilized information from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on its part nations and assessed those SOx emissions from all transportation modes represented 3.5% in 2015. Taking into account that road transport represented 0.48%, the portion of maritime transportation in SOx emissions has been radically diminished since 2005. Notwithstanding the introduction of SECAs, as of January 2010 the European Union (EU) set a sulphur limit of 0.1% for ships berth in EU ports with stays longer than 2 h, as well as when sailing on inland waterways [7]. European Commission has advanced the further arrangement of shorepower to its part states through an authority suggestion [8]. Port authorities all throughout the planet have launched initiatives that advance utilization of low-sulfur fuel in their proximity, with the port of Singapore being a notable example under the Green Ship and Green Port programs offering monetary incentives for clean practices that reduce CO2 and SOx emissions. At last, the ports of Los Angeles and of Long Beach have presented voluntary speed reduction programs (VSRP) in their proximity in return for a decrease of port disbursements accounts and are moving towards making the use of shorepower for ocean going ships mandatory. Concerning guidelines focusing on sulfur outflows, ship owners can consent by one or the other changing to ultra-low sulphur fuels like Marine Gas Oil (MGO) or investing in scrubber systems that treat the exhaust gases to remove SOx and PM emissions hence permitting the utilization of Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO). Additionally, to adapt to guidelines on emissions at ports a vessel can either utilize cleaner fuel or, on the other hand, be retrofitted to get shorepower if the port has cold ironing facilities. Thusly, to address ecological regulation the shipowners have to pay to obtain abatement technology or increase their operating costs by utilizing cleaner yet more expensive fuel. Which option of the above mentioned is more cost-effective for the shipowner depends on various factors, including ship type, ship size, regulations affecting the waters in which the ship sails, and ports of call. Simultaneously, the choice of a port to put resources into innovations that permit the arrangement of shorepower relies upon a few variables, which stem from emissions decrease strategies, and the entrance pace of the innovation in the calling ships. The last decades the demand of energy is being increased continuously. The massive use of different types of non-renewable sources of energy has led to very important problems in the earth, as global warming, by the production of big amounts of greenhouse gases (GHGs) [52]. Nitrogen oxides (NOx), carbon monoxide (CO) and carbon dioxide (CO2) are some of the elements that are being produced by the burning process of marine diesel engines and pollute the atmosphere. This fact is a result of the use of Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) in vessels' engines which is preferred by the shipowners especially for economy reasons [53]. New technologies concerning alternative sources of energy have started to provide new environmental standards by reducing the emissions of harmful for the environment gases as CO2. More than the 80% of the harmful emissions in the atmosphere are related to carbon [54]. Consequently, decarbonization constitutes on of the biggest environmental problems and despite the fact that the efficiency in terms of energy in the maritime transport has been increased significantly, shipping industry has the responsibility of almost 940 million tons of CO2 emissions in the atmosphere per year. Taking into consideration the continuously increase of the global fleet we can easily understand that these emissions are going to reach a higher level in the next few years [55]. The use of alternative fuels seems to be the only solution for the environment and European Union has already include in her White Paper on Transport their introduction [56]. More specifically, in 2016, European Union has already released a «Strategy for liquefied natural gas and gas storage» in order to highlight the advantages and the potential of the use of LNG to all members of the Union. Moreover, in October 2014, the executive committee of the European Union obliged 139 ports in Europe to act appropriate in order to have the possibility to offer bunkering facilities for LNG until 2020 [59]. Additionally, the effort to control the pollution emissions was strengthen by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) through the introduction of new regulations. More specifically, International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) was embraced by the IMO which also adopted amendments to MARPOL Annex VI (Resolution MEPC.203 (62)) through the introduction of an energy efficiency design index in order to reduce the CO2 emissions [54, 61]. This paper discusses the possibility of different types of fuels or technological investments to be used as marine fuels from the perspective of shipowners, terminal operators, and regulatory bodies while considering the extent of ecological improvement that can provide. The first section of this paper presents a concise literature review of relevant research in port emissions as well as regulations that are used nowadays, which are imposed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The subsequent section presents an analysis and evaluation of different types of fuels which should appraise the new ecological equilibrium following the established environmental and safety regulations. In the last part, the benefits and drawbacks of its kind of fuel are widely expressed.

In Europa e soprattutto in Italia si è assistito negli ultimi decenni a un progressivo invecchiamento della popolazione, conseguente a un calo della natalità e a un contemporaneo aumento della speranza di vita. Ne deriva una crescente attenzione da parte degli organismi politici internazionali e della comunità scientifica verso la popolazione in età avanzata, motivata dalle fondamentali trasformazioni socioeconomiche e organizzative che hanno interessato tutti i paesi a sviluppo avanzato. Questo fenomeno ha fatto sì che il tema dell'invecchiamento attivo assumesse un'importanza crescente non solo in ambito lavorativo ma anche in quello sanitario, economico e sociale. Anche la ricerca educativa ha sviluppato una nuova attenzione verso gli individui in età avanzata ripensando il concetto stesso di vecchiaia. Questo progetto di ricerca è stato l'occasione per raccogliere, analizzare e confrontare i programmi, le leggi, i decreti e i piani d'azione nel campo della formazione permanente in Sicilia a favore dell'invecchiamento attivo. L'OMS ha delineato un quadro strategico, indicato con il nome di Active Aging, per far fronte all'invecchiamento della popolazione. La strategia ha come obiettivo primario la creazione e il rafforzamento delle condizioni per un invecchiamento attivo le cui basi devono essere poste ben prima della vecchiaia. I pilastri dell'invecchiamento attivo devono essere: la salute, la partecipazione e la sicurezza delle persone in età avanzata. In Italia questo trend demografico si registra precocemente con le sue differenze regionali. In particolare, alcune realtà territoriali, come la Sicilia, in cui il trend mostra maggiore intensità. Il fenomeno dell'invecchiamento attivo e la necessità di costruire una società capace, non solo di prendersi cura ma anche di favorire l'autorealizzazione per l'intero arco della vita, richiede un'attenta pianificazione strategica da parte di tutte le istituzioni politiche, sociali ed economiche. Oggi, a causa della repentina trasformazione economica, sociale e culturale, il modello educativo-formativo deve essere distribuito ed esteso su un periodo di tempo molto più lungo. Il concetto di invecchiamento attivo si estende quindi all'idea di perseguire una vita sana e una qualità di vita per tutte le persone che invecchiano. Di conseguenza, il mantenimento dell'autonomia della persona anziana diventa un obiettivo fondamentale. L'educazione all'invecchiamento è un prerequisito per migliorare la qualità della vita degli anziani e dell'intera società. ; En Europa, y especialmente en Italia, las últimas décadas han sido testigo de un progresivo envejecimiento de la población, como consecuencia de un descenso de la natalidad y un aumento simultáneo de la esperanza de vida. Esto ha provocado una creciente atención por parte de los organismos políticos internacionales y de la comunidad científica hacia la población de edad avanzada, motivada por las transformaciones socioeconómicas y organizativas fundamentales que han afectado a todos los países de desarrollo avanzado. Este fenómeno ha hecho que el tema del envejecimiento activo adquiera una importancia creciente no sólo en el ámbito laboral, sino también en las esferas sanitaria, económica y social. También la investigación educativa ha desarrollado una nueva atención hacia los individuos en la vejez replanteando el propio concepto de vejez. Este proyecto de investigación ha sido una oportunidad para recopilar, analizar y comparar programas, leyes, decretos y planes de acción en el ámbito del aprendizaje permanente en Sicilia a favor del envejecimiento activo. La Organización Mundial de la Salud ha esbozado un marco estratégico, indicado bajo el nombre de Envejecimiento Activo, para hacer frente al envejecimiento de la población. La estrategia tiene como objetivo primordial la creación y el fortalecimiento de las condiciones para el envejecimiento activo, cuyas bases deben sentarse mucho antes de la vejez. Los pilares del envejecimiento activo deben ser: la salud, la participación y la seguridad de las personas en la vejez. En Italia, esta tendencia demográfica se registra tempranamente con sus diferencias regionales. En particular, hay algunas realidades territoriales, como Sicilia, donde la tendencia muestra una mayor intensidad. El fenómeno del envejecimiento activo y la necesidad de construir una sociedad capaz no sólo de cuidar sino también de fomentar la autorrealización a lo largo de la vida, requiere una cuidadosa planificación estratégica por parte de todas las instituciones políticas, sociales y económicas. Hoy en día, debido a la repentina transformación económica, social y cultural, el modelo educativo-formativo debe distribuirse y extenderse durante un periodo de tiempo mucho más largo. El concepto de envejecimiento activo se extiende, por tanto, a la idea de perseguir una vida sana y una calidad de vida para todas las personas a medida que envejecen. En consecuencia, mantener la autonomía de la persona mayor se convierte en un objetivo clave. La educación para el envejecimiento es un requisito previo para mejorar la calidad de vida de las personas mayores y de la sociedad en su conjunto. ; In Europe, and especially in Italy, the last few decades have seen a progressive aging of the population, as a result of a drop in the birth rate and a simultaneous increase in life expectancy. This has led to a growing attention on the part of international political bodies and the scientific community towards the population in old age, motivated by the fundamental socio-economic and organizational transformations that have affected all countries with advanced development. This phenomenon has ensured that the topic of active aging has become increasingly important not only in the working environment but also in the health, economic and social spheres. Educational research has also developed a new focus on older people and has rethought the very concept of old age. This research project was an opportunity to collect, analyze and compare programs, laws, decrees and action plans in the field of lifelong learning in Sicily in favor of active aging. The WHO has outlined a strategic framework, referred to as Active Aging, to deal with the aging of the population. The strategy has as its primary objective the creation and strengthening of conditions for active aging whose foundations must be laid well before old age. The pillars of active aging must be health, participation and security of people in old age. In Italy this demographic trend is registered early with its regional differences. In particular, there are some territorial realities, such as Sicily, where the trend shows greater intensity. The phenomenon of active aging and the need to build a society capable not only of caring but also of fostering self-fulfillment throughout life, requires careful strategic planning by all political, social and economic institutions. Today, due to the sudden economic, social and cultural transformation, the education and training model has to be distributed and extended over a much longer period of time. The concept of active aging therefore extends to the idea of pursuing a healthy life and quality of life for all aging people. Consequently, maintaining the autonomy of the elderly person becomes a key objective. Education for aging is a prerequisite for improving the quality of life of older people and of society as a whole.

Relevance of research. Ukraine is a poly-religious, multi-ethnic country, where religious minorities are a prominent subject in its religious field. The interests of religious minorities are protected by Ukrainian laws. But in real life, the guaranteed rights of religious and ethnic minorities often remain unexercised. Meanwhile, religious minorities have their own specific needs and special conditions to meet them. In particular, the existing laws do not automatically ensure a proper legal basis for participation of religious minorities in public life, especially in such areas as chaplaincy - military, medical, penitentiary, educational; volunteering; educational, informational and cultural space, etc. The purpose of this article is to characterize religious minorities as a spiritual and social phenomenon of poly-religious Ukraine and as the subject of sociological research. Results. The article gives examples of searching for the definition of "religious minorities" in international legal documents, in the works of foreign and national researchers. Attention is paid to the description of sociological research methodology, which object of study is religious minorities. The results of the focus sociological research named "Religious Minorities of Ukraine and State-Denominational Relations"2 have been analyzed, particularly, regarding the assessment of Ukrainian legislation in the field of freedom of conscience and activities of religious organizations by experts (representatives of central and local executive bodies, local self-government authorities (in the matter of religion); leaders of religious minorities communities – persons with administrative and organizational experience; specialists in freedom of conscience and religions (in particular, scholars, lawyers, theologians, media representatives, etc.) and believers-members of religious minorities. The main conclusion the article leads to is the fact that, in civil society, which seeks to be the Ukrainian one, there is a public need for legal understanding of the new principles of interaction between the state and religious organizations, and particularly religious minorities. Thus, experts and believers-members of religious minorities assessed the Ukrainian legislation in the field of freedom of conscience and the activities of religious organizations on a 5-point scale, where 5 is the highest score; and the scores were the following: 3.6 and 3.7 points, respectively. The experts assessed the opinion on the need to update the legislation in order to increase the level of democracy at 3.4 points, and believers at 3.0 points, where 5 is completely perfect legislation. This shows the existing demand of society, in particular religious minorities, for a better legal framework for successful governance in the field of state and religious relations, for proper information and communication activities of all its subjects in this area. Implementation of all legal principles of state and religious relations, mutual information, constant dialogue will contribute to the improvement of these relations as a cooperative (partnership) model of relations in the context of pluralization and democratization of religious life. ; Актуальність дослідження. Україна - багатоконфесійна, багатоетнічна країна, в якій релігійні меншини є помітним суб'єктом її релігійно-конфесійного поля. Інтереси релігійних меншин захищені українським законодавством. Але в реальному житті гарантовані права релігійних та етнічних меншин часто залишаються нереалізованими. Тим часом релігійні меншини мають свої специфічні потреби та особливі умови для їх забезпечення. Зокрема, існуючі закони не гарантують автоматично належної правової основи для участі релігійних меншин у суспільному житті, особливо в таких галузях, як капеланство - військове, медичне, пенітенціарне, освітнє; волонтерство; освітній, інформаційний і культурний простір тощо. Метою даної статті є характеристика релігійних меншин як духовно-соціального феномену поліконфесійної України та об'єкта соціологічного дослідження. Результати. В статті наведені приклади пошуків визначення дефініції «релігійні меншини» у міжнародних правових документах, у працях зарубіжних та вітчизняних дослідників. Приділена увага опису методології соціологічного дослідження, в якому об'єктом вивчення є вітчизняні релігійні меншини. Проаналізовані результати фокусного соціологічного дослідження «Релігійні меншини України та державно-конфесійні відносини»1, зокрема, стосовно оцінки законодавства України у сфері свободи совісті і діяльності релігійних організацій експертами (представники центральних та місцевих органів виконавчої влади, органів місцевого самоврядування (з питань релігій); лідери громад релігійних меншин – особи з адміністративним та організаційним досвідом; спеціалісти з питань свободи совісті та релігій (зокрема, науковці, юристи, богослови, представники медіа тощо) та вірянами релігійних меншин. Основним висновком, до якого підводить матеріал статті, є те, що в громадянському суспільстві, яким прагне бути й українське, формується суспільна потреба на правове розуміння нових принципів взаємодії держави і релігійних організацій, зокрема і особливо, релігійних меншин. Так, експертами та віруючими релігійних меншин українське законодавство у сфері свободи совісті і діяльності релігійних організацій за 5-ти бальною шкалою, де 5 – найвищий бал, було оцінено на 3,6 та 3,7 бали відповідно. Думку про необхідність актуалізації законодавства з метою підвищення рівня демократичності, де 5 - цілком досконале законодавство, експерти оцінили на 3,4, а віруючі на 3,0 бали. Це свідчить про наявний запит суспільства, зокрема релігійних меншин, на більш досконалу правову базу для успішного управління в полі державно-конфесійних відносин, на адекватну інформаційно-комунікаційну діяльність в цій галузі всіх її суб'єктів. Реалізація усіх правових принципів державно-конфесійних стосунків, взаємоінформування, постійний діалог сприятимуть вдосконаленню цих стосунків як кооперативної (партнерської) моделі відносин в умовах плюралізації та демократизації релігійного життя. ; Актуальність дослідження. Україна - багатоконфесійна, багатоетнічна країна, в якій релігійні меншини є помітним суб'єктом її релігійно-конфесійного поля. Інтереси релігійних меншин захищені українським законодавством. Але в реальному житті гарантовані права релігійних та етнічних меншин часто залишаються нереалізованими. Тим часом релігійні меншини мають свої специфічні потреби та особливі умови для їх забезпечення. Зокрема, існуючі закони не гарантують автоматично належної правової основи для участі релігійних меншин у суспільному житті, особливо в таких галузях, як капеланство - військове, медичне, пенітенціарне, освітнє; волонтерство; освітній, інформаційний і культурний простір тощо. Метою даної статті є характеристика релігійних меншин як духовно-соціального феномену поліконфесійної України та об'єкта соціологічного дослідження. Результати. В статті наведені приклади пошуків визначення дефініції «релігійні меншини» у міжнародних правових документах, у працях зарубіжних та вітчизняних дослідників. Приділена увага опису методології соціологічного дослідження, в якому об'єктом вивчення є вітчизняні релігійні меншини. Проаналізовані результати фокусного соціологічного дослідження «Релігійні меншини України та державно-конфесійні відносини»1, зокрема, стосовно оцінки законодавства України у сфері свободи совісті і діяльності релігійних організацій експертами (представники центральних та місцевих органів виконавчої влади, органів місцевого самоврядування (з питань релігій); лідери громад релігійних меншин – особи з адміністративним та організаційним досвідом; спеціалісти з питань свободи совісті та релігій (зокрема, науковці, юристи, богослови, представники медіа тощо) та вірянами релігійних меншин. Основним висновком, до якого підводить матеріал статті, є те, що в громадянському суспільстві, яким прагне бути й українське, формується суспільна потреба на правове розуміння нових принципів взаємодії держави і релігійних організацій, зокрема і особливо, релігійних меншин. Так, експертами та віруючими релігійних меншин українське законодавство у сфері свободи совісті і діяльності релігійних організацій за 5-ти бальною шкалою, де 5 – найвищий бал, було оцінено на 3,6 та 3,7 бали відповідно. Думку про необхідність актуалізації законодавства з метою підвищення рівня демократичності, де 5 - цілком досконале законодавство, експерти оцінили на 3,4, а віруючі на 3,0 бали. Це свідчить про наявний запит суспільства, зокрема релігійних меншин, на більш досконалу правову базу для успішного управління в полі державно-конфесійних відносин, на адекватну інформаційно-комунікаційну діяльність в цій галузі всіх її суб'єктів. Реалізація усіх правових принципів державно-конфесійних стосунків, взаємоінформування, постійний діалог сприятимуть вдосконаленню цих стосунків як кооперативної (партнерської) моделі відносин в умовах плюралізації та демократизації релігійного життя.

[eng] Understanding what drives individuals to vote for parties or individuals who have often used violent rhetoric toward women and minorities and enacted discriminatory laws is critical. At the same time, it is crucial to comprehend what tools these forces use to gain consensus and, even more relevant, the consequences of having these political forces in power. This thesis attempted to help provide answers to the points listed above. Using different empirical techniques and analyzing different European settings, I aimed to enlarge the knowledge on the causes and consequences of the political success of far-right parties, how the new media influence citizens' opinions, and which political parties have been advantaged (or harmed) from the recent paradigm shift in the communication process. The unifying theme of the chapters was the focus on immigration -- and, more specifically, on the relationship, analyzed in various aspects, between natives and immigrants. I started by asking whether the ability to access a potentially unlimited and relatively affordable medium of information -- the Internet -- changed the knowledge that natives have about migration patterns in their own country. Indeed, surveys and academic literature have found a strong misperception of natives, who vastly overestimate the number of foreigners in the country; besides, natives think immigrants are culturally and religiously more distant from them and are economically weaker -- less educated, more unemployed, and more reliant on and favored by government transfers -- than is the case. The second chapter of my thesis, Does the Internet change the attitude towards migrants? Evidence from Spain, showed that people exposed to the early Internet (from 2008 to 2012) are associated with a better knowledge of the (national) migration trends; additionally, the possibility to go online is responsible for an overall improvement in attitudes toward immigrants. The analysis, set in Spain, exploited a unique and confidential survey dataset and combined a difference-in-differences method with an instrumental variable approach. In the second part of the analysis, I demonstrated, using both survey data and real electoral outcome, that access to the Internet generates a decrease in the political support for the traditional Spanish right-wing party. Having extreme parties (or individuals) in power is no longer a remote possibility but a reality. This is the case both at the national and local levels. Understanding the effects on economic and social outcomes of these governments is both essential and underdeveloped in the literature. In the third chapter of my thesis, Do far-right mayors increase the probability of hate crimes? Evidence from Italy, I aimed to contribute to this emerging research area by focusing on the effect of electing local politicians on hate crimes against immigrants. Indeed, hate crimes are soaring in many countries, and many argue that a close relationship exists between the increased support for extremist parties and acts of violence toward immigrants and other minorities. Using an RD approach and focusing on the Italian context, where the presence of candidates belonging to anti-immigrant parties is significant and widespread in the territory, I showed that in municipalities where an extreme right-wing mayor is elected, the probability that a hate crime occurs is significantly higher. Municipalities with higher Internet access drive this effect; additionally, I demonstrated that the election of an extreme right mayor generates a change in behavior also in the surrounding municipalities. One element that many argue has contributed to the success of far-right parties is the recent refugee crisis that European countries have faced, primarily as a result of the Arab Springs and the violence that has resulted from them. Anti-immigrant parties have exploited this abnormal arrival of asylum seekers to increase the fear of natives and gain votes. However, this technique has not always proven successful. In the fourth chapter of this thesis, Is this the real-life or just fantasy? Refugee reception, extreme-right voting, and broadband internet, we studied the effect of a specific policy of relocation of asylum seekers in Italy (SPRAR) that involves opening medium-small centers and offering refugees the opportunity to interact with members of the local community. This micro-exposure to refugees had significant consequences on the voting choices of natives: using an instrumental variable approach, we showed that support for far-right parties is reduced in municipalities where a SPRAR center has been opened. However, this micro-exposure effect is smaller in higher macro-exposure areas to migrant news - i.e., in higher Internet exposure areas. There are some takeaways from this thesis. First, it is essential to point out how easily the Internet can convert from an information medium (Chapter 2) to an echo chamber that raises citizens' fears (Chapter 4) and pushes them to behave violently (Chapter 3). If this has been proven to be true for traditional media, such as newspapers and TV, this issue is even more delicate with the possibility of going online, considering the highly self-segregated news platform provided by the Internet. This opens the door to potential strands of research on the supply of extremist parties and the characteristics of their representatives. A natural question is why non-extremist parties have failed lately to offer equally charismatic leaders. Besides, since there is an emerging consensus that populists have pursued successful communication strategies, often via social media and the Internet, an additional related question is why mainstream parties are not able to follow suit. Second, as we expect more and more extremist parties to come to power in the near future, careful analyses of their governments' impact are crucial. These should focus on traditional economic outcomes, such as investments, trade, and wages; however, as demonstrated by the third chapter, these analyses should assess the effect of extremist governments on elements that ensure freedoms essential to democracies, such as the independence of media and judicial bodies and the quality of their bureaucrats. It is pivotal to monitor whether these administrations are responsible for discrimination in labor access, health care, and education. At the same time, future research should focus on how mainstream governments can defend themselves against the threat of the arrival of extremist parties. Lastly, a final thought on the management of refugees and, more generally, migration policies in Europe is necessary. The evidence suggests that the aggregate economic impact of immigration on receiving countries is likely to be positive. However, to dismantle extremist parties' rhetoric, which associates the presence of migrants with negative social repercussions related to crime, the drain of social welfare benefits, and cultural differences, two elements are necessary. First, increase the level of awareness among the local population. Second, as highlighted by chapter four, implement reception policies that generate integration and interaction between natives and immigrants.

The starting question underlying this thesis is "What is so deep about deeply divided societies?2" The "deeply divided societies" paradigm emerged during the 20th century as a depiction of societies considered as fragmented and in need of a certain diagnostic for them to be able to live peacefully and with no constant fighting. For those societies to achieve peaceful coexistence, the diagnostic has been, until now, implementing a consociational model of governance, implying power-sharing among the segments of society and/or formerly belligerent factions. However, why are some societies depicted as deeply divided, while others are not, although they share – obviously each within its own context – the same factors and dynamics implying deep division as prescribed by the paradigm? Moreover, where does the scientific literature put the threshold for considering a group of people as deeply divided, knowing of course that conflicts exist in every part of society, from the family unit up to state institutions? Our focus for this thesis will be Lebanon. Our choice stems from two main reasons. The first being that Lebanon, in the political science literature, is depicted as an interesting case of deeply divided society, with, for some authors, a functioning consociational model that is successfully managing societal disruptions, and able to settle conflicts between sectarian groups in Lebanon, while for other authors consociationalism has failed to develop into a fully-fledged democratic model. The second reason is, as mentioned in the above paragraph, the blurry definition and conceptualization revolving around the "deeply divided societies" paradigm. Since no threshold seems to be able to set a clear definition of the paradigm, the idea remains very shallow. Arbitrarily categorizing a handful of countries and societies as deeply divided and not others, although they share very "similar" characteristics, seems quite a far-fetched problematic. Insights from Lebanon reveal some interesting dimensions as per the "deeply divided societies" paradigm: no one actually seems in bad terms with the other, or hates the other. To put it in a simple way: if a Christian is asked about Muslims in the country, the answer would be far from expressing hostility. On the contrary, the questioned person will clearly show indifference regarding the other's sect (Majed, 2021). If so, then what is really "deep" about the so-called division? What differentiates it from other normal divisions of any society? Another rationale behind this work is the latest uprising that started in 2019 in Iraq and Lebanon. In the societies depicted as "deeply divided", light is always shed on identity-based cleavages (sect-based identities, or sometimes in Iraq a mix of ethnic and sectarian related identities (Kurds - Sunni muslims - Shi'a muslims)), even at a time when social and economic demands are taken at the forefront of country-wide protests (Majed, 2019). In the Lebanese case, it is indeed the economic reality which constituted the main drive of the uprising. Firstly, most of the protesters belonged to a 16 to 25 years old age range. They belonged mostly to popular classes with relatively low monthly incomes and are vulnerable to any eventual shocks due to their precarious situation (Bou Khater and Majed, 2020: 11). In addition to that, the interview sample clearly pointed out the dire economic situation pushing them to be part of the uprising. Secondly, protesters belonged to different geographical areas, and protests were not only focused in the capital Beirut (unlike for example other contemporary uprisings as the "You Stink" movement in 2015 for instance). Naturally, major Cazas (districts) such as Tripoli or Beirut attracted more protesters due to their size, but the other regions were equally "represented" (Bou Khater and Majed, 2020: 10). This geographical representation in the whole country brings some doubts about what the "deeply divided society" paradigm implies. How is the Lebanese society so deeply divided then if all of its social components, and especially its youth, rallied around the same socio-economic demands, and to a certain extent, political demands? Although these are preliminary questions – and cannot lead to any conclusion whatsoever in this promptness – they invite us to re-question the aforementioned paradigm. As per the paradigm itself, does deeply divided societies imply as their core element pretending divisiveness, identities as they are? Or does it imply the polarization of identities? Imagining a causal chain leading to a deeply divided society is in fact quite a difficult task to achieve; for a society to achieve a great step towards divisiveness suggests a model of society where each group does not/cannot face the other directly. Here comes the role of the institutional arrangements where the consociational model of governance lies. Its role is appeasing these tensions and paving the way to a more peaceful and integrated society. As shown by many scholarly studies, diversity does not form an obstacle to democracy (Fearon, 2004; Fish and Brooks, 2004: 162). In addition to that, it is argued that all civil conflicts share more or less the same underlying economic reasons, while the ethnic/religious aspect becomes relevant in the war's aftermath. If so, why did only a certain sample of countries/societies receive the "deeply divided society" description, and others not? Put differently, why is the emphasis on certain cleavages focal for certain societies and not others? Is it truly because these societies do have particularities, or because the religious cleavage is maintained at the forefront of the analyses and descriptions? It is noteworthy to mention that many defenders and sympathizers of the consociational model of government have been advising policy-makers on many issues, be it at the United Nations, on Northern Ireland, Cyprus, South Africa or Iraq. We consider such recommendations as erroneous and inaccurate, since the description of the conflicts and of their aftermath is often – if not always – misleading, by putting forward the parameters and factors that are only relevant for the consociationalists. In this sense, policymakers, consultants and other "weighty" bodies are not remedying the source of the problem, but are rather enforcing and anchoring it (Majed, 2017). This Master's thesis presents itself as an alternative exploratory roadmap to the study of what is usually presented as "deeply divided societies". It will explore the Lebanese case – which is usually presented as a deeply divided society – and will try, through an attempt at clarifying definitions, and a qualitative-historical analysis, to put into question the rigid idea of the aforementioned paradigm. The study will do so by questioning the traditionally used paradigm, and by inverting the variables of study by defining sectarianism as the dependent variable, rather than the explanatory one, as usually done to describe Middle Eastern societies (Ghosn and Parkinson, 2019: 494). In order to set the frame of the work, it is worth noting what lies in the debate around "disciplinarians" and "area specialists" on the notion of sectarianism, since this thesis fits exactly in this middle ground: "While the former, lack "conceptual sophistication and methodological rigor", favor "description over explanation", and have "no interest in parsimony and generalizations", the latter are "engaging in sterile conceptual and abstract theoretical debates providing little real insight into complex behavioral patterns" (Valbjørn, 2021: 4).

Problem setting. Changes in the socio-economic development of the country, caused by geopolitical, technological, economic and social factors, create new challenges for the competition policy of the state. The COVID-19 pandemic added to this list, significantly affecting the activities of the business environment, households, and the world economy in general. The development of an effective competition environment in commodity markets is a prerequisite for the restoration of stable economic growth on the basis of innovation and investment development.In this regard, there is a need to rethink the mechanism and set of instruments of competition policy on their adequacy to the current situation, their effectiveness and ability to ensure the achievement of goals and objectives. Nowadays, the emphasis of competition policy is changing, caused by changes in the competition environment and the objectives of economic policy in general. At the same time, the formation of competition policy should take place as a holistic system of influence by public authorities on the activities of economic entities and commodity markets in accordance with national goals and priorities of socio-economic development.Recent research and publications analysis. The works of Ukrainian and foreign scientists, including V. Lagutin, Z. Borysenko, A. Gerasimenko, G. Filyuk, K. Kantur, T. Shvydka, Y. Yasko, T. Shcherbakova, M. Porter, O. Kilievich and others.are devoted to the study of theoretical and applied principles of competition policy.Highlighting previously unsettled parts of the general problem. Despite significant developments in competition policy, there are still crucial problems to solve regarding the mechanism, tools and methods of competition policy, considering the socio-economic changes in society, changes of the emphasis in its implementation, given the existing problems, dynamics and structure of violations of competition law, the need for coordination of competition policy with the entire system of state regulation of the national economy and adaptation to competition practices in developed countries. Therefore, further research is needed to improve the state's competition policy in the face of new challenges.The main purpose of the article is a theoretical study of competition policy, identification of the main problems in the implementation of competition policy on the basis of analysis of the Western Regional Territorial office of Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine and formulation of recommendations for their elimination.Paper main body. Competition policy is one of the most important and complex forms of economic policy of the state. In its content, it is much broader than antitrust regulation, as it aims not only to limit and terminate monopolistic practices, anticompetitive agreements between economic entities and government actions, but also to develop and maintain effective economic competition, including through the application of competition law.Nowadays, the main focus of the state's competition policy is to strengthen its preventive nature in order to promote fair competition, as well as to end the monopolistic behavior of both enterprises and public authorities.The most important principles of competition policy, which are mainly reflected in the current legislation and correspond to the best world practices are: improving the welfare of society; flexibility of competition policy; increasing the competitiveness of the national producer; promotion of entrepreneurial activity; creating opportunities for access to the benefits created by natural monopolies; coordination of the state's competition policy with the priorities of economic policy and the goals of state regulation in general.Analysis of antitrust authorities showed that in the total number of violations of competition law the largest share are anticompetitive concerted actions of economic entities, violations in the form of anticompetitive actions by government, local authorities, bodies of administrative management and control, which significantly reduce the effectiveness of competition policy of the state at all levels.An actual problem in the implementation of state competition policy is to ensure equal conditions for all business entities, regardless of the type of ownership. This is due to the fact that most commodity markets in Ukraine are characterized by the presence of state-owned enterprises. Thus, according to the OECD and the World Bank (as of 2018), approximately 19 commodity markets in Ukraine have at least one state-owned enterprise; The number of utility companies is constantly increasing: at the beginning of 2021, 14,174 of them were registered in Ukraine, which is 22% more than in 2018.A reflection of the existing problems is the discrepancy between the amounts of fines imposed by the regulator for violating competition law and the amounts of fines actually paid. Thus, for the period of 2017-2020, the Western Regional Territorial office of Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine imposed fines for violation of competition law in the amount of over UAH 95 million, and in fact UAH 11219543 was collected from violators, which is only 11.8%. The factors of this situation are: imperfection of legal norms and insufficient justification of penalties for business entities; low competitive culture of market participants, low responsibility of violators of competition law and "commitment" of government officials to some of them; lack of effective motives to prevent anticompetitive actions in economic activities, and lack of support and development of competition in commodity markets.Among all areas of state competition policy today, we consider the protection of competition and demonopolization of potentially competitive and monopolistic markets to be the main ones. In order to prevent collusion and counteract cartel agreements, it is necessary to establish effective interaction between the regulator and law enforcement agencies, expand the powers of the AMCU to inspect business entities, and introduce competitive conditions at all stages of public procurement. The control, transparency and targeting of state aid, as well as the cessation of discrimination in the actions of public authorities, are the key to ensuring the equality of economic entities, especially in the face of the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Termination of unfair competition practices based on fair competition advocacy.Conclusions of the research and prospects for further studies. The main task of the state's competition policy is to ensure the effectiveness of competitive relations in commodity markets, which leads to increased competitiveness of the domestic economy. All instruments and mechanisms of state competition policy should be used solely to develop effective competition in commodity markets. Competition policy, adapted to modern requirements and challenges, should encourage competition between producers, which will improve the quality of goods, services, the formation of economically reasonable prices and reduce them, and thus increase the level of satisfaction of society's needs.The main instruments of competition policy should be preventive measures, strengthening the level of responsibility of economic entities for violations of competition law, as well as competition advocacy aimed at forming a competitive culture of market participants, the predominance of the principles of fair, transparent competition. ; Обґрунтовано суть, принципи і особливості конкурентної політики. На основі аналізу звітності Західного Міжобласного територіального відділення Антимонопольного комітету України визначено головні проблеми реалізації конкурентної політики в умовах сучасних соціально-економічних викликів. Визначено головні напрямки удосконалення конкурентної політики, спрямовані на розвиток конкуренції, демонополізацію потенційно конкурентних та монопольних ринків.

Aquest article analitza la relació entre els artistes i les estrcuturas de poder portuguesos i les masses populars després de la Revolució de el 25 d'abril de 1974 i fins a 1977. L'anàlisi d'aquest període a Portugal considerarà les dinàmiques que envolten les pràctiques artístiques socialment compromeses integrades en l'espai públic, dins del seu marc històric i social. L'article sosté que el context artístic portuguès en estudi va sorgir de la motivació dels polítics i artistes per apropar l'art i les masses populars a l'procés revolucionari en curs. En aquesta aproximació, identifico la col·laboració com l'actitud més utilitzada pels artistes en relació amb el sistema polític i la població. Aquest enfocament va disminuir des de 1976, moment en què es va incrementar el conflicte amb les estructures de poder polític. Pel que fa a la relació amb la població, a partir d'aquest moment també hi va haver una disminució en l'ús d'eines col·laboratives i una intensificació d'eines transgressores i provocatives en les pràctiques artístiques. Aquests canvis seran articulats en l'article a partir de les condicions polítiques i socials objectives de país, i la seva influència en els matisos actitudinals identificats en les pràctiques artístiques socialment compromeses en anàlisi. ; This article analyzes the relationship between Portuguese artists and bodies of power and the popular masses after the Revolution of 25 April 1974 and until 1977. The analysis of this period in Portugal will consider the dynamics surrounding socially engaged artistic practices integrated in the public space, within its historic and social framework. The article argues that the Portuguese artistic context under consideration arose from the politicians and artists motivation to bring art and the popular masses closer to the ongoing revolutionary process. In this approach, I identify collaboration as the most frequent attitude used by artists in relation to the political system and population. This approach decreased since 1976, at which time there was an increase in conflict with the political power structures. Regarding the relationship with the population, from that moment on there was also a decrease in the use of collaborative tools and an intensification of transgressive and provocative tools in artisticpractices. These changes will be articulated in the article based on the country's objective political and social conditions, and their influence on attitudinal nuances identified in the socially engaged artistic practices under analysis. ; Este artículo analiza la relación entre los artistas y las estructuras de poder portugueses y las masas populares después de la Revolución del 25 de abril de 1974 y hasta 1977. El análisis de este período en Portugal considerará las dinámicas que rodean las prácticas artísticas socialmente comprometidas integradas en el espacio público, dentro de su marco histórico y social. El artículo sostiene que el contexto artístico portugués en estudio surgió de la motivación de los políticos y artistas para acercar el arte y las masas populares al proceso revolucionario en curso. En esta aproximación, identifico la colaboración como la actitud más utilizada por los artistas en relación con el sistema político y la población. Este enfoque disminuyó desde 1976, momento en el que se incrementó el conflicto con las estructuras de poder político. En cuanto a la relación con la población, a partir de ese momento también hubo una disminución en el uso de herramientas colaborativas y una intensificación de herramientas transgresoras yprovocativas en las prácticas artísticas. Estos cambios serán articulados en el artículo a partir de las condiciones políticas y sociales objetivas del país, y su influencia en los matices actitudinales identificados en las prácticas artísticas socialmente comprometidas en análisis. ; Cet article analyse les relations entre les artistes et les structures de pouvoir portugaises et les masses populaires après la Révolution du 25 avril 1974 et jusqu'en 1977. L'analyse de cette période au Portugal considérera les dynamiques qui entourent les pratiques artistiques socialement engagées intégrées dans l'espace public, dans leur cadre historique et social. L'article soutient que le contexte artistique portugais à l'étude est né de la motivation des politiciens et des artistes à rapprocher l'art et les masses populaires du processus révolutionnaire en cours. Dans cette approche, j'identifie la collaboration comme l'attitude la plus utilisée par les artistes par rapport au système politique et à la population. Cette approche a diminué depuis 1976, lorsque le conflit avec les structures du pouvoir politique s'est accru. Concernant le rapport à la population, à partir de ce moment, il y a également eu une diminution de l'utilisation des outils collaboratifs et une intensification des outils transgressifs et provocateurs dans les pratiques artistiques. Ces changements seront articulés dans l'article en fonction des conditions politiques et sociales objectives du pays, et de leur influence sur les nuances comportementales identifiées dans les pratiques artistiques socialement engagées en analyse. ; Questo articolo analizza il rapporto tra artisti e strutture di potere portoghesi e le masse popolari dopo la Rivoluzione del 25 aprile 1974 e fino al 1977. L'analisi di questo periodo in Portogallo prenderà in considerazione le dinamiche che circondano le pratiche artistiche socialmente impegnate integrate nello spazio pubblico, all'interno del loro quadro storico e sociale. L'articolo sostiene che il contesto artistico portoghese oggetto di studio è nato dalla motivazione di politici e artisti di avvicinare l'arte e le masse popolari al processo rivoluzionario in corso. In questo approccio, identifico la collaborazione come l'atteggiamento più utilizzato dagli artisti nei confronti del sistema politico e della popolazione. Questo approccio è diminuito dal 1976, quando è aumentato il conflitto con le strutture del potere politico. Per quanto riguarda il rapporto con la popolazione, da quel momento si registra anche una diminuzione dell'uso di strumenti collaborativi e un'intensificazione di strumenti trasgressivi e provocatori nelle pratiche artistiche. Questi cambiamenti saranno articolati nell'articolo in base alle condizioni politiche e sociali oggettive del paese e alla loro influenza sulle sfumature attitudinali individuate nelle pratiche artistiche socialmente impegnate in analisi. ; Este artigo aprofunda as relações estabelecidas entre os artistas, os organismos de poder e as camadas populares portuguesas após a Revolução do 25 de Abril de 1974 e até 1977. A análise deste período português considera a dinâmica criada pelas práticas artísticas socialmente comprometidas integradas no espaço público, a partir do seu enquadramento histórico e social. O artigo influi que o contexto artístico português em análise surgiu da motivação de determinados circuitos políticos e artísticos em aproximar a arte e as camadas populares do processo revolucionário em curso. Seguindo esta óptica, a colaboração é identificada como a atitude mais frequente utilizada pelos artistas em relação ao sistema político e à população. Essa postura colaborativa diminuiu a partir de 1976, altura em que o conflito com as estruturas de poder político começou a aumentar. No que se refere ao relacionamento com a população, foi também a partir desse momento que houve uma diminuição do uso de ferramentas colaborativas e uma intensificação de ferramentas transgressivas e provocativas nas práticas artísticas. A alteração destas dinâmicas será articulada, no artigo, a partir das condições políticas e sociais objectivas vividas no país e sua influência nas nuances atitudinais identificadas nas práticas artísticas socialmente comprometidas em análise.

Pavlichenko Yе. V., Annenko О. S. Legal, organizational and tactical aspects of the activity of defenselawyer in criminal proceedings. – Article.The article presents ideas on the general structure of the methodology of professional protection incriminal proceedings, which main elements include: forensic characteristics of the relevant type of criminaloffense; determination of priority general tactical tasks of defence at the stage of entry of a defence lawyerinto the process; selection of a typical position of protection in view of the current situation and practice ofprofessional protection in the relevant criminal proceedings; establishing the circumstances, which proofwill help to obtain the most favourable final decision for the client; tactical features of the performance ofa defence lawyer during the criminal proceedings on a premeditated murder.Analysis of the provisions of criminal procedure law, which determine the means of gathering evidenceby the defence, showed that the defence lawyer is essentially deprived of the possibility of independentprocedural actions, where there would be a possibility of comprehensive cognitive and identificationoperations depending on the nature of the investigation. However, the tasks of the investigation of a lawyercannot be fully realized without such actions.It is emphasized that there can be no special procedure for collection of evidence by a defence lawyerwithin a lawyer's investigation, which would be significantly different from similar actions of aninvestigator or a prosecutor during pre-trial investigation. Otherwise, there will always be a possibility ofdiscriminatory treatment of the evidentiary value of the results of the lawyer's investigation. Proceduraldifferences in the conduct of procedural actions to collect evidence by the investigator (prosecutor) andthose of a defence lawyer may be due to only one factor – the lack of power to use coercion or any otherrestriction of human and civil rights and freedoms by the latter.The article defines the legal, organizational and practical aspects of the defender's activity in criminalproceedings. Based on the analysis of the work of the pre-trial investigation bodies, the issues have beenidentified that require legal settlement with the definition of the powers of the prosecution and defence andthe introduction of changes and additions to the current criminal procedure legislation.The article defines the concept, the essence of the procedural status of a defender in criminal proceedings;the characteristic of participation of a defender at the stage of pre-judicial investigation is given; theinstitute of independent lawyer's investigation in criminal proceedings is covered; the participation of adefence lawyer at the stage of trial is revealed; the evidentiary activity of a defence lawyer is substantiated;the ways to improve the legal regulation of the participation of a defence lawyer in criminal proceedingsare identified.Based on the research, it was proposed to make changes and additions that, on the one hand, willclearly define the function and role of the investigating judge in criminal proceedings, and on the otherhand, increase the guarantees of his procedural independence. It is proved that observance of the rightsand freedoms of citizens will be facilitated by the procedural activity of head of the pre-trial investigationbody, which is designed to provide conditions for effective work of subordinates and control theircompliance with the law. The article draws attention to the fact that among the subjects who, on the basisof the obtained factual data, establish the presence or absence of facts and circumstances relevant to thecriminal proceedings and subject to proof, there is no defence lawyer. It is established that there is a legalcontradiction between certain provisions of the CPC of Ukraine. It is shown that a defence lawyer has theright to gather information about facts that can be used as evidence. It has been proved that a defencelawyer has the right to obtain evidence in criminal proceedings by initiating investigative actions, covertinvestigative (search) actions and other procedural actions, in cases provided for by this Code. It is shownthat the initiation of investigative actions by the defence lawyer, covert investigative actions and otherprocedural actions should be carried out by submitting appropriate motions to the investigating judge.It is proved that the tactics of the defender is a way of his practical activity, which is a set of tacticsdeveloped by forensic science, which he uses to exercise tactical influence on the object of such influence,aimed at overcoming the resistance of this object, or to encourage this object to take certain actions inthe interests of protection (in the absence of explicit opposition), in order to achieve the goal set by thedefender to implement the function of protection. Regarding the tactics of the defence in general, this issueis debatable and needs further study.The article provides an argument for the necessity to give the defender the right to conduct proceduralactions independently, where there would be a possibility of comprehensive application of cognitive andidentification operations, depending on the nature of the traces of the investigated event. ; Павліченко Є. В., Анненко О. С. Правові, організаційні й тактичні аспекти доказової діяльностізахисника в кримінальному провадженні. – Стаття.У статті визначаються правові, організаційні й практичні аспекти діяльності захисника в кри-мінальному провадженні. На основі аналізу роботи органів досудового розслідування виявленіпроблеми, які потребують правового врегулювання з визначенням повноважень суб'єктів сторониобвинувачення та захисту й внесення змін і доповнень до чинного кримінально процесуальногозаконодавства.У статті визначено поняття, сутність процесуального статусу захисника в кримінальному про-цесі; надана характеристика участі захисника на стадії досудового розслідування; висвітлено інститутсамостійного адвокатського розслідування в кримінальному провадженні; розкрито участь захисникана стадії судового розгляду; обґрунтовано доказову діяльність захисника; визначено шляхи вдоскона-лення правової регламентації участі захисника в кримінальному провадженні.На основі проведених досліджень було запропоновано внести зміни й доповнення, які, з одногобоку, визначать чітко функцію та роль слідчого судді в кримінальному провадженні, а з іншого, – під-вищать гарантії його процесуальної самостійності. Доведено, що дотриманню прав і свобод громадянсприятиме процесуальна діяльність керівника органу досудового розслідування, яка покликана забез-печити умови для ефективної роботи підлеглих і контроль за дотриманням ними вимог законодавства.У статті звернено увагу на те, що серед суб'єктів, які на підставі отриманих фактичних даних вста-новлюють наявність чи відсутність фактів та обставин, котрі мають значення для кримінального про-вадження та підлягають доказуванню, захисника не визначено. Установлено, що між певними поло-женнями кримінального процесуального кодексу України існує правова протилежність. Показано, щозахисник має право збирати відомості про факти, що можуть бути використані як докази. Доведено,що захисник має право отримувати докази в кримінальному провадженні шляхом ініціювання про-ведення слідчих дій, негласних слідчих (розшукових) дій та інших процесуальних дій у випадках,передбачених Кодексом. Показано, що ініціювання захисником проведення слідчих дій, негласнихслідчих дій та інших процесуальних дій повинно здійснюватися шляхом подання слідчому або слід-чому судді відповідних клопотань.Доведено, що тактика захисника – це спосіб його практичної діяльності, який являє собою сукуп-ність тактичних прийомів, вироблених криміналістичною наукою, котрі використовуються ним дляздійснення тактичного впливу на психіку об'єкта такого впливу, спрямованого на подолання проти-дії, що чиниться цим об'єктом, або на спонукання цього об'єкту до вчинення певних дій в інтересахзахисту (за відсутності явної протидії) з метою досягнення захисником поставленої мети для реалізаціїфункції захисту. Щодо тактики сторони захисту в цілому, то це питання дискусійне й потребує додат-кового дослідження.У статті надана аргументація необхідності наділення захисника правом самостійного проведенняпроцесуальних дій, у межах яких існувала б можливість комплексного застосування пізнавальнихі посвідчувальних операцій залежно від характеру слідів розслідуваної події.Ключові слова: гарантії, слідчі дії, законність, обґрунтованість, негласні слідчі дії, суб'єкти забез-печення захисту прав, тактика захисника.

Introduction. The level of the company's financial security is determined not so much by the indicators of its activity on the basis of economic analysis, but by the perception and, as a consequence, professional judgment of stakeholders, experts. The basic approaches to the company's financial security definition are described and the role of economic analysis in the assessment, which consists not of its complex research, but of the economic indicators, quantitative data on the state of the company's financial security, is presented. Nevertheless, to speak of a comprehensive and in-depth study of the level of financial security based on economic analysis only would be incorrect and inaccurate. Indices, indicators that are analyzed on the basis of financial or managerial reporting provide only a superficial understanding of the problem or even distort the overall picture, as they are recorded at a particular point in time. When processing data in numerical or visual format, it is rarely possible to present all the information as a whole at the same time. The expert assessment of company's financial security is the most objective method, which, however, has disadvantages related to the cognitive limitations of experts.Purpose. To substantiate the principles of assessing the company's financial security based on the principles of behavioral economics Results. The article put forward a hypothesis and proved that the level of the company's financial security is determined not so much by the indicators of its activity on the basis of economic analysis, but by the perception and, as a consequence, professional judgment of stakeholders, experts. The basic approaches to the company's financial security definition are described and the role of economic analysis in the assessment, which consists not of its complex research, but of the economic indicators, quantitative data on the state of the company's financial security, is presented. Nevertheless, to speak of a comprehensive and in-depth study of the level of financial security based on economic analysis only would be incorrect and inaccurate. Indices, indicators that are analyzed on the basis of financial or managerial reporting provide only a superficial understanding of the problem or even distort the overall picture, as they are recorded at a particular point in time. When processing data in numerical or visual format, it is rarely possible to present all the information as a whole at the same time. The expert assessment of company's financial security is the most objective method, which, however, has disadvantages related to the cognitive limitations of experts.Originality. The analysis of financial indicators based on economic analysis data does not allow to assess company's financial security in an unambiguous and objective way and that its level is determined, rather, on the basis of the perception of those, who evaluate it, as well as that it is impossible to obtain reliability, based solely on subjective judgments, we propose to use the expert method, as the most objective one for assessing company's financial security.Such approach is not a new one or unique, because this is how almost the whole, and especially large, business has worked successfully for a long time, creating collegial bodies for decision-making (board, board of directors, supervisory board, etc.). However, this method is characterized by shortcomings and features that are inherent in the principles of behavioral economics, which should be considered in more detail.It is clear that experts' perception of the level of this important indicator can not be formed only on the basis of their even significant experience, but should consider the data of objective control of the company on the basis of its financial, management and other reporting – those indices and indicators that reflect the state of financial security for a certain (adequate) period of its functioning.The key one will be the question of who and for what purpose assesses company's financial security. The final decision of the experts on determining the level of financial security will depend on the set goals, tasks, as well as their formulations. This is due to the cognitive limitations of each expert group member.Therefore, the level of company's financial security is ultimately determined by just two levels of "high enough" and "not high enough" in specific situations when making concrete decisions. This level is defined by a group of people or a person entrusted with such powers of the company. It is possible to determine the level of company's financial security by a certain digital value, for example, using an integral indicator or a set of indices, coefficients, indicators, using different methods. However, these indicators and their normative values can be thoroughly substantiated, nevertheless, decision-makers will only take them into account and not consider them explicitly as dogma.Thus, the most important issue is the formulation of the request to decision makers and the justification of its consequences.Conclusion. The article substantiates that the level of company's financial security depends not so much on the indicators of its activity, but on its perception of decision-makers and other stakeholders. At the same time, this perception is formed due to the continuous participation of the stakeholder in operations, constant monitoring of financial indicators, the study of current approaches to enterprise management, changes in the environment, market conditions, etc. The role of economic analysis in assessing company's financial security as a state is not in its complex study, but in the presented economic indicators, the processing of quantitative data on the company's financial security. Instead, to speak of a comprehensive and thorough study of the level of financial security on the basis of economic analysis only would be incorrect and unreliable. Indices, indicators that are analyzed on the basis of financial or management reporting provide only a cursory view of the problem or even distort the overall picture, as they are taken at a particular point in time. For example, liquidity indicators change in certain groups of businesses and the country's economic or political environment can transform a liquid company with a solid stock of liquidity into absolutely illiquid in a few moments. However, considering the previous data of economic analysis without bearing in mind other aspects, it is possible to make fatal decisions for the company. Although, of course, such a scenario is impossible, since behind each enterprise there are people, whose decisions and experience depend on its further development, and practice shows that such people are not oriented solely to economic analysis data without context, to assess the situation in the economy of the country or the world in general. Their experience and perception of financial security are essencial in decision making. Thus, the paper argues that the method of expert assessment of company's financial security is the most objective one, which, however, has disadvantages associated with cognitive limitations of people.

The TransAID project defines, develops and evaluates traffic management measures based on C-ITS equipped road infrastructure to eliminate or mitigate the negative effects of Transition of Control (ToC) along Transition Areas in future mixed traffic scenarios where automated, cooperative, and conventional vehicles will coexist. This document summarises the results of the stakeholder consultation activities of the TransAID project. For TransAID, the most relevant stakeholders are transport authorities and policy makers, road operators, vehicle manufacturers and suppliers, road infrastructure and traffic service providers, academia and knowledge institutes, future product owners and standardisation bodies. The consultation activities aimed to gather feedbacks on the project choices (selected use cases, scenarios, modelling solutions, implementation approaches) as well as on the achieved results. Such feedbacks were necessary to confirm the validity of the project's work, and to adapt, whenever possible and needed, its implementation while running. Consultation also allowed obtaining the stakeholders' view on the impact of prospective automated vehicles introduction. Finally, the stakeholders were asked about their ambitions and interests related to role and responsibilities in future scenarios of automated vehicle presence. Hearing about these last two aspects was necessary to identify possible activities beyond the TransAID project's duration. A summary of 9 stakeholder consultation events is provided in this deliverable: Main stakeholder workshops - TransAID-MAVEN-CoExist Stakeholder workshop, 10 October 2017, Brussels - TransAID-INFRAMIX stakeholder workshop, 9 October 2019, Graz - TransAID final event, stakeholder workshop, 2 July 2020, online International liaison activities - TransAID-U.S. CAMP expert meeting, 25 July 2019, Detroit - TransAID + ITS Japan / UtmobI expert meeting, 7-8 April 2020, online Additional stakeholder consultation opportunities - TransAID session and survey, 8 June 2019, IEEE-IV, Paris - EU EIP workshop on ODD, 1 October 2019, Turin - International workshop on ODD, 22 October 2019, Singapore - Joint dissemination of H2020, CEDR projects and other initiatives related to CAVs and Infrastructure, 3 March 2020, Brussels For each stakeholder consultation event, this deliverable gives a detailed description of the scope and aim, participants, plenary and break-out sessions, survey results (when applicable) and implications to the TransAID work. The main common findings that have been identified throughout the various events are listed in the following along with the major implications for TransAID and/or any similar follow-up activity: - Managing mixed traffic in transition areas is still an almost unexplored field. Despite transition areas are recognized as a prospective problem, very little is known or has been studied about it. This simple acknowledgment confirms the need and timeliness of TransAID. - Due to the uncertainty about many technical aspects related to the introduction of AD, it was difficult for transport authorities and traffic managers to provide insights on aspects to be considered for the selection of TransAID use cases and scenarios. Nevertheless, the majority of use cases and scenarios finally selected by TransAID were recognized to be reasonably generic, yet addressing recurrent problems, and hence deemed useful for real-world application. - Connectivity was recognized as a key enabler to extend the Operational Design Domain (ODD) of AD. In this sense, most experts foresee application of hybrid solutions with both ITS-G5 and cellular connectivity capabilities. For this purpose, TransAID's assumption of digitalizing the road infrastructure with additional sensing, computing and communication capabilities was acknowledged to be correct, even if maybe not realisable in the short term. - TransAID traffic management allowing the road infrastructure to provide additional information to CAVs was also recognized as a valid approach in almost all the consultation and twinning events. In this context, European and Japanese stakeholders firmly defend the use of infrastructure support for automated driving and even highlight the need to adapt traffic rules for automation or change the legal frameworks (e.g. authorize the road infrastructure to provide advices that break the traffic rules if needed). On the contrary, US stakeholders are very hesitant and fear possible financial consequences resulting from liability issues. - Remote operation is an emerging possible solution at least for management of level 4 automated public transport (e.g. autonomous shuttles or pods) in edge cases and transition areas, when the vehicles operate without a steward in the vehicle. This use case is not considered by TransAID, and hence it would be interesting to investigate its effectiveness with similar evaluations means as those utilized by TransAID. - Sensitivity of information around OEMs' current and future implementations has prevented obtaining commonly recognized functional descriptions reusable for modelling and simulations of automated vehicles behaviours. Despite that, the modelling solutions developed in the project under the consultancy of Hyundai were considered adequate and meaningful by the inquired stakeholders. - For the TransAID measures to work effectively, vehicle AD capabilities shall be known by the infrastructure, and infrastructure (support) capabilities shall be known by OEMs. Consequently, sharing this data in both directions is needed. From the consultation, this approach was welcomed by infrastructure stakeholders while OEMs were more hesitant mostly due to competition and liability implications arising from sensitivity of the shared information. To preserve sensitivity of information, the TransAID "intermediary service" concept (see TransAID D4.3) was generally supported, but its practical application in real-world deployment scenarios would need to be proven. - In addition, it is considered needed to derive clear and unambiguous definitions of AD ODDs for adoption at both OEMs and infrastructure side. Transport Authorities could use this information for allowing vehicles of different automation capabilities to use specific roads or to provide additional physical of digital support where needed. Nevertheless, defining ODDs is a complex task for the involved stakeholders, and despite initial activities have been started and proposals have been made, there is still a long way to go. - From an even more generic perspective, transport authorities (especially cities) are mostly interested in fulfilling their greener, safer and comfort goals and see AD as an opportunity in that direction. For the moment being, they are not favouring a particular automated transport mode in a proactive way. Rather, they seem to be monitoring the situation to apply reactive policies when AD introduction will be more mature and clearer. In fact, adoption of alternative policies like strategically "managing" private CAVs vs. fostering use of MaaS with public automated shuttles will depend on penetration. For TransAID, it is irrelevant which way authorities will choose, as the proposed TransAID solutions can apply irrespectively of the selected automated transport mode. As it can be seen, some of the findings from the consultation events reflect the uncertainty associated to vehicle automation and its evolution in the coming decades. Nevertheless, from the sequence of stakeholder consultation events a steady progression in the collective understanding of the relation between vehicle automation and infrastructure could be observed. The possible implications to the stakeholders involved became also clearer at subsequent events.