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The post-Cold War era has witnessed a dramatic transformation in the German political consensus about the legitimacy of the use of force. However, in comparison with its EU and NATO partners, Germany has been reticent to transform its military to meet the challenges of the contemporary security environment. Until 2003 territorial defence rather than crisis-management remained the armed forces' core role and the Bundeswehr continues to retain conscription. The book argues that 'strategic culture' provides only a partial explanation of German military reform. It demonstrates how domestic materia

The post-Cold War era has witnessed a dramatic transformation in the German political consensus about the legitimacy of the use of force. However, in comparison with its EU and NATO partners, Germany has been reticent to transform its military to meet the challenges of the contemporary security environment. Until 2003 territorial defence rather than crisis-management remained the armed forces' core role and the Bundeswehr continues to retain conscription. The book argues that 'strategic culture' provides only a partial explanation of German military reform. It demonstrates how domestic material factors were of crucial importance in shaping the pace and outcome of reform, despite the impact of 'international structure' and adaptational pressures from the EU and NATO. The domestic politics of base closures, ramifications for social policy, financial restrictions consequent upon German unification and commitment to EMU's Stability and Growth Pact were critical in determining the outcome of reform. The study also draws out the important role of policy leaders in the political management of reform as entrepreneurs, brokers or veto players, shifting the focus in German leadership studies away from a preoccupation with the Chancellor to the role of ministerial and administrative leadership within the core executive. Finally, the book contributes to our understanding of the Europeanization of the German political system, arguing that policy leaders played a key role in 'uploading' and 'downloading' processes to and from the EU and that Defence Ministers used 'Atlanticization' and 'Europeanization' in the interests of their domestic political agendas

This book examines the evolution of the EUs Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) from its inception in 1998 to the present day. Using the theoretical framework of historical institutionalism, it examines both the successes and failures of the CSDP. Drawing on a series of interviews with officials and researchers from various EU institutions, NATO, and diplomatic missions of EU member states, it assesses what has instigated changes in the CSDP, and why some events have proven more determining and influential than others. The book reviews six crises that have shaped the CSDP, including the Yugoslav Wars, the Second Gulf War, the Libyan campaign, the Ukrainian crisis, the Syrian crisis, and Brexit, in order to understand how real-life events have influenced policy. In this context, the book defines the term European Strategic Autonomy dynamically, as the residual effect of negotiation over time. It will appeal to government officials and policymakers, as well as students and scholars of European politics and international relations. Marilena Koppa is Associate Professor of Comparative Politics at Panteion University of Athens, Greece. She was a Member of the European Parliament from 2007 to 2014. Whilst an MEP she was the Coordinator of the S & D Group at the Subcommittee on Security and Defence, and rapporteur on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy.

Three participants of the Core Group colloquium on enhanced cooperation as key to effective foreign & defense policy for Europe in Belgium share their ideas on the EU European Security & Defense Policy, NATO, & strategies for achieving international cooperation. A. Siegel

EU Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) that encompasses 29 nations is gaining momentum. The aim of this study is to acknowledge ongoing developments in EU CSDP and define their impact for Lithuanian defence and security policy. Comparative scientific literature and document analysis method was used throughout this study. Article firstly reviews a path of EU CSDP developments, outlines roles and responsibilities of EU structures and examines current activities in CSDP framework with the focus to Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Second part is devoted to consider Lithuanian's role in current EU CSDP context, to outline decisions that Lithuanian authorities made to implement new PESCO initiative. Study reveals that: CSDP remains adaptive framework for EU; established procedures ensure CSDP is in compromise with all of nations; PESCO initiative signals positive outcomes while reinforcing idea of "EU Strategic autonomy". Furthermore it was indentified that: approved National Security Strategy backs current EU initiatives; PESCO could provide flexible response options without duplicating NATO's efforts; national participation in PESCO initiatives will enable improvements in cyber security and will enable rapid access for possible EU and NATO troops deployments; participation in PESCO negotiation phase reached given political aims to seek more extensive projects and position nation within core members of EU. Lithuanian policies' shift for deeper engagement in CSDP is likely shaped by recognition that strategic trans-Atlantic partnership is not certain anymore, as well as UK role at post-Brexit period as 3rd party.

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Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Globalisation and Security: A Conceptual Framework -- Concepts of Globalisation -- Definitions of Globalisation -- Concepts of Security -- Chapter 3. Security Culture and Theories -- Traditional Approach -- The Liberal Institutionalism/Collective Security Approach -- Constructivist Approach -- Democratic Peace Theory -- Globalist Approach -- Chapter 4. Turkey's Security Perception -- Domestic Debate - Identities Affecting the Security Conceptualisation and Perception -- Reflection of Identities on Security Perception in Different Eras -- The Turkish Perspective on Regions that are perceived as Security Threats -- Turkish perspective ons Mediterranean Security -- Chapter 5. A Comparison of Turkey and EU Security Perceptions -- Nature of the EU as a security Actor -- Fears -- Fear Related to the EU -- The International Character of the EU -- The European Security Strategy (ESS) -- General Mediterranean Policy -- Bilateral Relations of the EU with Middle Eastern and some Mediterranean countries: The EU and Syria ; The EU and the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) ; The EU and Iraq ; The EU and Iran -- European Neighbourhood policy towards the Black Sea Area -- Other features of the ESS -- Other priorities of EU citizens -- Support for Common Foreign Policy and Common Defence and Security Policy -- Chapter 6. 'Optimist' versus 'Pessimist' Perspectives -- The 'Optimistic' Perspective -- The 'Pessimistic' Perspective -- Chapter 7. Conclusion -- Response to the research questions -- Contribution to the literature -- Further Research Agenda.

Executive SummaryThreats to the security of the UK are evolving with the changing nature of conflict and balance of power in the world. They are multiple and fragmented, and domestic and online as well as overseas in nature: principally state-based threats such as posed by Russian activity; terrorism; cyber-attacks; and serious organised crime. To respond, the United Kingdom will need flexible capabilities aimed at fostering infrastructural and societal resilience as much as conventional defence. Above all, the UK needs to focus on maintaining, promoting, and defending the international rules-based order, as represented by the UN and NATO among other institutions.The UK possesses significant assets to these ends, including its continuing status as one of eight acknowledged nuclear powers – a status that it should not abandon unilaterally; permanent membership of the UN Security Council; membership of the 'Five Eyes' intelligence community; and its internationally respected armed forces.But effort and resources are required to support these commitments, for example in helping to encourage other European states to spend more on defence; in contributing to UN peace-keeping operations or other collaborative overseas actions; and most of all in ensuring that army and navy manpower is rebuilt. Two per cent of GDP is no longer sufficient for the proper defence of the nation. Even allowing for the demands of other parts of government, the target for defence spending should be raised in the next review to 2.2 per cent.The principal focus will need to be on efficiency and redeployment of resources as the current equipment-heavy procurement cycle comes to an end. In particular, investment needs to continue to be rebalanced towards new capabilities such as drone technology, offensive and defensive cyber and intelligence manpower.But, to avoid any weakening of the country's security, priority should be given to negotiating a new agreement on security and intelligence cooperation with its European allies to replace the arrangements it had within the EU.

Objectives: EU Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) that encompasses 29 nations is gaining momentum. The aim of this study is to acknowledge ongoing developments in EU CSDP and define their impact for Lithuanian defence and security policy. Methods: Comparative scientific literature and document analysis method was used throughout this study. Article firstly reviews a path of EU CSDP developments, outlines roles and responsibilities of EU structures and examines current activities in CSDP framework with the focus to Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Second part is devoted to consider Lithuanian's role in current EU CSDP context, to outline decisions that Lithuanian authorities made to implement new PESCO initiative. Results: Study reveals that: CSDP remains adaptive framework for EU; established procedures ensure CSDP is in compromise with all of nations; PESCO initiative signals positive outcomes while reinforcing idea of "EU Strategic autonomy". Furthermore it was indentified that: approved National Security Strategy backs current EU initiatives; PESCO could provide flexible response options without duplicating NATO's efforts; national participation in PESCO initiatives will enable improvements in cyber security and will enable rapid access for possible EU and NATO troops deployments; participation in PESCO negotiation phase reached given political aims to seek more extensive projects and position nation within core members of EU. Conclusions: Lithuanian policies' shift for deeper engagement in CSDP is likely shaped by recognition that strategic trans-Atlantic partnership is not certain anymore, as well as UK role at post-Brexit period as 3rd party.