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"Since June 2007, the creditworthiness of structured finance products has deteriorated rapidly. The number of downgrades in November 2007 alone exceeded 2,000 and many downgrades were severe, with 500 tranches downgraded more than 10 notches. Massive downgrades continued in 2008. More than 11,000 of the downgrades affected securities that were rated AAA. This paper studies the credit rating crisis of 2007-2008 and in particular describes the collapse of the credit ratings of ABS CDOs. Using data on ABS CDOs we provide suggestive evidence that ratings shopping may have played a role in the current crisis. We find that tranches rated solely by one agency, and by S&P in particular, were more likely to be downgraded by January 2008. Further, tranches rated solely by one agency are more likely to suffer more severe downgrades"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site

This paper describes sovereign credit ratings in emerging markets both for a specific year and over time, using quantitative explanatory variables. It turns out that rating adjustments have been worse than what economic fundamentals justify for some countries and also more frequently altered, questioning the long-term properties of sovereign ratings. The results support the view that rating changes during the Asian crisis have been procyclical rather than counter-cyclical. Omitted variables, such as soundness of banking sector, social and political factors, can be one reason for this misalignment but cannot explain all.

The basic goal of the article is analyse the current regulations about credit rating agency and their activity in European Union and United States and answer the question which one the issuer or investor paid credit rating model is better, as a result building the own credit rating management model. It has been made a literature review abut actual models of risk management. Then are presented the current trends and propositions of changes in regulations. There have been described models: "issuer pays" and "investor pays" and introduced the original model management agency, taking into account the rating of four players, namely: the investor, issuer, rating agency and supervisory institutions. It has been put the following hypothesis: The introduction of regulations on credit rating agencies and credit ratings, improve the social welfare and the quality of the presented notes. ; Celem artykułu jest analiza aktualnych przepisów regulujących działalność agencji ratingowych stosowanych w krajach Unii Europejskiej oraz Stanach Zjednoczonych, a także odpowiedź na pytanie, który z modeli: "emitent płaci" czy "inwestor płaci" jest lepszy z punktu widzenia funkcjonowania rynku finansowego i w związku z tym zbudowanie autorskiego modelu zarządzania agencją ratingową. Dokonano również przeglądu literatury dotyczącej aktualnych modeli zarządzania ryzykiem. Następnie zaprezentowano bieżące trendy i propozycje zmian w przepisach. Opisano modele "emitent płaci" i "inwestor płaci" oraz przedstawiono autorski model zarządzania agencja ratingową przy uwzględnieniu czterech graczy, a mianowicie: inwestora, emitenta, agencji ratingowej oraz instytucji nadzorczej. Postawiono hipotezę badawczą, że wprowadzenie regulacji prawnych dotyczących agencji ratingowych oraz credit ratingów poprawia wypłatę społeczną oraz podnosi jakość prezentowanych not.

"Serial no. 109-66." ; Distributed to some depository libraries in microfiche. ; Shipping list no.: 2006-0247-P. ; "Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services." ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Mode of access: Internet.

"Serial no. 111-33." ; Shipping list no.: 2010-0003-P. ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Mode of access: Internet.

AbstractIn this paper, we study whether credit rating agencies (CRAs), as they claim, follow the rating through‐the‐cycle approach as opposed to a pro‐cyclical approach. In particular, we compare the behavior of CRAs during the credit crunch and normal market conditions. Using the credit rating data by S&P, we find that CRAs assign lower credit ratings to firms during credit crunch relative to normal times. Nevertheless, this result does not necessarily imply that CRAs show an excessively pro‐cyclical behavior if credit crunches have a long‐term fundamental impact on firms. Our further investigation reveals that downgrades during a credit crunch will not be reversed over the subsequent 1–5 years, which supports through‐the‐cycle credit rating.