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Suggests the need for a more complex picture of the role of law in industrial capitalism, one focusing on the relationship between law & power exercised in & around the workplace as well as law's relationship with capitalists & workers. A qualitative analysis of appellate court opinions on employers' liability 1870-1906 finds that the representation of work in these opinions is related to transformations in the technology & organization of the railroad industry, the leading sector of the economy during the period. It is suggested that the introduction of disciplinary technologies of power over workers was initially hidden & politically defused by the law. Over time, however, the law helped sustain a rationalization process within disciplinary power that increasingly sought to hold managers & workers accountable to its logic of systematic coordination & control. The eventual shift to workers' compensation reflected the limits of discipline in governing the work place. 54 References. Modified AA

[ES] Desde una perspectiva teórica se analizan las transformaciones de la política a partir de la presencia masiva de medios de comunicación y sondeos de opinión; que los ha convertido en representantes cotidianos de las opiniones ciudadanas. El creciente peso de la información audiovisual, con sus particularidades específicas, es considerado por el autor como un factor clave de la transformación de algunos elementos constitutivos básicos del proceso político democrático: campañas electorales, partidos políticos y candidatos. ; [EN] From a theoretic perspective the article analyzes the changes of politics related to the massive presence of media and opinion polis; these ones have appeared as the habitual representations of public opinions. The growing importance of audiovisual information, with its specific features is considered by this author as a key factor of the transformation of some constitutive elements of the democratic process: electoral campaings, political parties and candidates.

To explain why the wealthy are not only rich (they exercise purchasing power) but powerful as well (they command obedience) in liberal societies characterized by a competitive market capitalist economy, the political structure arising from competitive exchanges in a capitalist economy are defined. It is demonstrated that, under quite general conditions, the holders of substantial wealth are powerful in the sense that they can further their interests through the credible use of sanctions against others. Thus, the common representation (in both liberal political philosophy & economic theory) of at holds that voluntary exchanges as devoid of asymmetrical power relationships is shown to be false. By contrast, a microeconomic model is elaborated of the endogenous enforcement of claims arising from exchange & the consequent nonclearing nature of competitive market equilibria. Applications to the labor & capital markets demonstrate that substantial wealth holders exercise power in both types of exchanges. 2 Figures.

A brief historical review of race relations between whites & Afro-Americans in the US identified seven periods from the seventeenth-century slave trading period up to 1990, each distinctive in terms of race relations, public sentiment, policy, & the role of race in politics. Since WWII, there has been a general acceptance of the basic principles of racial equality, resulting in better political representation for Afro-Americans, but the tendency to radicalize racial themes remains. Prejudice & discrimination are more subtle & more complex, but even so, proof of permanent racial antagonism among US whites is perceptible in clear statements of prejudice, racial stereotypes, resistance of whites to redistributive policies, government political divisions, & the existence of racial tensions between whites, Asians, & Hispanics. Some racial problems have economic roots, but national disarray in the face of racial tension, & resistance to policies specifically targeting minorities are also factors. 60 References. Adapted from the source document.

Maurice Agulhon : Marianne, Some Reflections on her history.
At the crossroads of political history, of folklore and sometimes of art, the author follows the changes in the image of the woman with the Phrygian cap, whether she was called Marianne or not. He recalls her beginnings during the Revolution, how she came into her own in the Nineteenth Century, especially from the Second Empire on and above all under the Third Republic during which the name « Marianne » and the effigy of the Republic became one and have since shared a common destiny. Marianne's history is part of that of political allegory, of the visual representation adopted by states ; it both comes under the heading of national folklore and of partisan symbolism. Such a complexity gives it its wealth of meaning and brings up the question of the role of this kind of research.

Elisabeth Liris, From Liberty to Union in the Iconography of the Flags of the Parisian Districts.
Set up in 1788, the sixty Parisian districts each had its own flag in the early days of the Revolution, at the time the National Guard was being organized. Vieilh de Varenne, one of the victors of the Bastille published a "curious" description of them "accompanied by plates" which furnish the necessary material for an analysis of the symbolism established by these banners, each of which is different. One finds representations of victorious Liberty, of violence brought under control, of the desire for union and reconciliation. There are references to the royal person, and to the allegory of Paris : the monarchical or religious elements are mixed with the new emblems of liberty in the framework of this period between July and October 1989 and the search for a reborn unanimity.

In this article I develop a simple game-theoretic model of administrative reform in Latin American democracies. The model, which is based on the incentives facing the politicians who must initiate reforms if any are to occur, yields two predictions: (1) reforms are more likely to pass the legislative hurdle when patronage is evenly distributed among the strongest parties, and (2) initial reforms are more likely to be followed by further extensions of reform where the electoral weight of the top parties remains relatively even and stable. Attention to the incentives facing legislators and party leaders also results in the expectation that certain political institutions, such as open list proportional representation and electoral rules that minimize party control over candidate lists, reduce the probability of reform. I test these predictions and expectations on a set of Latin American democracies and find them consistent with historical events.

Data collected in 1988 via a mail survey of 322 members of the lower houses of 12 state legislatures are drawn on to explore the relationship between the % of females (Fs) in state legislatures & their policy priorities, along with their impact on overall legislative policy. Analysis reveals that Fs in states with the highest % of F representatives introduce & pass more priority bills dealing with issues of women, children, & families than do their male counterparts, & more than their F counterparts in low representation legislatures. Moreover, Fs can successfully diffuse their priorities throughout the legislative process either through high %s of Fs in office or through the presence of a formal women's legislative caucus. It is concluded that women do indeed make a difference & that their capacity to do so is related to the level of colleague support. 3 Tables, 30 References. Adapted from the source document.

The distinctive configuration of issues emerging from a particular sector presents problems that can be avoided by addressing the structural dimension of issues, eg, abstracting the structure & form of issues from their substantive content to identify the anatomy of the issue. This concept is used to explain changing policy style in the face of complex sectoral issues in the electricity supply sector in West Germany. Based on 20 semistructured interviews with executives in electricity supply companies, sectoral interest organizations, Confederation of German Industry, & the Federal Economics Ministry, it is shown that even at the sectoral level the expectation of a monolithic & static policy style cannot be sustained. This sector displays a dual policy style, the source of which is located in the relationship between state & sector, the structure of interest representation, & ownership/market relations in the sector. 1 Figure, 26 References. Adapted from the source document.

SUMMARYIn the paper several reasons will be investigated why there is only partial deregulation in Germany and extensive deregulation in the U. S. Purely economic reasons such as economies of scale are shown to be of little help for understanding telecommunications policy in Germany as compared to the U. S. As an alternative, a politico‐economic approach is presented. It is shown that institutional differences can help to understand the differences in deregulatory policy. In Germany, decisions on telecommunications deregulation are centralized on the federal level, whereas they are distributed on the federal and state level in the U. S. As consequence, a different interest group representation is prevailing in each country promoting deregulation in the U. S. and impeding deregulation in Germany. It is shown that the obstacles to deregulation in Germany might be overcome through an explicit compensation scheme embodying an entry tax on the one hand a price subsidy on the other.

Empirical theories of electoral and legislative politics can be used to build propositions about the consequences of constitutional designs for citizen electroal control. This article reports preliminary tests of such propositions. Constitutional arrangements in 16 democracies are compared to the degree of clarity of responsibility, opportunity for party choice, decisiveness of elections and effective representation in policy-making, before and after elections. Previous work had suggested that different models of citizen control require different combinations of these characteristics. The preliminary analysis shows constitutional designs that emphasized majoritarian election laws and government dominance in the legislature generally succeeded in creating conditions for the Government Accountability and, to a lesser degree, Government Mandate models of citizen control, but did poorly in creating conditions for the Representative Delegate model. The consensual constitutional designs were generally successful only in creating conditions for the Representative Delegate model. However, much additional work remains.

Case studies are presented of the US government use of indicators as policy triggers, including: inflation indicators; income levels; population data; government financial conditions, eg, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit reduction initiative; economic conditions; & indicators of a specific agency's performance. A schematic representation of decision making that makes automatic the firing of policy triggers via indicators is drawn that, identifing issues of workload reduction & routinization of decisions, equalizing outcome, & reducing blame & conflict by binding future policymakers to certain actions. A flowchart illustrates the decision process of selecting a specific indicator. The effect of using social indicators is that statistics may become political factors, the flexibility of government policy makers may be limited, & entitlement to new rights may be implied. It is concluded that power & political interest determine how important policy triggers are selected & used. 1 Table, 2 Figures, 71 References. V. Wagener

An analysis of Hispanic employment patterns in 1,200 US cities, based on official 1984 reports from the cities to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Results reveal that minority job success is a function of the size of the minority population, the level of Hispanic political representation, & the size of the local public sector. Neither private sector job opportunities nor the educational characteristics of the Hispanic community affect the variation in employment outcomes. While black job progress is impeded by municipal employee unions & unreformed governmental structure, no such effect is noted for Hispanics. Public unions do not serve as a barrier to Hispanic employment success for decision-making, professional, & protective service positions. Although the parity gap is greater for Hispanics than for blacks, it is likely that Hispanics will encounter fewer obstacles on the path to increasing political equality. 3 Tables, 27 References. HA

An examination of the employment of women as commissioned officers in municipal police departments, an arena in which less progress has been made toward gender equity than in most other types of employment leading to managerial status. Data drawn from surveys of US cities with populations of 25,000+ conducted in 1984 & 1987 (N = 246 & 259, respectively) are presented to show how certain political & economic climates foster value trade-offs involving public sector work force policy; these are impacted by economic, political, institutional, & environmental factors. Results show that indicators from each of these factors play a role in variations of women's representation in police departments. More benefits become available to women when other women contribute to political decision making, but this happens only when a formal affirmative action program is court-enforced. These findings have wider implications for achieving greater gender representativeness in other occupational areas. 2 Tables, 30 References. C. Grindle