Suchergebnisse

Canada, like GB & the US, has kept the same "first-past-the-post electoral system" since the 19th century, while most European democracies have long since switched to proportional representation (PR) or a mixed system. While there is no perfect electoral system, PR systems are challenged far less often than others. It is contended that the benefits of PR in Canada would outweigh any disadvantages: party caucuses would be more balanced; no region would predominate in the government party; regionally representative cabinets would be facilitated; the cabinet system would be totally transformed; & coalitions would become the standard government formula. Further, there is no evidence that PR would lead to poorer economic performance or bad government. J. Stanton

In the early 1990s, popular discontent with polities in Italy, New Zealand and Japan led to the enactment of new electoral systems in all three countries, The results of the reforms have been mixed, as they have dramatically altered politics. In some cases but in others have been a great disappointment to many observers. This essay examines the reforms and the conditions under which they successfully addressed the problems of their parry systems. The cases highlight the limitations of using electoral systems to explain political out-comes that are not direct effects of electoral rules. Adapted from the source document.

In October 1988, Algeria began a process of transition from authoritarianism. Political reforms were introduced, on the surface, to facilitate the process of transition, but in reality to ensure the survival of the incumbent regime. The reform of the electoral system played a significant part in this survival strategy. Between 1989 and 1997, Algeria witnessed the adoption of three distinct electoral systems as the authorities sought ways to give a façade of democratisation while manipulating the rules to suit their purposes. This paper looks at the Algerian transition, asks why the Algerian authorities switched from one system to another, and assesses the impact of the three different electoral systems that the country has experienced.

In the early 1990s, popular discontent with politics in Italy, New Zealand, and Japan led to the enactment of new electoral systems in all three countries. The results of the reforms have been mixed, as they have dramatically altered politics in some cases but in others have been a great disappointment to many observers. This essay examines the reforms and the conditions under which they successfully addressed the problems of their party systems. The cases highlight the limitations of using electoral systems to explain political outcomes that are not direct effects of electoral rules.

The working of the electoral system in Canada is investigated in this paper. The object is to identify the more important factors which go to determine the share of seats in the federal House of Commons won by a political party at a general election. Factors considered are share of vote, distribution of the vote and number of candidates in the field. The responsiveness of share of seats to variations in these factors is estimated by fitting linear equations by least squares to data for the fourteen federal general elections which took place in Canada between 1921 and 1965.

Does the single-member plurality electoral system encourage a party to make sectional appeals? As put, such a question would daunt the most energetic historian of party strategy. But we can address a closely related question: does the single-member plurality system actually reward parties whose support is geographically concentrated and punish parties whose support is dispersed?