Suchergebnisse

In their repeated attempts to refute the "China threat" syndrome, Chinese leaders stress, among other things, the 25 percent cut of about one million troops in the size of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), announced in the mid-1980s. The author explores demobilization under Mao Zedong and after his death and problems and implications of demobilization. He points out that ostensibly, China's post-Mao demobilization has been remarkable. Within a few years over one million troops, one quarter of the PLA, have reportedly been transferred to civilian life. China's military strength is compared with those of some other countries. (DÜI-Sen)

Our essay proposes that while the predominant concept of revolution as driven by the mobilization of social, political, and cultural forces has value, at least as important for understanding the revolutions of 1917 was the dramatic demobilization of army, police, state, and society. We suggest that revolutions often see a conflict between affective mobilization (in which some portion of the citizenry becomes much more enthusiastic about particular social and political projects) and structural demobilization (in which the failure of major state institutions and economic enterprises makes positive social and political change nearly impossible). In early 1917, affective mobilization on behalf of the war and the regime was in decline, but structural mobilization was at its peak. The February Revolution brought a sudden radical structural demobilization. This structural demobilization both made it possible for relatively modest numbers of revolutionary forces to succeed in October 1917 and made the emergence of widespread apathy and disillusionment in 1918 much more likely.