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This volume addresses a variety of issues related to economic crisis in the broadest sense of the term, involving diverse national and international contexts, historical epochs, and a range of problems related to economic life. The chapters in this volume tackle criminologically relevant questions in connection with crime/deviance and/or the control thereof, on the basis of an analysis of any aspect of economic life, in general, and economic crisis, in particular. Thematically diverse within the province of criminology and the sociology of crime, deviance, and social control, the chapters are not restricted in terms of theoretical approach and methodological orientation. In these and all other relevant respects, this book is usefully varied in examining selected dimensions of economic crisis in relation to important questions of crime and crime control. Specific themes discussed include: corporate crime, money laundering, foreclosures, and mortgage fraud. This volume provides timely analyses of the impact of the current economic crisis, innovative perspectives on problems of economy and finance, and criminological insights on often neglected aspects of social life.

The functioning of welfare states and tax systems is fostered by social norms to obey the rules of the system. Morale can change and react to new incentives. In particular, a deep economic crisis with increasing unemployment and reduced prospects for market income may have a norm eroding effect. This study explores the link between economic crisis and morale. Our theoretical reasoning is based on an economic approach to the evolution of norms, according to which norms are influenced by self-interest. A distinction is made between two dimensions of citizens' morale: benefit and tax morale. Our econometric evidence based on data from the World Value Survey suggests that a sharp hike in unemployment reduces the morale standards along both dimensions. The crisis impact on benefit morale is conditional on the existence of generous benefit schemes. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

An influential body of scholarship in political science has investigated the impact of economic crisis on various political outcomes. The vast majority of these studies rely on annual growth rates (AGR) to specify economic crisis. I argue that this canonical approach comes with several logical shortcomings. It leads to misguided impressions of crisis severity; it makes no distinction between rapid expansion years and rapid recovery years; and it disregards the financial dimension of economic crises. I present and discuss three alternative approaches of measuring economic crisis, imported from economics: economic shocks, economic slumps, and measures of financial crises. Examples from the regime instability literature demonstrate that these alternative crisis measurements provide results that are theoretically more nuanced and empirically more robust. On this basis, the article encourages researchers to pay more attention to the way they measure economic crisis in general and to supplement the AGR approach with alternative crisis measures in particular.

2. The dilemma of causality3. More dilemmas; 4. Concluding remarks; Acknowledgments; Notes; References; Chapter 2: "Anti-Blanchard": a comparative technique for macroeconomics; 1. Signals of crisis in the 'core' of contemporary macroeconomics; 2. Rediscovering a comparative approach to economic theory and policy; 3. "Anti-Blanchard": a comparative approach in the sphere of teaching; 4. Further comparisons between alternative paradigms: monetary policy rules; 5. Which paradigm fits better with the data? Some empirical tests; References; PART II: Alternative theories

`For years Jon Woronoff has been telling us that far from having devised some miraculous solution to the problems of capitalism, Japan remains vulnerable to crisis. For years he was either patronised or ignored by purveyors of the myth of the `Japanese miracle'. Now, however, the economic `bubble' has well and truly burst, the `miracle' looks more and more tarnished and Woronoff has the grim satisfaction of being able to say `I told you so.' - John Crump, University of York Even while Japan's supporters and apologists boasted of the 'miracle' economy, it was developing weaknesses and flaws which have undermined it. Growth is slowing, the labour force is aging and youngsters lack the old work ethic. Manufacturing is dwindling while inefficient services, distribution and agriculture fester. There are good companies, but many more mediocre ones, and even the best make slim profits. Meanwhile people are tired of long work hours and little leisure, high prices for virtually everything, inadequate housing, amenities and welfare, and a quality of life that is a poor reward for their sacrifices. This adds up to a crisis for many Japanese companies, individuals and society as a whole. It is a crisis that has been spreading rapidly since the collapse of the 'bubble' of the 1980s. And there is little hope that another 'miracle' can overcome the problems and put the economy back on track. More radical change is needed, the sort of change that is most unlikely to occur in Japan. This predicament is well known to the Japanese. But it is inadequately reflected in books for foreigners. That is why Jon Woronoff has written The Japanese Economic Crisis . Again he reveals the problems and failures, the facts and realities that others still miss but are indispensable if you want to understand the true situation.

Intro -- ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE EUROZONE OVERVIEW, OUTLOOK AND ANALYSES -- ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE EUROZONE OVERVIEW, OUTLOOK AND ANALYSES -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1 THE EUROZONE CRISIS: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS -- Summary -- Issues for Congress -- Introduction -- Economic Problems in the Eurozone -- Major European Policy Responses -- Outlook for the Eurozone: What's Next? -- Issues for Congress -- Impact on the U.S. Economy -- Exposure of the U.S. Financial System -- U.S.-EU Trade and Investment -- U.S. Government Involvement -- The Federal Reserve -- Role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) -- The Eurozone Crisis, the IMF, and Legislation in the 111th and 112th Congress -- Implications for Broader U.S.-European Cooperation -- Supplemental Figures and Charts -- End Notes -- Chapter 2 STATEMENT OF TREASURY SECRETARY TIM GEITHNER. HEARING ON "EUROPE'S SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES FOR THE UNITED STATES AND LESSONS LEARNED" -- The European Policy Response -- Conclusion -- Chapter 3 STATEMENT OF FEDERAL RESERVE CHAIRMAN BEN BERNANKE. HEARING ON "EUROPE'S SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES FOR THE UNITED STATES AND LESSONS LEARNED" -- Developments in Europe and Their Effects on the U.S. Economy -- Actions Taken by the Federal Reserve -- Conclusion -- End Notes -- Chapter 4 STATEMENT OF C. FRED BERGSTEN DIRECTOR, PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS1. HEARING ON "OUTLOOK FOR THE EUROZONE" -- Summary -- The European Intergration Project -- The Political Battle to Save the Euro -- The December 2011 Summit -- The Role of the International Monetary Fund -- Moving toward Fiscal Union -- The Remaining Agenda -- The Implications for the United States and US Policy -- End Notes -- Chapter 5 STATEMENT OF SIMON JOHNSON. HEARING ON "OUTLOOK FOR THE EUROZONE" -- Summary

The article establish the relevance of the approach which focuses on the theory of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. The opening section surveys recent overseas evidence on profit rates and offers a theoretical account of the tendency for profit rates to fall. This provides a background to a tentative examination of Australian evidence and the attention paid to the issue by some mainstream economists. At appropriate points we suggest some political implications arising from the theory.

Nearly two decades after the fall of the Soviet Union, the character of Russia, its principal successor state, remains unresolved. So, too, does the character of Russia's relationship with the West. Though the intense U.S.-Soviet rivalry of the Cold War is over, Russia has not become the consistent partner that many on the outside hoped would emerge after the Cold War's end. The United States and Europe have taken issue with many elements of Russia's domestic trajectory and regional and international posture, including its democratic practices, energy-related activities in Europe, stance on Iran's nuclear program, and actions in the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict. At the same time, many Russians are also disappointed with Western policies and actions, including sympathy for Georgia, U.S. plans for missile defense, and, above all, the enlargement of NATO. This has made for a mix of resentment and assertiveness in Moscow. A principal factor enabling this assertiveness in recent years has been Russia's strong economic growth. Since 2008, though, Russia, like many other countries, has experienced a deep economic crisis. The question is how this crisis might affect Russia's domestic politics and foreign policy and, consequently, whether any change is warranted in U.S. policy toward Moscow.

In the midst of debates on possible causes and solutions to the current unrest in international markets, political and economic decision makers tend to primarily focus on the role of economic and financial measures and oversee the fact that the economic instability is also the result of negative occurrences beyond the economic sphere, i.e. in the area of values and culture. With reference to the findings in the 2010 World Economic Forum report and other relevant publications on the role of culture and values in economic development, the paper seeks to answer the question to what extent the present economic crisis is rooted in the crisis of some fundamental values critical not only to a sound economy but also society and what are the possible ways of dealing with it. ; W dyskusjach na temat możliwych przyczyn i rozwiązań obecnej niepewnej sytuacji gospodarczej na międzynarodowych rynkach, decydenci – zarówno polityczni, jak i ekonomiczni – mają tendencję do koncentrowania się na roli instrumentów gospodarczych i finansowych, pomijając tym samym fakt, że niestabilność ekonomiczna jest również rezultatem negatywnych zjawisk występujących poza sferą gospodarczą, tj. w sferze wartości i kultury. Przyjmując za punkt wyjścia wyniki raportu opublikowanego w 2010 roku przez Światowe Forum Ekonomiczne oraz odnosząc się do innych istotnych publikacji na temat roli kultury i wartości w rozwoju ekonomicznym, artykuł poszukuje odpowiedzi, do jakiego stopnia obecny kryzys ekonomiczny jest również kryzysem fundamentalnych wartości warunkujących istnienie nie tylko silnej gospodarki, ale również i zdrowego społeczeństwa. Artykuł przedstawia również postulaty zmian, które mogłyby uzdrowić sytuację.

The Yugoslav economic system suffers under at least three avoidable systemic and political deficiencies. First, the plants' authority of income distribution leads to an inflationary development of incomes. Secondly, the lacking differentiation between wages and profits leads to unreasonable and demotivating differences between remunerations for same work. A system of profit participation different to basic wages would be necessary. Thirdly, the institutional basis for a reasonable macro economic policy is too weak, or rather, the influence of regional and republic authorities as well as of monopolistic plants is much too strong.

The article examines the weaknesses and inefficiencies of the Soviet centralised planning system, and the means by which Gorbachev and his colleagues sought to reform it. Along with the objective difficulties in the way of 'marketisation' (lack of practical experience and market infrastructure, lack of agreement about the final objective of reform, obstruction by vested interests, ideological pre-conceptions, popular distrust), grave policy errors were committed (unbalanced budget, inflation ary money-creation, loss of control over incomes, reluctance to increase prices). Meanwhile the rise of natioralism, and the de-legitimation of the regime and of the Party, created a power-vacuum, which by 1991 made impossible the implementation of any policy. Disruption of inter-republican and inter-regional supply links, and drastic cuts in imports, are causing serious declines in production. The failed coup accelerated the process of disintegration.