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Focuses on diplomatic efforts, in accordance with the Rio Protocol's provisions for peace, friendship, and boundaries, to deal with Jan. 1995-Feb. 1997; addresses reasons for the boundary problem, possible solutions, and lessons to be learned from the Protocol. Some focus on the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Ecuador-Peru Military Observer Mission (MOMEP).

Klappentext: It is generally assumed that regional integration leads to stability and peace. This book is a systematic study of the impact of European integration on the transformation of border conflicts. It provides a theoretical framework centred on four 'pathways' of impact and applies them to five cases of border conflicts: Cyprus, Ireland, Greece/Turkey, Israel/Palestine and various conflicts on Russia's border with the EU. The contributors suggest that integration and association provide the EU with potentially powerful means to influence border conflicts, but that the EU must constantly re-adjust its policies depending on the dynamics of each conflict. Their findings reveal the conditions upon which the impact of integration rests and challenge the widespread notion that integration is necessarily good for peace. This book will appeal to scholars and students of international relations, European politics, and security studies studying European integration and conflict analysis.

European Foreign and Security Policy The EU represents one in a series of efforts to integrate Europe since World War II, and to achieve, inter alia, diplomatic stability and military security. In 1957 the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community (EEC), that was renamed European Communities (EC) by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. A series of further international treaties and treaty revisions based largely on this model led eventually to the creation of the EU. In the early 1970s the European Political Cooperation (EPC; renamed the Common Foreign and Security Policy by the Maastricht Treaty), consisting of regular meetings of the foreign ministers of each country, was established to coordinate foreign policy. As part of the second pillar of the Maastricht Treaty, members undertook to define and implement common foreign and security policies. Members agreed that, where possible, they would adopt common defense policies, which would be implemented through the Western European Union (WEU), a security organization that included many EU members. The WEU, that run from 1955 until 2011, was made up of 10countries, and operated as a forum for the coordination of matters of European security and defense. The WEU became the primary defense institution of the EU in the 1990s, though it gave up that role in 2001. The assembly of the WEU consisted of the delegates of the member countries to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). The Council of Europe (CoE) is an older and wider circle of nations than the 28-member European Union —it includes, for example, Russia and Turkey among its member states. The WEU contributed to the creation of the NATO and worked in cooperation with the Atlantic Alliance. NATO and the EU currently have 22 member countries in common. Relations between NATO and the EU were institutionalized in 2001, building on steps taken during the 1990s to promote greater European responsibility in defense matters. The 2002 NATO-EU Declaration on a European Security and ...

In 1962, the International Court of Justice ruled that the Preah Vihear temple lies within Cambodian territory. The status of the 4.6 kṃ of land surrounding the temple, however, remained unclear. When UNESCO declared the Preah Vihear temple a Cambodian World Heritage Site in July 2008, the situation was exacerbated. Several firefights between October 2008 and April/ May 2011 claimed at least 34 lives. The border dispute became a rollercoaster ride along the way: Talks between Thailand and Cambodia were regularly interrupted by exchanges of fire, only to be resumed a little later. This prevented a resolution of the conflict. The essay explores how Thailand's and Cambodia's conflict behavior can be explained from a first-image perspective. In doing so, uncovering the motives of both countries' prime ministers is crucial to understanding Bangkok's and Phnom Penh's actions in the border area. The paper argues that in low-intensity border conflicts, motivations are different from those underlying heads of government's behavior in high-intensity border conflicts. While this complicates an agreement on the Preah Vihear question, it also means that escalation to a manifest border war is very unlikely.