Suchergebnisse

The Rome Statute asserts that the ICC has jurisdiction over people (natural person). This affirmation is contained in article 25 (2) stating that persons committing offenses materially included in the ICC jurisdiction shall enter into individual criminal liability. Another article on the non-recognition of impunity is found in the provisions of article 33 of the Rome Statute stating that a person committing crimes covered by the Rome Statute on the basis of superior orders can not escape from criminal responsibility. But the 1998 Rome Statute has weak rules in article 98 paragraph 2 concerning cooperation concerning the release of immunity rights and consent to submit to which the treaty was made because of an existing SOFA agreement prior to the 1998 Rome Statute. The absence of impunity in the Rome Statute of 1998 has provoked a strong reaction from the United States. According to US, this non-impunity provision threatens its citizens, especially US troops who serve as peacekeepers or military cooperation with allies in various parts of the world. Therefore the United States uses the provisions of article 98 paragraph 2 to hold a number of bilateral agreements with various states stating that no citizen shall be an officer or former official, or any military personnel of any party which may be transferred or transferred by another State to the International Criminal Court for any purpose. This agreement became known as the Bilateral Implementation Agreement (BIA). Another term for this agreement is the NonSurrender Agreement (NSA). The BIA / NSA Agreement then becomes contradictory to the objective of the Rome Statute 1998 on impunity repudiation. If the BIA / NSA agreement is justified it will complicate the existence of the International Criminal Court.

Unilateral migration policies impose externalities on other countries. In order to try to internalize these externalities, countries sign bilateral migration agreements. One element of these agreements is the emphasis on enforcing migration policies: immigrant-receiving countries agree to allow more immigrants from their emigrant-sending partner if they cooperate in enforcing their migration policy at the border. I present a simple theoretical model that justifies this behavior in a two-country setting with welfare maximizing governments. These governments establish migration quotas that need to be enforced at a cost. I prove that uncoordinated migration policies are inefficient. Both countries can improve welfare by exchanging a more "generous" migration quota for expenditure on enforcement policy. Contrary to what could be expected, this result does not depend on the enforcement technology that both countries employ.

Attracting foreign investment, a developing country sets several goals: to obtain financial resources, use advanced managerial experience, and introduce innovative technologies. Achieving these goals becomes the basis for the modernization of the national economy. The advantages of bilateral agreements include the fact that they are the most flexible instrument for regulating interstate investment agreements that can have a direct regulatory effect on the subjects of these relations, thus compensating for the lack of incompleteness and instability of national investment legislation.

The international trade for wide world countries in the means more growth, more jobs and access on more products at competitive prices. The European Union is a major economy and an important trading partner for many countries and regions in the world. To stimulate growth and to create jobs in the Union, this economy has concluded multilateral trade agreement (under the World Trade Organisation) and a number of bilateral (preferential) trade agreements. The aim of this paper is to present an example of fully elimination of tariffs and tariff lines under a bilateral trade agreement. In this case, we have analysed Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) negotiated by the European Union and Canada. For both sides of Atlantic, the CETA is supposed to bring the solution for today's issues concerning the important trading aspects and, also, to facilitate the EU-Canada bilateral trade by creating competition.

Bilateral social security agreements are the oldest instruments which provide social security entitlements to persons moving between the countries. EU Member States' approaches to distinctive bilateral agreements with Non-EU States are analysed herein. Bilateral social security agreements are not only the oldest coordination instruments, but remain the most important ones linking social security systems of MS and Non-EU States. They are tailored to the social security systems of the two contracting states. Nevertheless, bilateral social security agreements might be neither comprehensive in their scope of application nor complete in covering all coordination principles. Moreover, they do not create a uniform coordination system. Under the modified migration patterns - i.e. movements for shorter period of time and between many countries - a more comprehensive social security coordination mechanism might be required.

AbstractThe Shiprider Agreement — an important aspect of Jamaica-US bilateral diplomacy — represents the strength of diplomatic engagements that have been used to address the cross-border drug-trafficking problem. To substantiate this claim, this article examines the Jamaica-US Shiprider Agreement on three criteria.First, examining some examples of counter-drug cooperation before the Shiprider Agreement demonstrates that the fundamental basis for the Agreement is premised on a positive Jamaica-US relationship. This relationship, along with the stipulated obligations enshrined in the 1988 Vienna Convention, impelled the United States' proposal of the Shiprider Agreement. Second, the article uses complex interdependence theory to test the negotiation process and the outcome of the Agreement. Findings demonstrate that complex interdependence mainly confirms explanations of the foreign policy outcomes and diplomatic conduct displayed in the Jamaica-US Shiprider case. Finally, the article assesses the breakdown in the negotiation process and the initial implementation phase of the Agreement, arguing that this breakdown must be seen in context given the Agreement's successful ratification and its non-controversial continuation. The article concludes that despite the instances of breakdown, the birth and provision of the judicious Jamaica-US Shiprider Agreement owed much to the success of diplomacy.