Suchergebnisse

Explores the governing institutions of New England as impediments to enhanced regional integration & economic development. Elements of New England politics & institutions are distinguished by political party competitiveness, historical urbanization & dominance of governing political machines, & dominance of the municipal government. Specific conditions for each state -- Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Maine, Vermont, Connecticut, & Rhode Island -- are highlighted. A history of attempts to form regional organizations across the states is surveyed, & economic & political factors that push toward & against regional integration are analyzed. 6 Tables, 9 References. L. Collins Leigh

"Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in International Institutions" published on by Oxford University Press.

Wenn sich die derzeitigen politischen Trends in den USA unverändert fortsetzen, ist eine Krise der Demokratie nur eine Frage der Zeit - und zwar unabhängig davon, wer die Präsidentschaftswahlen am 5. November 2024 gewinnt. Eine erneute Amtszeit Donald Trumps würde die Schwächung demokratischer Institutionen, die in der Leug­nung des Ergebnisses der letzten Präsidentschaftswahl gipfelte, massiv beschleunigen. Aber auch wenn Joe Biden noch einmal siegt, bleiben die Probleme des poli­tischen Systems gravierend: Das Vertrauen der Bevölkerung in die Integrität von Wahlen sinkt, die Bedeutung des Kongresses als institutionelle Instanz zur Kontrolle des Präsidenten nimmt ab und Strafverfolgung sowie Gerichtsbarkeit werden immer stärker politisiert. Vor diesem Hintergrund scheint es möglich, dass sich die Situation infolge eines knappen Wahlausgangs noch zuspitzt. (Autorenreferat)

This paper investigates the institutional reason underlying the change in the trajectory of economic growth in post-reform China, and argues that the trajectory of growth was much more normal during the period of 1978-89 than in the post-1989 era. In the former period, growth was largely induced by equality-generating institutional change in agriculture and the emergence of non-state industrial sector. In the latter period, growth was triggered by the acceleration of capital investments under authoritarian decentralized hierarchy within self-contained regions. Such a growth trajectory accelerates capital deepening, deteriorating total factor productivity and leads to rising regional imbalance. This paper further argues that the change in the trajectory of growth is the outcome of changes in political and inter-governmental fiscal institutions following the 1989 political crisis.

Microfinance institutions are one of the efforts of the government to give the right to low-income communities in the fulfillment of the need for housing. The program of special microfinance institutions for housing discussed in this study is microcredit housing. This research is a descriptive-qualitative research that compiles between microfinance institutions in Indonesia and in other developing countries in relation to housing microcredit program. It is found that from some aspects of comparability, other developing countries are better prepared in terms of micro housing microcredit program management than Indonesia.

This critical and thought-provoking book explores the causes and consequences of Europe's failed political and economic institutions. Europe's recession has created new challenges as market turmoil has shaken the foundations of the twin pillars of the new drive for European integration--political and monetary unions. This book critically assesses the patchwork solutions continually offered to hold the troubled unions together. Failed political policies, from the prodigious "Common Agricultural Policy" to ever more common fiscal stimulus packages, are shown to have bred less than stellar results in the past, and to have devastating implications for future European growth. The contributors outline the manner through which European monetary union has subsidized and continues to exacerbate the burgeoning debt crisis. Most strikingly, the interplay between Europe's political and economic realms is exposed as the boondoggle it is, with increasingly bureaucratic institutions plaguing the continent and endangering future potential

US influence has had a major role in the formation of Latin American political institutions, especially with respect to the separation of powers, the 2-chamber legislature, the central role of the president, & the requirement for periodic elections. European influences have been more marked in administrative organization & the legal system, & there have been some attempts to institute cabinet responsibility to the legislature. However, both models have been adapted to the idiosyncracies of the political dynamics of the region, especially to the frequency of dictatorship, rebellions, & other emergencies. Modified HA.

Manuel couvrant le programme des cours de droit institutionnel et de droit du contentieux de l'Union européenne. La première partie présente ses compétences, ses institutions, les rapports entre le droit de l'Union et le droit national. La seconde partie met en évidence la complémentarité des différentes voies du droit en matière de contentieux. ©Electre 2022

Das Papier diskutiert die relative Aufgabenteilung von privaten und öffentlichen Institutionen bei der Vermeidung und Bewältigung von Verschuldungskrisen souveräner Staaten. Anders als häufig in der Debatte dargestellt, sind Änderungen sowohl auf Seiten der Anleger gefragt wie auch Änderungen in der Politik und Rolle der Internationalen Finanzinstitutionen. Trotz der Erfahrungen der letzten Jahre sind die nötigen Änderungen bislang ausgeblieben. ; The paper discusses the relative role of private and public institutions in avoiding and dealing with the consequences of sovereign debt crises. Changes are required in the private sector as well as in the role and policy of the International Financial Institutions. Despite recent experiences with debt crises, necessary changes have not been implemented so far.

Preface -- Forward -- Fundamentals -- Introduction -- Arab political unity -- Arab economic unity -- Arab human development -- Moving towards privatization -- The Significant Role Of Oil Production -- Conclusion -- Major features of Arab economy -- Introduction -- It is a service economy -- Volatility of governments' revenues -- Insignificance of tax revenues -- High unemployment rates -- Increased burden of government's debt -- Surplus current accounts -- Significance of workers -- Remittances -- Conclusion -- Arab business environment -- Introduction -- Business culture in the Arab economy -- Not ease of doing business -- Modest competitiveness environment -- Low transparency -- Average credit rating -- Low ranking of good government -- Modest appeal to foreign investments -- Conclusion -- Arab financial institutions -- Introduction -- Currency systems in Arab economy -- Arab central banks -- Commercial banks -- Arab development funds -- Arab insurance companies -- Islamic finance

How do policing institutions affect the prospects for peace in post-conflict settings? We present a principal-agent theoretical framework to explain how the institutional design of policing affects the recurrence of civil conflict. We argue that the fragmentation of police forces can reignite conflict dynamics by impeding coordinated action, undermining information sharing, and enabling agents to pursue their own interests. We test these expectations with the Police Force Organization Dataset (PFOD) on police forces in over 100 developing states. Our empirical analyses show that increasing the number of distinct police forces is systematically associated with an increased risk of conflict recurrence in post-conflict states. We also find that a larger number of police forces is associated with more abuse against civilian populations in post-conflict states, setting the stage for new grievances that may undermine peace.

After a decade of research on the relationship between institutions and growth, scholars in this field seem to be divided. Economic institutions perform well in growth regressions and a body of literature argues that this supports the key importance of institutions for development. Other authors maintain that the type of constraints that the recent theoretical literature describes are the more stable political institutions, and these have been found to play no role in empirical growth analyses. In this paper we re-examine the role that institutions play in the growth process using cross-section and panel data for both developed and developing economies over the period 1970-2000. Our results indicate that the data is best described by an econometric model with two growth regimes. Political institutions are the key determinant of which growth regime an economy belongs to, while economic institutions have a direct impact on growth rates within each regime. These findings support the hierarchy of institutions hypothesis, whereby political institutions set the stage in which economic institutions and policies operate.

After a decade of research on the relationship between institutions and growth, scholars in this field seem to be divided. Economic institutions perform well in growth regressions and a body of literature argues that this supports the key importance of institutions for development. Other authors maintain that the type of constraints that the recent theoretical literature describes are the more stable political institutions, and these have been found to play no role in empirical growth analyses. In this paper we re-examine the role that institutions play in the growth process using cross-section and panel data for both developed and developing economies over the period 1970-2000. Our results indicate that the data is best described by an econometric model with two growth regimes. Political institutions are the key determinant of which growth regime an economy belongs to, while economic institutions have a direct impact on growth rates within each regime. These findings support the hierarchy of institutions hypothesis, whereby political institutions set the stage in which economic institutions and policies operate.