Suchergebnisse

The current crisis of the world political economy stems from the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, which was characterized by stable institutions of regulation of national capital accumulation within the Pax Americana. The resulting absence of rules governing international trade, reflected in rising (Northern) protectionism and anarchic competition for markets for agricultural commodities, underlies a dramatic restructuring of the world economy. Focusing on the world food order, this essay speculates about the characteristics of a new international food regime that could arise to match the growing power of transnational companies to restructure production and consumption relations on a global scale. It is argued that the recomposition of North-South relations means a new subordination of Southern political-economy by intensifying Southern food dependency. This is a prelude to the further centralization of Northern corporate power, and the possibility of a system of global regulation administered under the auspices of the IMF and the GATT.

The dissertation is devoted to the development of the concept of the formation of a global system of financial support for sustainable development, as well as practical recommendations for improving the mechanisms of its functioning in accordance with the current challenges of global development.In the dissertation, the global challenges and the conceptual nature of sustainable development have been investigated. The genesis of the conceptual and categorical apparatus of the research of sustainable development financing has been systematized and developed. It is substantiated that financing sustainable development as a process of mobilization, distribution (within priority sectors, programs and projects) and the use of financial resources to achieve sustainable development involves attracting national, international and world finances. It is determined that the global financial policy in the field of sustainable development implies the implementation of a focused set of actions and measures on the formation, distribution and redistribution of financial resources, carried out by international organizations, global funds and governments of countries within their powers and functions in the sphere of ensuring the realization of the goals of sustainable development.The classification of financial resources involved in the field of sustainable development is proposed, due to the inclusion of such features as forms of existence (cash, securities, debt obligations, grants, loans, investments), affiliation (own, borrowed, attracted (international financial assistance ), sources of formation (state, private, financial resources of international financial organizations), level of formation and use (national, international, world), term of use (short-term, mediumterm, long-term), profitability (philanthropic, commercial), the level of centralization of decision-making (centralized, decentralized), the direction of use (financing of the basic sectors of sustainable development, financing of global public goods, climate finance), which ensures the identification of financial resources and the possibility of their target orientation for solving specific problems in the area of sustainable development. ; Дисертаційну роботу присвячено розробці концепції формування глобальної системи фінансового забезпечення сталого розвитку, а також практичних рекомендацій щодо вдосконалення механізмів її функціонування відповідно до сучасних викликів глобального розвитку.Досліджено глобальні виклики та концептуальну сутність сталого розвитку. Систематизовано та розвинуто генезис понятійно-категоріального апарату дослідження фінансування сталого розвитку.Обґрунтовано, що фінансування сталого розвитку, як процес мобілізації, розподілу (у межах пріоритетних секторів, програм і проектів) та використання фінансових ресурсів з метою досягнення сталого розвитку, охоплює залучення національних, міжнародних та світових фінансів. Визначено, що глобальна фінансова політика у сфері сталого розвитку передбачає здійснення цілеспрямованого комплексу дій та заходів щодо формування, розподілу і перерозподілу фінансових ресурсів, що здійснюється міжнародними організаціями, глобальними фондами та урядами країн у межах їх повноважень та функцій в сфері забезпечення реалізації цілей сталого розвитку.Запропоновано класифікацію фінансових ресурсів, задіяних у сфері сталого розвитку, за рахунок включення таких ознак, як форми існування (грошові кошти, цінні папери, боргові зобов'язання, гранти, кредити, інвестиції), приналежність (власні, позикові, залучені (міжнародна фінансова допомога), джерела формування (державні, приватні, фінансові ресурси міжнародних фінансових організацій), рівень формування та використання (національні, міжнародні, світові), термін використання (короткострокові, середньострокові, довгострокові), прибутковість (філантропічні, комерційні), рівень централізації прийняття рішень (централізовані, децентралізовані), напрям використання (фінансування базових секторів сталого розвитку, фінансування глобальних суспільних благ, кліматичні фінанси), що забезпечує ідентифікацію фінансових ресурсів та можливість їх цільового спрямування на розв'язання конкретних проблем у сфері сталого розвитку.Уточнено зміст поняття «глобальна система фінансування сталого розвитку» – сукупність взаємопов'язаних сфер, механізмів, ланок фінансових відносин між суб'єктами процесу забезпечення потреб сталого розвитку шляхом мобілізації, акумуляції, розподілу та використання фінансових ресурсів на цілі економічного зростання, соціального прогресу та охорони навколишнього середовища на національному, міжнародному та світовому рівнях.Обґрунтовано конфігурацію глобальної системи фінансування сталого розвитку, що представляє сукупність взаємопов'язаних елементів національного, міжнародного і світового рівнів, що охоплює суб'єктів (країни, міжнародні фінансові організації, установи ООН, глобальні фонди) та об'єктів за сферами фінансування (соціальна, економічна, виробнича, інфраструктура, продовольча безпека, охорона довкілля, глобальні суспільні блага), що мають взаємодіяти на основі принципів синергізму, диференціації джерел фінансового забезпечення, підпорядкованості визначеним цілям сталого розвитку, ефективності, оптимальності шляхом використання економічних і адміністративних важелів управління сталим розвитком. Розроблено методологічний підхід до дослідження глобальної системи фінансування сталого розвитку та обґрунтувати механізм її функціонування.Досліджено еволюцію глобального інституціонального забезпечення сфери фінансування сталого розвитку, інституціональні механізми підвищення ефективності зовнішньої допомоги у сфері сталого розвитку.Систематизовано детермінанти діяльності установ ООН у сфері фінансування сталого розвитку.Проведено компаративні співставлення системних засад політики країн світу в сфері досягнення Цілей розвитку тисячоліття. Розроблено науково- методичний підхід до оцінки результативності міждержавного фінансування сталого розвитку країн, що розвиваються.Проаналізовано національне та міждержавне фінансування сталого розвитку країн, що розвиваються. За результатами аналізу національного та міждержавного фінансування сталого розвитку країн, що розвиваються, встановлено мультивекторність у фінансуванні базових секторів сталого розвитку, ефективності зовнішньої допомоги, що надається країнами- донорами країнам, що розвиваються; зростання обсягів допомоги, що надається десятьма найбільшими донорами – країнами-членами КСР ОЕСР; зміщення пріоритетів у наданні допомоги донорами за групами країн; невиконання країнами, що розвиваються, цільових показників фінансування базових секторів сталого розвитку, встановлених на міжнародному та регіональному рівнях.Обґрунтовано методологічний підхід до визначення залежності рівня результативності виконання Цілей розвитку тисячоліття країнами, що розвиваються, від рівня глобального фінансування сталого розвитку. Запропоновано авторську методику розрахунку Індикатору результативності виконання завдань Цілей розвитку тисячоліття, Індикатору глобального фінансування сталого розвитку.Розроблено стратегічні напрями мобілізації та використання фінансових ресурсів на цілі сталого розвитку в країнах, що розвиваються. Визначено пріоритетні заходи щодо покращення мобілізації національних фінансових ресурсів, що включають зміцнення потенціалу національних систем оподаткування; протидію незаконним фінансовим потокам; забезпечення підзвітності урядів і відкритості державних даних. Встановлено, що для підвищення ефективності державних видатків, спрямованих на підтримку пріоритетних секторів, необхідною є розробка адекватної системи оцінки ефективності видатків бюджету, підвищення відповідальності та мотивування виконавців бюджетних програм, активізація участі неурядових організацій в бюджетному процесі, забезпечення достовірної та оперативної інформації та прозорості усіх етапів бюджетного процесу.Здійснено аналіз національних політик високорозвинених країн у сфері надання зовнішньої допомоги. Установлено збільшення бюджетів зовнішньої допомоги на цілі сталого розвитку. Визначено пріоритетні регіони у розподілі ресурсів, спрямованих на фінансування програм сталого розвитку. Установлено різноспрямованість тенденцій у фінансуванні високорозвиненими країнами базових секторів сталого розвитку країн, що розвиваються. Визначено нерівномірність прогресу в підвищенні якості та ефективності офіційної допомоги розвитку високорозвинених країн.Розроблено концептуальні засади удосконалення міжнародного фінансування сталого розвитку. Визначено необхідність покращення формування міжнародних фінансових ресурсів на цілі сталого розвитку шляхом використання додаткових джерел фінансування. Установлено важливість покращення розподілу міжнародних фінансових ресурсів на цілі сталого розвитку, що включає реформування розподілу офіційної допомоги розвитку за групами країн, більш раціональний розподіл за секторами. Наголошено на необхідності підвищення ефективності зовнішньої допомоги на цілі сталого розвитку за рахунок підвищення якості офіційної допомоги розвитку, посилення донорами передбачуваності зовнішньої допомоги, збільшення донорами незв'язаності допомоги, посилення координації, зменшення донорами фрагментації допомоги, посилення взаємної підзвітності донорів і країн-реципієнтів допомоги. Запропоновано заходи щодо поліпшення інформаційного забезпечення міжнародного фінансування сталого розвитку шляхом створення єдиної міжнародної бази даних щодо фінансування сталого розвитку з повною інформацією в розрізі кожної країни- реципієнта зовнішньої допомоги за весь період її співробітництва з донорами.Проаналізовано ефективність взаємодії України з міжнародними інститутами та установами ООН у сфері сталого розвитку. Розроблено напрями удосконалення процесів залучення та використання фінансових ресурсів з метою підвищення ефективності фінансування сталого розвитку в Україні.

This book is the 2nd edition of the Economics of the International Coal Trade. Coal is the single most important source of power on our planet and today accounts for 40% of electricity generation and 30% of primary energy. The world's appetite for energy is still far from being met. Until 2050, an additional 6+ billion people will require access to proper power. "Why Coal Continues to Power the World" introduces the reader to the global coal business; its importance; its source; its global demand, supply and trade; its use; its environmental impact; and its future. Despite recent price hikes, coal does not appear to be a popular subject today, which may explain the little attention it receives in the scientific community. Since writing the first edition during the commodity super cycle in 2006-2008, the world has changed. How has this impacted the global world of coal? This book is useful to energy economists, businessmen, politicians, university professors, high school teachers, students and anyone with an interest in how the world is powered. It is also helpful to anyone studying climate change and global warming. This new edition of the book includes previously not covered special sections on: * Coal analysis and sampling with a special section on moisture * A technical summary of all key coking coal characteristics in Appendix 2 * Coking coal, iron ore and the steel industry * Cement and petcoke markets * Global gas markets and the shale gas revolution in the US * Nuclear energy and the history of the oil market * Renewable energy and the German "Energiewende" * Power plant technology and CO2 sequestration and processing * The role of CO2 and why man-made CO2 does not cause global warming Apart from giving an in-depth overview of the global coal business, in this book the author argues that coal is far from "dead". Some of my key messages are contrary to popular beliefs: (1) The importance of coal will further increase in absolute and likely even in relative terms for decades to come. (2) Man-made CO2 has no effect on global temperatures and combustion of fossil fuels does not influence the weather. (3) We cannot stop the advance of coal, we can only make this process as environmentally sustainable as humanly possible. Therefore, mankind needs to embrace coal as the "bridge" from the Oil Age to the Solar Age (through the "New Energy Revolution"). (4) Industrialized nations have to invest in coal and in all means to more efficientl ...

     

I was invited recently to take part on a panel discussion
on Modernizing Liquidity Provision as part of a conference hosted jointly by CATO and the Mercatus Center entitled A Fed for Next Time: Ideas for a Crisis-Ready Central Bank.  My post today is basically a transcript of the presentation I gave in my session. I'd like to thank George Selgin and David Beckworth for inviting me to speak on why the Fed should create a standing repo facility, an idea that Jane Ihrig and I promoted early last year in a pair of St. Louis Fed blog posts here and here.

In those posts, Jane I argued that the Fed should create a standing repo facility that would be prepared to lend against U.S. Treasury securities and possibly other high quality liquid assets (HQLAs). We distinguished the facility we had in mind from the discount window in two key respects. First, unlike the window, it would restrict collateral to consist only of HQLA; and second, it would grant access to non-depository institutions, in particular, to dealers and possibly even to all the counterparties that are presently permitted to access the Fed's ON RRP facility.

At the time, we motivated the facility as a way for the Fed to conduct monetary policy in a manner consistent with the FOMC's preferred operating framework of ample reserves together with its 2014 Policy Normalization Principles and Plans which stated, among other things, the desire to hold "no more securities than necessary to implement monetary policy efficiently and effectively."

Jane and I speculated that a significant source of the demand for reserves over other HQLAs came from the Global Systemically Important Bank's (G-SIB's) perceived need for resolution liquidity. We reasoned that these G-SIBs might be more inclined to hold higher-yielding HQLAs over reserves if it was known beforehand that the former could be readily converted into reserves on demand at a standing facility at pre-specified terms. At the same time, the facility would provide a ceiling on repo rates and eliminate the need to estimate the so-called "minimally ample" level of reserves. That is, the facility would automatically flush the system with the reserves it needed as reserve supply and demand conditions varied because of adjustments in the Treasury General Account or other economic factors. Finally, we doubted whether the facility would lead to any significant amount of disintermediation as some people feared. In our view, it would serve mainly to cap the terms of trade in a number of over-the-counter (OTC) repo transactions involving Treasury debt.

The title of this session is "Modernizing Liquidity Provision." We're here today, of course, because of the massive Fed-Treasury interventions in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Jane and I didn't tout the standing repo facility as a crisis tool because we figured that in a crisis, investors were unlikely to have much difficulty in finding buyers of U.S. Treasury securities. Since the 2008-09 financial crisis, we've grown accustomed to the idea of USTs serving as a flight-to-safety vehicle. And, indeed, this seems to have been the case as the present crisis initially unfolded. Bond yields began to drop sharply in Februrary and then again following the Fed's rate cut on March 5, with the 10-year hitting a low of 54bp on March 9.

But then something happened that I don't think anyone was expecting (certainly, I was not). In particular, after March 9, there's clear evidence of selling pressure stemming from what looked like a repo run on treasury securities. That is, for a variety of reasons there was an enhanced demand for cash which, in this instance, led to sales of U.S. Treasuries, depressing their value as collateral--effectively evaporating a significant portion of the supply of safe assets--which led to margin calls, which led to further selling pressure, and so on.

When the Fed cut its policy rate to 10bp on March 16, bond yields continued to rise, with the 10-year hitting almost 120bp on March 18. Bond yields came down only after the Fed intervened first with its discretionary repo operations and then with $1.5T of outright purchases of securities. This episode reminds us again that cash is king in a crisis and that U.S. Treasury securities are not always considered cash-equivalent in a crisis.

A natural question to ask here is whether disruptions like this constitute a policy problem. After all, it's not like bond traders are unfamiliar with the notion of interest rate volatility. When I glance at the data, the absolute size of this volatility seems more or less stable since the mid 1980s. However, because interest rate levels are so much lower today, a 50bp move is quantitatively more significant in relative terms. This wouldn't be much of a problem, in my view, if treasury securities served merely as pure saving instruments. But for better or worse, the UST has evolved over time to become an important form of wholesale money. In particular, it is used widely as collateral in the repo market (the so-called shadow bank sector). Its value as collateral stems in large part from its perceived safety and liquidity. And most of the time, the U.S. Treasury market is liquid. Except for when it isn't, of course. And so the question is, when it isn't liquid, does it matter and, if so, should something be done about it?

My views on this questions are informed by both by theory and from what I know of the history of the U.S. Treasury market (e.g., Garbade 2016). Theory tells us that in a fiat money system, there's no fundamental difference between account entries at the Federal Reserve and (say) at Treasury Direct. They are both electronic ledgers containing interest-bearing accounts. There are legal differences, of course. Only depository institutions have access to Fed accounts, whereas treasury securities can be held much more widely. Treasury securities are more complicated objects because they differ from each other in terms of coupon, time left to maturity, and possibly other characteristics. For this reason, treasury securities, as with most bonds, trade in decentralized over-the-counter markets instead of centralized exchanges.

While OTC markets may have their advantages (they evidently displaced the centralized exchange of bonds in the 1920s), their decentralized structure can be problematic. When investors become fearful, bond dealers and other traders may become unwilling or unable to execute trades, so that meaningful price information is lost. Safe assets may trade at significant discounts or premia, not for any fundamental reason, but simply because liquidity (market participation/communications) has vanished. Such events have implications that extend beyond the treasury market because, as is well-known, the yield on Treasury debt serves as a benchmark for many other financial assets. Unnecessary and avoidable problems in the treasury market can spillover into other financial markets, bringing grief to the broader economy.

From this perspective then, I am led to ask the question: in what world does it make sense to permit risk-free claims to fiat money like treasury securities to suddenly become illiquid? (This question is distinct from the one that asks whether risk-free claims to fiat money should be made illiquid--as in, the issuance of non-marketable debt; see here, for example) There is really no good reason, as far as I know.

I therefore continue to believe that a standing repo facility makes a lot of sense for the U.S. economy. And I again want to stress that this is not an hypothetical proposal. Many of the world's leading central banks operate such facilities. The Fed has had its ON RRP facility in place since 2013. Indeed, the Fed even implemented a repo facility (called the FIMA repo facility) in March of this year where foreign central banks can borrow funds at 25bp above IOER by presenting U.S. Treasury securities as collateral. The same type of facility set up for domestic purposes (ideally with Treasury support) could simultaneously help the FOMC achieve interest rate control, shrink the size of its balance sheet, and prevent unnecessary violent disruptions in the treasury market by setting a corridor around treasury yields at different maturities. The size of the corridor could ultimately be adjusted to help achieve yield curve control if desired. But this is a separate issue, so let me end here. Please feel free to comment below. 

The COVID-19 pandemic is a phenomenon that has already claimed millions of lives and has generated an enormous health, social and economic impact across the globe. The world has been confronted with two simultaneous crises: a humanitarian crisis and a crisis of the rule of law, both of which have severely undermined human security, particularly in countries that, even without the disruption caused by the pandemic, have been far from perfect in providing their citizens with a sense of security on many levels. In such circumstances, the role of civil society and third sector organizations is increasingly important. They try to supplement the insufficient means provided by state institutions and reach out to the most vulnerable sectors of society. However, NGOs, due to the specific nature of their functioning and sources of funding, are also particularly vulnerable. An illustration of the multifaceted problems the third sector faces because of the pandemic is presented with Brazil as the example. The article analyzes that country by taking into consideration two factors – a difficult situation caused by the pandemic as far as human security is concerned in its various dimensions, as well as the political aspect related to the role of the Brazil's president in view of this extraordinary challenge. The hypothesis is that the reluctant attitude of the president towards civil society rooted in his political authoritarian views hinders the functioning of the third sector. The question is to what extent Bolsonaro's decisions impact the activity of Brazilian NGOs in times when the country needs them most. The theoretical component of the article refers to the notions of human security and the third sector. ; La pandemia del COVID-19 es un fenómeno que ya se ha cobrado millones de vidas y ha generado un enorme impacto sanitario, social y económico en la escala global. El mundo se ha enfrentado a dos crisis simultáneas: una crisis humanitaria y una crisis del Estado de Derecho, y ambas han socavado gravemente la seguridad ...

The divergent developments in productivity and employment over the past two decades, as well as the crisis and subsequent recovery of the global economy have led to significant changes in different parts of the economic structure in all EU countries. The aim of our study was to examine changes in the basic segments of the economic structure of European countries. The
development of segments is assessed through the indicator of gross added value (in current prices) and employment in the period 1995 to 2017. We compared the situation of the two main groups of European countries - the original and new EU countries. We note that there are significant differences between these groups, especially in the 1990s. Subsequently, there have been changes in the structure of new countries that have narrowed the gap between countries. The structural gap between countries has slowly diminished in average. However, the crisis has significantly delayed the process of convergence and the economic recovery period has not recovered to the pre-crisis situation. On the contrary, after the end of crisis the structural gap has thus re-expanded in a number of cases. In this article we target on the comparison of Estonia and Germany. Estonia represents precisely the group of countries whose structural gap has widened after the end of the crisis. On the other hand, the German economy is seen as a stable backbone of European politics and economics. We considered Germany the most economically strong representative of the old EU countries. From this point of view, our research was based on the assumption that Estonia wants to bring its economy closer to Germany's economy. We monitored whether the Estonian economy was getting closer or moved away from the German economy. Our results confirmed that Germany's economy is stable and more or less unchanged for more than 20 years. However, the assumption that Estonia's economy is moving closer to Germany's economy has not been confirmed. The opposite is probably true.

BackgroundIn 1976, the U.S. Sugar Association (SA), a globally networked trade organization representing the cane and beet sugar industry, won the Public Relations Society of America's (PRSA) Silver Anvil Award for a crisis communication campaign. Their campaign successfully limited the diffusion of sugar restriction policies to control obesity, heart disease, diabetes, and dental caries, and marked the beginning of the modern-day SA. The sugar industry continues to resist measures to reduce sugar consumption, therefore understanding and addressing industry opposition is crucial to achieving global targets to reduce non-communicable disease.MethodsWe critically analyze common crisis management rhetorical strategies used by SA to defend itself from perceived wrongdoing, and sugar from perceptions of harm using a thematic content analysis based on Hearit's Corporate Apologia theory. Data sources were internal SA documents related to the 1976 Silver Anvil Award in 1) PRSA records, 2) Great Western Sugar Company records, and 3) William Jefferson Darby Papers.ResultsSA, using prototypical apologia stances (counterattack, differentiation, apology, and corrective action) and rhetorical dissociation strategies (appearance/reality, opinion/knowledge, and act/essence) constructed a persuasive narrative to successfully defend sugar from a product safety crisis, and the sugar industry from a social legitimacy crisis. SA's overarching narrative was that restricting sugar, which it claimed was a valuable food that makes healthy foods more palatable, would cause harm and that claims to the contrary were made by opportunists, pseudoscientists, food-faddists, lay nutritionists or those who had been misled by them. SA's apologia does not meet criteria for truthfulness or sincerity.ConclusionCorporate apologia theory provides an accessible way of understanding sugar industry crisis communication strategies. It enables public health actors to recognize and predict industry corporate apologia in response to ongoing product safety and social legitimacy challenges. Industry counterarguments can be examined for truthfulness and sincerity (or the lack thereof), and explained to policymakers considering sugar restriction policies, and to the public, thereby decreasing the effectiveness of illegitimate industry communication efforts to oppose regulation and legislation.

[EN] The recent economic crisis in Spain has provoked a number of food and nutrition security (FNS) impacts that have fuelled a fragmented landscape of food-related debates, although these have not taken the form of a coherent and allembracing public discussion on national food security. This paper is an inductive analysis of such debates, mostly based on media coverage, in an attempt to disentangle the different discourse frames on FNS in Spain, and the role played by the economic crisis in the shaping and underpinning of such frames. For this purpose a frame matrix was constructed, paying particular attention to the stakeholders governance claims in order to confront frame-specific problems. Results show how stakeholders have used elements of the crisis to underpin or reinterpret their core arguments. In addition, governance claims have concentrated on the malfunctioning of the food chain, mostly due to unequal bargaining power, and the way this could be putting at risk crucial components of the food system and future FNS. Also, the short-termism of most stakeholders approaches obscures the long run threats to the Spanish food system. ; This research is part of the project "Assessment of the impact of global drivers of change on Europe's food security" (TRANSMANGO), granted by the EU under 7th Framework Programme, theme KBBE.2013.2.5-01, Grant agreement no: 613532. Authors gratefully appreciate the comments and suggestions made by the three anonymous reviewers and the editors of the Journal.O ; Ortiz Miranda, D.; Moreno Pérez, OM.; Arnalte Alegre, EV. (2016). Food and nutrition security discursive frames in the context of the Spanish economic crisis. Food Security. 8(3):665-677. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12571-016-0574-x ; S ; 665 ; 677 ; 8 ; 3 ; Antentas, J. M., & Vivas, E. (2014). Impacto de la crisis en el derecho a una alimentación sana y saludable. Informe SESPAS 2014. Gaceta Sanitaria, 28(S1), 58–61. ; Brunori, G., Malandrin, V., & Rossi, A. (2013). Trade-off or convergence? The role of food ...

The contemporary urbanism model is based on the pre-crisis economy mode. During Chinese rapid economic expansion in the last several years, the existing model only needed to consider physical factors. The model requires strong determinism, and it cannot work without strong economic backing. On the other hand, the model of non-stop demand for urban land is yet an unsustainable element. Under this situation, government often seek for chances to demolish lands like urban villages to catch up the pace of real estate and political achievement even if the capital flow of this kind of process is gigantic and dangerous. What if the crisis is coming? The global economic crisis had affected China's real estate market within the recent 3 years. However, the urban land demolition is a long time process which could beyond 10 years. Local residents' environment and community has been damaged; developers don't want to take the risk when market is shrinking; government's huge investment is in danger. My method of building a post-crisis urbanism model is writing a fictional story based on the research of a real site. The script, which is the structure of the story, begins with an assumption of real estate crisis. The following assumptions are based on the references and investigations of related real world factors. The story aims to discover an alternative way of developing an old urban district without the top-down approach and the dangerous overwhelming capital flow. The site, Hanzheng street is a famous old district in Wuhan, and it was the most important commercial center and distribution center of small commodities in Hankou (downtown area of Wuhan), which has a long tradition of autonomy development and family workshops. During the rapid urbanization process in this typical Chinese mega city, Hanzheng street is under the fate of demolition and reconstruction into typical Megablocks which combining residential and commercial uses. This interesting site is a perfect stage for the story. ; published_or_final_version ; Architecture ; Master ; Master of Landscape Architecture

Uses 'discursive institutionalism' as its analytic framework, by focusing on the wide range of EU leaders' ideas about the crisis and how they have communicated about them. Examines the different ways in which the scholarly literature analyzes those ideas and discursive interactions, and how they lead one to consider different aspects of the crisis. Argues that there are disconnects between what EU leaders say to one another in the 'coordinative discourse' at the EU level and between what they say about those agreements to the markets and to the people in the 'communicative discourse'. Suggests, with regard to the markets specifically, that EU leaders have proposed solutions that were seen as too little too late; were considered to be the wrong solutions; or raised new contingencies that the markets themselves had not anticipated. Shows, with regard to the people, that EU leaders' communication of the wrong or misleading messages meant that national publics were often not prepared for the reform initiatives taken, and that this has often left the field open to the extremes of the right and left. The EU's sovereign debt crisis is not just economic; it is also political, resulting from the failure of EU leaders to offer solutions that calm the markets and convince the people. These failures stem from problems with EU leaders' ideas about how to solve the crisis as well as their communication about them. That communication encompasses not just EU leaders talking to one another in negotiations of crisis solutions but also speaking to 'the markets' and to 'the people' about those solutions, all of which may interact in perverse ways. This article uses the analytic framework of 'discursive institutionalism' to consider the different forms, types, levels, rates and mechanisms of change in ideas followed by the EU leaders' discursive interactions in the 'coordinative' discourse and their 'communicative discourse' to the global markets and European publics. It uses a range of country cases, but in particular Germany and France, in illustration. Adapted from the source document.

Research Highlights and AbstractUses 'discursive institutionalism' as its analytic framework, by focusing on the wide range of EU leaders' ideas about the crisis and how they have communicated about them. Examines the different ways in which the scholarly literature analyzes those ideas and discursive interactions, and how they lead one to consider different aspects of the crisis. Argues that there are disconnects between what EU leaders say to one another in the 'coordinative discourse' at the EU level and between what they say about those agreements to the markets and to the people in the 'communicative discourse'. Suggests, with regard to the markets specifically, that EU leaders have proposed solutions that were seen as too little too late; were considered to be the wrong solutions; or raised new contingencies that the markets themselves had not anticipated. Shows, with regard to the people, that EU leaders' communication of the wrong or misleading messages meant that national publics were often not prepared for the reform initiatives taken, and that this has often left the field open to the extremes of the right and left.The EU's sovereign debt crisis is not just economic; it is also political, resulting from the failure of EU leaders to offer solutions that calm the markets and convince the people. These failures stem from problems with EU leaders' ideas about how to solve the crisis as well as their communication about them. That communication encompasses not just EU leaders talking to one another in negotiations of crisis solutions but also speaking to 'the markets' and to 'the people' about those solutions, all of which may interact in perverse ways. This article uses the analytic framework of 'discursive institutionalism' to consider the different forms, types, levels, rates and mechanisms of change in ideas followed by the EU leaders'discursive interactions in the 'coordinative' discourse and their 'communicative discourse' to the global markets and European publics. It uses a range of country cases, but in particular Germany and France, in illustration.

The article deals with the issue of the identity of the place, taken in reference to the concept of places and non-places by Marc Augé. The main purpose of the theoretical analyses and analysis and interpretation of empirical results of the study was to determine the identity of the place (borderland) by referring to the individual memory of members of the minority group, inscribed in multifaceted, individual negotiations of experiencing the identity of the place. An important aspect discussed in the article are issues of social forgetting in Paul Connerton's approach and socio-cultural consequences of this process for the identity of the individual, group and place. Narrative interview was the main form of data collection. The analyses are oriented to the variable of the identity of the borderland. The categories of the analysis refer to: the cultural identity of the borderland; personal memories of respondents related to the events, situations related to the past of their family; social memory of the minority group; social memory of the majority group. Memory of the borderland is a memory strongly embedded in a given area and unequivocally localized – assigned to a place "marked" and "embedded" cul- turally. This, of course, implies a series of difficult group-based negotiations regarding the contents of memory, places, events that, from the perspective of internal diversity of the group, may construct contradictory images of the past of the place. ; jolamusz@uwb.edu.pl ; Faculty of Education, University of Białystok, Poland ; Assmann, J. (2008). Pamięć kulturowa. Pismo, zapamiętywanie i polityczna tożsamość w cywilizacjach starożytnych. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego. ; Augé, M. (1995). Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity. Transl. J. 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Debating the War in Ukraine discusses whether the war could have been avoided, and, if so, how? In this dialogical book, the authors discuss nodal points of history in terms of counterfactuals and contrastive explanations, concluding by considering future possibilities.

They start in the 1990s where several causal elements of the war originate involving Russia's economic developments and Europe's security arrangements. Moving on to the next decade, they focus on the Iraq war, colour revolutions, and NATO's 2008 announcement that Ukraine and Georgia will become members. Finally, they explore the past decade including the Ukrainian crisis of 2013–2014, the annexation of Crimea, and the consecutive war in east Ukraine. The current war can also be seen as a continuum of that war. The authors agree that NATO's 2008 announcement on Ukraine's and Georgia's NATO membership was an unnecessary provocation, and that the implementation of the Minsk agreement could have prevented the current war, but otherwise their analysis of counterfactual possibilities differs, especially when it comes to the action-possibilities of the West (including diverse actors). These differences are not just dependent on different readings of relevant evidence but, importantly, stem from dissimilar contrast spaces and divergent theoretical understandings of the nature of states and mechanisms of international relations and political economy.

This short, highly accessible book will be of great interest to all those studying and working in international relations and its various subfields such as peace and conflict studies and security studies, as well as all those wishing to understand more about the backdrop of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

The Open Access version of this book, available at http://www.taylorfrancis.com, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives (CC-BY-NC-ND) 4.0 license. The Open Access version of this book was funded by University of Helsinki Library.