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This paper aims at discussing the influence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) case-law on Brazilian jurisprudence or legislation. First, it presents an overview of the Brazilian legal system as well as of the functioning of its Judiciary. Then the paper analyses the dialogue between Brazilian courts, mainly the Supreme Court, with supranational and foreign courts, indicating and discussing some cases and legislation where foreign jurisprudence is mentioned by Brazilian courts or laws. The paper concludes that there is no tradition in the Brazilian Judiciary of citing international and foreign jurisprudence. Moreover, although so far there has not been much influence of CJEU case-law on Brazilian jurisprudence or legislation, there is a great potential for CJEU influence on Brazilian Supreme and Superior courts jurisprudence as well as on the Brazilian national parliament decision-making process in the coming years, especially on issues relating to the Information Society.

Article ; The Constitution of Kenya provides that the sovereign power of the people shall be vested in the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, reflecting the democratic ideal that if power is concentrated in the hands of a few, it is prone to misuse. This provision aims to safeguard against arbitrary and capricious governance and the abuse of power. In the new constitutional order, there has been instances of tensions between the judiciary and the other arms of government. Unfortunate incidents of members of the Legislature referring to court orders as stupid and idiotic with blatant disregard for court orders have been witnessed. In a government whose legitimacy is vindicated by a court, it is ironical to observe a selective attitude towards respecting subsequent court orders. This paper aims to consider the disregard of court orders against the backdrop of the separation of powers and other relevant principles of constitutionalism.

Effective since China's resumption of sovereignty on 1 July 1997, the Hong Kong Basic Law lays down the general policies and system of government for Hong Kong under the 'one country, two systems' formula. It guarantees Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy, enshrines the rights and freedoms of residents, and preserves a separate common law system with an independent judiciary. This introduction traces the origins of the Hong Kong Basic Law and the concepts and legal issues that surround it. Drawing on the experience of the first 15 years, it then analyses the content of the Hong Kong Basic Law, especially in relation to Hong Kong's political system, the judiciary, and human rights. Intended especially for students at all levels in law, politics, and other disciplines, this book—the only introductory guide of its kind to the subject—will also appeal to the general reader interested in Hong Kong's experience under 'one country, two systems'. ; postprint

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The federal judiciary (judiciary) and the General Services Administration (GSA) are in the midst of a multi-billion dollar courthouse construction initiative, which has faced rising construction costs. For 33 federal courthouses completed since 2000, GAO examined (1) whether they contained extra space and any costs related to it; (2) how their actual size compares with the congressionally authorized size; (3) how their space based on the judiciary's 10-year estimates of judges compares with the actual number of judges; and (4) whether the level of courtroom sharing supported by the judiciary's data could have changed the amount of space needed in these courthouses. This testimony is based on GAO's June 2010 report; for that report, GAO analyzed courthouse planning and use data, visited courthouses, modeled courtroom sharing scenarios, and interviewed judges, GSA officials, and others."

This article addresses the issue of the relevance of World Trade Organization (WTO) adopted reports in the US legal order with specific attention paid to the role of the judiciary. Far from being limited to the issue of direct effect, the analysis here is an attempt to look at how the US judiciary takes into account these adopted reports, also considering other softer effects, such as their persuasive authority and interpretative significance, which are thoroughly examined in light of the Charming Betsy doctrine. The conclusion is that in US judicial venues, WTO adopted reports are not totally neglected and that, if due account is taken of the case law of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Chapter 19 binational panels, they are granted an ever more solid indirect effect. This judicial trend is analysed also in light of the somehow similar evolution that took place in the recent case law of the European Community Courts.

Shipping list no.: 2009-0241-P (pt. 1), 2008-0343-P (pt. 2,3), 2008-0313-P (pt. 4), 2008-0382-P (pt. 5), 2008-0417-P (pt. 6), 2008-0391-P (pt. 8), 2009-0108-P (pt. 9). ; Distributed to some depository libraries in microfiche. ; Description based on pt. 2. ; Includes bibliographical references and indexes. ; pt. 1. Dept. of the Treasury FY 2009 budget justifications -- pt. 2. FY 2009 budget justifications: Executive Office of the President; the judiciary -- pt. 3. District of Columbia FY 2009 budget justifications -- pt. 4. Independent agencies FY 2009 budget justifications -- pt. 5. Election Administration; consumer protection in financial services; public witness testimony -- pt. 6. Federal judiciary; Supreme Court; District of Columbia -- pt. 7. Dept. of the Treasury; OMB; IRS; SEC -- pt. 8. Consumer Products Safety Commission; NARA; OPM; GSA; FCC; SBA -- pt. 9. Public, educational, and governmental (PEG) access to cable television. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The Courts, Ian Greene, The Canadian Democratic Audit Series;
Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2006, pp. xvii, 182.This book is another welcome addition to the Canadian Democratic Audit
Series. It sets out to assess the democratic credentials of Canada's
judiciary—a most significant branch of government in post-1982
Canada. The book's approach is refreshing in several respects.
Instead of the traditional focus on the well-rehearsed debate over the
questionable democratic credentials of judicial review, the book attempts
to evaluate the adequacy of the Canadian court system in relation to three
basic tenets of democracy: participation, inclusiveness, and
responsiveness. Unlike most accounts of Canadian political institutions,
it pays due attention to elements of the court system beyond the Supreme
Court of Canada. In so doing, Greene is able to assess more accurately
whether the Canadian judiciary as a whole is living up to that set of
reasonable democratic expectations.

This article maps current constitutional adjudication systems in 17 Latin American democracies. Using recent theoretical literature, the authors classify systems by type (concrete or abstract), timing (a priori or a posteriori), and jurisdiction (centralized or decentralized). This approach captures the richness and diversity of constitutional adjudication in Latin America, where most countries concurrently have two or more mechanisms. Four models of constitutional adjudication are currently in use. In the past, weak democratic institutions and the prevalence of inter partes, as opposed to erga omnes, effects of judicial decisions, prevented the development of constitutional adjudication. Today, democratic consolidation has strengthened the judiciary and fostered constitutional adjudication. After discussing the models, the authors highlight the role of the judiciary in the constitutional adjudication bodies, the broad range of options existing to initiate this adjudication process, and the prevalence of amparo (habeas corpus) provisions.

Countries such as Iran and Turkey do not fit comfortably into the democratic and authoritarian categories. In these countries, elections are held regularly, and the will of the people is accepted as one source of sovereignty. At the same time, both constitutionally and in practice the elected officials have to share the exercise of political power with institutions that do not draw their power directly from the will of the people. In such systems, the judiciary has two important political functions. First, the judiciary acts as a politically insulated decision-maker through which the unelected head can exercise some degree of control over the actions of the elected head. Second, the judiciary's direct involvement in the political arena increases political tensions and legitimates the continuation of the two-headed system. In systems based on divided sovereignty, the tensions created by the judicialization of politics contribute to the stability of the regime.

The natural models for English debates on judicial appointments have been from the common law. Although England and Wales remain very much within the common law world and its problems, we are increasingly drawn into a European world, where many of our ideas and standards are shaped by our participation in European agendas. There are important lessons to be learnt from European experience in this area. Based on that European experience, one can see a tension between the desire to give the judiciary greater independence from the executive and the practice of leaving the judiciary increasingly in charge of the processes of appointment and management of the judicial career and, even, of the judicial system itself. These tensions are much stronger in many other parts of Europe and these may serve as useful points of reference. There is an emerging European judicial model to which English debates are now referring, but which needs critical assessment.

This article explores the nature and evolution of government‐military relations in Chile since democratic restoration in 1990. Its highlights both the attempts by the Concertación governments to reinstate civilian control on the armed forces, as well as the mechanisms used by the military establishment to resist it. Special attention is given to two particular actors of the Chilean democratic transition who have played a critical role in the evolution of government‐military relations in the post‐authoritarian period: the civilian Right and the Judiciary. As this article aims to show, the strength of the Chilean right has constantly represented a formidable barrier for the Concertación governments in attempts to introduce the legal reforms required to re‐establish civilian supremacy over the military. Furthermore, legal decisions adopted by the Chilean judiciary on human rights‐related cases have also played a crucial role in the evolution of government‐military relations during the past decade.

In the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission, an independent agency in the judicial branch charged with promulgating binding sentencing guidelines for federal crimes. In Mistretta v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the Sentencing Reform Act does not violate separation of powers principles. This Note asserts that the Court misapplied separation of powers theory, and that the Sentencing Commission violates separation of powers in two ways. First, by delegating to the judicial branch the authority to create sentencing guidelines which have the effect of law, Congress impermissibly aggrandized the core function of the judiciary. Second, judicial service on the Sentencing Commission encroaches upon the core function of the judicial branch by threatening the impartiality and independence of judges and reducing public confidence in the judiciary. This Note concludes that the advantages of judicial service on the Sentencing Commission do not outweigh the detriment to the judicial branch.

Modern constitutional scholarship tends to focus exclusively on the role of the judiciary in the development of constitutional law. Recognizing that this "court-positivist" outlook leaves substantial gaps in constitutional literature, the authors turn their scholarly attention to legislative and executive contributions to the field. The subject of their inquiry is U.S. Senator Orrin G. Hatch, who has chaired the Constitutional Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and who is one of the Senate's most recognized constitutional commentators. The authors interviewed Senator Hatch about his positions on various issues in constitutional law and theory, and annotated the interview extensively to analyze the Senator's published and unpublished statements on the same subjects. The result is a fascinating portrait of the Senator who has been called "Mr. Constitution in the Senate," and a significant step toward a new body of constitutional scholarship that will truly recognize the tripartite nature of our federal constitutional system.

THIS STUDY ANALYZES THE IMPACT THAT PRESIDENTS CAN HAVE ON THE DECISIONAL OUTPUT OF THEIR APPOINTEES TO THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS. PRESIDENTIAL IMPACT MAY BE INFLUENCED BY A NUMBER OF FACTORS: THE EXECUTIVE'S DESIRE TO BASE APPOINTMENTS PRIMARILY ON IDEOLOGICAL CRITERIA; THE NUMBER OF JUDGES HE IS PERMITTED TO APPOINT; THE DEGREE TO WHICH HE CAN USE HIS POLITICAL SKILLS IN SUPPORT OF HIS NOMINEES; AND THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL CLIMATE INTO WHICH THE NEW JUDGES ENTER. THE EMPIRICAL DATA COMPILED ON THE VOTING BEHAVIOR OF THE VARIOUS PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEES DEMONSTRATES THAT FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES APPOINTED BY DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTS WERE COMPARATIVELY MORE LIBERAL THAN THOSE CHOSEN BY REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTS. THE FINDINGS ALSO INDICATE THAT POLITICALLY POWERFUL PRESIDENTS WHO SHOWED A PERSONAL INTEREST IN THEIR DISTRICT COURT SELECTIONS HAD A GREATER IMPACT ON THE JUDICIARY THAN PRESIDENTS WHO LACKED THE WILL, THE OPPORTUNITY OR THE POWER TO PACK THE JUDICIARY.

This case study of the impact of Baker v. Carr on the State of Washington attempts to discern the nature of the role of the judiciary in the implementation of new reapportionment rules. Redistricting is usually thought of as a highly political area, outside the normal involvement of courts. Now that federal judges are under a mandate to consider the problems in this area, it is important to understand the capacity of the judicial system to discharge its role. By exercising their power with restraint, the federal judges in Washington sought to influence the political system to do its duty without an open confrontation betwden the federal judiciary and the state legislature. The author concludes that the actions taken by the federal judges were a necessary condition for redistricting in Washington in 1965. His insights into the political decision-making process may have immediate value as the 1971 legislature faces its constitutional duty to redistrict the state.