Suchergebnisse

I consider a model in which the winner of a primary election faces a third candidate in a general election immediately thereafter. Prior to the primary election, there is a pre-election poll on how voters would vote in a hypothetical general election between one of the candidates in the primary election and the third candidate. I illustrate that voters have an incentive to misrepresent their voting intentions in the pre-election poll in order to influence voter beliefs about candidate electability in the general election and possibly cause voters to vote differently in the primary election.

"Administering Elections provides a digest of contemporary American election administration using a systems perspective. This provides insight into the interconnected nature of all components of elections administration, and sheds like on the potential consequences of reforms that fail to account for this"--

In December 1992 General elections marked an important step for the people of Kenya in their struggle for democracy. The National Election Monitoring Unit (NEMU) is an umbrella body consisting of four groups charged with inter alia election observance of the 1992 General Elections. It comprises (1) the National Ecumenical Civic Education Programme (NECEP); (2) the International Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA); (3) the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), Kenya Section; and (4) the Professional Committee for Democratic Change (PCDC). NEMU set up a broad observation strategy to cover the long-term run-up to the elections, the conduct of the authorities, the political parties, the Electoral Commission, the media and the actual conduct of the electoral process, from polling to vote counting. (DÜI-Hff)

AbstractTwo decades after the 'third wave of democratization', extensive violence continues to follow elections in sub-Saharan Africa. Whereas national processes connected to pre-election violence have received increased scholarly attention, little is known of local dynamics of violence after elections. This article examines the 2011 Nigerian post-election violence with regard to the ways in which national electoral processes interweave with local social and political disputes. The most affected state, Kaduna State, has a history of violent local relations connected to which group should control politics and the state. It is argued that electoral polarisation aggravated national ethno-religious divisions that corresponded to the dividing line of the conflict in Kaduna. A rapid escalation of violence was facilitated by local social networks nurtured by ethno-religious grievances.

Wahlverhalten und politische Einstellungen.

Themen: Wahlbeteiligung 1992; Wahlverhalten bei der Nationalratswahl
1992; Entscheidung bei der Repräsentantenhauswahl 1990;
Wahlbeteiligungsabsicht; gegenwärtige Wahlentscheidung; Parteien, die
die Interessen des Befragten vertreten; Arbeit für alle;
Demokratiezufriedenheit; Reduzierung der Einkommensdifferenzen;
ökonomische Situation; Privatisierung; Schließung nichtprofitabler
Unternehmen; Eignung von Atheisten für ein öffentliches Amt;
Nationalismus; Chancen vorwärts zu kommen; Abtreibung; Kriminalität;
Präferenz für einen patriotischen Politiker; Einfluss der Kirche;
Einschätzung der Teilung der Tschechoslowakei; Eigentumsrückgabe;
Selbsteinstufung auf einem Links-Rechts-Kontinuum; Hilfe für private
Unternehmen; kompetente Manager; Stärkung des Patriotismus; Schutz der
Meinungsfreiheit; Erhöhung der Renten und Gewinne; Aufrechterhaltung der
politischen Stabilität; Reduzierung der ökonomischen Lasten; Erhöhung
des Ansehens der Religion; Beschleunigung der Privatisierung;
präferierte Tschechisch-Slowakische Beziehungen; Senkung der
Arbeitslosigkeit; Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass Parteien politische Ziele
erreichen; Zigeuner; Beruf; Kirchgangshäufigkeit;
Religionszugehörigkeit; Gewerkschaftsmitgliedschaft; vor 1990 bestandene
Mitgliedschaft in der kommunistischen Partei; Volksgruppenzugehörigkeit.

Zusätzlich verkodet wurden Interviewdatum und Interviewdauer;
Kooperation des Interviewten.

Wahlverhalten und politische Einstellungen.

Themen: Finanzielle Situation des Haushaltes in den letzten und den
kommenden 12 Monaten; Volkswirtschaft in den letzten und den kommenden
12 Monaten; Wahlbeteiligung 1992; Wahlverhalten bei der Nationalratswahl
1992; Entscheidung bei der Repräsentantenhauswahl 1990;
Wahlbeteiligungsabsicht; gegenwärtige Wahlentscheidung; Parteien, die
die Interessen des Befragten vertreten; wichtigste Probleme im Land;
Partei, mit der besten Lösungskompetenz dafür; Arbeit für alle;
Demokratiezufriedenheit; Reduzierung der Einkommensdifferenzen;
ökonomische Situation; Privatisierung; Schließung nichtprofitabler
Unternehmen; Eignung von Atheisten für ein öffentliches Amt;
Nationalismus; Abtreibung; Kriminalität; Präferenz für einen
patriotischen Politiker; Einfluss der Kirche; Beurteilung der Teilung
der Tschechoslowakei als Fehler; Selbsteinstufung auf einem
Links-Rechts-Kontinuum; Zigeuner; Beschäftigung im privaten oder
öffentlichen Sektor; Beruf; Kirchgangshäufigkeit;
Religionszugehörigkeit; Gewerkschaftsmitgliedschaft; vor 1990 bestandene
Mitgliedschaft in der kommunistischen Partei; Volksgruppenzugehörigkeit.

Zusätzlich verkodet wurden Interviewdatum und Interwievdauer;
Kooperation des Interviewten.

Although the Storting election of 11 September 2017 reduced the number of seats backing the incumbent conservative government, it still gave the two governing parties and their supporting centre-right parties a parliamentary majority. Thus, Prime Minister Solberg's premiership will continue after the election. In the previous period, the government could secure a parliamentary majority with either of the two centrist parties; the Liberal Party or the Christian Democrats. After the 2017 election, they will need the support of both parties to secure a majority, unless they can get help from one or more of the centre-left opposition parties. When Solberg formed her government back in 2013, the populist right-wing Progress Party entered government for the first time. Even Progress Party leaders feared that they would lose support from anti-establishment voters. Poor turnout at the 2015 local election did not bode well. However, the Progress Party did far better in the 2017 national elections and lost only 1.1 percentage points and two seats compared with the 2013 election. A major success factor for the Progress Party was the attention given to immigration issues during the election campaign (see below). At the previous election, in 2013, the Green Party won a seat for the first time, increasing the number of parties in parliament from seven to eight. In 2017, the far-left Red Party increased the number of parties from eight to nine. Despite the re-election of the incumbent government, the election signalled a shift to the left, even to the left of the Labour Party.

General elections are held every five years in South Africa. During the 12 to 24 hour period after the close of the voting booths, the expected final results are of huge interest to the electorate and politicians. In the past, the Council for Scientic and Industrial Research (CSIR) has developed an election forecasting model in order to provide the media and political analysts with forecasts of the final results during this period of peak interest. In formulating this model, which forecasts the election results as the results from voting districts (VDs) become available, some assumptions had to be made. In particular, assumptions were made about the clustering of previous voting patterns as well as the order in which VD results are released.This election forecasting model had been used successfully for a number of elections in the past and in these previous elections, with around 5%{10% of the results available, the predictions produced by the model were very close to the final outcome, particularly for the ANC, being the largest party. For the 2014 national election, however, the predictions, with close to 50% of the voting district results known (equivalent to an estimated 40% of the total votes), were still not accurate and varied by more than 1% for both the ANC and the EFF. This paper outlines a post-election analysis to determine the reasons for these discrepancies and how they relate directly to the model assumptions. The aim is to highlight how practical realities can affect the assumptions and consequently their impact on the forecasted results. Reference is made to previous election forecasts and the 2014 post-election analysis is presented.Keywords: Forecasting, elections, assumptions, post-election analysis