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Since the early 1970s, litigation in many U.S. states has led to education finance reform. Over the same period, many states have imposed new tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) on local governments. The imposition of a TEL may alter how local and state education expenditures change subsequent to court‐mandated decreases in spending inequality. Similarly, the effectiveness of TELs in limiting local education expenditures may be influenced by reform. To better evaluate the effects of reform and TELs on education spending, this article considers them jointly and finds that reform has a negative effect on local own‐source education expenditures only in the presence of TELs. In the absence of court‐ordered reform, TELs decrease own‐source expenditure, but the effect is less pronounced than when TELs are present with reform. When both are present, state government spending on education is higher. Also TELs and court‐ordered reform independently increase state government spending on education. (JEL H72, I22)

AbstractWe provide—to the best of our knowledge—the first empirical study on the political economy of public spending on vocational education. Vocational schools raise human capital among non-academics and give the latter a stronger bargaining position in wage negotiation—thereby supporting the clientele of leftwing parties. At the same time, they provide publicly funded inputs that raise firm productivity—an aim particularly important for conservative parties. We analyze expenditures on vocational schools of 301 West-German counties between 2002 and 2013 using two-way fixed effects and mixed models. We find the counties' expenditures on vocational schools to decrease in the political power of Social Democrats and increase in the political power of Christian conservatives in the county council. Expenditures are higher in election years. We find no support for the conjecture building on Jensen (2011, Compar. Polit. Stud. 44, 412–435) according to which expenditures on vocational education are higher in regions suffering from deindustrialization. (JEL codes: H75, D72).

Im Rahmen dieser Studie wurden lange Zeitreihen zu unterschiedlichen Indikatoren des französischen Bildungssystems des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts erhoben. Die Daten teilen sich in zwei Gruppen auf: ein Teil bezieht sich auf den Besuch der Bildungsinstitutionen, der zweite Teil beinhaltet Daten zu den Bildungsausgaben der verschiedenen staatlichen Ebenen.

Die Daten zur Bildungspartizipation beinhalten 228 Zeitreihen zu folgenden Themen:
- staatliche und private Vorschulen, Grundschulen und Gesamtschulen
- Schüler (nach Geschlecht) in den Vorschulen, Grundschulen und Gesamtschulen
- Primärschulen und höhere Schulen in Frankreich und deren Schüler nach Geschlecht
- Gymnasien, Berufsgymnasien und deren Schüler
- Universitäre Ausbildung und einzelne Fakultäten
- Einschulungen bzw. Anmeldungen in Vorschulen, Primär- und Sekundärschulen, höhere Bildung (1815-1987)
- Bevölkerung Frankreichs nach Altersklassen (1815-1987)und (1776-1987)

Die Daten zu den Bildungsausgaben beinhalten in 136 Zeitreihen die Ausgaben in Millionen neuer laufender Francs für die Zeit von 1816 bis 1993.
Die Daten stammen aus rückblickenden Satellitenkonti der Volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrechnung und sind zum einen nach funktioneller Gliederung, untergliedert nach Bildungsebenen, und zum anderen nach wirtschaftlicher Gliederung, dargestellt nach Ausgabenarten, aufgeführt.
Es werden die Ausgaben auf der Staatlichen Ebene insgesamt, auf der Ebene des Staatshaushalts, der Regionen, der Départements, und der Kommunen und Gemeinden sowie für weitere öffentliche Verwaltungen dargestellt.

Many states are under court-order to reduce local disparities in education spending. While a substantial body of literature suggests that these orders and the resulting school finance equalizations have increased the level and progressivity of state education spending, there is little evidence on the broader effects of such measures on the change in total resources available not only for schools, but for other local government programs as well. When states spend more on education, both state and local budget constraints change. We find that while mandated school finance equalizations increase both the level and progressivity of state spending on education, states finance the required increase in education spending in part by reducing their aid to localities for other programs. Local governments, in turn, respond to the increases in state taxation and spending by reducing both their own revenue-raising and their own spending on education and on other programs. Thus, while state education aid does increase total spending on education, it does so at the expense of drawing resources away from spending on programs like public welfare, highways, and hospitals. These findings provide insight into the effectiveness of using earmarked funds to achieve redistribution.