Suchergebnisse

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Overview -- 2. Equity and Priority -- 3. Equity as Near as May Be -- 4. Equity, Equality, Proportionality -- 5. Cost Sharing -- 6. Progressive Taxation -- 7. Fair Bargains -- 8. Fair Process -- 9. Equity, Envy, and Efficiency -- 10. Conclusion -- Appendix: The Mathematical Theory of Equity -- Bibliographical Notes -- Bibliography -- Index

Enacted in 1972, general revenue sharing added a new dimension to the intergovernmental grant system in the United States of America. Unlike traditional categorical grant programs predicated on an externality or some other efficiency-based rationale, revenue sharing addressed issues of vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances as well as political concerns about the growing influence of the federal bureaucracy in the fiscal affairs of states and localities. Scheduled to terminate at the end of fiscal year 1986, revenue sharing nevertheless remains a viable concept in reckoning the makeup of a well-ordered intergovernmental grant system. It is with an eye toward future deliberations about such a program that this paper is written. The findings from six years of research at the Brookings Institution are drawn upon, and a review is given of the lessons learned about the role of such a program and how the design of any future revenue sharing program might be enhanced, with specific emphasis on greater equity and more effective integration of federal and state roles in addressing the causes and consequences of local-area fiscal disparities.

It is commonly thought that when democratic states act wrongly, they should bear the costs of the harm they cause. However, since states are collective agents, their financial burdens pass on to their individual citizens. This fact raises important questions about the proper distribution of the state's collective responsibility for its unjust policies. This article identifies two opposing models for sharing this collective responsibility in democracies: first, in proportion to citizens' personal association with the unjust policy; second, by giving each citizen an equal share of the costs. Proportional distribution is compatible with the principle of fairness. And yet, both in the literature and in political praxis we find many supporters for the equal sharing of the costs of unjust policies in democracies. How can equal distribution be defended on normative grounds? This article develops a defense that is grounded in citizens' associative obligations. I argue that, at least in some democracies, one of the intrinsic values of the civic bond revolves around the joint formation and execution of worthy political goals. This social good generates the political associative obligation to accept an equal distribution of the costs of unjust policies. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

Fair and equitable benefit-sharing is a diffuse legal phenomenon in international law that remains perplexing with regard to its general nature, extent, content, and implications. The continued proliferation of benefit-sharing clauses in international law can in effect be explained by its intuitive appeal as an optimistic frame. In principle, it serves to recognize, encourage, and reward in innovative ways sustainable human relations with the environment, by focusing on equity issues arising from the most intractable challenges of our time (biodiversity loss, climate change, poverty, global epidemics). Empirical evidence, however, indicates that in practice benefit-sharing rarely achieves its stated fairness and equity objectives, and actually ends up entrenching or worsening inequitable relationships, with little or no benefit for the environment. Instead of focusing on fair and equitable benefit-sharing in specific areas of international law separately, this book assesses the phenomenon both from a general international law perspective and through a comparative analysis across international environmental law, international human rights law, international health law, and the law of the sea. This analysis reveals an opportunity to advance the interpretation and practice of fairness and equity in benefit-sharing through a mutually supportive interpretation of international biodiversity law and international human rights law.

Reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD+) in tropical countries is now a critical piece of any international agreement that aims to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. An important issue refers to the distribution of benefits or, in other words, benefit sharing mechanisms. In this paper, I examine the degree of local participation in benefit-sharing mechanisms in the case of the Juma Sustainable Development Reserve in the State of Amazonas, Brazil, and assess how local participation – or lack of it – affects the outcomes, particularly with regard to equity. The analysis seeks to address the gap between theory and practice by considering the main concerns regarding equitable benefit sharing for REDD+, namely, the types of benefits to be distributed, eligible beneficiaries, the structure of benefits, and mechanisms for distributing them, and by identifying the possible negative and positive effects of benefit-sharing mechanisms. In doing so, my aim is to contribute to the more effective design and implementation of benefit-sharing mechanisms and to expand debate on the topic. The main research question of this paper is: how important is local participation for achieving equity in benefit-sharing mechanisms for REDD+? The results of this analysis indicate that the adaptation and mitigation goals of REDD+ are more likely to be achieved if the development and implementation of benefit-sharing mechanisms involve democratic and interactive processes for local participation, because such processes will lead to greater flexibility in the definition of benefits and distributional mechanisms. I draw the following conclusions: (1) the criteria for equity should be considered when benefits are defined, rather than when they are distributed and (2) given the complex and diverse relationships and issues involved in deforestation, it is important to adopt a multidimensional approach when identifying beneficiaries and benefits and designing benefit-sharing mechanisms.

The objective of this paper is to present different equity rules that can be applied to the initial allocation of greenhouse gas entitlements and to analyse the potential impacts of these rules EU-wide as well as on the level of member states. The methodological framework used in the empirical part of the paper is based on the GEM-E3 model, a multi-country and multi-sectoral computable general equilibrium model for fourteen EU-member states. The major finding of the paper is that being ex ante favoured with respect to the initial allocation of permits might not hold ex post, i.e. when trade of permits and actual emission reductions are carried out. The reason can be found in two effects. First, the interdependence of the EU economies allows smaller economies not to make full use of the advantages they get through the ability-to-pay allocation: The negative impact on the economic perfomance of the big economies leads to a drop of export demand in the smaller economies, which in turn lowers the expected positive impact on welfare in the latter ones. Second, the way of how a surplus of permits in a particular country is used has considerable impacts on consumer welfare. Selling the surplus of permits on the international market and use the receipts to reduce public deficit is one way, but it has no direct impact on demand. Other, more demand stimulating recycling strategies of the surplus (e.g. a lump-sum transfer to households) might be more promising if welfare losses are to be minimzed. Both effects may outweigh the positive effect realized ex ante in some countries due to a more 'fair' initial allocation of permits. The outcome emphasizes the importance of a consideration of full general equilibrium effects across countries.

Reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD+) in tropical countries is now a critical piece of any international agreement that aims to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. An important issue refers to the distribution of benefits or, in other words, benefit sharing mechanisms. In this paper, I examine the degree of local participation in benefit-sharing mechanisms in the case of the Juma Sustainable Development Reserve in the State of Amazonas, Brazil, and assess how local participation – or lack of it – affects the outcomes, particularly with regard to equity. The analysis seeks to address the gap between theory and practice by considering the main concerns regarding equitable benefit sharing for REDD+, namely, the types of benefits to be distributed, eligible beneficiaries, the structure of benefits, and mechanisms for distributing them, and by identifying the possible negative and positive effects of benefit-sharing mechanisms. In doing so, my aim is to contribute to the more effective design and implementation of benefit-sharing mechanisms and to expand debate on the topic. The main research question of this paper is: how important is local participation for achieving equity in benefit-sharing mechanisms for REDD+? The results of this analysis indicate that the adaptation and mitigation goals of REDD+ are more likely to be achieved if the development and implementation of benefit-sharing mechanisms involve democratic and interactive processes for local participation, because such processes will lead to greater flexibility in the definition of benefits and distributional mechanisms. I draw the following conclusions: (1) the criteria for equity should be considered when benefits are defined, rather than when they are distributed and (2) given the complex and diverse relationships and issues involved in deforestation, it is important to adopt a multidimensional approach when identifying beneficiaries and benefits and designing benefit-sharing mechanisms.

The objective of this paper is to present different equity rules that can be applied to the initial allocation of greenhouse gas entitlements and to analyse the potential impacts of these rules EU-wide as well as on the level of member states. The methodological framework used in the empirical part of the paper is based on the GEM-E3 model, a multi-country and multi-sectoral computable general equilibrium model for fourteen EU-member states. The major finding of the paper is that being ex ante favoured with respect to the initial allocation of permits might not hold ex post, i.e. when trade of permits and actual emission reductions are carried out. The reason can be found in two effects. First, the interdependence of the EU economies allows smaller economies not to make full use of the advantages they get through the ability-to-pay allocation: The negative impact on the economic perfomance of the big economies leads to a drop of export demand in the smaller economies, which in turn lowers the expected positive impact on welfare in the latter ones. Second, the way of how a surplus of permits in a particular country is used has considerable impacts on consumer welfare. Selling the surplus of permits on the international market and use the receipts to reduce public deficit is one way, but it has no direct impact on demand. Other, more demand stimulating recycling strategies of the surplus (e.g. a lump-sum transfer to households) might be more promising if welfare losses are to be minimzed. Both effects may outweigh the positive effect realized ex ante in some countries due to a more ?fair? initial allocation of permits. The outcome emphasizes the importance of a consideration of full general equilibrium effects across countries.

Cover -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- List of illustrations -- Figures -- Tables -- Acknowledgments -- List of contributors -- List of abbreviations -- Chapter 1: Centring equity -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Equity and COVID-19 recovery -- 1.3 Elaboration of normative principles for practice -- 1.4 Description of the principles -- 1.5 Overview of the book -- References -- Chapter 2: Weaving ways of knowing into pathways toward equitable futures -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Weaving paths toward equity -- 2.3 Know yourself -- 2.3.1 How can the CCGHR Principles help us with this work of knowing ourselves? -- 2.3.1.1 Partnering authentically -- 2.3.1.2 Practicing humility -- 2.4 Knowing each other -- 2.4.1 How can the CCGHR Principles help us to know each other? -- 2.4.1.1 Embracing inclusion -- 2.4.1.2 Creating shared benefits -- 2.5 Know the world -- 2.5.1 How can the CCGHR Principles help us to know the world? -- 2.5.1.1 Acting on causes of inequities -- 2.5.1.2 Committing to the future -- 2.6 Know the work, continue weaving -- References -- Chapter 3: The Coalition Story -- 3.1 The Pre-Coalition Context -- 3.1.1 The Commission Report -- 3.2 The Bangkok Conference -- 3.3 Early Discussions -- 3.4 Key Components of the Coalition -- 3.4.1 Developing Competencies using "Coalition Style" Processes -- 3.5 Nurturing Leadership -- 3.6 Country Partnerships -- 3.7 The Partnership Assessment Tool (PAT) -- 3.8 The Harmonized Health Impact and Partnerships Metrics to Accelerate Knowledge Sharing and Utilization Initiative -- 3.9 Harmonization Initiative -- 3.10 KT Curriculum -- 3.11 University Advisory Council (UAC) -- 3.12 Advocacy and Policy Influence -- 3.13 Other Relevant Developments -- 3.13.1 Funding Investments in Global Health Research -- 3.14 Links with Like-Minded Organizations.

1. Introduction -- 2. Conferences and Publications -- 3. Knowledge Intensity and Risk sharing -- 4. Information Asymmetry -- 5. Technology Transfer -- 6. Equity Participation -- 7. Cost Sharing -- 8. Warranties and Risk Sharing -- 9. Accident and Health Insurance -- 10. Securitization and Volatility -- 11. Foreign Institutional Investors and Regulatory Diligence -- 12. Financial Crisis and Regulatory Policy -- 13. Estimating the Parameters -- 14. Conclusion.