Pitanje mogućnosti formiranja ekološkog pokreta u Srbiji u kontekstu postsocijalistiĉke transformacije društva i procesa evrointegracija, predstavlja predmet bavljenja ove doktorske disertacije. Rad se sastoji iz tri veće celine i poglavlja u kome su izneta zakljuĉna razmatranja. U prvom delu rada, razvijeni su uporedno-istorijski, kontekstualni, konceptualni i metodološki okvir istraţivanja, kao polazne osnove za dalje analize. Kako bi mogle biti obuhvaćene sve relevantne dimenzije kompleksnog fenomena ekološkog pokreta i sloţena mreţa ĉinilaca koji utiĉu na njegov nastanak i razvoj, u istraţivanju su kombinovano korišćene razliĉite metodološke tehnike: anketno ispitivanje stavova i praksi na reprezentativnom uzorku graĊana Srbije (N=1952) i predstavnika lokalnih samouprava (N=232), polustrukturisani intervjui sa predstavnicima nevladinih organizacija (N=44), kao i dve studije sluĉaja zajednica sa izraţenim ekološkim problemima - Panĉeva i Bora. Drugi deo rada je posvećen opisu i analizi pojedinaĉnih elemenata ekološkog pokreta: ekoloških aktivista, ekoloških grupa / organizacija, ekoloških mreţa, kolektivnog identiteta i ekoloških konflikata. Na osnovu detaljne analize karakteristika osnovnih elemenata pokreta, u zakljuĉnom poglavlju drugog dela rada daje se odgovor na pitanje: da li u Srbiji postoji ekološki pokret? Osnovni istraţivaĉki nalaz je da u Srbiji nije došlo do formiranja klasiĉnog participativnog tipa ekološkog pokreta, kakav je prisutan u zemljama Zapada. TakoĊe, nema ni naznaka znaĉajnijeg prisustva elemenata transakcionog ekološkog aktivizma (pokreta), ĉiji je prisustvo zabeleţeno u zemljama Centralne Evrope. Umesto toga, svedoci smo razvoja specifiĉnog modela ekološkog kolektivnog delanja koji smo nazvali "ekološkim trećim sektorom". Naime, za razliku od participativnog i transakcionog delanja, koji imaju naglašeno politiĉku dimenziju, aktivnosti organizacija u okviru trećeg sektora su preteţno "apolitiĉne" po karakteru, usmerene na pruţanje usluga u oblastima iz kojih se, u sklopu neoliberalnih reformi, drţava povukla. Pored nerazvijenosti konfliktne (politiĉke) dimenzije, ekološki treći sektor odlikuje i atomizovano delanje profesionalnih ekoloških organizacija, koje samo izuzetno (pod spoljnim pritiscima ili podsticajima) uspostavljaju fiziĉke veze (mreţe) meĊu sobom, dok se na planu kolektivnog identiteta razvija samo kognitivna dimenzija (formalno prihvatanje odreĊenih ekoloških vrednosti i naĉela koja ĉine sastavni deo ekološkog diskursa dominantnog na Zapadu). GraĊani, po pravilu, nisu ukljuĉeni u rad ovih organizacija, izuzev kao korisnici usluga. U trećem delu rada se razmatraju razlozi usled kojih ne dolazi do razvoja participativnog i/ili transakcionog ekološkog pokreta (aktivizma). Za potrebe objašnjenja nastanka specifiĉne hibridne forme ekološkog trećeg sektora, kreiran je sintetiĉki eksplanatorni model koji kombinuje elemente razvijene u okviru razliĉitih teorijskih pristupa fenomenu društvenih pokreta. Eksplanatorna shema je formulisana na sledeći naĉin: za pokretanje kolektivnog delanja i nastanak ekološkog pokreta neophodno da prethodno budu ispunjeni sledeći uslovi: potrebno je da postoji izvesno socijalno-konstruisano nezadovoljstvo (problem) kod većeg broja pojedinaca / profesionalnih zastupniĉkih organizacija (socijalno-konstruktivistiĉka reinterpretacija klasiĉnih pristupa); zatim, grupa pojedinaca koja oseća dati problem / zalaţe se za njegovo rešavanje, mora posedovati odreĊene resurse za pokretanje i odrţavanje 5 kolektivne akcije (pristup teorije mobilizacije resursa); šire okruţenje treba da bude relativno povoljno kako bi nagovestilo mogućnost pozitivnog ishoda aktivnosti koja se ţeli realizovati (pristup strukture politiĉkih mogućnosti), a vrednosni okvir na takav naĉin podešen da usmerava na delanje predstavnike profesionalnih ekoloških organizacija i / ili neposredno ugroţenu populaciju (nezadovoljne) i (eventualno) širi krug podrţavalaca (pristup Novih društvenih pokreta). Na proces formiranja ekološkog pokreta, kroz ĉetiri neposredna faktora (socijalna-konstrukcija ekoloških rizika, dostupnost i karakteristike resursa, struktura politiĉkih mogućnosti, vrednosni sistem),indirektno deluju širi društveni procesi - postsocijalistiĉka transformacija i evropeizacija srpskog društva, kao i ĉinioci duţeg trajanja ((pred)socijalistiĉko nasleĊe). Testiranje postavljenih eksplikativnih hipoteza je pokazalo da ni jedan od uslova neophodnih za formiranje ekološkog pokreta, nije delimiĉno ili u potpunosti zadovoljen. Postojeći ekološki problemi su dominantno odreĊeni u kategorijama niskog rizika i male vaţnosti u odnosu na druga društvena pitanja, usled ĉega je i njihov podsticajni kapacitet za kolektivnu (re)akciju bitno sniţen. Pored toga, vladajuće shvatanje prema kome u ekološkoj modernizaciji leţi rešenje za gotovo sve ekološke probleme, pokazuje se kao ĉinilac koji nepovoljno utiĉe na graĊanski aktivizam, jer upućuje na pasivno išĉekivanje uvoĊenja obećanih mehanizama odrţivog razvoja. Većini graĊana na raspolaganju stoji vrlo ograniĉena koliĉina resursa, usled ĉega, u velikom broju sluĉajeva, oni odustaju od uĉešća u ekološkim akcijama. Ekološke organizacije, takoĊe, imaju poteškoća da obezbede neophodne resurse za rad, a dodatni problem predstavlja i naĉin njihove mobilizacije, usled kojeg gube samostalnost postajući zavisne od stranih izvora finansiranja. Kao posledica, ekološko delanje je atomizovano, a rivalitet i konflikti unutar ekološkog civilnog sektora, naglašeni; ekološke mreţe se teško formiraju i odrţavaju, kolektivni identitet je slab (nad njim prevagu odnose partikularni interesi), a kritiĉko delovanje ekoloških organizacija, nerazvijeno. Struktura politiĉkih mogućnosti se, uprkos postojanju relativno povoljnog zakonskog okvira, pokazuje zatvorenom prema uĉešću graĊana u donošenju odluka. GraĊani percipiraju predstavnike vlasti kao neprijemĉive za njihove potrebe, što se nepovoljno odraţava na njihovu spremnost da se organizuju i pokušaju da nametnu svoje zahteve. S druge strane, ekološke organizacije su iskljuĉene iz procesa odluĉivanja i svedene na ulogu asistenata u podizanju kapaciteta drţave za sprovoĊenje programa u oblasti zaštite ţivotne sredine. Konfliktno delanje organizacija je ograniĉeno, s jedne strane, time što ne dobijaju podršku moćnih aktera (meĊunarodne ekološke organizacije, strani donatori), a sa druge, finansijskim uslovljavanjem od strane drţavnih struktura. Karakteristike kulturološkog konteksta se, takoĊe, pokazuju nepovoljnim za razvoj ekološkog pokreta u Srbiji. Dominacija materijalistiĉkog sistema vrednosti i s njim povezano visoko vrednovanje ekonomskog razvoja, koje u senci ostavlja ekološke probleme, negativno utiĉe na ekološko aktiviranje graĊana. Ipak, uprkos preteţno materijalistiĉkoj vrednosnoj orijentaciji, graĊanima su vrlo bliske vrednosti Nove ekološke paradigme. MeĊutim, od naĉelnog prihvatanja vrednosti karakteristiĉnih za ovu paradigmu do aktivnog delanja, u kontekstu materijalne oskudice, put je dug i vrlo neizvestan. Zakljuĉno poglavlje je posvećeno rezimiranju i diskusiji empirijskih nalaza, kao i razmatranju širih implikacija nerazvijenosti ekološkog pokreta na zaštitu ţivotne sredine u Srbiji. ; he environmental movement in Serbia, in the context of post-socialist transformation and the EU integration process. The paper consists of three major parts and the concluding chapter. In the first part a comparative - historical, contextual, conceptual and methodological framework of the research is developed, as a starting point for the further analyses. In order to capture all relevant dimensions of the complex phenomenon of environmental movement and the composite set of factors that influence its emergence and development, the study is using a combination of different methodological techniques: a survey of attitudes and practices based on a representative sample of Serbian citizens (N = 1952) and local government representatives (N = 232), in parallel with the semi-structured interviews with representatives of non-governmental organizations (N = 44), and the two case studies of communities with serious environmental problems – the municipalities of Pancevo and Bor. The second part contains the description and analysis of individual elements of the environmental movement: environmental activists, environmental groups / organizations, environmental networks, collective identity and environmental conflicts. Based on a detailed analysis of the characteristics of the key elements of environmental movement, the concluding chapter of this part of the paper offers an answer to the question - is there an environmental movement in Serbia? The main research finding is that participatory type of environmental movement that is typical for the Western countries has not been formed in Serbia. There are even no indications of the existence of significant elements of transactional environmental activism (movement), that is present in the countries of Central Europe. Instead, we are witnessing the development of a distinct model of collective environmental action that we have named "the third environmental sector". Different from the participative and transactional activism which have an emphasized political dimension, the nature of the activities of the third sector organizations is mostly "non-political", aimed at providing services in those areas that the state has withdrew from, in the context of neo-liberal reforms. In addition to the underdeveloped conflict/political dimension, the environmental third sector is characterized by atomized actions of professional environmental organizations, which establish physical connections (networks) among themselves only as an exception (under external pressures or incentives), while at the level of collective identity only the cognitive dimension is being developed (the formal acceptance of the environmental values and principles which form an integral part of the environmental discourse dominant in the West). Citizens, as a rule, are not included in the work of these organizations, except as users of services. In the third part, the reasons for the absence of the participatory and / or transactional environmental movement (activism) are discussed. In order to explain the emergence of the specific hybrid form of the environmental third sector, a synthetic explanatory model was established, combining elements developed within different social movement theories. The explanatory scheme has been formulated as follows: for the launch of collective action and the emergence of the environmental movement certain conditions are necessary to be met - a certain level of socially-constructed 8 dissatisfaction (problem) needs to be generated in large numbers of individuals / professional advocacy organizations (social constructivist reinterpretation of classical approaches); then, a group of individuals who perceive the problem / advocates for its solution must possess appropriate resources to initiate and sustain a collective action (the Resource Mobilization Theory approach); the wider context should be relatively favorable as to suggest the possibility of a positive outcome of the action (the Political Opportunities Structure approach); the value framework should be set up in such a way to initiate the action of professional environmental organizations and / or the directly affected population, and possibly also of a wider circle of supporters (the New Social Movements approach). Through the four direct factors (social – construction of environmental risks, the availability and characteristics of resources, the structure of political opportunities, the value system), the process of development of the environmental movement is indirectly affected by wider-scale social processes – the post-socialist transformation and Europeanization of Serbian society, as well as by the factors of longer duration ((pre-) socialist heritage).The testing of the set of explicative hypotheses showed that the necessary pre-conditions for the formation of the environmental movement in Serbia have neither been fully, nor even partially met. In comparison with other issues, the existing environmental problems are dominantly defined in the terms of low-risk and low-importance, due to which their capacities to induce collective (re)action are significantly reduced. In addition, the prevailing concept of environmental modernization, presented as a solution to almost all environmental problems, proves to be a factor that adversely affects civic activism, as it leads to passive anticipation of the promised introduction of mechanisms for sustainable development. Since the majority of citizens have access only to very limited resources, they, in many cases, tend to give up their participation in environmental actions. Environmental organizations also face difficulties in obtaining necessary resources for their operation. An additional problem lies in the way resources are being mobilized: becoming increasingly dependent on foreign funding, organizations tend to lose their autonomy. As a result, the environmental action is atomized and rivalries and conflicts within the environmental civil society accentuated; environmental networks are difficult to establish and maintain and the collective identity is weak (due to domination of particular interests); the conflictual dimension of environmental organizations remains undeveloped. Despite the relatively favorable legal framework, the structure of political opportunities seems closed to the participation of citizens in the decision-making process. Citizens perceive government representatives as unresponsive to their needs, which negatively affects their readiness to act in an organized way and to attempt to impose their demands. On the other hand, environmental organizations are excluded from the decision-making process and reduced to the assisting role in the capacity building of the state bodies for the implementation of programs in the field of environmental protection. Conflicting action of such organizations is limited, on the one hand by the lack of support from powerful actors (international environmental organizations, international donors), and on the other - by the financial preconditions imposed by the state authorities. The characteristics of the cultural context also appear to be unfavorable for the development of the environmental movement in Serbia. The dominance of the materialistic value system and the related high priority attributed to the economic 9 growth, leaves the environmental problems on the margins, thus negatively affecting the environmental activation of citizens. However, despite the predominantly materialistic value orientation, the values of the New environmental paradigm are very familiar to the citizens. Still, in the context of material insecurity, the road from the general acceptance of such values to active action towards reaching them, is long and very uncertain. The concluding chapter is devoted to summarizing and discussing the empirical findings, as well as to considerations of implications of the under-developed environmental movement to the overall state of environmental protection in Serbia.
The aim of the following article is to find whether the European Court of Justice has reacted in its recent rulings to the growing reluctance of many Europeans and their political representations towards quasi-automatic rights of migrating of European Union citizens to move to another Member State and enjoy there the benefits of social policy on equal footing with this country´s nationals. The result of the referendum held in the United Kingdom on 23 June 2016 regarding the UK's membership in the EU demonstrates the importance of the issue in question. The authors analyse recent case law of the European Court of Justice in comparison with its earlier case law regarding the access of Union citizens to social assistance and the status of third country nationals as family members of European Union citizens. The authors have come to the conclusion that so far, the European Court of Justice tightened the interpretation of the European Union law in force in the area of welfare tourists' rights unlike in the case of economically active migrants. First, Martinez-Sala, Grzelczyk, Bidar, Trojani and other judgments are mentioned to remind the previous approach of the European Court of Justice, based on the principle of broad solidarity between Member States. Second, this approach is confronted with more recent case law, i. e. Dano, Alimanovic, Garcia-Nieto, Commission against the United Kingdom. In those cases, the court did not require the host Member States to recognize the value of EU citizenship as an individual's "fundamental status" nor to show a degree of solidarity. The court stood for the uncomplicated and rigorous application of Directive 2004/38. When it comes to third country nationals as family members of Union citizens, their status it is not only confirmed but even extended. The authors analyse briefly earlier case law of the European Court of Justice, namely the Singh, O. and B., Metock, Zambrano and Dereci cases. These judgments are characteristic of broad interpretation of Directive 2004/38 and provisions of the Treaty on EU citizenship in favour of the family members. Protection of fundamental rights also plays an important part. Other than in the case of social tourism, there has been no change in the approach of the European Court of Justice. On the contrary, in Marín, Chavez-Vilchez, Lounes or Coman judgments, the European Court of Justice confirms its previous line of reasoning and further develops it. Nevertheless, the authors hold the view that the European Court of Justice should more carefully balance and try to reconcile free movement rights, fundamental rights, as well as the sovereign rights of Member States in order to contribute to the prevention of European disintegration. ; The authors are thankful for support to the Charles University research program "PROGRES Q02 – Publicization of law in the European and international comparison" ; Magdaléna Svobodová: svobodom@prf.cuni.cz ; Václav Šmejkal: smejkalv@prf.cuni.cz ; Magdaléna Svobodová - Senior lecturer at Charles University, Faculty of Law, Department of European Law. Prague, Czech Republic. ; Václav Šmejkal - Associate professor at Charles University, Faculty of Law, Department of European Law. Prague, Czech Republic. ; Magdaléna Svobodová - Charles University (Czech Republic) ; Václav Šmejkal - Charles University (Czech Republic) ; Blauberger, M. & Schmidt, S. K. 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Why did Wilsonian ideals influence AEF actions in the First World War, and how did that affect the United States' involvement in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation? Wilsonian ideals influenced the AEF's actions in the First World War because most American leaders and soldiers shared Wilson's concepts of Progressivism and believed that the United States should play a role in saving Europe. Even if some did not agree with Wilson's politics, most doughboys shared his ideas of American Exceptionalism, and these views affected United States involvement in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation. In merging the two topic areas of Wilson's ideologies and AEF involvement in the war, this essay will attempt to answer how the American doughboy found motivation in the same principles that guided President Wilson. ; Master of Arts in Military History ; Week 11 Final Paper Wilsonianism in the First World War: Progressivism, American Exceptionalism, and the AEF Doughboy Brian P. Bailes A paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts in Military History Norwich University MH 562B Dr. John Broom August 16, 2020 Bailes 2 While the duration of American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) involvement in First World War combat operations remained short compared to the armies of the European powers, the experience had a lasting impact on the United States' status as a global power. President Woodrow Wilson's mediation in the European affair throughout American neutrality, his integration of the AEF into Allied operations, and his contribution to the post-war peace process cast him as a central figure of the conflict as well as a harbinger of United States interventionist foreign policy. Through the more than a century since the end of the war, historians have analyzed and debated various facets of United States belligerency. Historians have explored President Wilson's ideologies and the decision making that ultimately led to him making his April 1917 appeal to Congress for American belligerency. Additionally, historians have expanded on AEF actions in Europe and argued how General Pershing's adamancy on maintaining an independent American command created tension with the Allied leaders. Historians have not connected these two topics to analyze how a reader can conceptually link Wilson's ideas and doughboy exploits in Europe. Why did Wilsonian ideals influence AEF actions in the First World War, and how did that affect the United States' involvement in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation? Throughout the historiography of United States involvement in the First World War, specific themes reoccur as significant areas of consensus. The historiography presents two primary arguments in which historians agree. Historians agree that Wilson's peace objectives drastically differed from those of the Allies, and historians agree that these differences motivated Wilson's decisions regarding how the United States would enter the war. Historians also agree that friction existed between General Pershing and the Allied Commanders once the AEF arrived in Europe and began combat operations. These two commonalities in the historiography remain Bailes 3 relatively constant throughout the past 50 years of historical research, and even when portraying more positive sentiments expressed between AEF and Allied soldiers, historians still note some tension between Pershing and the Allied commanders. Historians agree that Wilson's peace objectives differed significantly from those of the Allies. David Woodford argues that the gap between British imperial interests and Wilson's peace objectives affected the alliance between the United States and England throughout the war.1 William Widenor argues that Wilson failed in achieving his goals during the Versailles Peace Settlement because he attempted to make too many concessions for enduring peace, and he claims that Wilson grew at odds with the Allied leaders at the peace conference.2 George Egerton argues that British policymakers were closely monitoring the dispute within the United States Senate during the Treaty of Versailles conference, and he suggests that British leadership remained skeptical of Wilson's League of Nations.3 Historians capture Wilson's opposing peace aims throughout the European conflict, and they seemingly agree on how these aims influenced Wilson's policies and actions. Some historians cite the most significant gap in peace aims as existing between the United States and France. David Stevenson argues that French leaders were continually at odds with Wilson throughout the war as the French war aims focused much more on their national security, which they saw as requiring the destruction of Imperial Germany.4 Stevenson points out that while Wilson's peace aims differed from England as well as France, many French objectives 1 David R. Woodward, Trial by Friendship: Anglo-American Relations, 1917-1918 (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1993), 7-25, 35-43, 77-80, 125-9, 208-20. 2 William C. Widenor, "The United States and the Versailles Peace Settlement," Modern American Diplomacy, eds. John M. Carroll and George C. Herring (Lanham: SR Books, 1996), 46-59. 3 George W. Egerton, "Britain and the 'Great Betrayal': Anglo-American Relations and the Struggle for United States Ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, 1919-1920," The Historical Journal 21, no. 4 (December 1978): 885-911, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2638973. 4 David Stevenson, "French War Aims and the American Challenge, 1914-1918," The Historical Journal 22, no. 4 (December 1979): 877-894, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2638691. Bailes 4 were more aggressive against Germany as they involved reclaiming land lost to Germany in previous wars, specifically the 1870 Franco-Prussian War.5 Stevenson highlights the fact that Wilson could not get French officials to see the "two Germanys" concept that prevailed in American thinking at the time. While the American public generally saw two Germanys – the autocratic ruling party dominated by the Prussian elite and the German people living under that oppressive regime – Stevenson argues that France only saw Imperial Germany as a total enemy.6 Robert Bruce explains that during the post-war occupation period, the American doughboys perceived Frenchmen as distrustful and hateful toward German soldiers, and this sullied the alliance between France and the United States.7 In line with Wilson's ideology, historians cite Wilson's desire for Europe to achieve a "peace without victory" as he attempted to serve as a mediator during the United States period of neutrality. These historians ultimately conclude that Wilson believed any of the European powers achieving their aims through victory would lead to a continuation of balance of power politics in Europe. They argue that Wilson thought merely putting an end to the fighting would be the only way to achieve lasting peace. Ross Gregory argues that Wilson acted as a persistent mediator throughout the war as he strove for a "peace without victory."8 Arthur Link explains that Wilson believed a "peace without victory" and a "draw in Europe" proved the best solution for establishing a new system to replace the broken power structure in Europe.9 Ross Kennedy portrays Wilson as advocating the United States as a neutral mediator striving for a "peace 5 Stevenson, 884, 892-4. 6 Stevenson, 885. 7 Robert B. Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms: America & France in the Great War (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 2003), 286-95. 8 Ross Gregory, The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1971), 115-6. 9 Arthur Link, "Entry into World War I," Progress, War, and Reaction: 1900-1933, eds. Davis R.B. Ross, Alden T. Vaughan, and John B. Duff (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, Inc., 1970), 141. Bailes 5 without victory" before the U.S. entered the war, then as an advocate of "just peace" after they entered the war.10 Kennedy argues that Wilson blamed the international system that led to power politics and wanted to have a separate voice in the peace process to shape a new diplomatic and global political order.11 Historians point to Wilson's ideology as a reason for his differing peace objectives, and historians point to Wilson's Christian faith as a significant motivation for his progressive philosophy. Lloyd Ambrosius highlights Wilson's four tenets of national self-determination, open-door economic globalization, collective security, and progressive history as the framework in which he envisioned a global order shaped by American democratic ideals that would bring the world to peace.12 Ambrosius examines Wilson's embrace of "American Exceptionalism" and looks at how his Anglo-American bias clouded his vision and prevented him from seeing the various cultural factors throughout the world.13 Ronald Pestritto examines Wilson's progressive form of history while arguing that Wilson saw democracy emerging within society as a phenomenon only natural to specific groups of people, and he only saw a few civilizations as "progressed."14 Pestritto notes Wilson's Christian inspiration, referencing early manuscripts written by Wilson titled "Christ's Army" and "Christian Progress."15 William Appleman Williams argues that Wilson maintained a Calvinist idealism that intensified the existing doctrine 10 Ross A. Kennedy, "Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and American National Security," Diplomatic History 25, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 15, 29, https://doi.org/10.1111/0145-2096.00247. 11 Kennedy, "Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and American National Security," 2-3. 12 Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 2-47. 13 Ambrosius, Wilsonianism, 125-34; Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 33-49; Lloyd E. Ambrosius, "World War I and the Paradox of Wilsonianism," The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 17 (2018): 5-22, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537781417000548. 14 Ronald J. Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 6-61. 15 Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, 23, 40. Bailes 6 based on God's supposed ordination of American influence and expansion in the world.16 Richard Gamble explains that Wilson's vision and rhetoric nested with many of the Christian messages of progressive religious leaders in the United States during the First World War who saw the war as a Christian crusade to spread American ideals.17 Historians seem in unanimous agreement that Wilson's separate peace aims formed the primary impetus for him seeking an independent American presence in the war effort. David Esposito argues that Wilson wanted to have an American presence in the war because he realized that to establish a dominant American voice in the post-war peace talks, the United States needed to make a significant contribution to Allied victory.18 Edward Coffman details the United States' experiences in the First World War by explaining Wilson's desire to gain an independent voice in the peace process.19 David Trask maintains that Wilson wanted to "remain somewhat detached from the Allies" in defeating Imperial Germany to provide Wilson leverage so that he could directly influence the post-war peace process.20 Arthur Link explains that Wilson did see the benefit of not joining the Entente but keeping the United States independent of "any political commitments" with the Allies as providing a chance to ensure an American presence at the peace conference.21 Thomas Knock argues that Wilson faulted the "balance of power" politics of Europe and saw the United States as the actor to save Europe and create a new system of 16 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1959; New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009), 67-112. Page references are to the 2009 edition. 17 Richard M. Gamble, The War for Righteousness: Progressive Christianity, the Great War, and the Rise of the Messianic Nation (Wilmington: ISI Books, 2003), 22-3, 86-208, 254-5. 18 David M. Esposito, "Woodrow Wilson and the Origins of the AEF," Presidential Studies Quarterly 19 no. 1 (Winter 1989): 127-38, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40574570. 19 Edward M. Coffman, The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1968), 5-8. 20 David F. Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 1917-1918 (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1993), 2-6. 21 Link, "Entry into World War I," 141. Bailes 7 diplomacy.22 Overall, historians agree that President Wilson desired very different peace outcomes for a post-war Europe, and this influenced him as he made decisions regarding United States actions throughout the war. In addition to the agreement that Wilson's peace aims differed from the Allies, historians also agree that once the United States did enter the war and the AEF arrived in Europe, friction quickly developed between General Pershing and the Allied commanders. David Trask argues many instances of "increasing friction" existed between Pershing and the French and British command. Trask includes a case where the Allies "attempted to bypass Pershing" by working directly with Wilson even though Wilson had appointed Pershing as Commander in Chief of the AEF.23 Trask argues that Pershing believed that the preceding few years of trench warfare had "deprived the French and even the British of offensive spirit," and he maintains that with Pershing's "open warfare" tactics, his methods of training drastically differed from the Allies.24 Michael Adas cites disagreement between Pershing and the Allied commanders immediately after Pershing arrived in France due to Pershing's unwillingness to listen to the experienced French and British leaders as they tried to suggest ways to employ the AEF.25 Adas argues that Pershing's desire to pursue "open warfare" did not take into account the realities of trench warfare and resulted in costly casualties.26 Russell Weigley cites frequent tensions between Pershing and the Allied commanders, including an example in September of 1918 in which AEF 22 Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest For a New World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 30-69. 23 Trask, AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 38-9. 24 Trask, AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 19. 25 Michael Adas, "Ambivalent Ally: American Military Intervention and the Endgame and Legacy of World War I," Diplomatic History 38 no. 4 (September 2014): 705-7, http://doi.org/10.1093/dh.dhu032. 26 Adas, "Ambivalent Ally," 710. Bailes 8 "traffic congestion" caused a significant disturbance in a visit from Georges Clemenceau.27 Weigley explains that Pershing's belief in "open warfare" would not work due to the enormous American divisions built for the trenches, arguing that Pershing would need "smaller, maneuverable divisions" if he wanted his open warfare to work.28 All historians agree that the issue of AEF amalgamation with the French and British forces served as the primary reason for the friction between the military leaders. David Woodford cites the notion that AEF amalgamation would "undermin[e] the significance of the American military role." Hence, Pershing remained adamant in his stance not to let the Allies use American soldiers to fight under French or British flags.29 Woodward notes that Pershing felt his AEF superior to the Allies as he "believed that the Americans had almost nothing to learn from French and British officers."30 Woodford explains that war aims and peace objectives formed the basis of a fractured Anglo-American relationship that finally crumbled during the peace conference.31 Mitchell Yockelson argues that despite tension between Pershing and the Allied leaders regarding the question of amalgamation, the 27th and 30th Divisions contributed significantly to the Allied effort under British command. Yockelson highlights a fascinating illustration of Pershing's stubbornness in noting that Pershing did not follow the exploits of these divisions even though they proved instrumental in the offensive against the Hindenburg Line.32 As an enduring theme throughout the amalgamation debate, historians point to Pershing's desire for the United States to deliver the decisive blow against Germany with an independent 27 Russell F. Weigley, "Strategy and Total War in the United States: Pershing and the American Military Tradition," Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918, eds. Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 333. 28 Weigley, "Pershing and the American Military Tradition," 341-2. 29 Woodward, Trial by Friendship, 57-8. 30 Woodward, 88. 31 Woodward, 7-80, 112-220. 32 Mitchell A. Yockelson, Borrowed Soldiers: Americans Under British Command, 1918 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), 92-228. Bailes 9 American army. Allan Millett argues that Wilson gave Pershing the explicit directive to keep the AEF separate from the Allies and allowed Pershing the freedom to make decisions on how to integrate the AEF.33 Millett cites Pershing's initial plan to use an AEF offensive on Metz as the critical blow that would decide the war and establish an American contribution to defeating Imperial Germany. Pershing would not have his AEF ready to carry out this offensive until 1919, and his stubbornness in dealing with the requests for amalgamation in the interim "frustrated the Allies."34 Bullitt Lowry narrates Pershing's attempt to shape the post-war peace terms by arguing that Pershing wanted to force Germany into an "unconditional surrender." While Lowry concludes that Pershing's effort to influence the political realm failed, he believed that the only way to "guarantee victory" would be to crush Germany in battle.35 David Woodward argues that Pershing believed that the AEF would decide the war by becoming "the dominant role in the war against Germany."36 Woodward cites Pershing's ideas regarding "the aggressive American rifleman, whose tradition of marksmanship and frontier warfare" could rid the Western Front of trench warfare and execute a great offensive against Germany.37 Historians cite the notion throughout the ranks of the AEF that the United States should remain independent from the Allies, and historians point to the fact that many doughboys saw themselves as superior soldiers to the Allies. Robert H. Zieger argues that "virtually the entire military establishment" agreed with Pershing's desire to have an independent American 33 Allan R. Millett, "Over Where? The AEF and the American Strategy for Victory, 1917-1918," Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present, eds. Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts (Westport: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1986), 237. 34 Millett, "Over Where?," 239. 35 Bullitt Lowry, "Pershing and the Armistice," The Journal of American History 55 no. 2, (September 1968): 281-291, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1899558. 36 Woodward, Trial by Friendship, 81. 37 Woodward, 89, 207. Bailes 10 command.38 Still, Zieger does note that this separate American command relied heavily on the Allies for logistics support, and the AEF "misunderstood the military dynamics of the Western Front."39 Richard Faulkner argues that Pershing's doctrine rested on his belief that the "superior American rifle marksmanship, aggressiveness, and skilled maneuvering" could win the fight for the Allies.40 Faulkner argues that American soldiers saw themselves as intervening in the war effort to help the failing French and British, taunting their British partners by claiming AEF stands for "After England Failed." He devotes a chapter named as such to explain the AEF belief in the superiority of the American fighting man.41 Harold Winton argues that Pershing believed that the United States soldier was superior to his European counterpart.42 Jennifer Keene argues that issues such as the treatment of African-American soldiers and disagreements about which nation contributed the most to the Allied victory created rifts between the two allies.43 In her full text, Keene narrates AEF interactions with their French Allies, and she claims that doughboys saw themselves as superior fighters who could help turn the tide of war.44 Michael Neiberg explains that United States citizens and soldiers came away from the conflict with the belief in the "inherent superiority" of the American system over that of Europe.45 38 Robert H. Zieger, America's Great War: World War I and the American Experience (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 92-102. 39 Zieger, America's Great War, 96. 40 Faulkner, Pershing's Crusaders: The American Soldier in World War I (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2017), 285. 41 Faulkner, 281-304. 42 Harold Winton, "Toward an American Philosophy of Command," The Journal of Military History 64, no. 4 (October 2000): 1059, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2677266. 43 Jennifer D. Keene, "Uneasy Alliances: French Military Intelligence and the American Army During the First World War," Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 1 (January 2008): 18-36, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684529808432461. 44 Jennifer D. Keene, Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 105-11. 45 Michael S. Neiberg, The Path to War: How The First World War Created Modern America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 23. Bailes 11 Even when historians convey a more positive relationship between the AEF and their Allied counterparts, they still address the tension between Pershing and Allied leadership. Robert Bruce portrays a much more positive partnership between the doughboy and his French ally. Bruce documents Marshal Joseph Joffre's visit to the United States after Congress declared war against Germany to muster American support for the French. By comparing France's visit to Britain's, Bruce argues that Joffre established the framework for an intimate Franco-American partnership.46 Bruce maintains that the French respected the American soldier and viewed the entry of the AEF into the war as the saving grace of the Allies. Bruce narrates a bond between doughboys and French troops that increased as they trained and fought together.47 Despite this positive portrayal by Bruce of the French and AEF bond, Bruce still highlights the tension in Pershing's interactions with French commanders as well as noting the general perception amongst French commanders that Pershing thought "he knew everything there was to know about modern warfare."48 Bruce adds that different peace aims and post-war sentiments towards Germany created disagreements amongst American and French soldiers that fractured the relationship built during the war.49 Of note, Bruce suggests that the doughboys harbored what they saw as a "perceived lack of aggressiveness in the French."50 After synthesizing the historiography, the question remains regarding how these two arguments can be linked. Why did Wilsonian ideals influence AEF actions in the First World War, and how did that affect the United States' involvement in the nation's first large-scale 46 Robert B. Bruce, "America Embraces France: Marshal Joseph Joffre and the French Mission to the United States, April-May 1917," Journal of Military History 66 no. 2 (April 2002): 407-441, http://doi.org/10.2307/3093066; Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 32-59. 47 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 86-121. 48 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 128, 143. 49 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 286-95. 50 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 122. Bailes 12 coalition operation? Wilsonian ideals influenced the AEF's actions in the First World War because most American leaders and soldiers shared Wilson's concepts of Progressivism and believed that the United States should play a role in saving Europe. Even if some did not agree with Wilson's politics, most doughboys shared his ideas of American Exceptionalism, and these views affected United States involvement in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation. In merging the two topic areas of Wilson's ideologies and AEF involvement in the war, this essay will attempt to answer how the American doughboy found motivation in the same principles that guided President Wilson. Perhaps a reader will identify that the AEF demonstrated trends in Europe that highlight an "American way of war" that still resonates in United States coalition operations today. When President Wilson brought the United States into the First World War in April of 1917, he sold it as an effort to make the world safe for democracy. In Wilson's war address to Congress, Wilson called Imperial Germany's resumption of their unrestricted submarine campaign "warfare against mankind."51 Wilson maintained that Imperial Germany had given the United States no other choice but to declare war when they resumed their submarine attacks on merchant ships in the early spring of 1917. Still, Wilson furthered his justification for war by appealing to the broader ideal of fighting to defeat the Imperial German autocracy. Wilson described the "selfish and autocratic power" against which a free people needed to wage war.52 Later in his address, Wilson stated that he found hope in what he saw as the restoration of power to the people demonstrated in the Russian Revolution. Wilson saw a pre-Lenin revolution as 51 Woodrow Wilson, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress Calling for a Declaration of War" in "President Wilson," Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President, ed. Mario R. DiNunzio (New York: NYU Press, 2006): 399, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfgbg.15. 52 Wilson, "Declaration of War," 400. Bailes 13 bringing democracy to the people of Russia, and it opened the door for the realization that the Allies fought because "the world must be made safe for democracy."53 Arthur Link comments on Wilson's initial optimism on hearing of the Russian Revolution overthrowing Czar rule.54 While the Russian Revolution took a different turn in the following years, the initial news of the Russian people revolting against the Czar gave Wilson confidence that democracy could spread in Europe since now the Allies truly represented a democratic system. Wilson had spent the first years of the war trying to mediate peace in Europe through United States neutrality, and he tried to negotiate an end to the fighting without a victory for any of the imperial belligerents. Wilson did not see a lasting peace coming to Europe if any of the imperial powers achieved their peace objectives, so he attempted to mediate a truce. Kendrick Clements narrates how Wilson's desire to keep the United States neutral grew at odds with his economic support for the Allies. War for the United States rose to be more likely as Imperial Germany became increasingly aggravated with the United States for supplying aid to France and Britain while professing neutrality.55 Fraser Harbutt argues that at the initial outbreak of war in Europe, leaders as well as citizens of the United States concerned themselves with the economic impacts of the war primarily, and the United States benefited economically by supporting the Allies, specifically in the steel trade.56 Imperial Germany's resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, as well as the capture of Germany's Zimmerman Telegram in January 1917, soliciting an alliance with Mexico, prompted Wilson to support waging war on Imperial Germany. Now American entry into the conflict presented Wilson with some new options for shaping the post- 53 Wilson, "Declaration of War," 401-2. 54 Link, "Entry into World War I," 122-3. 55 Kendrick A. Clements, "Woodrow Wilson and World War I," Presidential Studies Quarterly 34, no. 1 (March 2004: 62-82, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27552564. 56 Fraser J. Harbutt, "War, Peace, and Commerce: The American Reaction to the Outbreak of World War I in Europe 1914," An Improbable War? The Outbreak of World War I and European Political Culture Before 1914, eds. Holger Afflerbach and David Stevenson (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 320-1. Bailes 14 war world. Thomas Knock describes how even though the United States entry into the war meant the essential failure of Wilson's "Peace Without Victory," the international community had seemingly bought into Wilson's concept of "collective security."57 In the previous few years of American neutrality, Wilson had advocated for creating a collection of democratic nation-states to band together to prevent war, and by 1917 the international community seemed interested. Wilson would use American belligerency to shape his new world order for peace. Russia's withdrawal from the war in March of 1918 made the need for a United States presence all the more significant for the Allies. The American soldier would be a crusader of sorts, attempting to cure Europe of the diplomacy of old that had brought her to destruction. The European July crisis of 1914 that erupted in a full-scale war the following month proved to be the culmination of decades of the European balance of power diplomacy that led to rival alliances and an armament race between the feuding dynasties.58 European power politics had dominated the continent for centuries, which inevitably escalated into a world war, and the United States soldier would have the opportunity to save the nations from which most of their ancestors had descended. Michael Neiberg argues that by 1917, the American people felt an obligation to enter the war to save Europe. While the people of the United States supported neutrality initially, Neiberg explains that public opinion swayed over time toward a desire to save Europe from the terror of Imperial Germany.59 The United States Secretary of War from 1916-1921, Newton Baker, published a text almost two decades after the armistice in which he maintained that the United States went to war to stop Imperial Germany and make the world safe for democracy. Baker took issue with the 57 Knock, To End All Wars, 115. 58 James Joll and Gordon Martel, The Origins of the First World War, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2013), 9-291. 59 Neiberg, The Path to War, 7-8, 31-3, 235. Bailes 15 historians of the 20s and 30s who claimed that economic interest influenced the United States entry into the war, and he argued they ignored the necessity of U.S. involvement to stop Germany. Baker explained that the American public remained overwhelmingly critical of the German autocracy and desired to intervene to save the European people.60 Private Alexander Clay of the AEF's 33rd Division demonstrated this sense of duty as he wrote regarding his 1918 deployment to France. As Clay's ship passed the Statue of Liberty while leaving the New York harbor, he thought to himself of the French leader Lafayette's role in securing United States victory during the American Revolution. He wrote that the AEF went to France to "repay the debt of our gratitude to your country for your country's alliance with our country in obtaining liberty from an oppressor England."61 For the United States to effectively reshape the world, there needed to be an independent American command that would ensure the United States contributed to the victory over Imperial Germany, which would give Wilson his seat at the post-war peace talks. In a January 22, 1917 address to the Senate in which he articulated his vision for peace in Europe, Wilson claimed that the warring European nations could not shape a lasting peace. While Wilson still did not advocate for United States intervention at this point, he did state that to achieve peace "[i]t will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination of nations could face or withstand it."62 In this speech, Wilson advocated for a "peace without victory" because he did not envision a peaceful 60 Newton D. Baker, Why We Went to War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1936), 4-10, 20, 160-3. 61 Private Alexander Clay in American Voices of World War I: Primary Source Documents, 1917-1920, ed. Martic Marix Evans (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2001; New York: Routledge, 2013), 19, Kindle. 62 Woodrow Wilson, "Essential Terms for Peace in Europe" in "President Wilson," Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President, 393. Bailes 16 outcome if any of the imperial powers achieved victorious peace terms.63 Wilson reiterated his stance that the United States should play a decisive role in shaping post-war Europe and ensuring that "American principles" guided the rest of the world.64 When the United States declared war against Imperial Germany a few months after this speech, it essentially put Wilson's vision into motion. Diplomatic historian William Widenor argues that Wilson realized that the United States needed to participate in the war "rather than as an onlooker" to achieve his visions for peace.65 Widenor notes Wilson's desire for the United States to enter the war as an "associate" to the Entente as opposed to an "ally," and Widenor maintains that Wilson desired to change the world and "democratize and also, unfortunately, to Americanize it."66 The late international historian Elisabeth Glaser captures the Wilson administration's balancing between maintaining an economic relationship with the Entente powers while attempting to remain "an independent arbiter in the conflict."67 Wilson appointed General Pershing to lead the American effort, and Wilson gave him the simple instruction to keep the American Expeditionary Forces as a command separate from the Allies. In 1928, the Army War College published The Genesis of the American First Army, which documented the details surrounding how the War Department created an independent army of the United States. The text includes a caption from Secretary of War Baker's memorandum to Pershing. Baker informed Pershing of Wilson's order to "cooperate with the forces of the other countries employed against the enemy; but in so doing the underlying idea must be kept in view that the forces of the United States are a separate and distinct component of 63 Wilson, "Essential Terms for Peace in Europe," 394. 64 Wilson, 396-7. 65 William C. Widenor, "The United States and the Versailles Peace Settlement," 42. 66 Widenor, 42-3. 67 Elisabeth Glaser, "Better Late than Never: The American Economic War Effort, 1917-1918," Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918, eds. Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 390. Bailes 17 the combined forces, the identity of which must be preserved."68 The President did give Pershing the authority to decide how the AEF would integrate into Allied operations. Upon Pershing's June 13, 1917 arrival in Paris, he began making decisions regarding AEF employment as it pertained to logistics, training, and an initial American area of operations on the Western Front. With a plan of achieving a force of 1,328,448 men in France by the end of 1918, Pershing needed to ensure his troops were able to build combat power and prepare for war while simultaneously ensuring that he maintained a distinct American command.69 The following 17 months of conflict with American boots on the ground in Europe saw significant political and diplomatic friction between Pershing and the Allied commanders. Pershing attempted to keep his AEF intact while satisfying Allied requests for American soldiers to replace French and British casualties, especially when Germany launched their Spring 1918 offensives. Pershing described in his memoirs that the French and British requested American soldiers to fill their gaps on the front lines when they had each sent diplomatic missions to America shortly after the United States entered the war. Pershing maintained his adamancy against the United States "becoming a recruiting agency for either the French or British," and he recounted that the War Department retained his position as well.70 While Allied leaders ostensibly supported having an independent American army participate in the war effort, the need to replace casualties in the trenches proved to be their immediate concern. Russia withdrawing from the conflict allowed Germany to reinforce their strength on the Western Front and mount a series of offensives. Germany knew they had a limited window of time for victory 68 Army War College (U.S.) Historical Section, The Genesis of the American First Army (Army War College, 1928), Reprints from the collection of the University of Michigan Library (Coppell, TX, 2020), 2. 69 The Genesis of the American First Army, 2-9. 70 John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 1 (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1931), 30-3. Bailes 18 with the United States continuing to build combat power, so they surged in the early months of 1918. Pershing faced a strategic dilemma of trying to support the Allies and get his troops in the fight while simultaneously attempting to build an independent American army. Ultimately, Pershing gave the Allies some of his army divisions as much needed replacements, and he made an effort to ensure that these divisions remained as intact as possible. Pershing endeavored to organize these divisions under a U.S. corps level command, but this corps command proved mostly administrative rather than tactical.71 By the time Pershing activated his independent American First Army, it only spent a few months in combat. The temporarily amalgamated doughboys Pershing gave to the Allies to meet their requests had contributed more to the defeat of Imperial Germany than Pershing's independent army. Mostly because Pershing had interspersed his divisions throughout the French and British fronts to meet the Allied requests for replacements, the American First Army did not activate until August of 1918. The September 20-25 Meuse-Argonne offensive would be the first significant operation for Pershing's independent army.72 David Trask concludes his critique of Pershing by recognizing the contribution that the American soldier played in providing manpower to the Allies. Trask commends the bravery of the American doughboy, but he argues that the amalgamated U.S. divisions contributed more to victory than the American First Army.73 In a similar vein, Mitchell Yockelson contends that the 27th and 30th Divisions who remained under British command throughout the war benefited over the rest of the AEF from extensive training led by the experienced British troops, and they contributed significantly to the Allied 71 The Genesis of the American First Army, 9-46. 72 John J. Pershing, Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing: Commander-in-Chief American Expeditionary Forces. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919), 37-8; The Genesis of the American First Army, 45-58. 73 Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 174-7. Bailes 19 victory.74 Pershing detailed his plans to capitalize on the initiative gained with his Meuse-Argonne offensive to deliver his decisive blow against Germany. The November 11 armistice came before he could achieve his grand vision.75 While the American doughboy played a critical role in providing an Allied victory over Imperial Germany, Pershing never realized his concept of an independent American command autonomously crushing the German army. The American soldier contributed most significantly to the Allied victory by taking part in offensives planned and conducted under the control of French and British Generals. Understanding American motivation during the war effort requires understanding the Progressive Movement taking place in the early-twentieth-century United States. Michael McGerr writes a detailed account of the cause and effect of the Progressive Movement. McGerr describes the wealth disparity brought about by Victorian society and the Gilded Age, and the class conflict emerging from this gave birth to a social and political movement that attempted to enact massive change in the American system.76 McGerr claims that the Progressive Movement attempted such major reform that no social or political action since has tried "anything as ambitious" due to the adverse reactions of such massive change.77 The Progressive Movement engulfed American society and brought about changes in family structures, race relations, and governmental powers. Herbert Croly illustrated the drive for monumental change rooted in the Progressive Movement with his text Progressive Democracy. In his narrative, Croly advocated for a complete overhaul of the American system to achieve freedom and alleviate wealth disparity. Croly saw governmental reform as the method for spreading democracy to all 74 Yockelson, Borrowed Soldiers, 213-23. 75 Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 2, 355-87. 76 McGerr, A Fierce Discontent, 3-146. 77 McGerr, 315-9. Bailes 20 citizens.78 In describing American public opinion during the time of United States entry into World War I, David Kennedy argues that for those Americans who championed progressive ideals, "the war's opportunities were not to be pursued in the kingdom of commerce but in the realm of the spirit."79 While the United States maintained a formidable economic link with the Allies throughout American neutrality, Wilson appealed to American ideals to garner public support for the war. United States entry into the war did not come as the natural development of the Progressive Movement. Still, the American public's reason for supporting the war certainly borrowed progressive sentiments. Wilson championed progressive initiatives that had ingrained themselves in the national mood of early-twentieth-century America. Wilson ran for President in 1912 on the principles he codified the following year in his text The New Freedom. Wilson argued that the Jefferson era of United States democracy had long ended. Wilson maintained that because of the new complexities found in American society, a "reconstruction in the United States" needed to occur to achieve real economic and social freedom.80 Ronald Pestritto articulates Wilson's vision for a governmental system as it relates to a society's history and progress. According to Wilson, the method of government that works for people depends on how far that population has progressed. In that manner, the government should always change to reflect the progression of its people best.81 Pestritto argues that a major theme found in Wilson's 1908 text Constitutional Government in the United States rests in the idea that: [T]here are four stages through which all governments pass: (1) government is the master and people are its subjects; (2) government remains the master, not through 78 Herbert Croly, Progressive Democracy (New York: Macmillan, 1914; New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers; Second printing 2006), 25, 103-18. 79 David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 39. 80 Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom: A Call for the Emancipation of the Generous Energies of a People (New York and Garden City: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1913), www.philosophical.space/303/Wilson.pdf. 81 Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, 34-42. Bailes 21 force but by its fitness to lead; (3) a stage of agitation, when leaders of the people rise up to challenge the government for power; and (4) the final stage, where the people become fully self-conscious and have leaders of their own choosing.82 Wilson epitomized the Progressive Movement's ideals regarding the government adapting to the changes of the people to create a more representative system of government. He would appeal to these principles in advocating for United States intervention in Europe. An underlying sentiment existed within the Progressive Movement that sought to bring about massive change, and this energy extended into the war effort. Lloyd Ambrosius explains the rise of the United States as an imperial power during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. The outcome of the American Civil War created a more powerful central government, and economic growth during the following decades allowed more opportunity for global expansion.83 As the United States extended its global presence, the ideals that formed the nation began to influence foreign policy. David Kennedy writes about the shift in prominent progressives toward support of the war effort. Kennedy references John Dewey as a significant advocate for utilizing the war to satisfy progressive initiatives. According to Kennedy, progressives found appeal in Wilson's reasons for American belligerency in Europe as "a war for democracy, a war to end war, a war to protect liberalism, a war against militarism, a war to redeem barbarous Europe, a crusade."84 Michael McGerr states that the First World War "brought the extraordinary culmination of the Progressive Movement."85 Regardless of the typical progressive view of war, progressives could find merit in Wilson's justification for United States involvement. 82 Pestritto, 37. 83 Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 26-32. 84 Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society, 50-3. 85 McGerr, A Fierce Discontent, 280. Bailes 22 Even though a vast segment of the United States population did not support going to war in Europe, the notion of saving Europe still permeated throughout American society. In a series of essays published in the July 1917 edition of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, multiple thinkers of the time expressed the necessity of the United States entering the war to save Europe. Miles Dawson argued the importance of the United States' mission in the war by documenting the five "fundamentals" that made the United States unique, and he explained the importance of spreading those principles globally. Dawson advocated for the spreading of American ideals throughout the rest of the world.86 George Kirchwey argued that the United States must go to war to defeat Imperial Germany and secure peace. Kirchwey suggested that the war was a fight against an autocratic empire and a crusade to make the world safe for democracy. Kirchwey maintained that the United States needed to lead the effort in creating a world order for peace.87 Samuel Dutton saw the purpose of the United States as transcending party lines. Dutton suggested that the aim of defeating autocratic Imperial Germany needed to be a united American mission.88 Emily Greene Balch wrote that the United States "enters the war on grounds of the highest idealism, as the champion of democracy and world order."89 Walter Lippman argued that once the United States entered the war, they were obligated to fight to make the world safe for democracy. Lippman placed the blame for the war squarely on Germany and their aggression in Belgium and unrestricted submarine warfare. Similar to Wilson in his war address, Lippman drew parallels to the Russian Revolution and the 86 Miles M. Dawson, "The Significance of Our Mission in This War," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 72 (July 1917): 10-13, http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013639. 87 George W. Kirchwey, "Pax Americana," Annals, 40-48, http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013645. 88 Samuel Dutton, "The United States and the War," Annals, 13-19, http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013640. 89 Emily Greene Balch, "The War in Its Relation to Democracy and World Order," Annals, 28-31, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1013643 Bailes 23 importance of it signaling that the Allies truly represented democracy.90 Wilson's reasons for war had found a voice in the academic circles of the United States, and they nested well with the progressive message. Wilson's goals for peace illustrate how Progressive initiatives manifested into the global sphere. In his August 18, 1914 address advocating for the American population to remain neutral during the European conflict, Wilson maintained that the United States held a responsibility "to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend."91 Similarly, when addressing the Senate over two years later communicating his persistent intent of mediating peace in Europe through American neutrality, Wilson criticized the demands for peace submitted by the Entente that sought revenge over Imperial Germany rather than a lasting peace. Wilson instructed that "peace must be followed by some definite concert of power which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again."92 In line with his progressive ideology, Wilson believed in United States intervention in the European conflict that would fundamentally improve their diplomatic system entirely. The United States would intervene in Europe to not only end the conflict but restructure the political climate in a more peaceful, progressive manner. Kendrick Clements argues that Wilson's economic and diplomatic decisions throughout United States neutrality drew him into the war gradually as he continued to side with the Allies. Wilson attempted to maintain his ideals for peace as the United States continued to get closer to belligerency.93 When the United States entry into the war proved virtually inevitable, Wilson 90 Walter Lippman, "The World Conflict in Its Relation to American Democracy," Annals, 1-10, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1013638. 91 Woodrow Wilson, "An Appeal for Neutrality in World War I," 390. 92 Woodrow Wilson, "Essential Terms for Peace in Europe," 392. 93 Clements, "Woodrow Wilson and World War I," 63-81. Bailes 24 ensured that the reasons for fighting aligned with the progressive energy that moved within American society. A religious vigor inspired military action that can be seen as a product of the Progressive Movement as well. Richard Gamble narrates the origin of the opinion that the United States represented a light for the rest of the world, and he describes how this concept brought the nation into the war. Gamble argues that these Christian ideals drove the political climate as Wilson's vision echoed the religious sentiment, and they prompted men to fight.94 Gamble describes the "social gospel" movement that had energized progressive Christians in the United States as extending into the international realm. The same energy that had influenced Christians to enact domestic change had transcended into a desire to improve the world, and Wilson ensured these sentiments carried over into United States foreign policy.95 Ronald Pestritto argues Wilson's religious conviction and explains that Wilson linked his faith with his duty to help shape the rest of the world. Pestritto explains the belief that "America was a key battleground in the victory of good over evil."96 Richard Gamble's mention of literature such as Washington Gladden's 1886 "Applied Christianity" highlights the popular message of progressive faith that nests with Pestritto's argument.97 Wilson illustrated the linkage of religion and progressive reform when he spoke in Denver, Colorado, in a 1911 build-up to his run for the Presidency. Wilson commented that "liberty is a spiritual conception, and when men take up arms to set other men free, there is something sacred and holy in the warfare."98 Wilson went on to champion the necessity of finding truth in the Bible's message, and he concluded by warning against believing "that 94 Gamble, The War for Righteousness, 5-87. 95 Gamble, 69-87. 96 Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, 40-3. 97 Gamble, The War for Righteousness, 49-67. 98 Woodrow Wilson, "The Bible and Progress" in "On Religion," Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfgbg.7, 54. Bailes 25 progress can be divorced from religion."99 To Wilson, Christianity taught the spiritual duty of working toward social progress, and most progressive men of faith believed in these same sentiments which carried over toward United States actions in France. At the core of this Progressive energy and Wilson's peace aims were the sentiments surrounding an idea of American Exceptionalism. Many of the same ideas found in the religious aspect of the need to work for social progression catered to a sense of American Exceptionalism. In the same May 7, 1911 address in Denver, Colorado, Wilson spoke of the greatness of the United States as a direct correlation to the religious zeal and Biblical principles with which the founders had established the nation. According to Wilson, "America has all along claimed the distinction of setting this example to the civilized world."100 Wilson believed that the United States should serve as the model of Christian values for the rest of the world as "America was born to exemplify that devotion to the elements of righteousness which are derived from the revelations of Holy Scripture."101 In his text In Search of the City on a Hill, Richard Gamble describes how the United States narrative utilized an interpretation of divine providence to create an image of a nation built on religious principles that should serve as an example for the rest of the world.102 Lloyd Ambrosius describes the prevalent belief in the early twentieth-century United States that considered the United States a "providential nation" as citizens attempted to justify global expansion.103 If the United States existed as a providential manifestation of God's will, then that could rationalize the spread of the American system into the international realm. 99 Wilson, "The Bible and Progress," 53-9. 100 Wilson, 56. 101 Wilson, 59. 102 Richard M. Gamble, In Search of the City on a Hill: The Making and Unmakng of an American Myth (London: Continuum International Publishng Group, 2012), 6-119. 103 Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and Ameriam Internationalism, 33. Bailes 26 Men of faith found a divine message in the need for the United States to intercede in the global sphere to mold the world in her image. Wilson's brand of progressive history nested well with his idea of American Exceptionalism. Lloyd Ambrosius explains Wilson's fundamental belief that "primitive peoples moved toward greater maturity over the generations."104 Wilson applied this to the history of the United States. As Ronald Perstritto describes, Wilson believed that "the history of human progress is the history of the progress of freedom."105 As people progressed, they, in turn, developed a governmental system that allowed for more representation for its citizens. According to Ambrosius, Wilson believed that "the United States represented the culmination of progressive historical development."106 The American people had achieved real progression in Wilson's historical model, and democracy achieved through the American Revolution solidified his theory. Wilson certainly made this point evident in his writings regarding history. Wilson suggests that "the history of the United States demonstrates the spiritual aspects of political development."107 The United States embodied the ideal form of Wilson's progressive history. Wilson saw it as the responsibility of the United States to spread its exceptional personification of progressive history with the rest of the world. Wilson acknowledged his views on the uniqueness of the United States in his New Freedom. While arguing for progressive reform in the states, Wilson stated that "[t]he reason that America was set up was that she might be different from all the nations of the world."108 Indeed, Wilson believed in the providential nature of the United States, and he desired to shape the rest of the world. 104 Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 236. 105 Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, 37. 106 Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 236. 107 Woodrow Wilson, "The Historian," Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President, 216, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfgbg.10. 108 Wilson, The New Freedom, 16. Bailes 27 Early in the war during the period of United States neutrality, Wilson's reasons for remaining neutral stemmed from his belief in the exceptional nature of the American system and his desire for the United States to stay clear of European affairs. Even in American neutrality, Wilson still sought to mediate a peace in Europe because he perceived a chance to spread the democracy of the United States to Europe. Wilson believed that he needed to mediate in the European conflict because "mere terms of peace between the belligerents will not satisfy even the belligerents themselves," and he questioned whether the Entente and Central powers fought "for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power."109 Wilson's peace aims were in sharp contrast to the Allied leaders, which illustrated his emphasis that the United States should mold a post-war Europe, and this tied directly to American Exceptionalism. While the British leadership concerned themselves with imperial interests, the French sought revenge on Germany from the 1870 Franco-Prussian War. Wilson made it clear in his war address that the United States had "no quarrel with the German people."110 Wilson's vision for a post-war world remained focused on a lasting peace rather than what he perceived as selfish imperial gains or senseless revenge. American Exceptionalism formed the foundation for the interventionist foreign policy of the Progressive Era, and it profoundly motivated Wilson as well as the bulk of American society. Diplomatic historian William Appleman Williams details the rise of the United States as a global power. Williams argues that most Americans in the early twentieth-century United States agreed not only with "Wilson's nationalistic outlook," but they also agreed that the nation should serve as an example for the rest of the world.111 As mentioned previously, Miles Dawson contributed 109 Woodrow Wilson, "Essential Terms for Peace in Europe," 393. 110 Woodrow Wilson, "Declaration of War," 401. 111 Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 86. Bailes 28 to the July 1917 The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science to voice the justification of United States intervention in France. In his text, Dawson defined the five uniquely American fundamentals as: 1. The inalienable right of every man to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness – not as a mere dead saying, but as a living reality. 2. The right of local self-government, within territories possessing or entitled to claim such right, embracing every power of government not expressly granted to the union. 3. The guaranty to each state of a forum for the redress of grievances of one state against another with full power to enforce the verdict of that forum. 4. The guaranty of a republican form of government to each constituent state. 5. The right and duty to maintain the union.112 To thinkers like Dawson, this unique set of traits not only provided United States citizens with a system of government that separated them from the rest of the world, but it inherently gave them a duty to spread the American ideology to the rest of the world. Fundamentally, the idea that the world should take the lead from the United States exemplified the broad theme of American Exceptionalism inspiring AEF actions in the war. With Progressivism and American Exceptionalism at the root of the war effort, the citizen-soldier of the AEF found inspiration in the same rhetoric. Nelson Lloyd described the "melting-pots" of the army cantonment areas in which soldiers who were born outside of the United States "have become true Americans. They have learned the language of America and the ideals of America and have turned willing soldiers in her cause."113 Michael Neiberg argues that a lasting legacy of United States involvement in the war became a unified American mission superseding any cultural allegiance, and "disagreements would no longer be based on ethnicity 112 Dawson, "The Significance of Our Mission in This War," 11. 113 Newson Lloyd, How We Went to War (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922), 58, https://archive.org/details/howwewenttowar00lloyrich/page/n7/mode/2up. Bailes 29 or religion."114 United States entry into the war gave the American citizen-soldier a reason for fighting to preserve a democratic system in Europe, and Wilson's belief that the United States would play a central role became widespread amongst the ranks of the AEF. Lieutenant Willard Hill of the Transport Division and 94th Aero Pursuit Squadron claimed when hearing of the United States entry into the war "that this war is not over yet and that the U.S. troops will play a very decisive factor."115 The purpose of United States entry into the war inspired an idealism that would unify soldiers and champion a belief that the AEF would save Europe from the autocracy of Imperial Germany. Private Willard Newton of the 105th Engineers, 30th Division, exclaimed his joy during the September offensives by stating, "[a]t last we are at the beginning of a real battle between Prussianism and Democracy! And we are to fight on the side of Democracy that the world may forever be free from the Prussian peril!"116 The sentiments of these soldiers expressed a voice that echoed Wilson's desire to utilize an American army to bring peace to Europe, and Pershing dutifully followed his instructions. Pershing's stubbornness in not giving in to the Allies' request to amalgamate troops remained the most significant source of friction between him and the Allied military leaders. Still, Pershing's belief that the doughboy remained a superior warrior to the French and British soldier intensified Pershing's negative feelings toward his Allied counterparts. Pershing did not hide his views regarding coalitions when he wrote early in his memoirs that "[h]istory is replete with the failures of coalitions and seemed to be repeating itself in the World War."117 Russell Weigley argues that Pershing believed "that only by fighting under American command would 114 Michael S. Neiberg, "Blinking Eyes Began to Open: Legacies from America's Road to the Great War, 1914-1917," Diplomatic History 38, no. 4 (2014): 812, https://doi:10.1093/dh/dhu023. 115 Lieutenant Willard D. Hill (Cleburne, Texas) in American Voices of World War I, 47. 116 Private Willard Newton (Gibson, North Carolina) in American Voices of World War I, 140. 117 Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 1, 34. Bailes 30 American soldiers retain the morale they needed to fight well."118 This assertion proved incorrect as those American doughboys who fought under French and British command performed extraordinarily.119 David Trask maintains that Pershing's "presumption that the American troops were superior to others in the war helps explain his stubborn insistence on an independent army even during the greatest crisis of the war."120 Although the German Spring Offensives of 1918 put the Allies in desperate need of replacements, Pershing held his ground in resisting amalgamation. He only agreed to temporary amalgamation after much deliberation. Pershing's plan required maintaining a separate and distinct American force if the United States was to play a critical role in defeating Imperial Germany. This plan did not always synchronize with General Foch's overall plan for the Allied strategy for defeating Imperial Germany. Mitchell Yockelson describes an instance in late September 1918 in which a newly established AEF officers' school near Pershing's headquarters pulled a bulk of American officers from the front lines, which "affected the AEF First Army divisions that were about to attack in the Meuse-Argonne operation."121 United States political leadership back home undoubtedly noticed the friction between Pershing and the Allied leaders. David Woodward mentioned that at one point, Wilson and Secretary Baker intervened to plead with Pershing to be more accommodating to the Allies. According to Woodward, "Pershing proved as immovable as ever when it came to wholesale amalgamation and introducing Americans to trench warfare before he deemed them ready for combat."122 118 Weigley, "Pershing and the U.S. Military Tradition," 335. 119 Weigley, 335. 120 Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 61. 121 Yockelson, Borrowed Soldiers, 127. 122 Woodward, Trial by Friendship, 168-9. Bailes 31 Pershing's doctrine of "open warfare" proved predicated on a firm belief in the exceptional quality of the American fighting man. In his memoirs, Pershing documented his view that the results of the Battle of the Marne had placed the opposing forces in a trench defensive that had taken away their aggression and ability to fight an offensive battle. Pershing maintained that "victory could not be won by the costly process of attrition, but it must be won by driving the enemy out into the open and engaging him in a war of movement."123 Sergeant-major James Block of the 59th Infantry, 4th Division, wrote after an offensive near Belleau Wood that his troops "had proven to ourselves that we were the Hun's master, even in our present untrained condition. The Hun could not stand before us and battle man to man."124 David Trask argues that Pershing's reliance on the rifle and bayonet under his open warfare doctrine limited the AEF's ability to adapt to the combined arms fight as quickly as did the French and British.125 In his Final Report, Pershing praised the Allied training system that prepared his inexperienced troops for combat on the Western Front. Although he admitted that his soldiers needed to learn from the experiences of the combat tested French and British, he stated that "[t]he long period of trench warfare had so impressed itself upon the French and British that they had almost entirely dispensed with training for open warfare."126 Pershing relied heavily on his infantrymen, and he saw the rifle and the bayonet as the superior weapon. He did not factor advances in the machine gun, tanks, and artillery to integrate all lethal assets onto the battlefield. According to Richard Faulkner, Pershing planned on using his troops – who he believed were 123 Pershing, 151-4. 124 Sergeant-major James W. Block (Marquette, Michigan) in American Voices of World War I, 108. 125 Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 19. 126 Pershing, Final Report, 13-5. Bailes 32 better suited for offensive warfare – to "force the Germans from their trenches into open terrain where the Allies' greater resources would then destroy the unprotected enemy army."127 Perhaps nothing exhibited Pershing's obtuse attitude toward his Allied counterparts more than his desire to beat the French in seizing Sedan from the Germans. Pershing outlined his wishes that his "troops should capture Sedan, which the French had lost in a decisive battle in 1870."128 Russell Weigley comments on Pershing's intent "to try to snatch from the French army the honor of recapturing the historic fortress city of Sedan, where the Emperor Napoleon III had surrendered to the Prussians on September 1-2, 1870."129 Sergeant-major Block described the fierce German resistance during the late September Allied offensives. Still, he claimed that "[o]nce the Americans penetrated that line, their advance northward would be comparatively easy. Sedan would fall next."130 The AEF performed well during the offensives in early November, and the crumbling Imperial German army made Sedan easily attainable for either Pershing's Second Army or the Franco-American armies.131 David Trask points out the diplomatic issue that would ensue if Pershing were to "deprive the French army of this honor."132 The new commander of the American First Army, General Liggett, ultimately did not carry out the attack, which undoubtably prevented a political and diplomatic disaster.133 Russell Weigley maintains that Liggett changed plans after "the offended French" updated him of Pershing's plans on November 7.134 The idea that Pershing wished to take away French retribution by giving 127 Faulkner, Pershing's Crusaders, 285. 128 Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 2, 381. 129 Weigley, "Pershing and the U.S. Military Tradition," 342. 130 Sergeant-major Block in American Voices of World War I, 135. 131 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 282-3. 132 Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 174. 133 Trask, 174, 134 Weigley, 343. Bailes 33 his troops a decisive victory and morale boost demonstrated his disconnect from the sentiments of his Allied counterparts. Pershing's belief in the superiority of the American soldier to his French and British counterpart extended to the lower ranks of the AEF. While perhaps sensationalizing his account, Scout Corporal Edward Radcliffe of the 109th Infantry, 28th Division wrote regarding actions around St Agnon "that the French of the 10th or 6th army had fallen back, their officers being shot by our men when they ordered them to retreat."135 In a post-World War I survey, Sergeant Donald Drake Kyler of the 16th Infantry, 1st Division answered a question about what he learned about America and Americans from the war. Sergeant Kyler stated that "Americans are inclined to brag about their systems and accomplishments which may or not be superior to those of other peoples or cultures."136 In many of the accounts of AEF actions in Europe, General Pershing and his doughboys showcased American Exceptionalism. Richard Faulkner devotes a chapter of his text to argue that most of the AEF doughboys perceived inferiority in the French way of life compared to the United States. The majority of white AEF soldiers came away from the war, believing that, in terms of technology as well as general health and welfare, American society remained superior to that of France and England.137 Faulkner makes note that "with the notable exception of the African Americans, the soldiers generally believed that their society was markedly superior to anything they encountered in Europe."138 Sergeant-major Block wrote a letter home to his parents during the post-war occupation period. He wrote of the perception that "Paris makes up for the backwardness of the rest of France."139 135 Corporal Edward Radcliffe in American Voices of World War I, 94. 136 Sergeant Donald Drake Kyler (Fort Thomas, Kentucky) in American Voices of World War I, 196. 137 Faulkner, Pershing's Crusaders, 188-93. 138 Faulkner, 189. 139 Sergeant-major Block in American Voices of World War I, 191. Bailes 34 While the bond formed between the French and British soldiers and the AEF doughboy proved strong, there still seemed to be a sentiment of American superiority amongst the AEF ranks. Tasker H. Bliss, who served as Army Chief of Staff from September 1917 to May 1918, documented the challenge of absent unified Allied command in a 1922 essay. Bliss wrote a detailed piece in which he criticized the lack of a unified Allied mission while praising General Foch and championing his eventual selection as "Allied Commander-in-Chief."140 Bliss condemned the Allied leaders for waiting so long before establishing any sort of unified command, and he argued that for the first years of the war, they fought for their national goals only. Bliss maintained that this hindered United States integration into the war effort as well.141 Charles Pettit wrote an account of his time on the Western Front. Initially serving in the British army, Pettit joined the AEF once they arrived and concluded his 42 months of combat with the Rainbow Division. Pettit commented that "[w]e know why the French and English didn't win the War. They was waiting for us."142 Robert Bruce expands on the relationship between the American and French soldiers during the post-war occupation period. The doughboys believed that the Allied victory had eliminated the threat of autocratic Imperial Germany. At the same time, the French soldiers still demonstrated distrust of the German for fear of a future war. According to Bruce, "Americans did not want to hear about the need to prepare for a future war with Germany. They believed that victory in the Great War and the conversion of Germany to a democracy was enough to end the menace; Americans were unwilling to do more."143 For the AEF doughboy, the United States' actions in the war had saved Europe from the threat of the 140 Tasker H. Bliss, "The Evolution of the Unified Command," Foreign Affairs 1, no. 2 (December 1922): 1-30, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20028211. 141 Bliss, 7-30. 142 Charles A. Pettit in Echoes From Over There: By the Men of the Army and Marine Corps who Fought in France, eds. Craig Hamilton and Louise Corbin (New York City: The Soldiers' Publishing Company, 1919), 107-9. 143 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 289. Bailes 35 Imperial German autocracy. United States' involvement in its first large-scale coalition operation had solidified the dominance of the American soldier and the system for which he fought. The American doughboy contributed significantly to the Allied victory over Imperial Germany. Without American boots on the ground in France, Imperial Germany may have defeated the Allies. Allan Millett argues that Pershing's independent army did not achieve all that Pershing had hoped. Still, Millett maintains that an accurate assessment of the war would be that the "Allies might have lost the war without the American Expeditionary Forces."144 With the Russian withdrawal from the war and Germany's surge in the Western Front in the Spring of 1918, the Allies desperately needed more boots on the ground. AEF actions in Cantigny, Belleau Wood, and the attack on the Hindenburg line proved the value of the doughboys to the Allied victory over Imperial Germany and the Central Powers. Acknowledging the contribution of the American soldier to the Allied victory should remain a critical focus of any study of United States involvement in the war. While the presence of American troops on the ground benefited the Allies and did give Wilson his seat at the post-war peace talks, Pershing did not realize his grand vision of an independent American army crushing Imperial Germany. Bullitt Lowry documents Pershing's desire to capitalize on increasing the United States combat power to continue pressing a weakening German army and deliver a crushing blow.145 The Germans signed the armistice before Pershing could make this happen. While Wilson gained his seat at the peace conference and Pershing did not get his chance to win a tactical victory, the French and British still received their original desires and delivered Germany "harsh armistice terms."146 144 Millett, "Over Where?," 251. 145 Lowry, "Pershing and the Armistice," 286-91. 146 Lowry, 291. Bailes 36 With the eventual collapse of the League of Nations, Wilson never achieved his vision of a new world order for peace. Still, the United States government had established its importance and commenced its entry into the realm of global powers. United States involvement in the First World War helped solidify a national identity as well as establish an American presence on the international stage. Theodore Roosevelt Jr. wrote a letter on May 15, 1919, in which he documented the benefit of the war and what he saw as "Americanizing and democratizing" the soldiers through military service.147 Roosevelt commented that through service in support of the war effort, "love of the men for their country has been deepened, that their sense of real democracy has been sharpened and steadied and that insofar as any possible bad effect goes, the men are more than ever ready and determined to see order and fair play for all."148 In a similar vein, Italian born AEF Sergeant Morini wrote that the war provided him a chance "to make good on my Americanism."149 To Morini, fighting in the war provided him with "the right to the name Yankee all right."150 While the United States' efforts in the war were in support of the Allies, the war became a chance for the nation to claim its identity. A country that had been torn apart by civil war half a century before utilized the war effort to continue to unify and recover its self-proclaimed providence. The war ostensibly became an effort to Americanize its own citizens. The historiography of United States involvement in the First World War presents various arguments. Some historians such as David Trask and Russell Weigley remain critical of General Pershing and his decision making. While some scholarly history shows a narrative less scathing of Pershing, most of the description found in popular history showcases valiant actions of 147 Theodore Roosevelt in Echoes From Over There, 95. 148 Roosevelt, 95. 149 Sergeant Morini in Echoes From Over There, 115. 150 Morini, 115. Bailes 37 Pershing and his efforts in maneuvering the American Expeditionary Forces to achieve victory for the Allies against Imperial Germany. The fact remains that while the doughboys contributed significantly to the Allied victory, they helped the most when they were not fighting Pershing's fight. In his Final Report, Pershing highlights the benefit that the Allies provided to the American forces. In terms of training as well as logistics, the Allies provided the doughboys with the resources they needed to defeat Imperial Germany and the Central Powers effectively.151 Pershing recognized what the Allies had supplied him and his men, but his stubbornness and arrogance still clouded his vision to a degree. While Pershing did build a trusting relationship with the Allied commanders, and his troops were efficient, he did not always operate per their same vision. At times, Pershing's desire to maintain an independent American army superseded his desire to enable the Allied strategy. Pershing strived to meet Wilson's intent of keeping a distinct American command. The question remains if, in carrying out his President's instructions, Pershing prolonged the war and delayed the defeat of the Central Powers. Secondary and primary source literature from the First World War showcases both Wilson's peace aims – which were shaped by his ideology – as well as General Pershing and AEF actions while attempting to remain an independent command in the war. When war broke out in August 1914 in Europe, Wilson tried to mediate a peace while maintaining United States neutrality. When continued trade with the Allies brought the United States into the war in April of 1917, he seized the chance to shape a new world order by establishing an independent American command to defeat Imperial Germany. Primarily because of the Progressive Movement in the United States and the concepts surrounding American Exceptionalism, the American soldier embraced Wilson's ideologies for fighting and fought valiantly to defeat the 151 Pershing, Final Report, 90. Bailes 38 Imperial German autocracy. The Progressive Movement had established itself in American society by the time the citizen-soldier went to war in France, and the principles of American Exceptionalism permeated in virtually every facet of American culture. The American doughboy carried both of these concepts with him to France. Despite Pershing not attaining his decisive blow against the German army, and Wilson not achieving his vision for a new world order, the United States still met a significant amount of Wilson's original intent for entering the war. Wilson's ideologies influenced how the AEF fought in France. As the First World War shaped the United States standing as a global power, it also demonstrated the critical nature of maintaining relationships with coalition partners. Hew Strachan begins the conclusion to his history of the war by stating that "[t]he First World War was a coalition war."152 The American doughboy established a positive relationship with his French and British counterparts. The ability of the American soldier to learn from the experiences of the combat tested Allies, to adapt to the rigors of trench warfare, and to perform well in battle fighting beside his international partners shows the success of the AEF's performance in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation. Despite these successes, the AEF doughboy exhibited American Exceptionalism in the First World War. As the United States built its presence in the international realm over the following century, and the need for maintaining partnerships with allied nations continued to increase, the precedent set by the AEF in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation would be essential. 152 Hew Strachan, The First World War (New York: Viking Penguin, a member of Penguin Group, 2004; New York: Penguin Group, 2013), 303. Bailes 39 Bibliography Secondary Sources Adas, Michael. "Ambivalent Ally: American Military Intervention and the Endgame and Legacy of World War I." Diplomatic History 38 no. 4 (September 2014): 700-712, http://doi.org/10.1093/dh.dhu032. Ambrosius, Lloyd E. Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Ambrosius, Lloyd E. Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017. Ambrosius, Lloyd E. "World War I and the Paradox of Wilsonianism." 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This review of public expenditures on Social Protection (SP) in Nicaragua is based on the analytical framework of Social Risk Management (SRM) developed by the World Bank. The concept of managing social risk comes from the notion that certain groups in society are vulnerable to unexpected shocks which threaten their livelihood and/or survival. Social protection focuses on the poor since they are more vulnerable to the risks and normally do not have the instruments to handle these risks. This prevents the poor from taking more risky activities that usually yield higher returns and that could help them overcome gradually their poverty situation. Social risk management involves policies and programs aimed at reducing key risks, breaking inter-generational cycle of poverty and vulnerability. Risk management consists in the choice of appropriate risk prevention, mitigation and coping strategies to minimize the adverse impact of social risks. Social protection under SRM is defined as public interventions to assist individuals, households and communities to better manage risk and provide support to the critically poor. Thus Social protection should provide: a safety net, particularly for the poor that are likely to fall in the cracks of established programs; and a springboard for the poor to bounce out of poverty.
In M.-V. werden wesentliche politische Entscheidungen regelmäßig von Hinweisen auf Bevölkerungsprognosen begleitet. Dabei sind es Bevölkerungsvorausberechnungen, deren Ergebnisse maßgeblich von den getroffenen Annahmen, den zugrundeliegenden Bevölkerungsdaten und der Methodik abhängen. In Kombination mit deren weiteren Prinzipien handelt es sich eher um Modelle, deren Aussagekraft bezüglich eines langen Prognosezeitraumes stark limitiert ist. Da alternative Instrumente demgegenüber deutlich zurückstehen, können Infrastrukturentscheidungen nicht in ausreichendem Maße abgesichert werden. Vor dem Hintergrund, dass M.-V. bspw. durch eine geringe Bevölkerungsdichte oder eine Vielzahl kleiner Gemeinden gekennzeichnet ist, sollte es die oberste Prämisse sein, langfristig weithin akzeptierte Strukturen zu schaffen, die den Gemeinden eine Perspektive gibt. In diesem Sinne ist der bisherige Ansatz der Stärkung der Zentren und der infrastrukturellen Marginalisierung der übrigen Gemeinden nicht erstrebenswert. Diesem Ansatz wird eine Flexibilisierung von Infrastruktur entgegengestellt, mit der alles erfasst wird, was im politisch gesetzten Auftrag bestehende Funktionsdefizite ausgleicht oder abdeckt. Gleichzeitig wird dem Begriff der Daseinsvorsorge eine Absage erteilt, da von Grunddaseinsfunktionen bei einem staatlichen Rückzug aus der Fläche nicht mehr gesprochen werden kann. Andernfalls würden bspw. die über 65-Jährigen nicht in die Zentren "flüchten". Zudem muss festgehalten werden, dass mit der Flexibilisierung des Begriffes Infrastruktur auch eine Neuinterpretation der Begriffe Mobilität und Verkehr einhergeht. Mobilität zeichnet bisher durch eine technische Überbetonung aus und zielt auch auf Ortsveränderungen ab. Damit überschneidet sich Mobilität definitorisch mit Verkehr. Zugleich ist die Rolle der Infrastruktur von nachrangiger Bedeutung. Die Integration des flexiblen Infrastrukturbegriffes führt zu einer Mobilität, die einfach die Fähigkeit zur Interaktion beschreibt und Verkehr wird zu konkreten Handlungen von Subjekten oder sozialen Gruppen. Beide sind dann nur noch von den individuellen Präferenzen und der Infrastruktur abhängig, wobei die Unplanbarkeit der individuellen Präferenzen festgehalten werden muss. Die infrastrukturelle Abhängigkeit zeigt sich auch bei Vulnerabilität und Resilienz. Während Vulnerabilität für Prozesse und deren Wirkungen auf Systeme sowie Organisationen in Abhängigkeit von Infrastruktur steht, bezeichnet Resilienz den Umgang mit vulnerablen Prozessen in Abhängigkeit von der Infrastruktur und der Zielsetzung. Aufgrund der nur unzureichend vorhandenen Informationen über die Gemeinden in M.-V. stand die Verbesserung der empirischen Basis gegenüber de-taillierten Maßnahmen im Fokus. Ganz allgemein vollzog sich auf der Gemeindeebene zwischen 1990 und 2012 eine sehr vielschichtige Entwicklung. Das betrifft neben der Einwohnerzahl auch die altersgruppenspezifische Betrachtung, die der Beschäftigung sowie die Gemeindefinanzen. In Bezug zu den Einwohnerzahlen führte der Zensus zu eine deutlichen Bereinigung der Statistik. Jedoch wurde eine Rückrechnung für frühere Jahre per Gerichtsentscheid für unzulässig erklärt. Daher behalten die Werte vor 2011 ihre Gültigkeit. Während in den Jahren vor 2000 eine deutliche Suburbanisierung erkennbar war und sich in den Stadt-Umland-Bereichen entsprechende arbeitsräumliche Verflechtungen etablierten, hat sich die Suburbanisierung in der Folgezeit stark abgeschwächt und teilweise ins Gegenteil verkehrt. Getragen wird diese Entwicklung insbesondere durch die 20 - 25 sowie die über 65-Jährigen. Während bei den 20 - 25 Jährigen die ökonomischen Motive überwiegen, welche eine selektive Reurbanisierung stützt, hat die Wanderung der über 65-Jährigen eher infrastrukturelle Gründe. Die infrastrukturelle Marginalisierung der kleinen Gemeinden trifft auf eine Altersgruppe, die in zunehmenden Maße zu keiner Kompensation mehr fähig ist und so in Richtung der zentralen Orte abwandert. Alternativ zieht es diese Altersgruppe auch in touristisch bedeutsame Gemeinden. Damit tritt eine planerisch opportune Wanderungsbewegung ein, welche die Prämisse der Stärkung der Zen-tren unterstützt. Diese Segregation vollzieht sich vor einer dispersen Siedlungsstruktur, welche durch die politische Rahmensetzung und gezielte Vermarktungsstrategien in der Vergangenheit verfestigt wurde, die den individuellen Präferenzen viel Freiraum ermöglichte. Die Infrastrukturkonzentration destabilisiert die Strukturen und fördert wiederum die Arbeitsplatzkonzentration in den Zentren. Allein die Ober- und Mittelzentren vereinten 2012 60 % der SV Beschäftigungsverhältnisse. Die Arbeitsplätze sind damit weit stärker konzentriert als die Bevölkerung und hohe Auspendlerquoten die Folge. Dabei obliegt der Ausgleich infrastruktureller Defizite den Gemeinden, die wiederum eine hohe fremdbestimmte Ausgabenlast zu bewältigen haben. Demgegenüber steht ein KFA, der sich nicht an den realen Aufwendungen orientiert, so dass infolgedessen die Investitionen reduziert wurden. Des Weiteren sind finanzielle Spielräume kaum vorhanden. Im Ergebnis markiert bspw. die selektive Bevölkerungsentwicklung oder die Handlungsunfähigkeit der Gemeinden, die aus der Entwicklung der Gemeindefinanzen resultiert, jeweils einen vulnerablen Prozess, die bisher nicht adäquat bewältigt werden. Die Stärkung der Zentren kann nur im Hinblick auf die politische Zielsetzung als eine positive Resilienzstrategie für eine Handvoll Gemeinden bezeichnet werden. Um eine zukünftige Alternativendiskussion anzuregen, wurden die Gemeinden im Anschluss einer multivariaten Analyse unterzogen. Zur Absicherung der Ergebnisse wurde eine Prüfung auf Normalverteilung sowie eine Untersuchung auf stochastische Unabhängigkeit vorgeschaltet. Die Prüfung auf Normalverteilung hat ergeben, dass diese für keine der 165 Variablen vorlag. Die maßgebliche Ursache hierfür liegt in der Betrachtungsebene der administrativen Einheiten und dem hohen Anteil der Gemeinden bis 2.000 Einwohner. Allerdings sind die Gemeinde gerade Untersuchungsgegenstand dieser Arbeit, so dass sich eine Änderung der Betrachtungsebene ausschloss. Folglich führte die Gliederung der administrativen Einheiten in M.-V. in Abhängigkeit von den Einwohnerzahlen zu Autokorrelationen zwischen den einzelnen Variablen. Diese Zusammenhänge bestanden auch bei Variablen mit einem zeitlichen Trend, so dass als Folge der Prüfung auf stochastische Unabhängigkeit die Clusteranalyse in zwei Analysen mit jeweils einem Variablenblock geteilt wurde. Die Anzahl der betrachteten Variablen reduzierte sich hierbei auf insgesamt 88. Das Resultat der ersten Clusteranalyse waren 5 Klassen, wobei Rostock eine eigene Klasse bildete. Die anderen Städte wie Greifswald, Stralsund, Neubrandenburg, Wismar sowie Schwerin formten ihrerseits einen Cluster und die übrigen Gemeinden verteilten sich auf die anderen drei Klassen. Insbesondere zahlreiche Tourismusgemeinden und zentrale Orte traten in einem eigenen Cluster deutlich hervor. Die Dominanz der großen Gebietskörperschaften zeigte sich auch in der zweiten Clusteranalyse, wobei sich die Struktur mit 6 Klassen als sehr stabil erwies. Die Ergebnisse wurden nach-folgend in einer Typisierung zusammengefasst, wobei sich 14 Regionaltypen erga-ben, deren Interpretation 7 Haupttypen offenbarte. Neben Rostock als Regiopole treten u. a. Regionalzentren, Kleinstgemeinden oder Gemeinden mit eingeschränkter Leistungsfähigkeit auf. Durchaus bemerkenswert ist der Umstand, dass einige Gemeinden von Usedom und Rügen eher Stadt-Umland-Gemeinden entsprechen und solche mit einer eingeschränkten Leistungsfähigkeit eher im Osten des Landes anzutreffen sind. Daneben sind Tourismusgemeinden ähnlich strukturiert wie Mittelzentren und zahlreiche Grundzentren grenzen sich lediglich über ihren Status von anderen Landgemeinden ab. Darüber hinaus grenzt sich diese Gliederung deutlich von der des Landes mit den ländlichen Gestaltungsräumen ab. Zur Identifizierung dieser wurden Kriterien herangezogen, die stochastisch nicht unabhängig sind, welche zur Basis für ein politisch motiviertes Ranking wurden. Die damit aufgeworfene These von der fragwürdigen Zukunftsfähigkeit, ist in erster Linie politisch determiniert. Insgesamt zeigt sich mit der Handlungsmaxime "Stärkung der Zentren" ein vulnerabler Prozess, der sich in der Gemeindeentwicklung deutlich niederschlägt. Zur Vermeidung einer weiteren Vertiefung ist zunächst eine theoretische Neuausrichtung, wie sie in Grundzügen vorgestellt wurde, notwendig. Dabei ist die Forderung, dass Infrastruktur flexibilisiert werden muss, nicht neu. Sie wurde bspw. schon in Zusammenhang neuer interkommunaler Kooperationsformen postuliert. Die bisherige normative Fixierung der langfristigen Infrastrukturentwicklung über ROG und LPlG manifestiert die Reduzierung des ländlichen Raumes auf seinen existentiellen Kern und ignoriert gewachsenen Strukturen und individuelle Präferenzen der lokalen Bevölkerung. Im nächsten Schritt sollten die Bevölkerungsprognosen um andere Instrumente ergänzt werden, um frühzeitig bestimmte Entwicklungen aufzudecken und zu gestalten. Hierbei sollten die Akteure vor Ort, insbesondere die Gemeinden, auch in der Lage sein, die Gestaltungskompetenz wahrzunehmen. Das setzt voraus, dass zur Erfüllung der Pflichtaufgaben keine Liquiditätskredite erforderlich sind. Sollte eine aufgabengerechte Finanzausstattung nicht möglich sein, muss die derzeitige Aufgabenverteilung zwischen den Kommunen, dem Land sowie dem Bund neu geregelt werden. Eine fremdbestimmte Aufgabenträgerschaft und starre Richtwerte hinsichtlich der infrastrukturellen Ausgestaltung sind Mittel der Vergangenheit, die eine Flexibilisierung und mehr gemeindliche Selbstverantwortung nicht zulassen. Danach kann man beginnen über eine Gemeindegebietsreform Organisationsschwächen zu beseitigen und eine Resilienzstrategie zu verfolgen, die sich nicht allein in einer weiteren Infrastrukturkonzentration erschöpft. ; In Mecklenburg-West Pomerania essential political decisions are regularly accompanied by indications of projections by the population. These population´s projections´ results depend to a large extent on assumptions, population data and the methodology used. In combination with their further principles, these are rather models, the significance of which is strongly limited in relation to a long prognosis period. As alternative instruments are clearly less adequate, infrastructure decisions cannot be sufficiently covered. Against the background that Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, for example, is characterized by a low population density or a multitude of small municipalities, it should be the top premise to create widely accepted structures which give a perspective to the communities. So the previous approach to strengthening the centers and infrastructural marginalization of other municipalities is not desirable. This approach is made possible by a more flexible infrastructure, with which everything is recorded and which compensates or covers existing functional deficits in political tasks. At the same time, the term "services for the public" is denied, since there is no longer any reason to speak of basic existential functions in case of a state withdrawal from the area. Otherwise, the over 65-year-olds would not "escape" to the city centers. In addition, it is important to note that a more flexible interpretation of the concept of infrastructure also includes a reinterpretation of the concepts of mobility and transport. Mobility so far has been characterized by technical over-interpretation and is also aimed at changes in location. So the definition of mobility overlaps with the definition of traffic. At the same time, the role of infrastructure is of subordinate importance. The integration of a flexible infrastructure concept leads to a definition of mobility that simply describes the ability to interact, whereas traffic describes concrete actions of subjects or social groups. Both are dependent on individual preferences and infrastructure only, while the unpredictability of individual preferences must be documented. Infrastructural dependency is also evident in vulnerability and resilience. While vulnerability stands for processes and their effects on systems as well as organizations depending on infrastructure, resilience describes a handling of vulnerable processes depending on infrastructure and objectives. Due to insufficient information about communities in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, the focus was on an improvement of the empirical basis compared to detailed measures. Since chapter 2.5 drew a wide conclusion, the following text will be limited to the essentials. Between 1990 and 2012 there was a very complex development at the community level in general. Apart from the number of inhabitants, this also applies to age group-specific considerations, considerations of employment and to community finances. In relation to the number of inhabitants, the census led to a clear adjustment of statistics. However, a retroactive accounting for previous years was declared inadmissible through court decision. Therefore, the values before 2011 remain valid. While a clear suburbanization was apparent before 2000, and the city-surrounding areas were able to establish appropriate interdependencies of working space, suburbanization in the later period has strongly weakened and partially reversed. This development is particularly supported by 20 to 25 as well as by over 65-year-olds. While in 20 to 25-year-olds, which support a selective reurbanization, economic motives prevail, the migration of over 65-year-olds has rather infrastructural reasons. The infrastructural marginalization of small communities comes upon an age group which is increasingly unable to compensate and thus moves towards more central locations. Alternatively, this age group is also attracted by communities of touristic interest. In this way there is a planning opportune migration which supports a strengthening of the centers. This segregation takes place before a dispersed settlement structure, which has been consolidated in the past by political framework and targeted marketing strategies, which allowed the individual preferences a great deal of freedom. The concentration of infrastructure destabilizes structures and, in turn, supports concentration of employment in the centers. In 2012 the upper and middle centers solely combined 60% of employment conditions for employees required to pay social security contributions (SV). Workplaces are therefore much more concentrated than the population which results in high commuter rates. The communities are responsible for balancing the infrastructural deficits, which in turn have to cope with a high, otherdirected output workload. On the other hand, there is a municipal financial equalization (KFA), which is not based on real expenses and which lead to a reduction of investments. In addition, there are hardly any financial scopes. As a result, for example, the selective population development or the paralysis of communities, which result from the development of community finances, mark a vulnerable process which has not yet been handled adequately. Strengthening the centers can only be described as a positive resilience strategy for a small number of communities in regards to political objectives. In order to stimulate a future discussion of alternatives, the communities were subsequently subject to multivariate analysis. In order to secure the results, a check for normal distribution as well as an investigation on stochastic independence was executed. The test for normal distribution showed that this was not the case for any of the 165 variables. The main reason for this is the choice of perspective on the administrative entities as well as the high proportion of municipalities with up to 2,000 inhabitants. However, the community is this paper's object of investigation, so that a change in the level of observation was impossible. Consequently, a structuring of Mecklenburg-West Pomerania's administrative units, which are depending on the number of inhabitants, leads to autocorrelations between the individual variables. These correlations also existed in variables with a temporal trend so that, as a result of the stochastic independence test, the cluster analysis was divided into two analyses, each consisting of one variable block. The number of variables considered thus reduced to a total of 88. The result of the first cluster analysis were 5 classes, with Rostock forming a separate class. The other cities, such as Greifswald, Stralsund, Neubrandenburg, Wismar, and Schwerin, formed another cluster and the rest of the communities is spread to the remaining three classes. Especially numerous tourist communities and central locations emerged clearly within their own cluster. The dominance of large regional authorities was also shown in the second cluster analysis, whereas a structure including 6 classes proved to be very stable. The results were then summarized in a typing, resulting in 14 regional types, whose interpretation revealed 7 main types. In addition to Rostock as a regiopolis, there were regional centers, small communities or municipalities with limited capacity. The fact that some communities of Usedom and Rügen rather tend to correspond to city-surrounding communities and that those with a limited capacity are more likely to be found in the east of the country is very remarkable. In addition, tourism communities are similarly structured as middle centers and numerous lower-order centers are only separated from other rural communities by their status. In addition, this structure is clearly different from that of rural design areas. In order to identify these, criteria were used which are not stochastically independent and which have become the basis for a politically motivated ranking. The consequential thesis of a questionable sustainability is, above all, politically determined. Overall, the guiding principle "strengthening of the centers" results in a vulnerable process, which is clearly reflected in community development. In order to avoid further specializations, a theoretical reorientation, as basically presented in this paper, is necessary. Demands for a more flexible infrastructure are not a novelty. It has already been postulated, for example, in the context of new inter-communal forms of cooperation. The previous normative fixation of the long-term infrastructure development via regional planning laws (ROG) and country planning acts (LPlG) manifests the reduction of rural areas to their existential core and ignores organically grown structures as well as individual preferences of the local population. As a next step, the population forecast should be supplemented by other instruments in order to identify and shape certain developments at an early stage. In this case local actors, particularly communities, should be able to make use of those shaping skills. This presupposes that no liquidity loans are required in order to fulfill the mandatory tasks. If sufficient financial resources cannot be made available, the current distribution of tasks between communities, the state and the federal government must be revised. An other-directed task assignment and rigid guidelines regarding the infrastructure design are outdated means which allow neither more flexibility nor more municipal self-responsibility. After that, it might be possible to eliminate organizational weaknesses through a district reform and pursue a resilience strategy, which is no longer limited to a further concentration of infrastructure.
"This sweltering summer of the Negro's legitimate discontent will not pass until there is an invigorating autumn of freedom and equality. Nineteen sixty-three is not an end, but a beginning…I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed: "We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal…"And if America is to be a great nation, this must become true."Martin Luther King Jr." I have a dream speech" (March on Washington, August 28, 1963)On Wednesday August 27th, at the Pepsi Center in Denver, Colorado, before a crowd of 20,000, Barack Obama became the first biracial man to be officially nominated as presidential candidate by a major party. When the turn came for the delegates from the state of New York to vote, Obama had received 1,549 and Hillary Rodham-Clinton 231. Hillary then made a motion to suspend the roll call vote and select him by acclamation:"With eyes firmly fixed on the future in the spirit of unity, with the goal of victory, with faith in our party and country, let's declare together in one voice, right here and right now, that Barack Obama is our candidate and he will be our president."The night before, Hillary had made a gracious and persuasive speech in support of Obama, calling on her supporters to vote for the man that would bring health care to all Americans and restore the country's standing in the world, thus tacitly acknowledging that their platforms are one and the same. She had also reminded the audience that the (presidential) "glass ceiling now had 18 million cracks", a reference at the number of votes she received and a reminder of how close women had come this time around to win the Presidency, a white male domain until now. That was her way to give comfort to her female supporters, some of which have avowed to vote for McCain in the Fall. Then on Wednesday night it came up to Bill Clinton to put the proverbial final nail in the coffin of the bitter conflict that had bitterly divided the party up to then. He did it with a masterful, authoritative speech, in which he reassured the audience that Obama was just as ready for the Presidency as he himself had been in 1992. The clarity of his ideas and the perfect delivery reminded us all of why he will go down as one of the greatest Presidents in this country's History.Already by Wednesday night there was a sense of fulfillment and relief, since the unification of the Democratic Party was perceived by most Democrats as the Convention's main objective. The party had been divided since the 1970s, when the moderate, blue collar workers and Southerners became disgruntled with McGovern's socially liberal platform and voted for Nixon. Ten years later they would become known as the Reagan democrats, and the label would stick. Bill Clinton was able to bring them all back to the fold by focused policies and his ability to connect both with white and black blue-collar workers. But in the last eight years the divisions have reappeared, as it became plain during the primary: Obama appeals strongly to the black community and to white college educated youth but has been unable to extend that appeal to older women and white workers. That is why Hillary got 18 million votes. That is also why Obama's choice of Vice President is a solid one. Senator Joseph Biden, with his Catholic, blue-collar background, his toughness and his 30 years of experience in the Senate, and his wisdom and knowledge of foreign affairs, has added weight and credibility to the ticket. The expectation is that this formula will reunite the fractured party once again.This has been a historic Convention in more ways than one: the first African-American to win the nomination, the first woman to come so close to winning it, the passing of the torch to a new generation of Americans by Ted Kennedy, the brilliant speech by Bill Clinton which by all measures restores his stature within the party. But more than anything else, this Convention is historic because, as Clinton said, Barack Obama is "the twenty first century incarnation of the American Dream", and a reaffirmation of Ted Kennedy's proclamation on the first day of the Convention, that "the Dream Lives on" in Obama.The climax came on Thursday night with Obama's long awaited acceptance speech at the closing of the Convention. It was a carefully choreographed affair, overlaid with symbolism. Delivered before a crowd of 75,000 at the INVESCO open-air stadium at Mile High, against a background evoking the pillars of the Lincoln Memorial, it was watched by a TV audience of around 40 million and ended with fireworks across the Colorado sky. Barack Obama is also the first candidate since John F Kennedy to choose an open-to-the public venue to deliver his acceptance speech. There were some risks to this venue, from security to climactic. But more than anything else, his greatest challenge on this historic night was to communicate to his huge audience and the American nation at large, that he is not just a great orator but that he understands their woes and has the fortitude to fight for them; that he is ready to battle ahead and bring about the change he so brilliantly articulates in his speeches, and that this young man standing before them, half preacher, half professor, is also a practical politician, able to back his ideas with concrete and feasible plans. As Richard Haas says in his latest article on the Foreign Affairs Journal, the next president must confront "the reality of the country's expectations" and he must do so by "identifying meaningful yet achievable goals and lay them out before the nation…and then achieve them through leadership skills that will be tested by pressures unimaginable to anyone who has not held he job." Obama passed this difficult test on the first two requirements. The third is awaiting him, if elected in November.By most accounts, the speech was an overwhelming success. Obama presented a complete blueprint on how he will govern if elected. He first listed all the issues Americans are dissatisfied with, starting with the economy and ending with Iraq. He then outlined his specific policies to solve these problems. He subsequently gave examples of how McCain is closely aligned with George W. Bush's failed policies, thus demolishing his opponent's claims of independence from the incumbent. Finally, he presented himself as open-minded and pragmatic, willing to find middle ground on the so-called culture wars issues (gays, guns, abortion) that are frequently framed as false choices to elicit emotions, not rationality, from the part of the voters. He re-introduced himself to the public as a common man, with personal accounts of his childhood as son of a single mother, who raised him with the help of her parents and at times had to use food stamps to take care of him; of his admiration for his grandfather, a WWII veteran who went to college on the GI bill and taught him hard work, pride and love of country. Looking straight into the cameras, he humanized his message and connected with people. He was able to turn the tables on John McCain, who he presented as elitist, out of touch and thus, less trustworthy. His move to the middle ground on cultural issues ("We can withhold the Second Amendment and still get AK 47s out of the hands of criminals") and his calls for greater civic and parental responsibility ("Government cannot replace parents in educating their children…") gave consistency to his claim of post-partisanship.By asserting that America is the best hope for the world, he rejected the notion that only Republicans are patriotic ("Democrats can own that, too."). He also defied the fallacy that Democrats are weak on foreign policy ("We are the party of FDR and JFK, so don't tell us Democrats that we cannot defend the country…and restore the moral standing for all who fight for freedom."). And he did all this not so much with the soaring rhetoric of his earlier speeches, but with a tone of strength and defiance. He took the fight to John Mc Cain, promising to debate him not on petty issues but on who has the "judgment and the temperament" to be Commander-in-Chief. He thereby injected the question of McCain's short temper into the Fall campaign. The speech ended with an evocation of Martin Luther King's I have a dream speech delivered on this same day forty-five years ago at the Lincoln Memorial, and a pledge to once more "March forward together."Memories of the Democratic National Conventions and the momentum created by this brilliant speech were not, however, destined to linger for long in the American psyche. They were shattered by two events, one man-made, one natural. On Friday, August 29th, John McCain made an announcement that caused quite a stir in the media and public alike. He chose as his Vice president Mrs. Sarah Palin, the little-known first-term female governor of Alaska, a no exceptions pro-lifer who believes that Creationism should be taught in the schools alongside Evolution, and whose thin political résumé is startling to most observers. After they recovered from the initial shock, some pundits were able to articulate the intriguing yet-to be-answered question: was this the brilliant decision of a crafty tactician or the insane choice of an impulsive, overly ambitious politician? Is this a masterful stroke or a risky gamble? Only time will tell.That same day, Mrs. Palin had to share the limelight with Gustav, an impervious hurricane that was making its way toward the Gulf Coast at vertiginous speed and strength. Plans for the Republican National Convention to start on Monday had to be scrapped, while McCain and Palin made their way to Mississippi, turning this into an opportunity to distance themselves early on from Bush's fiasco during hurricane Katrina two years ago. Most Convention events were suspended for Monday and Tuesday and replaced by a bare-bones schedule of committee meetings, while the crucial events (vice-presidential speech and nomination vote) start this Wednesday and culminate Thursday with McCain's acceptance speech. This could turn out to be a blessing in disguise for Republicans. Courtesy of Gustav, now downgraded to a grade one hurricane, speeches by Bush and Cheney were cancelled. The President, who hastily made his way to New Orleans, may still speak for a short time via satellite on Wednesday, which will give him an opportunity to amend the terrible legacy of Katrina by replacing those images in the minds of the public with a much improved disaster relief response to Gustav.Palin is expected to give a good speech at the Convention. As a young political reformer who has fought corruption in her home state, she has energized the campaign. As a social conservative with deep convictions against abortion she has galvanized the conservative Evangelical base of the party. She is attractive and warm, and connects easily with the public, one of the few advantages of her political experience in Alaska, a sparsely populated state that requires extensive face-to-face contact with voters. An active hunter and life-long member of the NRA, she may be able to connect with the kind of independent blue-collar and rural voters that Obama has not been able to appeal to. But Palin has never been under the extreme national scrutiny that the next few months will bring, nor has she had to answer any unscripted questions about a wide variety of topics from the often vicious national press. Mc Cain picked her over men with extensive experience in economic matters (Mitt Romney) and in homeland security (Tom Ridge), both of whom had been extensively vetted. His choice of Palin as running mate is even more surprising if we consider that his main campaign theme against Obama was the latter's lack of executive experience. In contrast with Palin, Obama has had his trial-by-fire in the primary debates and through 18 months of campaigning. He has run against formidable candidates in the Primary, has been repeatedly tested by the media, and has emerged as the choice of Democratic voters. Palin, on the other hand, has one year of executive experience and a gaping lack of foreign policy knowledge. She is the choice of one man, John McCain, who has only met her twice. What will be the public's perception of Palin's credibility and readiness to step in as President should something happen to McCain? Did McCain, always the maverick, abdicate in his duty to the people by not choosing someone manifestly ready for the presidency? We may have some answers to these questions in a week or two.For those that expect Hillary's women to flock to the Republican side just because of McCain's Vice-presidential pick, think again. If there is one principle those women activists care about is the protection of the Roe v Wade Supreme Court decision, so they would be loath to vote for a strongly anti-abortion candidate such as Palin. Nevertheless, Obama does need to worry about the white blue-collar workers' vote. He has been consistently ahead in the polls but the margin has narrowed somewhat. He is now 6 percentage points ahead in the polls (47% to 41%) but so far has been unable to break the 50% barrier. Given the byzantine workings of the Electoral College in a presidential election, even a sliver of independents and Reagan democrats here and there (especially in Ohio, Pennsylvania and Michigan) can win this election for McCain. The long-awaited Autumn of Freedom would then become for many, the Winter of Discontent.Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia
The agricultural and food production sector plays a key role in fighting poverty and food insecurity in Moldova, but is facing critical challenges to modernize and integrate into the international market. This paper focuses on smallholder farms, which make up 95 percent of all farms, and explores their potential for growth and the poverty links. Findings reveal that structural change is slow and smallholder farm growth in Moldova is an exception, not the rule. Only a small share of smallholder farms have the interest or capacity to commercialize but need targeted support policies to grow, intensify their farm activities, and integrate into the markets. For the remaining majority, enhancing their livelihoods calls for policies beyond the agricultural sector to help farm households diversify toward non-farm income.
Demand is also fueled by other factors: in many emerging economies a 'demographic dividend' of young people, the product of significant reductions in child and infant mortality rates—is poised to enter education and work. And, according to the 2014 Millennium Development Goals report, nearly 90 percent of children in developing regions are on track to complete primary education. The shift from agricultural to knowledge-based economies also plays a significant role in creating demand for higher learning. The purpose of the study was to identify key success factors in private sector student lending in order to support IFC in understanding, and potentially making investments, in student lending across a range of emerging markets. The study examined 70 student lending models globally as well as a range of innovative financial models. Detailed case studies were developed for eight compelling and diverse private sector student lending models. The study also highlighted a range of innovative financial models including crowd funding, big box banking, social impact bonds, and other mechanisms. The purpose of this investigation of innovative financial models was to see what leading-edge methods might be at work in other sectors and to see if they might offer inspiration to student lending.
This assessment of accounting and auditing requirements and practices in Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) Macedonia is part of a joint initiative implemented by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to prepare reports on the observance of standards and codes (ROSC). The assessment focuses on the strengths and weaknesses of the accounting and auditing (A and A) environment that influences the quality of corporate financial reporting, and includes a review of both statutory requirements and actual practice. The assessment also considers the extent of compliance with European Union (EU) requirements under the acquis communautaire. The strategic objective of this report is to support government efforts to improve the business climate in FYR Macedonia, and achieve the country s overarching goal of EU integration. The three essential pillars of institutional infrastructure are: (i) adequate and appropriate legal requirements, (ii) capacity sufficient to implement those requirements, and (iii) effective enforcement mechanisms. This report updates the first ROSC A and A prepared in 2003. This report provides policy recommendations to improve financial transparency in the domestic corporate sector and to strengthen accounting and audit practices in line with international benchmarks and EU Directives.
This Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) provides an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the existing financial reporting infrastructure that underpins financial accounting and auditing practices in Cape Verde. The assessment focuses on six pillars of financial reporting infrastructure: statutory framework, professional education and training, accountancy profession, accounting standards, auditing standards, and monitoring and enforcement of the applicable standards. The main purpose of this assessment is to assist the development and implementation of a country action plan for strengthening institutional capacity with attendant effects on enhancing corporate financial reporting in Cape Verde. The findings reveal that Cape Verde has recognized the importance of a strong corporate financial reporting architecture. In terms of accounting and auditing standards, Cape Verde adapted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for the private companies and fully adopted IFRS for banking and insurance institutions sector. However, there is no tradition of financial analysis in the country (except within the financial institutions when issuing credit) and no credit-rating agencies. The banks do not rely on corporate financial statements; generally, the lenders manage credit risks using collaterals. The Bank of Cape Verde mandated IFRS for banks and insurance companies in 2008. In addition, the capacity of regulators would be built to cope with the demands of IFRS-compliant financial reporting. The central bank would include in its scope the regulation of micro-finance institutions, which are currently unregulated. In order to improve the legal framework of corporate financial reporting, there is need to enact a Financial Reporting Act with focus on all regulatory aspects of accounting and auditing.
The housing finance market in Mali remains small and under developed. Few banks currently offer a full mortgage product with Banque Malienne de Solidarite, Mali Housing Bank (BHM), Bank of Africa, and EcoBank being the main lenders although at minimal levels. The total annual housing need in Mali based on the household formation rate amounts to 82,500, split between 51,100 urban units and 31,400 rural units. Overall some social housing is constructed and support is provided by the state for low income housing through the Office Malienne de l'Habitat (OMH), but the numbers remain small. The Malien authorities have been working to strengthen financial sector stability which includes measures to stabilize the BHM and put it in a position where it begins to fulfill its mandate of providing credit for the housing sector. A strategy was approved by the council of Minister for a strategic disengagement by the state from the share capital of BHM. Initially the agreed plan was for BHM to be privatized. Overall progress in delivery of affordable housing will require a concerted effort among all stakeholders both in public and private sector. This should be supported through establishment of stakeholder coordination group to oversee change across the housing value chain.
The focus of this paper is on the institutions outside the executive branch that include supreme audit institutions, legislative oversight bodies (such as parliamentary public accounts and budget committees, and ombudsmen), related independent bodies, and civil society organizations. Through their support for accountability, donor countries and international financial institutions seek to help countries: promote voice and accountability as an intrinsic human right, and improve development outcomes in terms of poverty reduction, sustainable development. The report is organized as: first, provide a brief literature review of research on accountability, and how donors and other actors can work to improve it, including a review of the experience of other bilateral and multilateral donors in supporting domestic accountability through their policies, strategies, and behaviors as well as through direct support to accountability actors and systems. Second, briefly review the guidance prepared for Bank staff toward enhancing accountability. Third, review some examples of the Bank's experience in supporting domestic accountability. Finally, we present some conclusions and accountability-related questions for further analysis.
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs are becoming a popular tool for alleviating short-term poverty and reducing the inter-generational transmission of poverty. More than 30 developing and transition countries have implemented these programs, providing incentives to poor households to make investments in the human capital of their children. Programs vary in scale, transfer size, conditionality's, eligibility, and implementation features. This report is structured around five chapters as follows: the first chapter gives an overview of the program, the context in which it was implemented and available evidence on the impacts of the Female School Stipend Program (FSSP) as well as other CCTs. Chapter two focuses on the questions this evaluation sets out to answer and the methods and information used to answer them. The third chapter presents the results from the analysis and is structured around three evaluation questions regarding average impact, heterogeneity of impacts, and spillover effects. Chapter four performs the robustness checks of the findings, examining whether they are sensitive to preprogram trends, measurement error, endogenous compositional changes, and crowding-out effects. Finally, the conclusion discusses the implications of the results, some limitations of this evaluation, and areas that require further work.
FEBRUARY, J900 ■ Gettysbur Mercury CONTENTS. Puzzles and their Value in Men-tal Training, 261 How Obtain Equilibrium be-tween Production and Con-sumption, 265 Scene in the Forest, Orlando Soliloquizing, 271 Education more than a Means of Gaining a Livelihood, 272 A Comparative Study in Ruskin, 274 Editorials 278 Economic Results of Gambling, 279 Results of the Art of Healing,. 282 Public Control of Industries 285 The Power of Ignorance; 292 KAVOR THOSE WHO FAVOR US. For Fine. Printing go to p o ,,0 CARLISLE ST. GETTYSBURG, PA. C. B. Kitzmiller Dealer in Hats, Caps, Boots and . Douglas Shoes GETTYSBURG, PA. J. H. Myers Fashionable Tailor, Clothier and Gents' Furnisher. The best place in town to taaveyourCloth-ing made to order. All workmanship and Trimmings guaranteed. No charge for re-pairs and pressing for one year. Dyeing and Repairing a specialty. Ready-made Clothing the largest stock in town. Up-to-date styles. Bicycle Suits and Breeches Headquarters. 11 Baltimore St., Gettysbarg, Pa. EDGAR 5. MARTIN, F^CIGARS AND SMOKERS' ARTICLES. ijr* l2r* i£?* Chambersburg St., Gettysburg. Do you :::;:: ever write ? No doubt you do. Bat 1B your spelling alwayx correct ? Do you have to watch out BO as to avoid thouc humiliating "break*" which convict one of "bad English"? Are you sure of vour punctua-tion ? DoeB compogition writing Vonie easy to you?— letter writing? — any kind of writing? Are ynu glib with the different word* of similar meaning ? Are you up on the etiquette, the amen-ities, of polite letter-writing and businesi corre-spondence? Well, with the following up-to-date works BO readily obtainable, no one need be lem than an adept: Hindu fy Noble's New Spelter, 25c. How to Punctuate Correctly, 25c, Bad English Corrected. RQe. Composition Writiny Made Easy. 7.1c, Liies and Opposite* {Synonyms and Anto-nyms). 50c. Hinds » Noble's New Letter Writer. 75c. HINDS & HOBLE, Publishers 4-5-13-14 Cooper Institute H. Y. City Schoolbnohs of all publishers atone store. R. A. WONDERS, Corner Cigar Parlors. A full line of Cigars, Tobacco, Pipes, Etc. Scott's Corner, Opp. Eagle Hotel. GETTYSBURG, PA. JOHN M. MINNIGH, Confectionery, Ice, andIee Cpeankjj-* Oysters Stewed and Fried. No. 17 BALTIMORE ST. I .THE. GETTYSBURG MERCURY. Entered at the Postoffice at Gettysburg as second-class matter. VOL. VIII. GETTYSBURG, PA., FEBRUARY, 1900. No. 8 Editor-in-Chief. J. FRANK HEILMAN, '00. Assistant Editors. LUTHER A. WEIGLE, '00. S. A. VAN ORMER, '01. Alumni Editor. REV. F. D. GARLAND. Business Manager. JOHN K. HAMACHER. '00. Assistant Business Manager. CLARENCE MOORE, '02. Advisory Board. PROF. J. A. HIMES, LIT. D. PROF. G. D. STAHLEY, M. D. PROF. J. W. RICHARD, D. D. Published monthly by the students of Pennsylvania (Gettysburg) College. Subscription price One Dollar a year in advance, single copies Fifteen Cents. Students, Professors and Alumni are cordially invited to contribute. All subscriptions and business matter should be addressed to the Business Manager. Articles for publication should be addressed to the Editor. Address THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY, GETTYSBURG, PA. PUZZLES AND THEIR VALUE IN MENTAL TRAINING. [GIES PRIZE ESSAY, FIRST PRIZE.] OF all the powers of the human soul, the imagination is one of the most universal in its application and pleasing in its products, the earliest activity of the infant mind, and the last to cling to old age. Without the exercise of this faculty, the world would be a barren waste of material facts, in which would dwell the human race, passive recipients of objective im-pressions, without the power to revel in the beauties of imaged thought and conception of the Divine. Poetry, philosophy, art, science, invention, religion—all would be lost to mankind. L,ittle wonder, then, that the products of the imagination have ever been present and cultivated among men. The word "puzzle" has been variously defined, and the objects of thought and action to which it may be applied are widely different. But a common ground may be assumed—a puzzle is an invented contrivance, either intellectual or material, mtmllM - 262 THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. whose solution requires time and ingenuity. It will be seen that the puzzle is pre-eminently the product ot the inventive imagina-tion and in turn its highest application is in the exercise of that power for its solution. Intellectual puzzles are in many senses the most important and also most ancient, being generally cast in the form of riddles. From the earliest times of history we can find evidence of the existence of puzzles, either as a form of intellectual amusement or didactic discipline. Among the Eastern nations obscure forms of expression were the inevitable associates of their symbolical modes of thought. It is certain that such methods of statement were in use among the Egyptians, while several books of riddles exist in old Arabic and Persian. One of the most well-known of puzzles is the riddle which Samson propounded to the Philistines, and many other examples are found in the Bible. The proverbs of Solomon are at times excellent types of the didactic form of the riddle. The parables of the Savior were skillful methods of teaching important truths veiled under an interesting narrative which drew the attention of the crowd, and would be very accept-able to an Eastern mind. In Greece the riddle was a favorite mode of intellectual enter-tainment at symposia. To the active mind of the Greek nothing was more pleasing than a well-directed turn of expression which would give room for play of the imagination. There is abundant evidence of this among their writers. Some of their poets even did not hesitate to write whole books of riddles, and Kleobulus, one of the seven wise men, was especially noted for his composi-tions along this line. The famous riddle of the Sphinx as told in the Oedipus Tyrannus, is probably the best known puzzle of Greek literature, though the most interesting form was a part of their very religious life and character—the oracles of the inspired priests, on which hung sometimes the fate of nations, even of the world. The raveling of such obscurities of expression was a source of the keenest pleasure to the Greek mind, and, while a product of the imagination, was an efficient agent in bringing it to that perfection shown in attic literature, thought and philosophy. The Roman mind, more earnest and grave, found small pleas-ure in these modes of intellectual activity, and very little is known of their use of puzzles until the later republic and empire, when they were introduced with the passion for everything Greek, and ■■■■HH THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. 263 professional riddle-makers soon began to take a prominent part in their entertainments and banquets. During the middle ages puzzles were cultivated more as a pleasant means of entertainment than for any other purpose, and until recently the same idea has clung to them. Many manu-script and printed editions of collections of puzzles, riddles and conundrums are in existence. Much of their content consists of coarse jests, but there are some real gems of wit and valuable aids to a true estimate of mediaeval life. The Reformation put a stop to this merry jesting for a time, but it soon crept into favor again, and during the eighteenth century the most brilliant minds of Europe were engaged in the intellectual pastime. At the present day puzzles are still in great favor with both young and old, and their educational worth is becoming more and more realized. As a mental training the value of the puzzle lies chiefly in its power of cultivating quickness and strength of the constructive imagination. An obscurity of expression or mechanical con-struction may require time to solve its intricacies, but the mind is certainly the better for having mastered it. All the faculties of memory and imagination are brought into play, and side by side comes development of the reasoning power as we attempt to deduce from our problem its elements, or to arrive by induction at the result of certain assumed forces. These are the things which made the riddle so attractive to the Greek, with his quick imagination and active reasoning power. When we solve a dif-ficult puzzle, we in fact repeat the very processes by which as children we began to learn, for then everything was a puzzle; and in doing so we strengthen the faculties of the mind which are most essential, and besides strength impart to them a facility and quickness of action, which is in itself most valuable. The subject-matter of the puzzle may be another source of con-siderable benefit. The didactic riddles of the East have already been mentioned as examples of what may be taught in this way. A truth given an obscure expression which requires mental effort to unravel will be impressed upon the mind when it has been gained. A mechanical construction whose every portion has been carefully studied with a view to its possible part in the function of the whole, will not soon be forgotten. In this fact alone may be grounded a strong argument in favor of the puzzle's part in mental training. 264 THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. Puzzles are beginning to play a more and more important part in the education of the child. Almost the first book placed in its hands, "Mother Goose," is full of simple riddles. Froebel's kindergarten method, so generally acknowledged now-a-days, em-bodies the puzzle idea to a great extent, developing as it does the powers of observation, invention and reasoning. As the child passes into school, puzzles of graded difficulty are used for several years, and his toys always include a number of puzzles and games, many of which contain subject-matter of educational value. Many firms now publish educational games, whose benefit to the child will be revealed by even a superficial examination. The use of puzzles may be carried too far, however; for they may be made an end in themselves. Men may become so infatu-ated with the delicacy of reasoning and exhilaration of discovery as to lose sight entirely of the practical use of the mind. So did the School-men of the middle ages, who waged long controversies on trivial and absurd questions merely for sake of the argument. Neither should puzzles take the place of more legitimate means of education, for it must be kept in mind that they are for the more developed merely an intellectual pastime which will benefit instead of harm ; and for the child a means of starting its mind upon the path which it must shortly travel with the more able guides of language, art and science. Puzzles seem to be trivial things, and are so in a certain sense. But they present wonderful capabilities to the student of Psy-chology and the teacher of the child's mind. Used within proper bounds, as a means and not an end, they may become, in devel-opment of strength and facility of the imagination and the reas-oning power, and in didactic force, a powerful factor in mental training. —L. A. W., '00. Hold fast to the Bible as the sheet anchor of your liberties; write its precepts in your hearts, and practice them in your lives. —U. S. Grant. A broken reputashun is like a broken vase—it may be mend-ed, but alwuss shows whare the brak waz.—Josh Billings. THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. 265 MOW OBTAIN EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION. AS a matter of course, the first thing to consider in searching for a remedy for any evil, whether in economics or else-where, is to seek to find the causes of that evil, and to discover a means of removing these causes. Whether the means proposed be beneficial in other respects or advisable upon other grounds we do not need to inquire in this paper. All that is necessary is to find some measure which gives fair promise of bettering matters in this one department of economic life which we have under consideration, namely, of establishing a more stable and more nearly correct relation between the producer and consumer. Briefly and roughly stated, it seems to us that the whole difficulty arises from the fact that the producer is not able to foretell how much of a demand there will be for his goods and incidental to this, how many of those who create the demand will be able to pay within a reasonable time, provided he is willing to sell on credit. As to the second point, demand un-doubtedly is defined to be how much certain persons are ready to take at a certain price. But we must remember that an enormous part of economic operations are conducted on a credit basis and we cannot overlook this as it exercises such a potent influence in increasing or lowering the demand or supply at any time. For if a man believes the credit of his purchasers is good, he will be willing to sell a greater quantity of goods on credit and at a lower price than if he is doubtful as to their credit, and so we might illustrate further. This second point then is incidental to the first, but it is so important in the view we take of the matter that we mention it at once in connection with what we regard the leading difficulty, namely, the producer's ignorance of the con-sumer's future demand for his goods. For he must anticipate the future. It is possible in so few industries to carry on production by filling orders already filed, that we may almost neglect them. And where there are such, the difficulties which we find elsewhere between producer and consumer do not exist, since they work on a solid basis with regard to the future, and are not compelled to base their output upon a supposed state of the market. In other words, they know 266 THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. what the market will be and this is the element which is ordinar-ily lacking and which is the cause, as we believe, of the mis-understandings. Now it becomes important to try to answer the question "Why are these producers in ignorance of the future demand for their goods ?" Necessarily an important factor, in all economic life, is the large mass of natural products which are so dependent on the forces of nature, and as it is impossible to control the workings of these to any appreciable extent, the period between the planting for the future and the realization of it, between "seedtime and harvest," must always be one of doubt. It is apparently impossible to control the amount of production in this sphere, and, so far as this operates as an agent in causing misunderstandings between the producer and consumer, we do not attempt to suggest a remedy. As long as it is impossible for a man to know that he can meet a certain demand, even though he is sure that demand will exist, and that impossibility depends on the fact that the agents which cause the uncertainty are beyond human control, the cure seems also to be without the bounds of human power. From this class of cases where there is an impossibility for the producer to tell what supply he can put upon the market, we pass, by almost imperceptible gradations, to cases where the producer needs only know the demand and he can meet it with an ample supply. No doubt there are natural products which lie on the line between these extremes, as, for example, the output of mines which can be regulated to a fair extent, and there are products, not strictly natural, which are very uncertain as to the possible supply, but as a rule the further removed the product is from the soil, the more completely is the extent of its production within the control of man. It is to this class of products that we wish to direct particular attention. Assuming then that the demand could be met if it could be known, we come again to the question "Why cannot the demand be known ?" The producer can find from his table ofstatistics how many producers there are in the same business with him, how large an amount of their products has been sold during the year previous to that one, and the year previous and soon back, and then, by dividing his capital into the total capital invested in the business, he can find how much of that output should belong --. Sira :-:.'; . THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. 267 to him. A simple problem, no doubt, but with no correctness in its application, and why not ? Simply because no one of his fellow producers, nor himself either, will be satisfied with the amount as he would thus work it out, but partly through natural aggressive-ness, partly though a desire to protect himself against aggressive-ness on the part of his competitors, he will seek to produce and to sell a little more than his share. He will devise new means by which he can bring his goods a little more in favor with the pub-lic than his rivals. He will reduce his prices, allowing himself a narrower margin of profits, hoping to make himself even by larger sales. No doubt in this way he will sell more goods than his slower going neighbor and will get some of the trade which would otherwise have gone to him. His neighbor's trade falls off and he finds that he provided for more trade than he is getting and is burdened with an unsalable stock. This is so much idle capi-tal and makes him so much less able to carry on a successful business. This single illustration, on a small scale, though it is, shows the inherent tendency of competition to make uncertain what share of a given demand will fall to a producer's lot. The same amount of goods may be sold, as he had anticipated, but he has not sold his share, for some one has succeeded in selling it ahead of him. We believe, therefore, that competition is the main reason. why the producer cannot foretell what the demand for his goods will be, and as it is this inability to foretell which leads to the mis-understandings between producer and consumer, the natural conclusion is that we should remove competition. We wish to make mention again that we do not argue that this is necessarily a beneficial or advisable means generally. ■ All we are concerned with is the question whether it will tend to remove the misunderstandings we have been speaking of. Of course it is not far to seek a means of accomplishing this. The means have been thrust upon us rather generously during the past few years. The tendency toward industrial combination, seeming to be the logical outgrowth of competition, appears, like Zeus, to threaten the reign of its progenitor. No doubt, it ap-pears startling to those economists who have been accustomed to regard competition with a kind of solemn awe, as containing a remedy for "all the heartaches and the thousand natural shocks 268 THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. that flesh is heir to ;" but perhaps its partial disappearance may be attended by some results not altogether detrimental. The trust can estimate the demand which it will be called upon to meet. The total demand for a given article during any given period, does not vary through so large a range as to render this estimate one of great uncertainty. No doubt seasons of unusual depression or excitement may render calculations imperfect, but, all in all, the total output which the consumer stands ready to dispose of, is a matter of far higher certainty than the numerous possibilities existing when the producers are multiplied. By the immense amount of capital invested, the trust is better able to adapt itself to an unusual season of excitement or depres-sion. For example, the American Sugar Refining Company a few years ago built a new refinery furnished with the newest techni-cal improvements, to serve only as a safeguard in the case of a suddenly increased demand, or of stoppage in other factories. President Hadley in an article on Trusts, says, " A consoli-dated company has advantages in its power of adapting the amount of production to the needs of consumption. Where several con-cerns with large plants are competing and no one knows exactly what the others are doing, we are apt to have an alternation between years of over-production and years of scarcity, an alter-nation no less unfortunate for the public than for the parties im-mediatety concerned. A wisely managed combination can do much to avoid this. By making its production more even, it can give a constant supply of goods to the consumers and a constant opportunity of work to the laborers; and the resulting steadiness of prices is so great an advantage to all concerned that the public can well afford to pay a very considerable profit to those whose organizing power has rendered such useful service. Morever, the consolidation of all competing concerns avoids many unnecessary expenses of distribution. Under the old sys-tem, these expenses are very great. The multiplication of selling agencies involves much waste. Competitive advertisement is often an unnecessary and unprofitable use of money. Delivery of goods from independent producers, whether by wagon or by rail-road, often costs more than the better organized shipmeuts of a single large concern. All of these evils can be avoided by con-solidation." The same writer compares the trusts with an army, and the THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. 269 comparison is apt for more purposes than one. The effectiveness with which a thoroughly organized and wealthy trust can meet an unexpected crisis, as compared with a large number of disorgan-ized and quarrelsome companies or individuals,is well paralleled by the difference between the manner in which a thoroughly equipped and organized army will overcome a sudden and severe attack, where a host of stragglers would have been cut to pieces. The very organization constitutes an element of tremendous strength. It must be concluded, we think, then, that trusts, would, or rather do furnish a means by which the future demand for the goods of the producer may be rendered more certain and hence they tend to remove the misunderstandings between the producer and the consumer. And now, how would such a remedy apply when we consider the matter of selling on credit. The man who sells, necessarily is not satisfied merely because he can tell how many goods his cus-tomer will buy. He wants to know how many he can and will pay for. Here in addition to the fact that their superior mastery of all the details of their business renders them more capable of judging of the credit of their purchasers, we seem to find another and very important fact. When competition exists, the producer is all the time seeking to hold out more inducement than his com-petitor. One of the common forms these inducements take is a sale on credit, and then competition arises as to extending the time of credit. Now, when the backbone of competition is broken, the trust no longer needs to use such means to secure purchasers. It stands in a position to dictate, to a great degree, its own terms, and can provide much more fully against dangerous credit than can be done where competition has full play. It is worth while, too, to mention the indirect effects flowing from those above mentioned. As the future is more closely anti-cipated, and as the sales made are more fully realized on than formerly, the financial embarrassments of various producers, under the old regime become a gradually disappearing quantity in the disturbing influences on trade. Of course the increased danger from the possibility of the trust must be omitted, but we believe it is overbalanced by the failures due to competition. When we entered upon the analysis of the causes which ren-dered demand uncertain, we supposed for the time being that the 'JO THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. demand, if known, could be met. We now return to that point to inquire briefly how the trust would effect that side of the ques-tion, though we have already incidentally touched upon it. Necessarily, one thing which renders uncertain the ability of the producer to meet a given demand is the possibility of dissatis-faction among his employees, leading to a strike. The same argument applies here as applies to selling on credit. The employee is, to a certain extent, able to make more at the kind of work he is engaged in than at any other, for the simple reason that he knows more about it. Now when there are a number of producers in the same business he knows, if he leaves one, he can probably find work with another, while, where there is but one employer, he loses this advantage. But writers on Trusts and Industrial Combinations in the United States agree that the information given by the working-men, themselves, seems to prove that generally a reduction of hours for labor, seldom a reduction of wages and occasionally, an increase, have taken place, especially where the workingmen were well organized themselves. "It is pretty clear that the laborers in centralized undertakings have not been worse off than in decentralized ones." So that it appears that there is less likeli-hood of a strike under such organization than under the decen-tralized form, so that less opposition to the free course of produc-tion would be met with here. And again the indirect results would be beneficial. For, as the demand becomes more certain, and there is less waste from imperfect attempts to meet it, more and more the production of the trust becomes near to a uniform standard and thus tends to give the workmen steady employment at regular wages, which is a strong barrier against a strike on their part. From the direct and indirect results, therefore, of the consoli-dated form of production, we are led to believe that it presents a means of establishing a far better understanding between the pro-ducer and consumer. That in some minor details the result might be otherwise we do not deny, but looking at it in its broad out-lines and confining our attention carefully to theparticularsubject we have under discussion, we conclude that trusts furnish a method for removing much of the friction between the producer and the consumer. 'oo. ItttfSM&B&iSaSB THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. 271 SCENE IN THE FOREST, ORLANDO SOLILOQUIZING. IS it so that in this guise she sought me? My heart is sick within me. I'll take me back to a wilder region in the forest and there the remainder of my days I'll spend in mourn-ing for my lost love. Aye, virtue is modesty and modesty is a virtue and in that is she lacking. Seek her ? Speak with her ? But strike me dead if I may speak one word with her, I'll write it, fold it, give it to her and fly. 'Twill be a testimony of my love that was, that is no more. She merits now nothing but my scorn. If I had wit, I'd make her blush for very shame, if shame there be in her. But my last breath is drawn. Oh how I loved her to distraction ! I ought to go, but how to move? What is this feeling within me that holds me back ? Is it because the road is long and I am tired. No, 'tis an accursed lingering of that love that once so filled me that I knew naught else. Will it never be in my power to shake it off? 'Twassent from Heaven and not from earth; 'twas given by God and not by man. And yet I'll rid me of it. Can one so unworthy hold my affections thus ? I have a dim vague unrest, can it be removed ? I hear a rustle in the autumn leaves. Ay, here she comes, do I love her yet ? I know not how strong my passion is. I faint from fear. I see her so plain, yet must seem to see her not. She speaks— Enter Ros. and Alia. Ros. (Dressed as a woman.) I am much distressed and faint for succor, must I fall with my true love standing near me and aiding me not ? Alia. Perhaps he sees us not. Shall I go touch him on the arm ? Ros. Yes, ask him if he loves me still. Tell him if when I need it his love fails me it is not love. ' Alia. (Goes up and touches him.) Rosalind has come to seek her lover. Do you not. see her ? She is in need of your aid ? What ails you ? Your eyes look wild and you seem to know me not. Orl. If any of pity exists in your heart for me leave me alone. Alas, I know not what I say; I want you to leave me and yet I fain would have you stay. Ros. (Coming up.) Pray pardon me for calling you my lover, you received it with such melancholy dignity, methinks 272 THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. you do not half appreciate the honor placed upon you. Can I relieve you of the burden of the title? But why do you look at me thus ? Have I done aught against you ? Orl. I show no bravery by standing before you thus. I would that I could die before your very eyes to let you know what havoc you have wrought. But I leave you now this very minute to go far into the forest, perchance to take of my abode with a shepherd and thus spend my remaining days. I leave yet I stay. I cannot stir an inch, (aside.) Sweet Rosalind, has turned my head, Howl love her! Despite her faults, despite her lack of modesty.' Why came you to me thus? Tell me wished you again with your wiles to torment my morbid feelings. Ah, Rosalind, I still shall call you mine. Ros. Orlando, why did you think so ill of me ? Could you not see in my glowing eyes the story of my love. I would rather have had you woo me but bashful man makes maidens bold and love will find a way. We were parted but I could not abide far from thee. Wherever fate led I followed swayed by love alone. And as the days grow brighter and our hearts grow lighter we shall sing for joy, yes, joy without alloy. EDUCATION MORE THAN A MEANS OP GAINING A LIVELIHOOD. THAT education is a means of gaining a livelihood is a fact that needs no proof. Almost every day we are brought into contact with those who are gaining a comfortable liveli-hood by means of their education. In our day there are many others who are striving to get possession of the same means for no other purpose than that of making a living. It is to be regretted, however, that too many look at education as if it were a mere instrument for easily securing the things which satisfy their physical wants. Through this motive men have lost sight of the real and lasting value of education. I would not say that it is wrong to consider education as a means of gaining a livelihood, but I think that it is a very grievous error to consider education as having no other use or value. Indeed, education without any other purpose than that of a means of gaining a livelihood would be of little value to beings created as we are. THE GETTYSBURG MERCURY. 273 Herbert Spencer in his work on Education says, "In education the question of questions is how to decide among the conflicting claims of subjects and determine the relative values of knowledge. Every one in contending for the worth of any particular order of information, does so by showing its bearing upon some part of life. All effort, either directly or by implication, must appeal to the ultimate test of what use is it?" In other words, the writer affirms that the essential question for us to ponder is "How to live." Not how to live in the mere material sense only, but in the widest sense. The general problem which comprehends every special prob-lem is the right ruling of conduct in all directions, under all circumstances. In what way to treat the body; in what way to treat the mind; in what way to manage our affairs; in what way to bring up a family; in what way to behave as a citizen; in what way to utilize all those sources of happiness which nature supplies—how to use all our faculties to the greatest advantage of ourselves and others—how to live completely! And this being the great thing needful for us to learn, it is, by conse-quence the great aim of education. The leading kinds of activities which constitutes human life are: (1) Those activities which directly minister to self preserva-tion; (2) Those activities which, by securing the necessaries of life, indirectly administer to self preservation; (3) Those activities which are involved in the maintenance of proper social and political relations; (4) Those miscellaneous activities which make up the leisure part of life, devoted to the gratification of tastes and feelings. Is it not education which prepares the individual for direct and indirect self-preservation, for parent-hood, for citizenship, and for the miscellaneous refinements of life? Of course ideal education is complete preparation in all these divisions. Some one has said that education is to the soul what sculpture is to the marble. As the sculpture brings out of the marble the god-like form, the symmetrical proportion, the life-like attitude of the finished and polished statue, so education brings out of man as an animal man, a rational being, making him a complete creature after his kind. To his frame it gives vigor, activity and beauty; to his senses correctness and acuteness; to his intellect, power and truthfulness; to his heart, virtue. r
I.1 Motivation Exchange rates are a key issue in international economics and politics. While the determinants of exchange rates have been extensively studied in previous works, this dissertation contributes to the literature by deriving exchange rate expectations from stock market (ADR) data and analyzing their determinants. This exercise is done for three cases where one has to resort to exchange rate expectations since the national exchange rate is either manipulated by the central bank (the first paper in Chapter II), fixed in pegged exchange rate regimes (the second paper in Chapter III), or not existent as the considered country is part of a currency union and therefore has no national currency (the third paper in Chapter IV). The first paper presented in Chapter II analyzes exchange rate expectations for the case of China in the period 1998-2009 in order to test standard exchange rate theories. American officials repeatedly accused China of systematically undervaluing its currency against the U.S. dollar , which produces political tensions between both countries. A recent climax in this dispute was reached on September 28, 2010, when the House of Representatives passed the Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act, which would allow the imposition of import duties for countries with undervalued currencies, namely China. Although this bill did not pass the Senate, Chinese officials clearly opposed the bill arguing against significant undervaluation of the yuan and in favor of political opportunism of U.S. officials. As the assessments of a fair exchange rate significantly differ among officials of both countries, the Chinese-American exchange rate dispute continues. Measuring the development of market determined exchange rate expectations may help to find a compromise in this international political dispute and knowing the determinants of these expectations may help to identify macroeconomic policies necessary to influence future exchange rates. The second paper presented in Chapter III investigates the development of exchange rate expectations and their determinants for the currency crisis episodes in Argentina (2001-2002), Malaysia (1998-1999), and Venezuela (1994-1996 and 2003-2007). Large devaluations of Southeast Asian and Latin American currencies were to be observed during the currency crises in the 1990's and at the beginning of the last decade. Due to an appreciation of foreign currency denominated debt, capital withdrawals, and bank runs, for example, currency crises typically lead to significant output losses in the affected economies (Hutchison and Noy, 2002). Avoiding currency crisis outbreaks has therefore become one of the major policy goals in many developing countries, which may explain the rapid accumulation of foreign exchange reserves aimed to fend off speculative attacks in these countries. The costs of this currency crisis prevention policy are however often overseen. Since foreign exchange reserves are typically invested in U.S. Treasuries, they yield a relatively low return compared to the high cost of domestic capital in these countries. Moreover, foreign exchange reserves may lose in value as the domestic currency appreciates against the U.S. dollar (Rodrik, 2006). An alternative way to avoid the outbreak of currency crises may be to regularly adjust the official exchange rate (typically managed by the domestic central bank) to levels in line with market expectations. Knowing market-based exchange rate expectations and their determinants may therefore be a cheaper way to avoid currency crises than holding excess amounts of foreign exchange reserves. The third paper presented in Chapter IV uses daily ADR data to analyze the determinants of the risk of withdrawals from the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) for the five vulnerable member countries Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain for the period 2007-2009. The subprime lending crisis has triggered significant financial turmoil in the EMU. Banking systems were destabilized and the governments of Greece, Ireland, and Portugal had to be bailed out. Reasserting national authority over monetary policy may help domestic policymakers to address the problems caused by banking and sovereign debt crises or an overvalued euro at national discretion. While the abandonment of fixed exchange rate regimes has so far been analyzed for countries with national currencies, the financial vulnerabilities in the EMU offer a new case to study the possibility of withdrawals from a monetary union. Although a country's membership in the EMU is typically considered irreversible, many authors agree that sovereign states can choose to leave the EMU (Cohen, 1993; Scott, 1998; Buiter, 1999; Eichengreen, 2007). The new Treaty of Lisbon now includes a provision outlining voluntary withdrawal from the Union, which may cause the members to re-think the pros and cons of remaining in the EMU. Although the European Central Bank (ECB) has implemented measures meant to support the banking sectors and governments in the EMU, autonomous national central banks would probably pursue more expansionary monetary policies. By analyzing the determinants of exchange rate expectations in the monetary union one may therefore analyze the drivers of the risk of withdrawal from the EMU. I.2 Deriving exchange rate expectations from prices of American Depositary Receipts Measuring movements in exchange rate expectations is a relatively easy task for currencies in which a liquid and free forward exchange market exists. For the cases considered in this dissertation, however, the forward exchange market either produces bad forecasts or does not even exist. For the case of China, the yuan/U.S. dollar forward exchange rate is most likely managed by the Chinese central bank in the course of its foreign exchange market intervention policies, which hampers its ability to provide good signals for the future spot market exchange rate (see, for example, Wang, 2010). For the considered member countries of the EMU, no national currencies exist and consequently forward exchange rates cannot be used. For the case of the currency crisis episodes studied in this dissertation, one could use regression-based forecasting models that employ data on macroeconomic variables in order to produce currency crisis signals (see, among others, Eichengreen et al., 1995; Frankel and Rose, 1996; Kaminsky et al., 1998; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Karmann et al., 2002). The drawback of these approaches is the nature of macroeconomic data used, which enables one to create only monthly or quarterly crisis signals based on backward-looking data. In this dissertation I use stock market data to derive exchange rate expectations, which has several advantages compared to existing approaches. First of all, the prices of the considered stocks are most probably not manipulated by central bank interventions since these stocks are traded in the United States, which enables the derivation of exchange rate expectations formed under free market conditions (also for China). The used stock market data is available for the considered EMU member countries, which facilitates the analysis of the risk of withdrawals from the EMU. Moreover, stock market data is forward-looking and available on a daily basis, which enables the derivation of more accurate and up-to-date currency crisis signals for the considered crisis episodes. In order to derive exchange rate expectations I use data on a particular type of stock called American Depositary Receipt (ADR). An ADR is a financial instrument for foreign companies to list their shares at stock exchanges in the Unites States. An ADR represents the ownership of a specific number of underlying shares of a company in the home market on which the ADR is written. While the underlying stock is denominated in the currency and traded at the stock exchange of the home market, the ADR is denominated in U.S. dollars and traded at a U.S. stock exchange. Since both types of stocks of the same company generate identical cash flows and incorporate equivalent rights and dividend claims, cross-border arbitrage implies that the ADR and its underlying stock have the same price when adjusted for the current exchange rate. When capital controls or ownership restrictions are implemented, cross-border arbitrage is not possible and the law of one price is not binding. In such an environment, information efficiency suggests that the relative prices of ADRs and their underlying stocks – which only differ with respect to the currency they are denominated in – will signal exchange rate expectations of stock market investors. Using data on relative prices (or returns) of ADRs and their underlying stocks and the current exchange rate I can calculate measures for exchange rate expectations of stock market investors. Although the papers presented in this dissertation differ with respect to the considered companies, countries, and time periods, each paper uses the same kind of data and a similar methodology to derive exchange rate expectations – relative prices or returns of ADRs and their corresponding underlying stocks. In each paper I use a panel regression framework in order to analyze the determinants of exchange rate expectations. Each of the included papers focuses on a distinct facet of exchange rate expectations. The first paper focuses on standard exchange rate theories such as the relative purchasing power parity or the uncovered interest rate parity in order to analyze the factors that drive exchange rate expectations in general. The second paper studies the determinants of currency crisis expectations. The third paper analyzes the determinants of the risk of withdrawals from the EMU as expected by ADR market investors. I.3 Contribution to the literature This dissertation adds to two strands of the literature. First, it contributes to a literature that studies the determinants of exchange rates, currency crisis outbreaks, and risk of withdrawal from the EMU. The first paper (Chapter II) contributes to a vast literature on the determinants of exchange rates. An incomplete list of exchange rate determinants analyzed in the literature includes: labor productivity (Chinn, 2000; Cheung et al., 2007); inflation rates (Lothian and Taylor, 1996; Taylor et al., 2001); interest rates (Froot and Thaler, 1990; Chinn, 2006); overvaluation of the domestic currency (Glick and Rose, 1999; Corsetti et al., 2000); or export growth (Williamson, 1994; Isard, 2007). I study the impact of these macroeconomic fundamentals on ADR investors' exchange rate expectations for China. China makes a good case to study standard exchange rate theories since the Chinese central bank manages the official yuan/U.S. dollar exchange rate, which therefore reacts much less to changes in macroeconomic fundamentals than is suggested by theory. Using ADR market data, I can test exchange rate theories for the Chinese peg/managed float regime under free market conditions. The second paper (Chapter III) contributes to a literature, which analyzes the determinants of currency crisis outbreaks (Eichengreen et al., 1995; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Karmann et al., 2002). Existing papers employ low-frequent and backward-looking macroeconomic data to forecast currency crises. This dissertation uses ADR market data to derive more accurate and up-to-date currency crisis signals on a daily basis. Moreover, the determinants of currency crisis expectations, such as banking or sovereign debt crisis risk, can be studied using daily market-based risk proxies. The third paper (Chapter IV) contributes to a literature on the sustainability of the EMU. Several papers discuss the possibility of withdrawal from the EMU (Cohen, 1993; Scott, 1998; Buiter, 1999; Eichengreen, 2007). I present empirical evidence that daily ADR market data reflects the risk that vulnerable member countries may leave the EMU and analyzes which determinants drive this withdrawal risk perceived by ADR investors. Second, this dissertation contributes to the literature on the pricing of ADRs. A common finding in the literature is that the outbreak of a currency crisis negatively affects the returns of U.S. dollar-denominated ADRs as the devaluation of the local currency depresses the dollar value of the underlying stock (see, for example, Bailey et al., 2000; Kim et al., 2000; Bin et al., 2004). Several papers find that the introduction of capital controls (typically meant to prevent a currency crisis outbreak) can lead to a permanent violation of the law of one price between ADRs and their underlying stocks since cross-border arbitrage cannot take place (Melvin, 2003; Levy Yeyati et al., 2004, 2009; Auguste et al., 2006). Arquette et al. (2008) and Burdekin and Redfern (2009) find that the price spreads of Chinese cross-listed stocks are significantly driven by market-traded forward exchange rates. This dissertation builds on these findings and uses the relative prices (or returns) of ADRs and their underlying stocks to derive exchange rate expectations. I present empirical evidence that ADR investors' exchange rate expectations are driven by theory-based determinants of exchange rates, currency crisis outbreaks, or the risk of withdrawal from the EMU. This analysis therefore provides new insights into the price (return) determinants of ADRs. I.4 Main findings and policy implications The findings of this dissertation may broaden the understanding of exchanger rate expectations. The results of the first paper (Chapter II) suggest that stock market investors form their exchange rate expectations in accordance with standard exchange rate theories. Based on a monthly panel data set comprised of 22 ADR/underlying stock pairs and 52 H-share/underlying stock pairs from December 1998 to February 2009 I find that stock market investors expect more yuan appreciation against the U.S. dollar: if the yuan's overvaluation decreases (the incentive of competitive devaluation); if the inflation differential vis-à-vis the United States falls (relative purchasing power parity); if the productivity growth in China accelerates relative to the United States (the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect); if the Chinese interest rate differential vis-à-vis the United States decreases (uncovered interest rate parity); when Chinese domestic credit relative to GDP decreases (lower risk of a twin banking and currency crisis); or, if Chinese sovereign bond yields fall (lower risk of a twin sovereign debt and currency crisis), ceteris paribus. These findings suggest that the theoretical links between macroeconomic variables and exchange rates in most cases also apply to exchange rate expectations. In this way, the results support the validity of many exchange rate theories and substantiate the rationality of stock market investors' expectations. This approach (based on stock prices formed under free market conditions) provides an opportunity to test exchange rate theories in managed floating regimes, where the official exchange rate is manipulated by the central bank and does therefore not necessarily respond to changes in macroeconomic fundamentals. Moreover, I use a rolling regressions forecasting framework in order to evaluate the quality of exchange rate expectations. I find that exchange rate expectations drawn from the ADR and H-share market have a better ability to predict changes in the yuan/U.S. dollar exchange rate than the random walk or forward exchange rates, at least at forecast horizons longer than one year. The People's Bank of China may take advantage of ADR and H-share based exchange rate expectations in order to determine possible misalignments of the yuan/U.S. dollar exchange rate. In this way, the Chinese central bank may improve the timing and intensity of foreign exchange market interventions meant to manipulate the yuan/U.S. dollar exchange rate. The second paper (Chapter III) focuses on the derivation and determination of currency crisis signals formed by ADR market investors. Using daily data on 17 ADR/underlying stock pairs for the capital control episodes in Argentina (2001-2002), Malaysia (1998-1999), and Venezuela (1994-1996 and 2003-2007) we find that ADR investors anticipate currency crises or realignments well before they actually occur. Policymakers could use ADR investors' up-to-date assessment of the peg's sustainability in order to identify currency crisis risk earlier and to take the necessary steps to realign an (unsustainable) peg rate before a crisis breaks out. In this way, they could prevent the outbreaks of damaging currency crises without holding excess amounts of costly foreign exchange reserves. Using panel regressions we find that ADR investors anticipate a higher currency crisis risk when export commodity prices fall, the currencies of trading partners depreciate, sovereign bonds yield spreads rise, and interest rate spreads increase. These findings suggest that ADR investors' currency crisis expectations are based on currency crisis theories even on a daily basis underlining the validity of these theories. The third paper (Chapter IV) studies a particular form of currency crisis risk: the risk that vulnerable member countries could leave the EMU. I use a multifactor pricing model to test whether the financial vulnerability measures assumed to reflect the incentives of national governments to withdraw from the EMU (banking crisis risk, sovereign debt crisis risk, and overvaluation of the euro) are priced in ADR returns. Using daily data on 22 ADR/underlying stock pairs of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain in the period January 2007 to March 2009 I find that ADR investors perceive a higher risk of withdrawal (priced in ADR returns) when the risk of banking and sovereign debt crisis and the overvaluation of the euro increase. Policymakers could use ADR market data in order to assess the stability of the EMU. Higher correlations between ADR returns and currency crisis risk factors would suggest a higher risk of withdrawals from the EMU. In such a case, financial vulnerabilities may be addressed within the EMU in order to preserve the integrity of the eurozone. However, time will show how long the policymakers in the EMU will continue with the implementation of even more anti-crisis measures. Growing controversies on the ECB's sovereign bond purchases and the bailouts for Greece, Ireland and Portugal cast doubt on the sustainability of the EMU in its current form.
