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How has wirelessness--being connected to objects and infrastructures without knowing exactly how or where-- become a key form of contemporary experience? Stretching across routers, smart phones, netbooks, cities, towers, Guangzhou workshops, service agreements, toys, and states, wireless technologies have brought with them sensations of change, proximity, movement, and divergence. In Wirelessness, Adrian Mackenzie draws on philosophical techniques from a century ago to make sense of this most contemporary postnetwork condition. The radical empiricism associated with the pragmatist philosopher William James, Mackenzie argues, offers fresh ways for matching the disordered flow of wireless networks, meshes, patches, and connections with felt sensations. For Mackenzie, entanglements with things, gadgets, infrastructures, and services--tendencies, fleeting nuances, and peripheral shades of often barely registered feeling that cannot be easily codified, symbolized, or quantified--mark the experience of wirelessness, and this links directly to James's expanded conception of experience. "Wirelessness" designates a tendency to make network connections in different times and places using these devices and services. Equally, it embodies a sensibility attuned to the proliferation of devices and services that carry information through radio signals. Above all, it means heightened awareness of ongoing change and movement associated with networks, infrastructures, location, and information.The experience of wirelessness spans several strands of media-technological change, and Mackenzie moves from wireless cities through signals, devices, networks, maps, and products, to the global belief in the expansion of wireless worlds.

This Element offers a new account of the philosophical significance of logical empiricism that relies on the past forty years of literature reassessing the project. It argues that while logical empiricism was committed to empiricism and did become tied to the trajectory of analytic philosophy, neither empiricism nor logical analysis per se was the deepest philosophical commitment of logical empiricism. That commitment was, rather, securing the scientific status of philosophy, bringing philosophy into a scientific conception of the world.

Despite the emergence of new forms of feminist empiricism, there continues to be resistance to the idea that feminist political commitment can be integral to hypothesis testing in science when that process adheres strictly to empiricist norms and is grounded in a realist conception of objectivity. I explore the virtues of such feminist empiricism, arguing that the resistance is, in large part, due to the lingering effects of positivism.

This new critical edition is an examination of William James's Essays in Radical Empiricism in light of the scientific naturalism prominent in James's Principles of Psychology (1890) and the subsequent development of Darwinian, functional psychology and functionalism in psychology, the philosophy psychology and the philosophy of mind.

Under the banner of martial empiricism, we advance a distinctive set of theoretical and methodological commitments for the study of war. Previous efforts to wrestle with this most recalcitrant of phenomena have sought to ground research upon primary definitions or foundational ontologies of war. By contrast, we propose to embrace war's incessant becoming, making its creativity, mutability and polyvalence central to our enquiry. Leaving behind the interminable quest for its essence, we embrace war as mystery. We draw on a tradition of radical empiricism to devise a conceptual and contextual mode of enquiry that can follow the processes and operations of war wherever they lead us. Moving beyond the instrumental appropriations of strategic thought and the normative strictures typical of critical approaches, martial empiricism calls for an unbounded investigation into the emergent and generative character of war. Framing the accompanying special issue, we outline three domains around which to orient future research: mobilization, design and encounter. Martial empiricism is no idle exercise in philosophical speculation. It holds the promise of a research agenda apposite to the task of fully contending with the momentous possibilities and dangers of war in our time.

A turning point in philosophy: Carnap-Cassirer-Heidegger / Michael Friedman -- Carnap's "Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language": a retrospective consideration of the relationship between continental and analytic philosophy / Gottfried Gabriel -- Schlick and Husserl on the essence of knowledge / Roberta Lanfredini -- Carnap versus Gödel on syntax and tolerance / S. Awodey and A.W. Carus -- On the Austrian roots of logical empiricism: the case of the first Vienna circle / Thomas Uebel -- On the International encyclopedia, the Neurath-Carnap disputes, and the second world war / George Reisch -- Carl Gustav Hempel: pragmatic empiricist / Gereon Wolters -- The methods of the Tractatus: beyond positivism and metaphysics? / David G. Stern -- Two roads from Kant: Cassirer, Reichenbach and general relativity / T.A Ryckman -- Vienna indeterminism II: from Exner to Frank and von Mises / Michael Stöltzner -- The mind-body problem in the origin of logical empiricism: Herbert Feigl and psychological parallelism / Michael Heidelberger -- Logical positivism and the mind-body problem / Jaegwon Kim -- Kinds of probabilism / Maria Carla Galavotti -- Smooth lines in confirmation theory: Carnap, Hempel and the Moderns / Martin Carrier -- Changing conceptions of rationality: from logical empiricism to postpositivism -- Gürol Irzik -- Reason and perception in defense of a non-linguistic version of empiricism / Paolo Parrini -- Commit it then to the flames ... / Wesley C. Salmon.

This article examines the role of concepts in the so-called 'new' empiricism that is currently emerging from the writings of Gilles Deleuze. It asks what concepts are, and how they might be put to work to present the 'pure difference' of the empirical world. In addressing these questions, a number of parallels and contrasts are drawn between the writings of Deleuze and Max Weber. It is shown that many of Deleuze's key arguments about concepts- in particular, that they are pedagogical, multiple, networked and problem-oriented in basis - are anticipated by Weber's sociological methodology of concept formation. This leads, finally, to a consideration of whether the creation of concepts as a practice belongs primarily within the domain of philosophy (as argued by Deleuze), or if it is a key part of social scientific work more generally.

It is fitting to include an essay defending the application of empirical research to family law and policy in a symposium honoring the scholarly career of Peg Brinig, who is probably the leading empiricist working in family law. While such a defense might seem unnecessary, given the expanding role of behavioral, social, and biological research in shaping the regulation of children and families, prominent scholars recently have raised concerns about the trend toward reliance on empirical science in this field. A part of the criticism is directed at the quality of the science itself and at the lack of sophistication of legal actors, who may be unable to evaluate research adequately or to understand the limits for particular legal purposes of even well-designed and well-executed studies. For example, decisionmakers increasingly use algorithms that critics argue incorporate questionable factors. Also, researchers themselves may have biases that shape outcomes. And one study, or a handful, is a thin reed on which to base any policy. But skeptics also challenge family law's turn to empiricism on more fundamental grounds, arguing that emphasis on empirical knowledge may obscure important value competitions in family law or have undue influence on how different values are prioritized. Ultimately, critics raise the concern that the use of empirical knowledge can reinforce bias and harm marginalized families and communities. This Essay acknowledges these problems but suggests that most concerns can be alleviated by more careful and sophisticated use of science. The application of science to questions of family and juvenile law is a relatively recent phenomenon. Legal actors have already become skillful in the use of this tool, and interdisciplinary teams of legal scholars and researchers have played a key role in the design of research and translation of empirical knowledge to law. This trend holds extraordinary promise as a means to inform regulation in ways that enhance individual and social welfare. The Essay highlights issues on which the introduction of scientific knowledge has resulted in beneficial reforms. First, twenty-first century juvenile justice regulation increasingly has been shaped by developmental science clarifying that teenage offenders differ in important ways from adult counterparts. Second, policies supporting family preservation and healthy child development have gained support from a large body of research on child development as well as programmatic studies. These examples provide lessons for the use of research in this domain. Finally, the Essay probes the foundational critique of empiricism in family law and argues that the threat may be less severe than critics fear. To be sure, values shape family law and policy, and competing values often cannot be prioritized solely (or even largely) on the basis of empirical knowledge. But values often have empirical content, and accuracy in evaluating the stakes of the value contests is important. Moreover, the evidence does not support the concern that answers offered by empirical studies will be given undue weight in values competitions. The likely alternative – reliance on conventional wisdom and assumptions about the world – is usually inferior as a basis of policy and possibly more likely to result in biased calculations harmful to marginalized families.