Banking on a union: the politics of changing eurozone banking supervision
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 23, Heft 1, S. 119-135
ISSN: 1466-4429
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In: Journal of European public policy, Band 23, Heft 1, S. 119-135
ISSN: 1466-4429
This paper analyzes cooperation between sovereign national authorities in the supervision and regulation of a multinational bank. We take a political economy approach to regulation and assume that supervisors maximize the welfare of their own country. The communication between the supervisors is modeled as a 'cheap talk' game. We show that: (1) unless the interests of the countries are perfectly aligned, Þrst best closure regulation cannot be implemented; (2) the more aligned the interests are, the higher is welfare; (3) the bank can allocate its investments strategically across countries to escape closure.
BASE
This article analyses the economics of financing banking supervision and attempts to respond to two questions: What are the most common financing practices? Can the differences in current financing practices be explained by country specific factors? We perform an empirical analysis that identifies the determinants of the financing structure of banks´ prudential supervision using a sample of 90 banking supervisors (central banks and financial authorities). We conclude that supervisors in central banks are more likely publicly funded, while financial authorities are more likely funded via a levy on the regulated banks. The financing rule is also explained by the structure of the financial systems. Public funding is more likely in bank oriented structures. Finally, the geographical factor is also significant: European bank supervisors are more oriented towards the private funding regime. In general, we do not find evidence of the role of the political factor, the size of the economy, the level of development and the legal tradition
BASE
World Affairs Online
Tighter regulation and more powerful supervision are being enacted after the global financial crisis. Although this trend may have positive welfare effects, it may also impose large social costs due to the strong reliance on supervisory information. We argue that offering banks a Flexible Supervision contract, designed to be chosen by those banks that will otherwise attempt to capture the supervisor, is a mechanism to implement the most efficient regulation under asymmetric information. The result that Flexible Supervision outperforms Mandatory Supervision remains robust to a series of extensions to our baseline model. Policy implications follow directly: Benevolent regulators should enact a Flexible Supervision regime for the less risky, more capitalized and transparent banks in addition to the traditional Mandatory Supervision regime. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published
BASE
In: Journal of Banking Regulation (2022). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41261-022-00204-5
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In: CEPS Task Force Reports, December 2014
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In: Journal of international economic law, Band 22, Heft 2, S. 205-228
ISSN: 1464-3758
ABSTRACT
Starting from the observation of an increased politicisation of the financial regulatory debate, the article analyses how this might impact the relationship between the European Union (EU) and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The article first describes transnational financial networks after the global crisis and the shift from trust in technocratic autonomy to distrust and politicisation. It then turns to examine the legal bases for the participation of EU institutions in the Basel standard-setting process, discussing the challenges posed under EU law. The last part of the research focusses on the European Parliament's attempts to become an active player in the transnational financial regulatory arena and on the role it might play to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the Basel process.
In: The William Taylor memorial lectures, 4
World Affairs Online
In: International economics and economic policy, Band 4, Heft 4, S. 357-361
ISSN: 1612-4812
In: IMF Working Papers v. Working Paper No. 14/220
9. Instruments Used by Islamic Banks to Manage Liquidity ShortagesVI. Transparency, Disclosure and Market Discipline; 10. Disclosure: Is There Any Difference?; VII. Deposit Protection and Bank Resolution; A. Deposit Protection; 11. Deposit Insurance Regulatory Framework; B. Bank Distress; C. Liquidation; 12. Bank Distress; VIII. Conclusion; Annex; 1. Definition of Key Shariah-Compliant Contracts; References.
In: Yearbook of European law, Band 33, Heft 1, S. 417-432
ISSN: 2045-0044
In: IMF Working Papers, S. 1-30
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